What legal standing does the US INDC/NDC, and in particular the overall economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%, as such, has under US law and are there ways the government could be held accountable by US citizens and/or legal entities for its implementation ?
You have asked us to examine the legal mechanisms by which US citizens or legal entities could seek to enforce compliance with the Nationally Determined Contributions (the “NDCs”) set by the United States of America (the “US”) pursuant to the Paris Agreement, as ratified on November 4, 2016 (the “Paris Agreement”) should the US President-elect Donald Trump withdraw from the Paris Agreement or otherwise fail to comply with the NDCs set by President Obama on March 25, 2015. We have reviewed the core elements of both the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as ratified on March 21, 1994 (the “UNFCCC”) as well as US case law and statutes relating to the domestic enforceability of international agreements. Part I of this memorandum provides a broad overview of the legal structure governing international agreements, Part II examines the available legal remedies as well the challenges to bringing a lawsuit to enforce provisions of international agreements in US courts and Part III analyzes whether a party could seek legal remedies to enforce the NDCs set by the US pursuant to the Paris Agreement.
1. Background of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC
The following section provides an overview of the legal history and the key provisions of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC was adopted as part of a global effort to combat climate change through the stabilization of “greenhouse gas concentrations [in the atmosphere] at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system.” While the UNFCCC’s objective is to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases and 197 countries, including the US, are parties to the agreement, the UNFCCC does not itself set a binding emission reduction target. Instead, the UNFCCC establishes the basic governance structure for the United Nation’s climate change regime, including by setting forth its overarching objective and principles, the general obligations of the parties to the UNFCCC, and the regime’s governing institutions. While the framework sets no binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and contains no enforcement mechanisms, it outlines how future international treaties (also called “protocols” or “agreements”) may be negotiated to set binding limits on greenhouse gases.
One such agreement adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC, was the Paris Agreement, which was ratified in 2015 and built upon the framework established by the UNFCCC to facilitate an international effort to combat climate change. The primary goal of the Paris Agreement is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. In order to achieve this goal, countries which ratified the Paris Agreement (the “Party” or “Parties”) are required to monitor, verify and report on their greenhouse gas emissions and implementation on the NDC registry.
However, like the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement does not set an emissions target nor does it legally bind countries to meet their self-determined emission targets. Instead, each Party must establish its own emission target or NDC and “communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve” to the NDC registry and update such NDCs every 5 years. While the Paris Agreement does not legally require Parties to meet their self-established emission reduction goals, it does create the binding obligation that each such ratifying country “pursue domestic mitigation measures” with the aim of achieving the objectives (i.e. emission targets) they set for themselves. Further, the Paris Agreement requires that the Parties act in good faith and use best efforts to employ domestic mitigating measures to reduce their greenhouse gas emission based on their nationally determined contribution.
Presently, pursuant to the Paris Agreement, the US’s emissions target (or NDC) is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26% to 28% by 2025, as compared to 2005 levels. In order to achieve this goal, the US has advanced domestic mitigating efforts under the Clean Air Act, the Energy Policy Act and the Energy Independence and Security Act. These mitigation efforts include the US’s adoption of the Clean Power Plan in 2015, proposed fuel economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles, the development of standards to address methane emissions from landfills and the oil and gas sector, the reduction of the use and emissions of high-GWP HFCs  and the reduction of buildings sector emissions.
2. Legal Nature of the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement and NDCs
From a US legal perspective, both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreements are international agreements entered into by the President through executive action. However, the US became a party to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement through different legal mechanisms, which impact the enforceability of those respective agreements under US law. Under US constitutional law, the President may utilize different tools for entering into international agreements, ranging on the scale of the degree of legislative approval with which they are signed. The President may enter into international agreements through an Article II treaty confirmed by at least two-thirds of the Senate,  congressional-executive agreements,  treaty-executive agreement or sole executive agreements or executive orders. Although the President has the power to enter into international agreements on behalf of the US, the agreements do not necessarily become binding US law as discussed below.
The UNFCCC was ratified by President Bush upon the advice and consent of the Senate as an Article II, Section II treaty. It is important to note, however, that the US likely implemented the UNFCCC as a non-self-executing treaty. A self-executing treaty is a treaty that becomes judicially enforceable upon ratification, whereas a non-self-executing treaty only becomes judicially enforceable through implementing legislation. A treaty is found to be non-self-executing where: “(1) the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation; (2) the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, require implementing legislation; or (3) implementing legislation is constitutionally required.” During the ratification process for the UNFCCC, neither the Senate nor the Executive appeared to view the UNFCCC as an agreement that provided a legal basis for new regulations restricting greenhouse gas emissions. Further, during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on UNFCCC ratification, the George H.W. Bush Administration stated that Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC did “not require any new implementing legislation nor added regulatory programs” and that a UNFCCC amendment to adopt targets or timelines for emission reductions would need further advice and consent from the Senate. Accordingly, the UNFCCC is not considered to be a self-executing treaty.  Therefore, the UNFCCC is unlikely to bind the US to the terms of the agreement unless the US Congress passes legislation to that effect.
Unlike the UNFCCC, which was ratified as a treaty with the consent of the Senate, President Obama entered into the Paris Agreement through an executive agreement. The President has the ability to enter into international agreements without Senate approval through the use of executive agreements as long as there is legal support for such an agreement through pre-existing congressional legislation, Article II treaties or the President’s own constitutional powers. When entering into the Paris Agreement, President Obama relied on the Clean Air Act (congressional legislation) and the UNFCCC (an international treaty) for legal support.
Like a non-self-executing treaty, a sole executive agreement is internationally enforceable but needs subsequent legislation to give its provisions legal effect domestically. Without Congress’s approval, these agreements “do not have the effect of modifying participants’ existing legal obligations under domestic statutes and international legal agreements.” Presently, the US has relied on existing legislation such as the Clean Air Act, the Energy Policy Act and the Energy Independence and Security Act to carry out its commitments to reduce U.S. emissions to meet its 2025 NDC goals. However, the Paris Agreement and thereby the NDCs adopted under it are sole executive agreements and therefore, in and of themselves, are non-binding under US law.
3. The Justiciability of NDCs
Although the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC may not be automatically enforceable in the US, by ratifying the Paris Agreement, the US established its intent to achieve the objectives identified in its NDCs. Accordingly, this raises the question of whether US citizens or entities could seek to compel the US government to comply with the emission targets it set for itself in the Paris Agreement.
Private Party Legal Action
Standing and Cause of Action
In order for a private party, such as an individual or entity, to bring a federal lawsuit in order to seek injunctive relief to enforce NDCs, the party would need to have standing. The Supreme Court (the “Court”) has identified three core elements of standing. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an “injury in fact.” Second, that injury must be “fairly … trace[able]” to the government action that the plaintiff is challenging.” Third, the plaintiff must show the likelihood that the relief being sought will redress that injury. In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that a particular government action or law has caused harm. Accordingly, if the “law at issue has not caused the plaintiffs harm, then its invalidation will not bring the plaintiff relief.”
In addition to standing, the party must have a private cause of action, meaning that his or her legal rights must have been violated and there is a constitutional or statutory right to “redress the violation by bringing an affirmative action in federal court.” The cause of action may be derived from either an express or implied right that is created through the federal Constitution, statutes or regulations, in certain instances. However, not all federal statutes create causes of actions. In order for a statute to create a cause of action, it must create a legally binding obligation upon the government or another party.
Therefore, it is important to examine whether the Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement, which states that developed nations should undertake “economy-side absolute emission targets,” creates an enforceable obligation that could sustain a legal cause of action. The use of the word should rather than shall implies that the agreement, itself, does not bind the Parties to their proposed emission targets but instead creates a policy that encourages Parties to meet their emission targets. As explained by the Court in Halderman, a policy that merely encourages rather than mandates action does not create an enforceable right and cause of action.
Furthermore, as discussed above, only self-executing treaties are automatically enforceable in the US, while new legislation needs to be enacted in order to enforce the obligations of non-self-executing international agreements. While such non-self-executing agreements comprise international commitments “they are not domestic law unless Congress has…enacted implementing statutes.” Although the US did submit emission targets in the NDC registry, it stated that it would pursue those emissions through existing legislation such as the Clean Air Act. Since the Paris Agreement was not adopted by the US as a self-executing agreement and since the US has only complied with the Paris Agreement using existing legislation, the provisions of the agreement, including the NDC obligations, will likely not be enforceable in a US court.
Customary International Law & the Alien Tort Statute
Although it is unlikely that individuals or entities could bring a lawsuit to enforce non-self-executing international agreements, such a private party could potentially bring a lawsuit under the theory of customary international law. Customary international law is defined as resulting from “a general and consistent practice of States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation” meaning that all, or nearly all, States consistently follow the practice in question because they believe they are legally bound by the international custom. A private plaintiff could bring a lawsuit alleging a violation of customary international law pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute (the “ATS”), which establishes federal court jurisdiction over tort claims brought by aliens, or foreign parties, for violations of either a treaty of the United States or “the law of nations.”
In applying the ATS to an environmental violation, the plaintiff must show that he or she was “injured by the defendant’s actions, not the environment.” Next, the plaintiff must show that the alleged harm was a violation of “the law of nations.” In Filartiga v. Peha-Irala, the Court held that the “law of nations” should be defined by looking to the “works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.” Following Filartiga, the Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain held that a plaintiff could bring an ATS claim based on present-day international customary law as long as such international customary law “rest[ed] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms”  that existed at the time the ATS was enacted (e.g., a violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors or piracy).
While the Court has not defined what constitutes customary international environmental law, the case law suggests that a plaintiff asserting an ATS claim should allege a particularized right that is comparable to a right that was recognized as internal customary law in the 18th century. However, Courts have specifically rejected environmental ATS claims based on the theory that there is a fundamental international human “right to health,” right to “sustainable development,”  or right to live in a clean and healthy environment. The courts held that these assertions were too broad as there are no real limits or boundaries to the rights. The courts have also rejected arguments that certain environmental rights established by treaties are customary international law. For example, in Flores I, the plaintiffs argued that a “right to life,” right to health,” and the right to “sustainable development” was recognized as customary international law in several international agreements including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The district court held that “the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that these three rights were universally recognized because the Rio Declaration also recognized that nations have a sovereign right to exploit their resources and the Restatement (Third) generally recognized that each sovereign nation was responsible for controlling pollution within its borders.” Furthermore, courts have rejected environmental rights which referred “to a general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernible standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts.”
Accordingly, US courts tend to oppose broad assertions of customary international rights, particularly in the environmental context. While the ATS could in theory provide an avenue for parties to bring a lawsuit to enforce an international law in the US if they can allege that there was a violation that fell within the scope of the “law of nations” as defined by the ATS, in practice there has been no successful ATS claim alleging a violation of international environmental law. Furthermore, the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement were signed and ratified by nearly 197 and 122 nations, respectively. A plaintiff could argue that such widespread ratification implies an acceptance of the provisions of the agreements by the international community. A plaintiff would also need to link the obligations of the Paris Agreement to a universally recognized norm from the 18th century. It is unclear that a plaintiff would be able to make such a showing. On the other hand, the Court has held that foreign or international legal sources may be used as persuasive evidence that an obligation has become a customary international rule.
As such, while the ATS provides a procedural avenue for a foreign plaintiff to seek legal relief for violations of the Paris Agreement, he or she would likely face challenges in meeting the “law of nations” requirement of the statute. Finally, it may be helpful to examine whether a plaintiff could potentially bring a lawsuit against the US in an international tribunal for failure to comply with the terms of the Paris Agreement and UNFCCC in good faith. However, this potential avenue of legal relief is outside the scope of this memo which focuses on available US legal remedies rather than international legal remedies to enforce compliance with the NDC obligations of the Paris Agreement.
Congressional Legal Action
Generally, Congress or an individual congressman can bring a suit in very limited circumstances. To date, the Court has not definitively ruled on whether Congress has standing to bring a suit against the executive for “non-defense or non-enforcement of federal law” or international agreement, as in this matter. Accordingly, it is not clear that Congress could successfully bring a suit to enforce the executive to comply with the NDCs. The closest the Court has come to making such a pronouncement was in the case of INS v. Chadha. In INS v. Chadha, Chadha challenged the constitutionality of a one-house veto to override executive action. While the Court held that Congress was “a proper party to defend the constitutionality” of the one-house legislative veto, the Court only allowed the House and the Senate to join the litigation as amici curiae rather than as formal parties. Further, the issue in Chadha rested on the Congress’ structural role to unilaterally use its veto power. Scholars have argued that the Court did not directly opine on the ability of Congress to sue the executive. Rather, the holding should be narrowly interpreted to potentially allow Congress standing to defend its structural role but not to defend a particular statute.
The Court further sidestepped an opportunity to confirm whether Congress has standing to bring lawsuits against the executive for failure to defend or enforce federal law in United States v. Windsor. Initially, Windsor, a private party brought a lawsuit against the US to challenge the constitutionality of the provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which defined marriage as between a woman and a man. While the lawsuit was pending, the executive branch, through the Department of Justice, announced it would no longer defend that particular provision of DOMA. Subsequently, the House of Representatives sought to enter the suit to argue that the provision was constitutional and to enjoin the executive to enforce the provision. Rather than determining whether the House of Representatives had standing to be a party in the lawsuit, the Court found that it “need not decide” the issue, because the United States government was a proper defendant and adversary in the lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court did not provide further clarity on congressional standing in Windsor.
Furthermore, an individual congressman can bring a lawsuit in very limited circumstances. In Coleman v. Miller, the Court held that individual legislators can bring suit against the executive when a legislator’s vote would be completely nullified through an executive action. In Coleman, the Kansas Senate was deadlocked on an amendment, and the Lieutenant Governor cast a tie-breaking vote for ratification. The Senators subsequently filed suit against the executive’s actions. The Court held that the senators who opposed the ratification of the amendment had standing in the case because the Lieutenant Governor’s actions “prevented what would have otherwise been the effect of their votes.” In that sense, the senators had a “plain, direct[,] and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. However, in a subsequent case, the Court rejected a lawsuit by members of Congress challenging the Line Item Veto Act. The Court held that a group of legislators could sue only on the ground of a “vote nullification” rather than the “dilution of institutional legislative power.” In this instance, the legislative power was not nullified but instead diluted by a line item veto. If Trump were to withdraw from the UNFCCC, legislators could try to argue that such a withdrawal would nullify their previous vote to enter into the UNFCCC treaty in 1992. However, the Court may find that the Congressional power was merely diluted and not nullified since Congress could still pass legislation relating to greenhouse gas emissions without the existence of the treaty, particularly since the US has only relied on legislation enacted prior to the adoption of the UNFCCC to comply with the treaty.
Accordingly, Congress would likely face challenges in bringing suit against the executive for non-compliance with the NDCs set per the Paris Agreement. In addition to the Court’s unwillingness to opine on the justiciability of lawsuits by Congress against the executive, any lawsuit that Congress would bring will be for the enforcement of the NDCs, which are commitments under international law and not domestic, federal law.
As discussed above, a party would face challenges in bring a lawsuit against the US executive for failure to comply or enforce the NDC objectives outlined in the Paris Agreement. As neither the Paris Agreement nor the UNFCCC were ratified by the US as self-executing treaties, the commitments set forth in the agreements are not binding on the US domestically in the absence of implementing legislation. Rather, the US government has relied on regulations provided in existing federal law, such as the Clean Air Act, to pursue their NDC objectives. Since Congress has not otherwise passed implementing legislation, a US plaintiff would likely face legal challenges in bringing such a lawsuit for failure to show standing or a cause of action. A foreign plaintiff may potentially bring a lawsuit against the executive for a violation of international customary law through the ATS. As explained above, however, the foreign plaintiff would need to show that he or she was harmed by the executive’s action or inaction and that the US’s NDC objectives under the Paris Agreement are internationally recognized norms that meet the “law of nations” prong of the ATS.
 UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php.
 Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement, Center for Climate & Energy Solutions, May 2015, https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdf.
 UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.
 UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.
 Paris Agreement, U.N., Dec. 12, 2015, Article 7, Section 9.
 Paris Agreement, Article 4, Section 2.
 Climate & Development Knowledge Network, Is the Paris Agreement Legally Binding?, CDKN, Dec. 16, 2015, http://cdkn.org/2015/12/feature-is-the-paris-agreement-legally-binding/?loclang=en_gb.
 UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.
 US NDC, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
 US NDC Registry, http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_registry/items/9433.php.
 Greenhouse gases with high global warming potential (high-GWP gases) are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). See Emissions of Greenhouse Gasses in the U.S. (March 31, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/ghg_report/ghg_gwp.cfm.
 Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015).
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
 Hannah Chang, International Executive Agreements on Climate Change, 35 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 337, at 2-3, (2010); Nigel Purvis, Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership: The Case for
Executive Agreements and Climate Protection Authority, at 16-17, (Resources for the Future, 2008).
 Purvis, supra note 15, at 20.
 Alaine Ginocchio & Kevin Doran, The Boundaries of Executive Authority: Using Executive Orders to Implement Federal Climate Change Policy 5 (University of Colorado Law School Center for Energy & Environmental Security, 2008).
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Congress.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/102nd-congress/38/resolution-text.
 Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, (2015), at 12 (hereinafter “International Law and Agreements”). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Twenty‐First Century International Lawmaking, 101 Geo. L.J. 725, 72-7287 (2013).
 See generally Letter of Submittal to the President (Aug. 28, 1992), S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-28.
 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), at 93.
 Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate (2001), at 7.
 Letter from the Comm. on Env’t and Public Works to John Kerry, Secretary of State (Nov. 3, 2016), available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/244c9583-e2ec-47cf-a329-28c7c9f64fe3/letter-to-unfccc-re-paris-agreement-final.pdf.
 David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power?, LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2016) https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climate-change-legitimate-exercise-executive-agreement-power.
 Hannah Chang, International Executive Agreements on Climate Change 2-3, (Columbia Law School Center for Climate Law, 2009), at 5.
 Jane Legget, Cong. Research Serv., R44288, International Climate Change Negotiations: What to Expect in Paris, December 2015 (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44288.pdf.
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41 (1976).
 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 128-29 (1983).
 See Stern at 8. See also Simon, 426 U.S. at 41 (requiring plaintiffs to “allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action” to properly establish standing ).
 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40 n.18 (1979) (citations omitted).
 Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys, Chapter 5: Causes of Action, available at http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/chapter5.
 Id. at 1a.; For example, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Court found that Section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, which states that “mentally retarded persons ‘have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation’ in ‘the setting that is least restrictive of . . . personal liberty’” did not create an enforceable right. The court found that the provision was not legally binding and the plaintiff could not allege a cause of action since the language of the provision intended “to encourage, rather than mandate, the provision of better services to the developmentally disabled.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451, US 1, 20 (1981).
 John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal, Guardian, Dec. 16, 2015 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal.
 Pennhurst, at 1.
 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
 NDC Registry, http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_registry/items/9433.php.
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, §102(2).
 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
 Kathleen Jawger, Environmental Claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 Berkeley J. of Int’l Law 519, 521 (2010)
 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
 Garcia at 21.
 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
 Flores v. Southern Peru Cooper Corp, 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
 Bradford Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use Multinational Environmental Treaties as Customary International Law to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statue, 2007 University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications 1086, 1146
 Flores at 519-20.
 Mank at 1108; Flores at 520-22.
 Beanal I, 197 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1999).
 Kathleen Jawger, Environmental Claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 Berkeley J. of Int’l Law 519, 526 (2010).
 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006).
 Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2015).
 INS v Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
 Id. at 939.
 Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
 Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, at 22.
 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
 See id. at 2688.
 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1939).
 Stern, at 25.
 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433.
 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823-26 (1997).
 Raines, 521 U.S. at 826.