



SUMMARY OF COP27 OUTCOMES

A guide to the main decisions
taken in Sharm el-Sheikh





Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action (LACLIMA) is a network of legal experts dedicated to the development and dissemination of climate change law in Latin America. Based in Brazil and with more than 800 members, it aims to promote legal knowledge, capacity building and support the development of legal frameworks and solutions that can enable a pathway for decarbonization and climate resilience consistent with the implementation of the Paris Agreement, while consolidating a critical mass of climate change lawyers from the Global South.



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INTRODUCTION

On 6 – 20 November 2022, the annual climate conference under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt. It was originally scheduled to finish on 18 November but ran into overtime as parties struggled to find consensus on key issues.

The conference formally comprised:

- The 27th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 27) from 6 November to 20 November 2022;
- The 17th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 17) from 6 November to 20 November 2022;
- The 4th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 4) from 6 November to 20 November 2022;
- The 57th session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 57) from 6 November to 12 November 2022; and
- The 57th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 57) from 6 November to 12 November 2022.

The following summary does not aim to provide a full and comprehensive report of the negotiations and decisions taken in Egypt but to highlight key outcomes of the official intergovernmental process mainly. As a result, only outcomes under the COP and CMA are summarised (and CMP decisions are largely disregarded). For the time being, the text of all decisions can be found [here](#)¹.

To help the reader and provide a general overview, it groups together discussions around thematic areas and does not follow the official meeting agendas of the various bodies.

For more detailed explanations of the relevant COP, CMP and CMA decisions, please refer to LRI's *Paris Agreement A to Z* app² – the next update to incorporate COP27 outcomes is planned for June 2023.

1. This summary is partially based on the summary report of the conference published by IISD/Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

2. Available at: <https://apps.apple.com/gb/app/paris-agreement-a-to-z/id1560932012> and <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lri.parisagreement&gl=GB>

#01 COVER DECISIONS

SHARM EL-SHEIKH IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

At its final plenary, each governing body – the COP, the CMA and the CMP – adopts a package of decisions. This package usually starts with a so-called “cover” decision. The cover decision can contain political messages that are not necessarily associated with a specific issue on the agenda – such as addressing the ambition gap – , and topics that are not addressed elsewhere and, increasingly, captures the progress made in the negotiations and various parallel events.

Parties have at times launched new work programmes, dialogues, and processes in it. The language used in the cover decision is mostly aspirational, setting out parties’ new intentions rather than mandating specific action. Cover decisions have gained prominence and expanded significantly in recent conferences; they are as a result more structured and divided into sections and topics. Our summary of the [cover decision of CMA 4](#), below, highlights some of the main themes.

Mitigation

Section IV urges parties that have not yet revised and strengthened their 2030 NDCs - to align them with the Paris Agreement - to do so by the end of 2023; and parties that have not yet communicated their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies to do so by CMA 5. These strategies are also further specified as being “towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century”.

On fossil fuels, despite strong calls to go further than what was agreed in Glasgow, by including all fossil fuels rather than just coal, the decision adopts a similar language to the one in the Glasgow Pact, calling on parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies; the adoption of policies to transition towards low-emission energy systems; and efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

Science and urgency

Using identical language to that used in the Glasgow cover decision (often referred to as the “Glasgow Pact”), the CMA reiterates that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at a temperature increase of 1.5°C compared with 2°C and resolves to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. While the decision thus fails to advance ambition on the temperature goal, it mentions tipping points for the first time. Overall, this section is also weaker than the Glasgow Pact on urgency, ambition, and implementation³.

3. Under para.3 of Decision 1/CMA.3, the CMA expresses alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused around 1.1°C of warming to date, that impacts are already being felt in every region, and that carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted; under para.5, the CMA stresses the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address the gaps in the implementation of the Paris Agreement goals.

Energy

A highly debated section, the final text promotes a “clean energy mix”, which includes low-emission and renewable energy, rather than promoting the use of renewable energy exclusively.

Adaptation

Section V reiterates in very general terms the call for developed countries to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation.

The centrality of the role of the Adaptation Fund in the climate finance architecture is acknowledged in the decision, which also welcomes the new pledges made at COP28 and urges all contributors to fulfil theirs. The decision also highlights the role of the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund in supporting actions by developing countries to address climate change, welcomes the pledges made to the two Funds and invites developed countries to further contribute to the two Funds.

The Glasgow Pact had called on developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation from 2019 levels by 2025. The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan requests the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare a report on such doubling of adaptation finance for consideration by the CMA 5⁴.

For the first time, the importance of protecting rivers is acknowledged in a cover decision.

Loss and Damage

Section VI includes a reference to the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability and Mitigation. Parties note “with grave concern” the growing gravity, scope and frequency of loss and damage in all regions, resulting in devastating economic and non-economic losses. Deep concern is expressed at the associated significant financial costs for developing countries. The text also welcomes that, “for the first time”, matters relating to funding arrangements responding to loss and damage, including a focus on addressing loss and damage, are considered and related decisions adopted.

A separate section entitled “early warning and systematic observation” (section VII) recognizes that one third of the world does not have access to early warning and climate information services. The UN Secretary-General’s call for universal protection through early warning systems within the next five years (the Early Warnings for All initiative) is reiterated, and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, among others, are invited to support its implementation.

4. A lack of balance between mitigation and adaptation finance has been acknowledged in the negotiations for some time. Recent analysis from the [UNEP](#) warns that the amount of adaptation finance flowing to developing countries is currently 5 to 10 times lower than what is needed, while estimated annual adaptation costs are expected to reach USD 160-340bn by 2030 and USD 315-565bn by 2050.

Just Transition

Section VIII emphasizes that just and equitable transition involves pathways that include energy, socio-economic, workforce and other dimensions, which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection to reduce its potential impacts.

Parties decide to establish a Just Transition Work Programme that will present recommendations at CMA 5 to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement under a just and equitable transition, and to convene annual high level ministerial roundtables on just transition, the first one to take place at COP28.

Finance

In section IX, parties emphasize the importance of finance to promote energy transition and that a global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investment of at least USD 4–6 trillion per year, according to IEA reports. To deliver such funding, a transformation of the financial system will be required. To that end, the decision also calls on multilateral banks and financial institutions to reform their practices and priorities, scale up funding, simplify access, and create innovative ways to promote climate finance.

The CMA also emphasizes the importance of public finance, including specifically for mitigation and adaptation for vulnerable regions, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, which would be cost-effective and have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy.

The decision highlights findings from the [Standing Committee on Finance report](#) which estimates developing countries' financial needs to fulfil their NDCs is currently at USD 5.8–5.9 trillion for the pre-2030 period, and expresses serious concern that the goal of developed countries to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 has not yet been met and thus urges developed countries to meet the goal.

It further notes that global climate finance flows are small relative to the overall needs of developing countries. Such flows in 2019–2020 were estimated to be only 31 per cent of the annual investment needed to keep the global temperature rise well below 2°C or at 1.5°C.

Finally, the CMA launches the “Sharm El-Sheikh dialogue” to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 (the goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development; and finance, respectively). Two workshops will be held in 2023 and a report on the deliberations will be prepared by the Secretariat.

Capacity building

In section XI, parties note that capacity gaps and needs still exist in developing countries and call on developed countries to increase support for long-term country-driven capacity-building interventions.

Taking stock

The decision welcomes the invitation of the UN Secretary-General to convene a climate ambition summit in 2023 ahead of the conclusion of the first global stocktake at COP 28 and CMA 5.

Oceans

The key role of oceans is acknowledged with the CMA encouraging parties to also consider ocean-based action in their NDCs, long-term strategies, adaptation communications and other climate-related goals.

Forests

The CMA recalls Article 5.2 of the Paris Agreement, whereby parties are encouraged to take action to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, including through results-based payment. The decision then encourages parties to consider nature-based solutions or ecosystem-based approaches in their mitigation and adaptation actions, pursuant to the [UN Environment Assembly Resolution 5/5](#).

Action by non-party stakeholders

Section XVII recognises the contribution of stakeholders that are not parties, for example, the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities, cities and civil society, youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change.

To raise climate ambition and achieve climate goals, parties are encouraged to increase the full, meaningful and equal participation of women in climate action and to ensure gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation, including by fully implementing the Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan. Parties (without specifying which ones) are invited to provide support to developing countries for undertaking gender-related action and implementing the gender action plan.

Finally, parties welcome recommendations to enhance transparency and accountability of the Net-Zero pledges of businesses, investors, cities and regions; and progress in achieving them⁵.

Other relevant references

The introductory part of the cover decision (called ‘preamble’) contains a reference to the need for parties to consider the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment when acting on climate change, a right that has recently been recognized by a UN General Assembly resolution. Another noteworthy new reference is the recognition of the importance of “climate justice”, when taking action to address climate change.

Other references to human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the rights of other specific vulnerable groups

are the same as those already found in the preamble of the Paris Agreement. Although these are important references, their direct impact is limited given that they do not set out specific measures to address human rights and given their placing in the preamble.

Finally, the preamble mentions the current “geopolitical situation” (i.e., the war in Ukraine) and the recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, stating that, although increasingly complex and challenging, with impacts on the energy, food and economic situations, these circumstances should not be used as a pretext for backtracking, backsliding or de-prioritizing climate action.

5 Recommendations by the High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, launched by the UN Secretary-General in March 2022.

#02 MITIGATION AMBITION

In Glasgow in 2021, parties decided to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation (“MWP”) in “this critical decade”. This was a recognition that, without full implementation of NDCs already submitted and strengthening climate ambition, the 1.5°C warming limit would become out of reach. Parties also requested the SBs to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption at CMA 4. The need to raise ambition was for the first time formally put on the agenda.

Progress in Sharm El-Sheikh was slow due to divergences on such issues as guiding principles, scope and timeline for the process. Some developing countries, the large emerging economies in particular, were concerned with suggestions by developed countries that they should bear a greater burden of emission reductions, seeing these as an attempt to re-write the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Related to this, they objected to an attempt to identify new categories of countries by introducing new language such as “major emitters”.

Some of these developing countries were keen to backslide on the long-term temperature goal language achieved at CMA3, by just referring to Article 2.1a of the Paris Agreement rather than specifically to 1.5°C, a temperature goal increase that reflects the most up-to-date science.

The outcome finally reached was a [decision](#) that reaffirms the nationally determined nature of NDCs and the PA’s temperature goal and:

- To avoid any overlap between the MWP and the NDC process, confirms that the objective of the MWP is to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade but adds that this should

be done in a manner that complements the Global Stocktake;

- Decides that the MWP will be operationalized through focused exchanges of views, information, and ideas, and that its outcomes won’t be prescriptive or punitive, but facilitative and respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances; and will not result in new targets or goals;

- Does not single out any specific sectors, but include all sectors covered in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories as well as thematic areas in the contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC;

- Confirms that the MWP will start to be implemented immediately after COP28 and will be reviewed in 2026 and may be continued upon adoption of a new decision at that session. The programme should function in a way that is consistent with the procedures and timelines for communication of successive NDCs;

- Decides that the MWP will hold at least two global dialogues each year, which should be conducted in a hybrid format, before the regular sessions of the subsidiary bodies. Other dialogues may be held each year in conjunction with existing events, including investment-focused events to unlock finance;

- Parties, observers, and other non-Party stakeholders are invited to present submissions by 1 February 2023 and in every subsequent year, suggesting topics in line with the scope of the MWP. Four weeks before each dialogue, they can also submit their views on opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges, and barriers relevant to the topics of the next dialogue;

- Outputs will include a report on each of the dialogues, to be prepared by the Secretariat, as well as an annual report comprising

a compilation of the individual dialogue reports for consideration by the CMA. The co-chairs will make a presentation on the annual report on pre-2030 ambition from 2023 onwards at the annual high-level ministerial round table, and the SBSTA will take this report into account to analyze progress

and recommend a draft decision to the CMA at each of its sessions. These connections to annual CMA decisions and the high-level ministerial open the door to formal legal outcomes even though countries could not agree on concrete targets as a direct outcome of the MWP.

#03 COOPERATIVE APPROACHES (ARTICLE 6)

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows parties to cooperate using voluntary market-based and non-market-based approaches in order to implement their NDCs. Paragraphs 2 – 7 of this Article outline two different market-based approaches: the first one involves the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) between two or more parties (Art. 6.2 PA); the second one envisages the creation of a central mechanism, governed by a Supervisory Body (Art. 6.4 PA). This mechanism will enable generation of emissions reductions units, pursuant to methodologies approved by the Supervisory Body. Paragraph 8 of the Article provides for a framework of non-market approaches.

In Glasgow in 2021, the ground rules for the implementation of such market and non-market-based approaches were agreed. In Egypt, parties continued the detailed work for these approaches to become operational. A capacity building programme for parties to participate in Article 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 will be organized by the Secretariat as soon as possible.

3.1 Cooperative Approaches referred to in Article 6.2

The agenda under Article 6.2 included mainly the elaboration of processes for

reporting and reviewing information, and the infrastructure for such information to be recorded and for the tracking of ITMOs.

In Glasgow, parties agreed that those participating in Article 6.2 cooperative approaches will submit an “Initial Report”, a “Regular Report”, and an “Annual Report” - called the “Agreed Electronic Format” (AEF). In Egypt, outlines of the Initial Report and part of the Regular Report, as well as a draft outline for the AEF, were adopted in [Annexes V, VI and VII](#) to the decision. The AEF will contain information about ITMO transactions almost “in real time” and be incorporated into the Article 6 Database, which records transfers of ITMOs. The reports will be subject to review by technical experts. Guidance for the review, including scope and timing as well as outlines for the review’s reports is included in [Annexes II and III](#).

Regarding the use of registries to record information and track ITMOs, the Glasgow decision established that parties may use their own national registry or any other private registry, and those parties that do not have access to any such registries may use an international registry administered by the Secretariat. [In Egypt, parties agreed](#) to establish basic rules for the interoperability of such national/private registries. The UNFCCC Secretariat will provide

oversight to ensure that the transactions are consistent with Article 6 rules.

The remainder of the infrastructure to record and track ITMOs, mainly the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform (CARP) and the Article 6 Database, is still under development, with a view to having a provisional solution by January 2023 and a test version of both available by June 2024.

Parties agreed that confidential information pertaining to ITMOs can be identified as such but a justification must be provided. More detailed rules regarding confidentiality will be discussed and elaborated over the course of 2023.

The Secretariat is tasked to organise a capacity building training and design capacity building manuals, which will help parties in implementing the participation requirements under article 6.

There was no time to cover all agenda items, and pending topics were deferred to future sessions, including: a) special circumstances of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which will be addressed at CMA 5; and (b) the question of whether “emissions avoidance” will be considered under Article 6.2, which was deferred to the CMA 6.

Next steps in 2023

The topics to be further elaborated in 2023 include:

- Consideration of the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS;

- On Reporting:

- ▷ The Agreed Electronic Format template will be tested and further developed, for a final approved version to be deliberated at COP 28;
- ▷ The sequencing and timing between submission of the Initial Report, completion of the technical review of the Initial Report, and submission of the Agreed Electronic Format;
- ▷ The ITMO “authorization” process, including possible changes in authorization;
- ▷ How the timing of the “first transfer” of ITMOs, which triggers “corresponding adjustments”, will work;
- ▷ Tables for submitting annual information as part of the Regular Report;
- ▷ Consideration of the possible implications in annual reporting on the application of conversion methods from non-GHG metrics to the CO₂ equivalent metric in order to ensure that the amount of non-estimated GHG ITMOs acquired by a Party will not exceed the amount of non-estimated GHG ITMOs of the Party initiating the transfer.

- On Review:

- ▷ Modalities for reviewing confidential information;
- ▷ The scope of reviewers’ actions in cases of inconsistent information submitted, including what recommendations can be given by reviewers, how parties should respond to those recommendations, and the implications in the event of non-response;
- ▷ The process to identify, notify and correct inconsistencies in data on ITMOs in the Article 6 Database and its reliance on the Agreed Electronic Format.

- On Tracking and Infrastructure:

- ▷ Additional functionalities for the Article 6.2 International Registry to connect with the Article 6.4 Mechanism Registry;
- ▷ The accounts of the International Registry and the role of its Administrator;
- ▷ The submission of information by countries using the International Registry as a basis for tracking ITMOs;
- ▷ The use of a common nomenclature for registries.

3.2 Article 6.4 Mechanism

In Glasgow, parties agreed the rules, modalities and procedures to operationalise the Article 6.4 crediting mechanism. In Egypt, discussions under Article 6.4 concerned the elaboration of the processes defined in these rules. [Annex I](#) to the decision includes processes related to CDM transition and the use of CERs towards first (updated) NDCs, processes for reporting, for the operation of the mechanism registry, the application of a “share of proceeds” for administrative purposes and for adaptation, and for the cancellation of units for “overall mitigation in global emissions”. [Annex II](#) contains the rules of procedure of the Supervisory Body for the mechanism.

In terms of the requirements for transition of CDM activities, the Glasgow decision requires transitioning CDM projects to adhere to the 6.4 mechanism standards. [In Egypt, parties agreed](#) that an application template for CDM projects that want to transition into the new mechanism will be available by June 2023; and that, for projects that do transition into the new mechanism, their A6.4 crediting period will start on January 1, 2021.

The most contentious discussions under Article 6.4 were related to the issuance and timing of the “authorizations” and the process in relation to “non-authorized” units. Authorization by the transferring party is a necessary procedure whenever a unit is transferred for use towards an NDC. In turn, this triggers the application of correspond-

ing adjustments by the transferring party. However, the Glasgow decision does not refer to any such “non-authorized” units and the process by which they would be created and tracked within the Article 6 system. At CMA 4, parties agreed there would be two types of “Article 6.4 Emissions Reductions” units (A6.4ERs):

- **Authorized A6.4ERs:** A6.4ERs authorized for use towards achievement of NDCs and/or for other international mitigation purposes; and
- **Mitigation Contribution A6.4ERs:** A6.4ERs not specified as authorized for use towards achievement of NDCs and/or for other international mitigation purposes, and which can be used, among others, for results-based climate finance and domestic carbon pricing schemes, with the aim of contributing to emissions reduction in the project’s host country.

Rules for the application of the share of proceeds for adaptation and for the cancellation of units for overall mitigation of global emissions were adopted, with the clarification that these apply to both authorized A6.4ERs and mitigation contribution A6.4ERs.

After receiving strong negative reactions from observer organizations, parties disagreed with the draft recommendations for methodologies on removals activities developed by the Supervisory Body. They requested the Supervisory Body to further elaborate the recommendations on the basis of inputs from parties and observers.

[Next steps in 2023](#)

The topics to be further elaborated in 2023 include:

- By the SBSTA/CMA:

- Develop further responsibilities of the Supervisory Body and of parties that host Article 6.4 activities, in order for such host parties to apply national arrangements for the mechanism under the approval and supervision of the Supervisory Body;
- Consider whether Article 6.4 activities could include emissions avoidance and conservation enhancement activities;

- ▷ Linkages between the Mechanism Registry, the International Registry, and other registries, including the nature and extent of such interoperability features;
- ▷ Provision of a statement by the host party to the Supervisory Body specifying whether it authorizes Article 6.4ERs for use towards achievement of NDCs and/or for other international mitigation purposes, including its timing, relevant information on the authorization and any revisions.

- By the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body:

- ▷ Elaborate recommendations on requirements related to activities involving removals; including appropriate monitoring, reporting, accounting for removals and crediting periods, addressing reversals, avoidance of leakage, and avoidance of other negative environmental and social impacts. Parties and observers can make submissions by 15 March 2023, and the Supervisory Body must consider these views;
- ▷ Elaborate recommendations on the requirements to develop methodologies for Article 6.4 activities;
- ▷ Consider broader inputs from a structured public consultation process;
- ▷ Facilitate the tasks related to the transition of the CDM to the Article 6.4 mechanism by: (a) developing and operationalizing a procedure for requesting transition, which includes relevant forms, by no later than June 2023; (b) developing and operationalizing the transition process and reporting back to the CMA 5.

3.3 Non-market approaches under article 6.8

In Egypt, the discussions focused on operationalizing and mandating work under the NMA work programme.

Parties [adopted](#) a schedule for implementing the work programme in two phases:

- **First phase (2023–2024):** to identify and frame all relevant elements of the work programme activities and operationalize the UNFCCC web-based platform;
- **Second phase (2025–2026):** to fully implement the work programme activities by, among others, drawing on inputs from the first phase.

Information on NMAs will be recorded and exchanged on a UNFCCC web-based platform to be developed by the Secretariat. The platform is intended to facilitate opportunities to connect participating parties that record and exchange information, including on NMAs seeking support, with parties and entities making support available. To facilitate the exchange of information on NMAs further, the Secretariat is tasked to organize an in-session workshop, in conjunction with each meeting of the Glasgow Committee, and to prepare a report of each workshop.

The Glasgow Committee on NMAs is to undertake an expedited and simple assessment of the progress and outcomes of the first phase. The Committee will also identify and recommend additional focus areas for the work programme activities.

[Next steps in 2023](#)

The SBSTA Chair will convene a meeting with representatives of relevant UNFCCC bodies and the Glasgow Committee to enhance their collaboration during SBSTA 58. Also at that time, the Committee will consider a technical paper by the Secretariat on enhancing engagement with public and private sector stakeholders at its meetings.

#04 ADAPTATION

4.1 National adaptation plans

Under this item, parties continued consideration of information from the reports of the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Country Expert Group (LEG) started at SB 52, including on gaps and needs and the implementation of national adaptation plans (NAPs). Barriers to the development of NAPs, the urgent need to scale up adaptation finance and whether to include references to improved access to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (or whether to have this addressed under a separate agenda item on GCF guidance) were some of the main issues discussed. Concern was expressed at the low number of NAPs submitted and all agreed on the need to facilitate access to adequate finance by developing countries to formulate and implement NAPs.

These elements are reflected in the COP [decision](#), which:

- Invites the Adaptation Committee and the LEG to continue formulating recommendations on ways to facilitate the mobilization of support for the formulation and implementation of NAPs;
- Requests both Committee and LEG to continue identifying the priority gaps and needs of developing countries related to the process of formulating and implementing NAPs, the progress of each country in this process, any obstacles and challenges faced, and to enhance their work in addressing these gaps and needs and include this information in their reports;
- Requests those bodies to organise training for developing countries on addressing identified gaps and needs;
- Invites other UNFCCC constituted bodies and relevant organisations to provide information to the Adaptation Committee and

LEG on activities that aim to address gaps and needs related to the process of formulating and implementing NAPs;

- Notes that the best available science, and traditional, indigenous and local knowledge should be taken into account in addressing priority gaps and needs referred to above, and notes with serious concern the findings on adaptation gaps of the IPCC in its 6th Assessment Report;
- And notes that the process to formulate and implement NAPs is crucial to informing the assessment of progress towards achieving the global goal on adaptation (GGA).

The need to urgently and significantly scale up adaptation finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation, including for the formulation and implementation of NAPs, is also reflected in the COP 27 and CMA 4 cover decisions (at paras. 19 and 35 respectively).

4.2 Report of the Adaptation Committee for 2022 and review of its progress, effectiveness and performance

These items were considered jointly under the SBs and then jointly by the COP and CMA.

The Adaptation Committee is the advisory body established under the Convention to promote the coherent implementation of enhanced action on adaptation. Parties considered the Committee's 2022 [report](#), containing draft supplementary guidance for voluntary use by parties in communicating adaptation information and a technical paper on methodologies for assessing adaptation needs and their application and on related gaps and lessons learned.

Strengthening the link between the best available science and adaptation is seen as key by many developing countries. During discussions on the Committee's report, some called for asking the Committee to strengthen its engagement with the IPCC. Others disagreed, however, and as a result the wording in the final CMA Decision is weaker, as shown below.

Improving engagement with the IPCC also came up in the context of the review of the Committee, as did the need to increase its focus on NAPs and the visibility of its work more generally. Consideration of the review was not completed by the end of the session, however, and will continue at SB 58. This is noted in the [COP](#) and [CMA](#) decisions which also:

- Take note of the Committee's report and the recommendations it contains;
- Encourage the Committee to make further use of platforms for outreach, communication in languages other than English, and the organization of regional events and knowledge dialogues;
- Encourage parties to make available sufficient resources for the successful and timely implementation of the flexible workplan of the Adaptation Committee for 2022-2024.

In addition to the above, the CMA [decision](#) requests the Adaptation Committee to further engage with the IPCC on technical and substantive work.

[4.3 Global Goal on Adaptation](#)

At COP 26/CMA 3 in Glasgow, parties had tasked the SBs with carrying out a two-year "Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation," (GlaSS) designed to clarify and quantify the "Global Goal on Adaptation" (GGA) established by Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement. Prior to COP 27, four GGA workshops were held between June and November of 2022, focused on (1) goal-setting methodologies, (2) barriers to adaptation and related data gaps, (3) adaptation measurement

techniques and metrics, and (4) existing and proposed methods for reporting and communicating on adaptation.

At COP 27, developing country groups pushed for the establishment of a concrete GGA framework. In contrast, several developed countries and groups questioned the need to implement a comprehensive framework at COP 27, and advocated for another year of work before establishing a framework. This topic was the subject of extensive debate, and by the close of COP 27, parties still held divergent views on when, what metrics, and what funding should be linked to the GGA. The CMA [decision](#) on the GlaSS represents a compromise between these positions. Parties did not adopt a framework but established an outline of elements for a future framework.

Throughout the conference, there was also substantial discussion of the themes and modalities of the four GlaSS workshops scheduled for 2023. In the CMA's decision, parties agreed that workshops should be conducted in-person, with optional virtual participation, and agreed to a range of themes. These generally focus on GGA quantification issues, such as metrics, measurement, and target-setting, although they incorporate some cross-cutting concerns like gender-responsiveness and human rights. The decision also invited the IPCC to consider updating its 1994 guidelines for assessing climate change impacts and adaptation.

In addition to these core issues, the various bodies convened at COP 27 discussed other issues relating to adaptation. In particular, COP 27 welcomed the 2022 Global Climate Observing System Implementation Plan, which provides recommendations for developing a global climate monitoring system. The development of such a system is closely linked to the adaptation goals and in particular the goal of increasing access to early warning systems. COP 27 and CMA 4 did not reach consensus on adopting new adaptation finance agenda items.

#05 LOSS AND DAMAGE

5.1 Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism

In its [decision](#), the CMA welcomed the Executive Committee's report for 2022 and endorsed the recommendations in it. Parties also welcomed the adoption by the ExCom of its second five-year rolling workplan, the second plan of action of the technical expert group on comprehensive risk management and the third plan of action of the task force on displacement (all contained in [Annexes I-III](#) to the report).

The issue of the governance of the WIM was not resolved in Egypt. Its consideration will continue at COP 28. The related COP 27 decisions continue with the practice of endorsing the CMA 4 decisions. For a reminder of what this governance issue is about see [here](#).

5.2 Santiago Network on Loss and Damage

The Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD) was established in 2019 to catalyse technical assistance for loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. In Glasgow, parties agreed its functions and decided that it will be provided with funds to support technical assistance to implement relevant approaches to avert, minimize and address loss and damage. Parties also decided to further develop its institutional arrangements.

In the resulting [decision](#) at COP 27, the funding arrangements of the SNLD were not elaborated but the SNLD's institutional structure was established. It will be composed of a secretariat, an Advisory Board (part of the WIM), and a network of members from organisations, bodies, networks and experts. Parties

also adopted the SNLD's terms of reference, set out in Annex I to the decision, which detail, among others, the roles and responsibilities of its secretariat and Advisory Board.

The secretariat will be hosted by an organisation or consortium of organisations. One proposal to host the secretariat will be recommended by the SB 58, to be considered and adopted at COP 28. The criteria to evaluate proposals and select the host for the secretariat are detailed in Annex II to the Decision. Until the secretariat is operational, the UNFCCC Secretariat will continue providing support to developing countries who request the technical assistance of the SNLD.

Members of the Advisory Board will be nominated by parties and elected at COP 28. It will be composed of two members from each of the five UN regional groups, one member each from the LDCs and SIDS, and 2 members of the WIM ExCom. The Board will also have three other representatives from the women and gender constituency, from indigenous peoples' organisations and from the children and youth non-governmental organisations. While these three representatives can participate in the Board's deliberations, decisions will be taken by consensus by Board members only. Once the Board's membership is finalised, it will develop draft rules of procedure for consideration and adoption at COP 29 in 2024.

Which body, or bodies, the Advisory Board and secretariat will be under has been left open as considerations related to the governance of the WIM are continuing until at least COP 28.

5.3 Funding arrangements

The topic of funding to remedy the effects of loss and damage has been a priority for many climate vulnerable developing coun-

tries since the beginning of the UNFCCC. It finally made it onto the agenda of the COP and CMA in Egypt.

Parties [agreed](#) to establish “new funding arrangements” to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change to respond to loss and damage, including a focus on addressing loss and damage, by providing and assisting in mobilizing new and additional resources. These new arrangements complement and include sources, funds, processes and initiatives under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement. One of these funding arrangements, also established at COP 27, is a fund.

In order to operationalise the new funding arrangements and the fund, a transitional committee was established. The annex to the decision contains the terms of reference of the committee, including its mandate, composition and modalities of work. The transitional committee will be composed of 24 members, 10 from developed countries and 14 from developing countries (the latter according to a set geographical representation).

Based on its agreed terms of reference and specific elements (contained at para. 5 of the decision), it is tasked with making recommendations to operationalize the funding arrangements and the fund. The committee will adopt recommendations by consensus.

Several activities and reports will inform the recommendations of the transitional committee. These consist of two workshops, two synthesis reports by the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the 2nd Glasgow Dialogue (followed by a summary report on the Dialogue by the SBI Chair). The COP 27 and 28 presidents are requested to convene ministerial consultations prior to COP 28 and CMA 5 to advance a possible outcome on this matter at that session. The committee’s work will conclude with the consideration and adoption of its recommendations by the COP 28/CMA 5.

With COP 27 seen as an “implementation COP”, there were expectations that it would address the issue of the lack of sufficient and adequate funding for implementing the activities required to achieve the Agreement’s goals, especially for those parties most vulnerable to climate change.

However, except for progress on funding arrangements for loss and damage, the remainder of the finance negotiations were mostly a follow-up on existing work programmes and ongoing processes. Reports produced by various UN bodies and actors highlighted the gaps in finance provided and the amount needed by developing countries, paving the way for the finance talks in the next sessions.

#06 FINANCE

6.1 The New Collective Quantified Goal

Upon the adoption of the Paris Agreement at COP 21, the COP decided that a new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) post-2025 should be set by the CMA. The starting point would be the goal to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year (by 2020). In 2021, CMA 3 in Glasgow established an ad hoc work programme on the NCQG for 2022–2024 that would involve four technical expert dialogues (TEDs) per year and an annual report prepared by the Co-Chairs. This work programme will eventually inform the CMA’s decision on the NCQG in 2024 at CMA 6.

The TEDs started in March 2022, and addressed important questions such as the role of the private sector, barriers and drivers for private climate finance, and how to reflect the needs of developing countries.

At CMA 4 in Sharm El-Sheik, parties took stock of the ad hoc work programme’s progress and provided guidance for the work programme’s activities for 2023 and 2024. Their [decision](#) acknowledged the need to make substantive progress and requested that a workplan for 2023 be developed and published. Further requests were made to improve the TEDs. The decision further requested transparent information on the topics of discussion and outcomes of the TEDs held in 2023, including on possible options to set the NCQG. This information will help to inform the high-level ministerial dialogue on the NCQG to be held at CMA 5 in 2023.

6.2 Long-term climate finance

Under this item of the COP agenda, discussions related to the climate finance goal for developed countries to mobilize jointly USD

100 billion per year by 2020. In its decision in Sharm El-Sheikh, [the COP noted](#) with “deep regret” that the goal had not been met and urged developed countries to fully deliver on the goal urgently and through to 2025.

Parties noted that climate finance lacks a common definition and accounting methodology, which lead to different estimates of progress towards achieving the goal. Challenges in mobilising finance from private sources are acknowledged and “the significant role of public funds” noted.

The SCF is requested to prepare biennial reports, including a summary of key findings, on progress towards the goal for consideration by the COPs 29, 31 and 33.

6.3 Matters related to the Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund (AF) was established in 2010, under the Kyoto Protocol, to finance projects and programmes to help vulnerable communities in developing countries to adapt to climate impacts. The AF is replenished by donations from parties and by a share of proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, and soon also from the share of proceeds of the incoming Article 6.4 Mechanism under the Paris Agreement. The Adaptation Fund is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB), which is composed of 16 members and 16 alternates. Unusually for a climate change fund, the majority of members represent developing countries.

At CMA 1 and CMP 14, it was decided that the AF would be transitioned from the Kyoto Protocol to also serve the Paris Agreement from 2019 onwards, and that it would exclusively serve the Paris Agreement once the share of proceeds from the mechanism

under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement becomes available. What this means in practice for the makeup of the AFB is that those parties to the Paris Agreement that are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol are eligible for membership (mainly the United States). This has led to tensions over concerns for the AFB's decision-making balance.

In Sharm El-Sheikh, the AF was considered first by the SBI then by the CMP in relation to its fourth review, and jointly by the CMP and CMA in the context of the 2022 report of the AFB.

Discussions revolved around topics that had been raised at SBI 56: developing countries called for increasing funding, making it more sustainable and predictable, and for improved access modalities, and pushed for this to be reflected in the text of the decision. Many developing countries also voiced their concern about the numerous outstanding and unfulfilled pledges made by certain developed countries. In addition, some developing countries opposed proposals to diversify the AF's donor base, arguing that the onus of funding the AF should remain on developed countries.

Some of these issues are addressed by the CMP in its [decision](#) on the AFB's report: it takes note of various actions, decisions, and information, including funds received as of June/July 2022, contributions that remain outstanding, and the number of projects implemented. It also welcomes financial pledges made by several governments, underscores the urgency of scaling up finan-

cial resources, including voluntary support, recalls the call in the Glasgow Pact for developed countries to consider making multi-annual pledges and stresses actions to promote adequate and predictable financing.

The CMA [decision](#) duplicates much of the language in the CMP decision but adds several paragraphs relevant to the Paris Agreement, including requesting the AFB to update the CMA on support to assist developing countries in meeting their adaptation commitments under the Paris Agreement; reiterating that parties to the Paris Agreement are eligible for membership on the AFB and asking SBI 58 to continue consideration of this matter in view of the AF's transition to serving the Paris Agreement exclusively.

In its [decision](#) on the AF's fourth review, the CMP notes with concern the continued issues of sustainability, adequacy, and predictability of funding from the fund given the current prices of certified emission reductions, as well as outstanding pledges. It highlights the comparative advantages of the AF, reiterates the call made in Glasgow in 2021 for developed countries to at least double their adaptation finance to developing countries, calls for continued and increased voluntary contributions including multi-year ones, and asks the SBI to begin the fifth review in June 2025.

Following the conclusion of COP 27, the AF announced that it had received "nearly USD 243 million in new pledges and contributions" during the COP⁶.

⁶ <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/adaptation-fund-receives-over-us-230-million-mobilized-in-2022-for-the-most-climate-vulnerable-at-cop27-in-egypt/>

#07 TECHNOLOGY

To accelerate the development and transfer of technology and know-how in the context of climate change, a Technology Mechanism was established in 2010. The Mechanism, which also serves the Paris Agreement, consists of a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).

The TEC is the policy arm of the Technology Mechanism, which analyses and provides recommendations on key technology policy issues. The CTCN (implementation arm) is a network that supports countries in the implementation of climate technology projects and programmes.

The first periodic assessment of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism under the Paris Agreement started in

Glasgow at CMA 3 and was completed in Egypt. In its [decision](#) on this matter, the CMA acknowledges the findings of the Secretariat's final report on the first periodic assessment and requests the TEC and CTCN to detail their actions in response to the report's recommendations. It also decides that the main challenges identified in the report be considered in the global stocktake. Finally, the SBI is requested to initiate the second periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism in 2026.

In separate decisions, the [COP](#) and [CMA](#) consider the TEC and the CTCN's collaboration, their performance and activities throughout 2022 and their linkages with the Financial Mechanism.

#08 CAPACITY BUILDING

The Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) was established at COP 21 to address gaps and needs in implementing capacity building in developing countries and enhance the coherence and coordination of capacity-building activities under the Convention. It reports to both the COP and CMA. At COP 26, parties adopted its 2021-2024 workplan.

The [COP](#) and [CMA](#) decisions welcome the annual technical progress report of the PCCB for 2022 and take note of the recommendations therein. In addition, the CMA [decision](#) takes note of the synthesis report and conclusions of the PCCB for the first global stocktake's technical assessment. The decision also welcomes the launch of a toolkit to assess capacity-building gaps and needs to implement the Paris Agreement.

#09 ACTION FOR CLIMATE EMPOWERMENT

“Action for Climate Empowerment” (ACE) refers to measures to strengthen education and public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation (under Article 6 of the UNFCCC and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement).

During COP 26, the Glasgow Work Programme on ACE was created to include and empower the youth more effectively in the negotiations. In Egypt, [COP 27](#) and [CMA 4](#) adopted a 4-year ACE Action Plan under the Glasgow Work Programme on ACE. The action plan, contained in the Annex, establishes short-term, clear and time-bound activities up to COP 31 in 2026. These include strengthening coordination of ACE work under the UNFCCC and strengthening the integration of ACE into the development and implementa-

tion of national climate policies and plans.

In response to requests of civil society, especially of youth activists, the Action Plan is meant to take steps towards empowering all members of society, including children and youth, to engage in climate action, respecting, promoting and considering their respective obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and the empowerment of women.

The decisions request the Secretariat to include in each annual summary report under the Glasgow work programme information on materials, resources and findings as set out in the Action Plan. Parties and non-party stakeholders are invited to make suggestions for structuring the annual Dialogues on ACE.

#10 TRANSPARENCY

The issue of reporting and review under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement was taken up under the SBs and CMA.

With the modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) and common reporting tables agreed at previous sessions, most of the work under this agenda item has been completed. What is left relates to such issues as ensuring that developing countries have the financial and technical support they need for reporting and capacity building under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement. This topic was taken up by the SBI, with discussions focussing on the challenges faced by developing countries, in particular LDCs and SIDs, in implementing the ETF, including establishing and enhancing national reporting systems.

In its [conclusions](#), the SBI acknowledges those challenges and the importance of drawing them to the attention of the GEF and the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) in providing financial and technical support respectively to developing countries.

It invites interested stakeholders to submit views, by 30 April 2023, on how to address those challenges and agrees to continue considering this matter at SBI 58 with a view to facilitating the development of sustainable institutional and technical capacity of developing countries, in particular LDCs and SIDs, and recommending a draft decision for adoption by CMA 5.

Under the SBSTA, parties continued considering the issue of voluntary reviews of infor-

mation on climate change impacts and adaptation as part of the Technical Expert Review (TER) process, and the training needed to facilitate these reviews, started at SB 56. Reporting and reviewing this information will help track adaptation action and assess financial support needed.

Parties were able to agree on the two outstanding issues, i.e. that the voluntary review also facilitates the improvement of reporting by identifying, in consultation with the reporting party, areas of improvement and capacity-building needs; and that a training course for reviewers, to be developed by the Secretariat, would also be reviewed in the context of the review of the MPGs no later than 2028.

Thus, the SBSTA adopted [conclusions](#) recommending a draft decision for adoption by the CMA. Some of the key elements of [the CMA decision](#) include:

- That a party may, on a voluntary basis, request the Secretariat to organize a review of the information reported by the party

pursuant to Decision 18/CMA.1, annex, chapter IV (on climate impacts and adaptation), as part of the technical expert review;

- That this voluntary review consists of reviewing information reported in a party's biennial transparency report and of facilitating the improvement of the reporting by identifying, in consultation with the party, areas of improvement and capacity-building needs related to reporting;

- That the outcome of the review should be presented in a dedicated annex to the TER report;

- The CMA requests the Secretariat to include on the TER team an expert with relevant expertise, to develop and implement a training course for experts participating in the review, and to report on progress in developing the training course to the SBSTA; and

- It also decides to undertake a review of the training course in the context of the review of the MPGs no later than 2028 and to consider integrating into the training course relevant outcomes from the GlASS.

#11 GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

The global stocktake (GST) consists of three components: the information collection and preparation phase (CMA 3 – SB 58), the technical assessment (SB 56 - SB58) and the consideration of outputs (CMA 5). The second meeting of the technical dialogue took place at COP 27. The technical dialogue is framed as 'conversations' amongst parties, experts and non-party stakeholders to help develop a shared understanding of collective progress towards achieving the Paris Agreement's goals, informed by the best available science. Like the first meeting held in June 2022, it took place across multiple and innovative formats, such as a world café and roundtables, to encourage interaction and inclusivity amongst participants.

The GST ends two years before the next NDCs are submitted and, therefore, plays a key role in informing these, setting the course for further ambitious action and support. The focus of the second meeting was thus on how gaps in implementation can be bridged and identifying opportunities for enhanced action and support across all thematic areas of the GST.

In their [conclusions](#), the SBs requested the co-facilitators to take into account feedback by parties and by the joint contact group when preparing the summary report on the second meeting and designing the third meeting of the technical dialogue, and to submit this summary report well in advance of the third

meeting. They invited submissions by 15 February 2023 on the approach to the consideration of outputs component of the first GST; and requested the SB chairs to hold a consultation in April 2023 on preparations for that

component and convene an in-person workshop in October 2023 to develop elements for the consideration of outputs, to inform the work of the joint contact group.

#12 IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE

The PAICC facilitates the implementation of and promotes compliance with the Paris Agreement. In Egypt, parties [welcomed](#) the PAICC's annual report and adopted its remaining rules of procedure. The complete set of rules are contained in the decision's

annex and include: rules regarding the duties and conduct of members and alternate members; decision making and voting; initiation of a consideration of issues; measures and outputs; systemic issues; and others.

#13 AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is discussed under a formal negotiation track under the UNFCCC. The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture was established in 2017, focusing on agriculture and food security, including by supporting adaptation and mitigation measures in the sector, with the aim of recommending actions to be incorporated by countries in their NDCs.

At COP 27, negotiations revolved around defining the future of the programme, whose timeframe ended in 2021. As a result, the COP [mandated](#) the SBSTA and SBI to establish a 4-year Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security. The joint work will, among other things, implement the agenda of the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture. Its objectives are to, among others, promote a "holistic approach" to deliver a range of multiple benefits, such as adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and mitigation.

Parties established an online portal to share information on projects, initiatives, and policies for increasing opportunities for implementation of climate action to address issues related to agriculture and food security. To support the joint work, the Secretariat is requested to prepare an annual synthesis report and organize in-session workshops. Parties are invited to provide submissions on topics for these workshops, on their views on the elements of the programme, and on the operationalization of the portal.

#14 RESPONSE MEASURES

The potential impacts of “response measures” (measures to mitigate emissions and address climate change) on countries’ economies are recognized in the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. In 2011, a Forum was set up under the UNFCCC to understand and address these.

The Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) was created to support the Forum’s work in 2018.

The [COP](#) and [CMA](#) decisions in Egypt welcome the annual reports of the KCI and adopt the Forum’s recommendations on activities 2-5 and 11 of the KCI’s [current 6-year workplan](#). Recommended activities related to lessons learned and best practices from posi-

tive and negative impacts are also adopted.

The planned midterm review of the workplan of the Forum could not be concluded and recommended. An informal note captures parties’ discussions, although its content does not represent consensus. The review will continue under the Forum at SB58.

During 2023, parties will undertake a review of the Forum’s functions, work programme and modalities. This is set to conclude at SB59.

All 3 decisions (COP, CMP and CMA) are identical except that the CMA [decision](#) also encourages parties to submit views on efforts related to addressing the social and economic impacts of response measures and requests the Secretariat to compile and submit these views as input to the global stocktake.

#15 GENDER

Gender has been integrated in the UNFCCC through the 2014 Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) and the 2017 Gender Action Plan (GAP). At COP25, an enhanced 5-year LWPG and its GAP were adopted.

In its [decision](#) at COP 27 regarding the intermediate review of the implementation of the GAP, the COP urged parties to advance implementation of the enhanced LWPG and GAP. It also encouraged parties and relevant organisations to strengthen the use of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in implementing climate policies, plans, strategies and actions. The International Labour Organization was invited to organise a workshop or dialogue on gender-responsive climate action and just transition.

The COP also underscored the need to promote efforts towards gender balance and improve inclusivity in the UNFCCC process. Still on this theme, the Secretariat is requested to support national gender and climate change focal points attending relevant mandated UNFCCC meetings. Parties and relevant public and private entities are encouraged to strengthen the gender responsiveness of climate finance. The COP also adopted the amendments to the GAP as contained in the annex.

In a separate [decision](#) regarding the latest report of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and guidance to it, the COP called on the GEF to enhance its support for the enhanced LWPG and its GAP.

#16 OTHER OUTCOMES OUTSIDE THE UNFCCC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

COP and CMA decisions are made by consensus, which means the diplomatic processes involved in negotiating decisions can be slow. Final texts often do not embody the levels of ambition and urgency that are required to counter the climate crisis but rather, represent the lowest common denominator between parties' positions.

Against this backdrop, pledges and other outcomes established on the margins of the negotiation sessions can be a means to make up for the asymmetries in the interest and capacity of different States in committing to new climate obligations. These "coalitions of the willing" have the potential to unlock faster progress on topics of the global climate agenda around which there is no consensus but enough political will to forge meaningful sectoral pledges.

Particularly noteworthy examples of this architecture are the coalitions built in Glasgow around the themes of deforestation, methane, fossil fuel financing, coal, zero emission vehicles, and finance. Their developments and outcomes at COP 27, as well as other initiatives launched at COP 27, are addressed below.

16.1. Sectoral initiatives

Deforestation

In Glasgow, over 100 world leaders committed to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030, through a pledge known as the Glasgow Leaders Declaration on Forests and Land Use backed by USD 19.2bn in public and private funds. Currently, the declaration encompasses 145 countries and 90.94% of global forests, but deforestation remains

rampant in major rainforest nations.

At COP 27, the Forests and Climate Leaders' Partnership (FCLP), to be co-chaired by Ghana and the United States, was launched in order to facilitate and enhance cooperation on the delivery of pledges made in Glasgow. The take up was relatively low, however, suggesting many countries are unwilling to follow up on the pledge they made in Glasgow.

Methane

At COP 26, over 100 countries joined the Global Methane Pledge (GMP), a collective effort to cut methane emissions by 30 percent from 2020 levels by 2030. Relevant domestic regulations followed suit: both the United States and the European Union proposed their own methane legislation.

At COP 27, 50 more countries joined the pledge. However, top methane emitters China, Russia, and India did not sign up. Currently, 95% of countries have included methane in their NDCs.

In 2022, three pathways of policies and initiatives to drive methane reductions in key emitting sectors were launched: the GMP Energy Pathway, the GMP Food and Agriculture Pathway, and the GMP Waste Pathway.

Also at COP 27, UNEP launched their Global Methane Assessment 2030: Baseline Report, commissioned by GMP partners, to determine baseline emissions scenarios to establish a harmonized estimate of methane emissions through 2030. Monitoring from the World Meteorological Organization shows the volume of methane in the atmosphere has increased at record rates in 2022.

Fossil Fuel Financing

At COP 26, 39 countries and financial institutions issued a statement to end direct international public financing for fossil fuels by the end of 2022, except in limited and clearly defined circumstances consistent with 1.5°C, as well as to fully prioritize public finance for the clean energy transition (the [Glasgow Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition](#)). The text recognizes that investing in unabated fossil-related energy projects increasingly entails both social and economic risks, especially through the form of stranded assets, and has ensuing negative impacts on government revenue, local employment, taxpayers, utility ratepayers and public health.

At the time of writing, countries such as Sweden, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Finland have already published policies to halt overseas oil and gas finance⁷, but others are still to deliver on the pledge by passing necessary domestic instruments.

Coal

The Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement is a coalition to phase out coal by the 2030s for developed countries, and 2040 for developing countries. The deal was signed in Glasgow with the notable absences of major producers and consumers, such as China, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

At COP 27, coal discussions were fraught due to geopolitical issues and the need to replace Russian gas, but there was express recognition that the war in Ukraine is no excuse to halt decarbonization.

Zero Emission Vehicles

The COP 26 Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration (ZEV Declaration) on accelerating the transition to 100% zero emission cars and vans was signed by national governments, states, regions, cities, vehicle manufacturers, businesses, investors and civil society.

At COP 27, the Accelerating to Zero (A2Z) coalition was announced and joined by over 200 organizations from governments, industry, and civil society, in order to commit to eliminate sales of combustion cars and vans by 2040, and by 2035 in leading markets.

Finance

Another important sectoral initiative launched at COP 26 did not involve States, but the financial sector: the world's biggest climate-finance coalition, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), involving over 450 firms across 45 countries, with around USD 150trn in assets under management.

Immediately before COP 27, the alliance's language on the commitment to exclude coal projects was softened, and Race to Zero membership was removed as a requirement for membership. GFANZ has since announced the channelling of resources to the Vietnam JETP, addressed below.

16.2 Other multilateral and bilateral initiatives

Beyond the more encompassing sectoral pledges described above, which are generally open to adhesion by all relevant parties, there was a flourishing of multilateral and bilateral declarations and commercial agreements made at COP 27. These aim to combine the efforts of certain actors - and, particularly, at channelling financial and other resources - towards specific climate-related initiatives. The most representative examples are summarized below.

JETP Initiatives

Just energy transition partnerships (JETPs) were launched at COP 26 to help fossil fuel dependent countries shift towards renewable energy in a fair and equitable manner. Three such JETP initiatives have been launched so far:

- South Africa: The United States, the United

⁷ <https://priceofoil.org/2022/10/12/finland-joins-growing-list-of-countries-restricting-international-oil-gas-finance-leaving-norway-the-only-nordic-country-not-to-do-so/>

Kingdom, the European Union, France, and Germany pledged to mobilize USD 8.5bn (of USD 98bn needed over 5 years) to help it transition away from coal.

- Indonesia: The United States pledged to mobilize USD 20bn to help the world's largest exporter of coal reach a net-zero power sector by 2050 and a net-zero economy by 2060.
- Vietnam: The government announced it would ramp up its renewable energy efforts from 36% to 47% from wind, solar and hydro power by 2030, while accelerating the phase down of fossil fuels. USD 15.5bn were pledged to help it transition away from coal, half of which from governments, the Asian Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation, and the remainder from private investment mobilized by GFANZ.

South-South Rainforest Leadership Alliance

Right after the conference, at the G20 Bali summit, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia announced a South-South rainforest leadership alliance – dubbed by some as the “OPEC of forests” - to negotiate a new multilateral funding mechanism to help them tackle deforestation and boost carbon sinks under the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity.

First Bilateral ITMO Agreements

The very first Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) agreements under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement were signed at COP 27 between Switzerland and Ghana and Switzerland and Vanuatu.

The Ghana project consists of training rice farmers covering nearly 80% of the country's production in sustainable agricultural practices. In Vanuatu, the project aims at enabling access to reliable, affordable electricity from renewable sources.