



SUMMARY OF COP28 OUTCOMES

A guide to the main decisions taken in Dubai



Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action (LACLIMA) is a network of legal experts dedicated to the development and dissemination of climate change law in Latin America. Based in Brazil and with more than 1,000 members, it aims to promote legal knowledge, capacity building and support the development of legal frameworks and solutions that can enable a pathway for decarbonization and climate resilience consistent with the implementation of the Paris Agreement, while consolidating a critical mass of climate change lawyers from the Global South.



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The authors are grateful for the contributions of Alessandra Lehmen, Anna Maria Cárcamo, Caroline Medeiros Rocha Frasson, Caroline Prolo, Eneas Xavier, Gaia Hasse, Olivia Tattarletti, Pascale Bird, Sarah Hill-Smith, Temiloluwa Lawal and Vanessa Chan.

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INTRODUCTION

On 30 November – 13 December 2023, the annual climate conference under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

The conference formally comprised:

- The 28th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 28);
- The 18th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 18);
- The 5th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 5);
- The 59th session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 59); and
- The 59th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 59).

The following summary does not aim to provide a full and comprehensive report of the negotiations and decisions taken in Dubai but to highlight key outcomes of the official intergovernmental process mainly. As a result, only outcomes under the COP and CMA are summarised (and CMP decisions are largely disregarded). At the time of writing, only the advance unedited version of the decisions was available. To help the reader and provide a general overview, this summary groups together discussions around thematic areas and does not follow the official meeting agendas of the various bodies. For more detailed explanations of the relevant COP, CMP and CMA decisions, please refer to LRI's Paris Agreement A to Z app,¹ and LACLIMA's "Rumo à COP: guia de bolso para entender as negociações do clima – Edição COP 28".

You can find [here](#) a list of submissions arising from the conference in Dubai and [here](#) a list of UNFCCC mandated events for 2024.

¹Available at: <https://apps.apple.com/gb/app/paris-agreement-a-to-z/id1560932012> and <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lri.parisagreement>.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE (GST)

The first Global Stocktake (GST I) that took place during the climate conference in Dubai, was the main political outcome of the negotiations. Parties and observers were acutely aware of the importance of reaching agreement on this first exercise of accountability of collective progress in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), civil society and many other stakeholders had been making their own assessments of this progress (or lack of) throughout the years, the GSTI was the first time that Parties would undertake this and agree, by consensus, on the shortcomings and challenges ahead to achieve the Paris Agreement goals.

WHAT IS THE GST?

The Global Stocktake (GST) is one of the Paris Agreement's core pillars of accountability. It entails a comprehensive assessment ('stocktake') of all Parties' collective progress towards implementing and achieving the Paris Agreements' long-term goals.² The GST is broad in scope, focussing on Parties efforts relating to mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation (which include climate finance, technology transfer, and capacity building), response measures, and loss and damage.³

CMA 5 in Dubai, marked the completion of the first Global Stocktake, which will be undertaken every five years going forward.

The GST is also an important part of the Paris Agreement's ambition ratchet mechanism, in that its findings are intended to catalyse ambition and inform the Parties' next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which Parties must submit at the start of 2025.⁴

The two-year long GST process was conducted by the CMA with the support of the SBI and SBSTA. It involved (i) an information collection and preparation phase, which ran from CMA 3 to SB 58; (ii) a technical assessment phase, which comprised three technical dialogue meetings at SB 56, CMA 4, and SB 58;⁵ and (iii) the consideration of outputs, known as the 'political phase', which took place at CMA 5 in the UAE. The objective of CMA 5 was to translate the findings of the technical phase into political decisions.⁶

²Paris Agreement Art 14, para 1. See also: Art 7, para 14 (adaptation); Art 9, para 6 (climate finance); Art 10, para 6 (technology); Art 13, paras 5-6 (transparency); Art 14.

³The scope of the GST set out in Article 14(1) of the Paris Agreement (focusing on adaptation, mitigation and MOI) was extended by Decision 19/CMA.1 to also consider Parties' efforts to address the impacts of response measures and loss and damage incurred.

⁴Paris Agreement Art 4, para 9; Art 14, para 3. See also LRI advice: <https://legalresponse.org/legaladvice/ndc-submission-date/>

⁵See [Legal Response International » Summary of COP 27 outcomes](#); [Legal Response International » SB 58 Summary](#); [Legal Response International » Global Stocktake Explainer](#).

⁶See [SB59 Joint Chairs note \(unfccc.int\)](#).

GST negotiations at COP 28

The GST negotiations were somewhat tense, particularly around language signalling the future of fossil fuels and other key themes such as finance and the recognition of historical contributions to climate change. Parties' divergent views made the task of drafting balanced and representative decision text problematic. In week 1, two draft texts comprising 'textual building blocks' were produced. These reflected all Parties' views, and often diverging, rather than agreed wording. Many paragraphs included an option for "no text". Despite Parties' making written and oral submissions on the second draft in informal negotiations, the second draft was forwarded to ministers to negotiate further as unagreed text, accompanied by a compilation of Parties' views and submissions not yet fully reflected in the draft decision.⁷ A third version was published shortly afterwards.⁸ Towards the end of week 2, negotiations continued behind closed doors. A fourth draft was produced by the COP/CMA Presidency, but this was widely opposed because the reference to fossil fuels was much diluted. The GST I decision was gavelled on 13 December 2023, 23 hours after the conference was due to end. Parties' closing statements reflected how difficult it was to broker an acceptable compromise between drastically differing national priorities.

THE GST I DECISION

Given its broad scope, the GST decision comprises 196 paragraphs across 21 pages – almost as long as the Paris Agreement itself. Yet despite "emphasiz[ing] the need for urgent action and support to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach", the text contains few operative verbs (ex. eight "decides" and eight "requests", which require action to be taken),⁹ and instead favours non-operative verbs like "notes", "recalls", or "welcomes", which do not require any action to be taken.

The GST decision is structured in the following four chapters:

I. Context and cross-cutting considerations;
II. Collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including under Article 2, paragraph 1(a-c), in the light of equity and the best available science, and informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, action and support;

III. International cooperation; and
IV. Guidance and way forward.

Chapter I on context and cross-cutting considerations includes important statements, such as underlining that "despite overall progress, Parties are not yet collectively on track towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals" (para 2). It also recalls the centrality of science as it welcomes and unpacks –with concern– the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) (paras 14-16). In terms of guiding principles, parties commit to accelerate action in this critical decade on the basis of the best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty (para 6).

⁷See [sb2023 L11E.pdf \(unfccc.int\)](#).

⁸See [Microsoft Word - GST.docx \(unfccc.int\)](#).

⁹Simon Evans on X: "Hardly any of the verbs in the latest draft global stocktake text at #COP28 actually *ask for action* It's all "notes", "recognises" etc etc, with a few weak "invites" and only a very few slightly stronger "calls on" (most "requests" go to the secretariat or similar) <https://t.co/ap0Ygm3tm1>" / X (twitter.com) and Carbon brief COP28 key outcomes.

Chapter II reflects Parties progress towards achieving the Paris Agreement's goals. Within this chapter, the subchapter on **mitigation** (paras 18 – 42), among other things, “calls on Parties to contribute to the following global efforts, in a nationally determined manner”:

- Tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling global energy efficiency by 2030;
- Accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power;
- Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science;
- Accelerating zero and low-emissions technologies including “renewables, nuclear, abatement and removal technologies such as carbon capture and utilization and storage;”
- Accelerating the reduction of non-CO2 emissions globally, including methane by 2030;
- Phasing out “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible.”

The remainder of the subchapter addresses other mitigation efforts, including recognising the role of transitional fuels (para. 29); mitigation technologies and renewable energy (para. 30); “conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems” (para. 33); and “transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production” (para. 36).

Still in chapter II, the **adaptation** subchapter (paras 43 – 65) notes gaps in adaptation finance and support, particularly from developed country Parties, and the inherent challenges faced by Parties in collecting the information needed to access early warning systems and prepare national adaptation plans. Inter alia, the decision:

- Calls on Parties to have in place national adaptation plans and policies by 2025 and have progressed in implementing them by 2030 (para 59);
- Urges Parties and invites non-Party stakeholders, such as development partners, international financial institutions and other operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (para 50), to “increase ambition and enhance adaptation action and support” toward achieving climate resilient water systems, food and agricultural systems, health services, ecosystems, infrastructure and human settlements, guided by traditional, Indigenous and local knowledge (para 63); and
- Affirms the framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) that requires Parties to take measures by 2030 to: assess climate hazards, risks and exposures; plan and implement country-driven, gender-responsive [...] national adaptation plans and policies; and operationalise systems for monitoring and evaluating national adaptation efforts (para 64).

Parties' progress on 'Means of implementation and support' was assessed in three areas: finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building. On finance (paras 66-100), the decision:

- Recognizes the importance of, but notes the limited progress achieved towards making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development for the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;
- Welcomes pledges made to the Green Climate Fund, the Loss and Damage Fund, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund;
- On mitigation finance the decision notes “with deep regret” that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation has not been met, and “urges developed country Parties to fully deliver, with urgency, on the USD 100 billion per year goal through to 2025;”
- On adaptation finance, it notes with concern that the “adaptation finance gap is widening” and recognizes that adaptation finance “will have to be significantly scaled up beyond the doubling as per decision I/CMA.3, paragraph 18 to support the urgent and evolving need to accelerate adaptation and build resilience in developing countries;”
- On loss and damage finance, the decision urges developed country Parties to continue to provide support and encourages other Parties to provide, or continue to provide support, on a voluntary basis, for activities to address loss and damage “with developed country Parties continuing to take the lead in providing financial resources;”

- The decision underscores the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture, including multilateral development banks (MDBs);
- Emphasizes the role of governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors in improving assessment and management of climate-related financial risks, ensuring global access to climate finance, establishing innovative sources of finance, including taxation, for implementing climate action, and scaling down harmful incentives; and
- Calls for a scale up of highly concessional and grant-based financing.

On technology development and transfer (paras 101 – 110), the decision:

- Highlights persistent gaps and challenges in technology development and transfer and the uneven pace of adoption of climate technologies around the world, and urges Parties to address these barriers and strengthen international cooperation, including with the private sector; and
- Decides to establish a technology implementation programme, supported by the Financial Mechanism operating entities, to help developing Parties implement national technology priorities.

On [capacity-building](#) (paras 111 – 120), the decision:

- Acknowledges and recognizes the urgent need to address “persistent gaps” in developing country Parties’ capacity to implement the Paris Agreement, including relating to “skills development, institutional capacity for governance and coordination, technical assessment and modelling, strategic policy development, and implementation and capacity retention;”
- Encourages the provision of effective capacity-building support, including by facilitating collaboration platforms and capitalising on the exchange of knowledge, country-led experiences and best practices;
- Calls on Parties to meaningfully engage with Indigenous Peoples and local communities in their climate policies and action;
- Requests the secretariat to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices for the preparation and implementation of NDCs, including through workshops;
- Encourages developing country Parties to identify capacity-building needs in their Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) and requests the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and Adaptation Fund to provide updates on their capacity-building support in their annual reports to the CMA.

The next subchapter, on [loss and damage](#) (paras 121 – 135):

- Recognizes the importance of particularly vulnerable developing countries and already vulnerable groups in responding to loss and damage caused by climate change;
- Acknowledges significant gaps, including finance, in responding to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the associated economic and non-economic losses;

- Expresses deep concern regarding the consequences for developing country Parties of loss and damage, including reduced fiscal space and constraints on realizing the Sustainable Development Goals;
- Calls on Parties to improve coherence and synergies between efforts pertaining to disaster risk reduction, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, and displacement, planned relocation and migration, and slow onset events, in order to avert, minimise and address loss and damage;
- Requests the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage ([WIM ExCom](#)) to prepare voluntary guidelines for enhancing the collection and management of data and information to inform the preparation of BTRs.

The last subchapter of chapter II (paras 136 – 152), on [response measures](#):

- Notes that the achievement of the Paris Agreement temperature goal, and global transition to low-emissions and climate resilient development, provide opportunities for but also pose challenges to sustainable development, economic growth and eradication of poverty;
- Welcomes the decision on the work programme on just transition pathways;¹⁰ and
- Notes that a just transition of the workforce, the creation of decent work and quality jobs, and economic diversification are key to maximising the positive and minimizing the negative impacts of response measures.

¹⁰ See the advance unedited version: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma5_auv_5_JTWP.pdf

Chapter III on international cooperation reaffirms the commitment to multilateralism, recalls the importance of international collaboration to progress in the implementation of the Paris Agreement goals. After a heated discussion about the impact of unilateral measures, the decision brings attention to creating supportive and open international economic systems, noting that the measures to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Additionally, it acknowledges the role of non-state actors in supporting parties and contribute to the collective progress in implementing the Paris Agreement.

The final chapter of GSTI, titled '[Guidance and way forward](#)' (paras 164 – 196), “recalls” that all Parties should submit their next NDCs at least 9 -12 months before CMA 7 / COP 30, which will be held in November 2025 in Brazil.

This is the first time the Paris Agreement’s ambition ratchet mechanism will bite, meaning the NDCs must “represent a progression beyond the Party’s current NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition.” In this respect, GSTI “encourages” Parties to:

- Submit “ambitious, economy-wide emissions reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors, and categories... aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C” (para 39);

- “Align” their next NDCs with “long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” (para 40);
- Take into account the good practices and opportunities identified during the technical dialogue of GSTI in enhancing actions and support (para 177); and
- “Communicate their NDCs with an end date of 2035 (para 170).”.

The guidance and way forward chapter of the GSTI also:

- Invites Parties to “put in place or intensify existing domestic arrangements” for preparing and implementing NDCs (para 171);
- Encourages Parties to implement climate policy and action that is gender-responsive, fully respects human rights, and empowers youth and children (para 178);
- Recalls that Parties shall submit their first biennial transparency reports and national inventory reports by 31 December 2024 and urges them to make the necessary preparations for their timely submission (para 173); and
- Decides to launch, under the guidance of the CMA 5, 6 and 7 presidencies, a set of activities (“Road map to Mission 1.5”) to significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition in the next round of nationally determined contributions (para 191).

NEXT STEPS (SB 60)

The GST will be undertaken every five years,¹¹ with the information collection and preparation component of the second global stocktake (GST 2) commencing at CMA 8 / COP 31 in November 2026. The consideration of outputs will take place at CMA 10 / COP 33 in 2028.

In the meantime, consideration of how to improve and refine the procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process will commence at SB 60 (June 2024) and conclude at CMA 6 (November 2024). To that end, Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to submit “information on experiences and lessons learned” during the GST I by 1 March 2024, which the secretariat will synthesise in a report (para 193). The GST I decision also invites:

- Parties to provide information on how the outcomes of GST I informed the preparation of their second and subsequent NDCs (para 196); and
- Feedback on the GST I process from the scientific community, the IPCC, the high-level champions, Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action, and non-party stakeholders (para 185).

Also, at the sixtieth session of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 2024 (SB 60), the SBs will organize and develop the modalities for the work programme of an annual global stocktake dialogue, to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the GST I outcomes informed the preparation of NDCs. The dialogue will be operationalised at CMA 6 (2024) and conclude at CMA 10 in 2028.

ADAPTATION

Adaptation refers to the measures taken to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerabilities associated with climate change. Within the UNFCCC, there are various negotiation and work streams aiming to address this important issue.

GLOBAL GOAL ON ADAPTATION (GGA)

Whilst the Paris Agreement established a GGA, it did not quantify it or expand on its qualities. To address this, at COP26, Parties agreed to launch a two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme on the GGA (GlaSS) to develop a framework for tracking and measuring progress on adaptation.

At the climate conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, developing country groups pushed for the establishment of a concrete GGA framework but this was resisted by several developed countries and groups, who advocated for another year of work before establishing a framework. The main bones of contention centered around what metrics to use, whether funding should be included and timeline. Eventually Parties reached a compromise, by outlining key elements for a future framework without adopting a specific one. It was also decided that attention should be given to GGA quantification issues and other cross-cutting concerns at four GlaSS in-person workshops throughout 2023. Limited progress was made at SB58 last year, with Parties agreeing - after protracted debates - on possible elements for the structure of a decision to be taken at CMA 5.

¹¹[Paris Agreement](#) Art 14, para 2.

At COP 28, significant progress in concluding the GlaSS work programme and adopting the GGA framework was elusive until the final days. The two most contentious issues were around finance and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Regarding the first, G77 nations advocated for a finance target to be included in the framework whilst developed countries opposed this, arguing that adaptation finance should be negotiated as part of the new collective quantified goal on finance, due to be adopted at the end of this year. Separately, many developing countries wanted to see the principle of CBDR-RC acknowledged in the GGA text, whilst developed nations opposed it.

Ultimately a compromise was reached. Key elements of the [decision](#) include:

- The conclusion of the GlaSS work programme on the GGA;
- The adoption of the GGA framework, known as the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, whose purpose is to guide the achievement of the GGA and the review of overall progress in achieving it;
- Agreement on “thematic” targets related to water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty eradication and cultural heritage with a 2030 timeline but quite short on specifics: there are no sub-goals or attempt to quantify the targets and there are no specific funding goals;
- Agreement on targets set by reference to the iterative adaptation cycle, and related to 1) impact, vulnerability and risk assessment 2) planning 3) implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning;

- It makes it clear that efforts in relation to the above targets are voluntary and country-driven and that no additional reporting burden is placed on Parties as a result;
- The launch of a two-year UAE – Belém work programme on key indicators for measuring progress achieved towards the above targets with a view to identifying and developing indicators and potential quantified elements for those targets;
- A recognition that means of implementation and enabling factors, including leadership, institutional arrangements, policies, data, public participation and strengthened and inclusive governance, are key to the implementation of adaptation action;
- It urges developed countries and other Parties to mobilize support for developing countries for the implementation of the UAE Framework and reiterates the call to developed countries to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025; the decision however falls short of actual targets for mobilizing funds;
- It highlights the need for a clear definition of “transformational adaptation”, to be examined by the Secretariat along with a method for assessing transformational approaches’ progress at a global level.

NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLANS (NAPs)

Under this item, informal consultations were held based on the [SBI's draft text elements](#) from the SB58 in June 2023.

Developing countries continued to push for the scaling-up of means of implementation (MOI), understood as technology, capacity-building and climate finance, by developed countries to enable implementation of adaptation plans. But developed countries argued for these discussions to take place in the context of negotiations on MOI.

Also, parties debated whether to prioritize the text from SBI 58 or share their adaptation priorities for NAPs progress review, including matters such as local stakeholders' engagement, capacity-building, monitoring and evaluation and highlighting links to the GST and the GGA. In addition, proposals to amend the language of the negotiating text to accommodate issues such as the inclusion of indigenous peoples' adaptation knowledge as part of the "best-available science" were made by developing countries.

No significant progress was made on the foregoing issues and no consensus on a decision text. The [draft conclusions](#) by the SBI Chair therefore limit themselves to noting the actions and steps necessary to initiate the assessment of progress in the process of formulating and implementing NAPs and agreed to continue the consideration of this matter at SB60.

In addition, NAPs are included in the GST outcomes – which recognize the significant challenges developing countries face in accessing finance for implementing their

NAPs – and the decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG) which confirms that the deliberations on the scale and elements of the NCQG will take into consideration amongst others, the need to support implementation of and NAPs.

ADAPTATION COMMITTEE: Report of the Adaptation Committee

During the climate conference in Dubai, the [October 2023 report of the Adaptation Committee \(AC\)](#) and review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Committee were considered, covering the Adaptation Committee's work from October 2022 to October 2023 .

The parties welcomed the AC report but couldn't agree on several issues. Some of the discussions revolved around the integration of forward-looking elements to enhance resilience and the need for more engagement with the IPCC. The most significant impediment to consensus on how to proceed with the report emerged as the Co-Facilitators presented a single draft text document with two parts: one part of the text focusing on the review of the AC, and the other focusing on the AC report itself. Debates ensued over whether to assess both sections jointly or separately, revealing a divergence among parties. Some argued for joint consideration, emphasizing the inclusion of all salient issues in the review, while others advocated for separate discussions on the two parts.

Eventually, the COP Presidency announced in the joint COP and CMA plenary held in the final days that this item would be up for consideration at the 60th sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 2024 due to a lack of consensus on how to proceed at COP 28.

ADAPTATION FUND

The CMP and CMA considered the [report of the Adaptation Fund Board](#).

During informal consultations, discussions centered on the need for increased financial contributions and for additional guidance and modalities, particularly related to the Global Environment Facility ([GEF](#)), when the Fund serves the Paris Agreement.

This first point is reflected in the [CMP decision from Dubai](#) which, amongst others, notes with concern the outstanding pledged contributions to the Fund and urges parties to fulfil their pledges as soon as possible; and requests the Fund Board to continue to enhance access to the Fund and country ownership by considering strengthening the readiness activities for national implementing entities.

These topics are also addressed in the [CMA decision from Dubai](#), which also recalls [decision 3/CMP.16](#), which confirms that parties to the Paris Agreement are eligible for membership on the Fund's Board; and encourages the Fund's Board to continue its consideration of its rules of procedure in the context of serving the Paris Agreement, including after the SBI has concluded consideration of matters related to membership of the Fund's Board.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

Loss and damage is one of the most sensitive topics on the climate agenda, as it addresses the impacts of climate change that cannot or are not being avoided or overcome through mitigation or adaptation measures. Damaging effects such as rising sea levels, storms, floods and forest fires are intensifying in frequency and severity, and addressing how the international community should tackle irreversible climate-related damage when adaptation is no longer feasible is crucial for developing countries. The Paris Agreement brings the issue of Loss and Damage within its Article 8, which states that Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, as appropriate, on a co-operative and facilitative basis, regarding the loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

LOSS AND DAMAGE FUND

At the climate conference in Sharm el Sheikh, countries decided to create funding arrangements and a fund for Loss and Damage ([decision 2/CMA.4](#) and [decision 2/CP.27](#)). They also established a [Transitional Committee](#), tasked with presenting recommendations for the operationalisation of the fund and funding arrangements, to be presented at COP 28.

In Dubai, on the first day of COP 28, countries adopted an unprecedented decision, adopting the [recommendations](#) of the Transitional Committee and defining the rules for operationalising the Loss and Damage Fund.

The decision, among other things:

- **Recalls the purpose of the Fund, which is to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events;**
- **Decides that the Fund will be serviced by a new, dedicated and independent secretariat and will be governed and supervised by a Board to be appointed by the Parties;**
- **Approves the Governing Instrument of the Fund (contained in annex I of the decision);**
- **The Board will have, among other responsibilities, the duty to define the operational modalities and access to the Fund's resources, effectively detailing and applying the rules and principles established in the TC decision;**
- **The Secretariat will be hosted and the Fund administered on an interim basis by the World Bank, for the next 4 years, and should start operating once the Board has defined its operational modalities, and these have been presented to COP 29. The World Bank interim administration of the Fund is conditional on its observance of governing rules established in the decision (set out in para.20) and by the Board. If, at the end of the 4-year period, the conditions have been met, the World Bank will continue in its role. If the conditions have not been met, the COP and CMA will take steps to establish the Fund as an independent stand-alone institution;**
- **Eligibility: Although the decision explicitly allows all developing countries to directly access the resources from the Fund, including through subnational, national and regional entities, it is conjectured that the operational and access modalities, financial instruments and funding structures, still to be defined by the Board, may limit the access and prioritize the particularly vulnerable developing countries, as per the Fund purpose. Observance of these guidelines will probably be monitored closely, as it is one of the conditions for the World Bank to maintain its conditional administration of the Fund;**
- **The Fund should operate in a manner that promotes coherence and complementarity with new and existing funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change across the international financial, climate, humanitarian, disaster risk reduction and development architectures;**
- **The Fund will operate in a transparent and accountable manner guided by efficiency and effectiveness and sound financial management, and it will pursue a country ownership approach to programmes and projects and seek to promote and strengthen national response systems through, among other means, the effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders, including non-State actors;**
- **The Fund will provide resources in the form of grants or loans on highly concessional terms, and may use other financial instruments that take into account debt sustainability;**
- **The Board will develop simplified procedures and criteria and modalities to facilitate access to the Fund;**

- The Board should have equitable and balanced representation of all Parties, being comprise of 26 members (12 from developed countries, 3 members from Asia-Pacific States, 3 members from African States, 3 members from Latin American and Caribbean States, 2 members from SIDS, 2 members from the LDCs and 1 member from a developing country not included in the regional groups or constituencies. All voting member nominations for the Board were submitted early March 2024. The UNFCCC secretariat has now convened the first meeting of the Board between the 30th of April and the 2nd of May 2024 in the UAE.
- Alongside with the funding arrangements for expeditious operationalization of the Fund, the decision also urges developed country Parties to continue to provide support, for activities to address loss and damage.
- The consortium should promote cost-benefit analyses of various potential locations to determine the secretariat's headquarters.
- In addition to the headquarters, UN regional and sub-regional offices around the world could be used to provide services, infrastructure and support to developing countries, ensuring the dispersion and presence of the Network in the various regions.
- The Santiago Network secretariat should coordinate its efforts with the work of other UNFCCC institutions, especially the secretariat of the Loss and Damage Fund and the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism, taking into account their complementary relationships.

THE SANTIAGO NETWORK

The Parties also adopted a decision defining the host of the Santiago Network, a platform created in 2019 in Madrid to promote technical assistance to vulnerable countries in the field of loss and damage. To summarise, at COP 28 was decided that:

- The secretariat will be hosted by a consortium between the UN offices for disaster and risk reduction (UNDRR) and project services (UNOPS) for an initial term of five years.
- The Consortium is encouraged to explore areas for collaboration with the Caribbean Development Bank, which also submitted a proposal for hosting the secretariat.
- The secretariat should report to and operate in accordance with the guidance of the Santiago Network Advisory Board.

THE WARSAW INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM

Article 8 of the Paris Agreement incorporated into this treaty the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), which was created in 2013 at COP 19 as an instrument to seek to deepen studies and capacity building to understand the risks of loss and damage and develop ways to avoid, reduce or address these risks. Although the Paris Agreement defined that the WIM would be subject to the authority and guidance of the CMA, there was no definition of the governance dynamics between the two treaties - whether decisions would be taken by the COP and/or the CMA, whether they would be joint decisions or whether the functions would be divided.

Although it seems like a mere formality, this vagueness has impacted decision-making capacity on agenda items that may have implications on governance issues, such as the WIM. For example, in 2021 the governance of the WIM was being debated in ministerial consultations, with many developing countries calling for the WIM to be governed jointly by the COP and the CMA, whilst some developed Parties would only accept the governance by the CMA.

In Dubai, the parties welcomed the [report](#) of the WIM [Executive Committee](#), in a [decision](#) that noted, among other things:

- Appreciation of the work carried out by the Committee and the thematic expert groups and the progress made in drafting technical guides.
- Encouragement for the Executive Committee to continue strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies with relevant bodies and organizations, both within and outside the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.
- Request that the Committee actively engage with the work of the Santiago Network and seek ways to collaborate with the entities that make up the funding mechanisms and arrangements.
- Consideration of WIM governance issues should continue at COP 29.

MITIGATION

As there is a direct relation between global average temperatures and the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, mitigation -understood as efforts to reduce emissions and enhance sinks- is key for the solution to the climate change problem. There are various negotiation streams related to mitigation.

In Glasgow, in 2021, Parties decided to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation, the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme ([MWP](#)). This program would be complementary to the GST.

At the climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh ([decision 4/CMA.4](#)), the format and scope of the programme was defined, and it became the “Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme”. The Parties decided that the MWP would be operationalised through focused exchanges of views, information, and ideas, and that its outcomes would not be prescriptive or punitive, but facilitative and respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances; and would not single out specific sectors or result in new targets or goals.

The decision also established that at least two global dialogues on mitigation would occur each year and that implementation of the programme would begin immediately after COP 27/CMA 4 and be reviewed in 2026.

Two global dialogues were held in 2023. They focused on accelerating a just energy transition. The annual report of the work programme captured key findings of both events, and can be found [here](#).

In Dubai, the topic was covered under the CMA 5 agenda item 6, “Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme referred to in decision 4/CMA.4”.

Negotiations on this topic were tense due to potential overlaps with those on the GST and concerns of fossil fuel producing countries which considered that the energy sector was “singled out” by the dialogues organized in 2023 and the report.

Some developing countries were also concerned that the discussions surrounding investment, would focus on the private sector and divert attention from the responsibilities of developed country governments to provide finance to developing countries.

As a result, most of the substantive mitigation outcomes were included in the GST decision and the MWP [decision](#) became much more procedural, as the points below show.

The decision in this matter:

- Welcomes the organization of, and takes note of the discussion at, the second annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition held on 9 December 2023, and welcomes the presentation on the annual report,
- Welcomes the focused exchange of views, information and ideas among participants during the global dialogues and investment-focused events held under the work programme in 2023,
- Notes the key findings, opportunities, barriers and actionable solutions summarized in the annual report on the work programme, recognizing that it does not represent an exhaustive summary of all views.

Regarding next steps, the decision requests:

- The secretariat to organize, under the guidance of the co-chairs of the work programme, future global dialogues and investment-focused events in a manner that enables effective engagement of participants, which may be held in conjunction with existing events, such as the regional climate weeks; and
- The Subsidiary Bodies to consider progress, including key findings, opportunities and barriers, in implementing the work programme.

FINANCE

Climate finance is a cross-cutting subject that permeates nearly all areas of the international climate regime. At the heart of the Paris Agreement, climate finance is set as one of the treaty’s objectives: to make “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Article 2.1c). Furthermore, climate finance is also referred to as a means of implementation, determining that “developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention” (Article 9.1).

Negotiations on climate finance under the UNFCCC are based on the operational definition by the Standing Committee on Finance ([SCF](#)) that: “climate finance aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts”.¹²

In Dubai, the agenda of climate finance negotiations was broad and encompassed many items, such as (I) long-term climate finance, (II) matters relating to the SCF, and (III) the NCQG.

¹²Standing Committee on Finance, 2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report, available at: https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/2014_biennial_assessment_and_overview_of_climate_finance_flows_report_web.pdf

LONG TERM FINANCE

In 2009, developed countries pledged to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries ([Decision 2/CP.15](#)). Fast forward to 2021, developed countries acknowledged that they had failed to meet the target for 2020,¹³ and requested the SCF to prepare a report in 2022 on progress towards achieving the target ([Decision 4/CP.26](#)). At the following climate conference in 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh, countries expressed “serious concern that the goal” had not been met and urged “developed country Parties to meet the goal” ([Decision 13/CP.27](#)).

At the climate conference in Dubai, countries continued their discussions on the progress and fulfilment of the target. Heated debates took place, including on the language referring to efforts deployed and the possible achievement of the goal in 2022 by developed countries, on the lack of common definition of climate finance and agreed methodologies to track it, as well as financing burdens and access-related issues faced by developing countries.

In the end, the related COP [decision](#), among others:

- notes with “deep regret that the goal” was not met in 2021;
- welcomes the ongoing efforts undertaken by developed countries;
- notes the different estimates in the report by the SCF on progress towards achieving the goal and recognizes the lack of a common definition and accounting methodology in this regard (included in the SCF report was an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ([OECD](#)) report which

concluded that the goal was likely to have been met in 2022. Developed countries pushed for this to be explicitly recognised but developing countries opposed it);

- acknowledges the “fiscal constraints and increasing costs” arising from adaptation efforts;
- emphasizes the need for further efforts to enhance access to climate finance, including through harmonized, simplified, and direct access procedures, to address the needs of developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States;
- Urges developed countries to “fully deliver the USD100 billion per year goal urgently and through 2025, noting the significant role of public funds”.

MATTERS RELATING TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The SCF supports coherence and coordination in the delivery of finance inside and outside the UNFCCC. In [decision 14/CP.27](#), parties noted with concern that, despite the increase in climate finance flows in 2019-2020 compared to the previous biennial period, the amount remained small relative to the overall needs of developing countries. The importance of “enhancing methodologies for measuring and reporting on the results and impacts of climate finance” was stressed and “the complexities associated with the diversity of definitions of climate finance” were noted. Parties entrusted the SCF to elaborate a set of reports for further consideration of the COP and CMA.

¹³Climate Finance Delivery Plan available here:

<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230401054904/https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf>

In Dubai, discussions under the COP and the CMA related to the report of the SCF and its attachments,¹⁴ and to the second review of the SCF's functions. On the latter, countries could not agree on a way forward. Disagreement related to whether the CMA is to affirm the COP decision or to elaborate distinct substantive points. Several developing countries objected to the idea that the SCF is equally under the authority and guidance of both CMA and COP. Discussions on the second review will continue at SBI 61 (November 2024).

With regard to the SCF's report and its attachments, the COP noted the report and endorsed the SCF's workplan for 2024. It also requests the SCF to consider updating its operational definition of climate finance, and to prepare a report on common practices regarding climate finance definitions, reporting and accounting methods, by COP 29 (November 2024).

In addition, the CMA [decision](#):

- determines to continue and strengthen the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c), and its complementarity with Article 9, both of the Paris Agreement;
- recognizes “the urgent need to scale up adaptation finance”;
- encourages parties to consider implementing the recommendations in the executive summary of the report on the doubling of adaptation finance;¹⁵
- invites developed countries to enhance transparency of their efforts to double adaptation finance, including by providing “relevant information on a baseline” towards it; and

- requests the secretariat to organize at least two workshops per year and requests the co-chairs of the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue to prepare a report on the deliberations in 2024 and 2025 for consideration by the CMA 6 and CMA 7 (November 2024 and 2025 respectively).

NEW COLLECTIVE QUANTIFIED GOAL ON CLIMATE FINANCE

Through [Decision 1/CP.21](#), countries decided to set “a new collective quantified goal from a [starting point] of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”. In 2021, they established an ad hoc work programme for 2022-2024, with yearly technical expert dialogues (TEDs) to further develop the views of parties and non-parties stakeholders on the elements of the NCQG ([Decision 9/CMA.3](#)). In Sharm el-Sheikh, [Decision 5/CMA.4](#) noted with appreciation the work undertaken in the first year of the programme, whilst acknowledging the need for substantive progress, and provided guidance for the work in 2023.

In Dubai, countries considered the [annual report](#) of the co-chairs of the ad hoc work programme and [the summary](#) of the high-level ministerial dialogue. With a decision on the goal due at COP29/CMA6, much of the discussion focussed on the mode of work in 2024 and how to ensure enough time is allocated to textual negotiations, TEDs and political-level engagement. The CMA decision, among others:

¹⁴<https://unfccc.int/documents/632278>

¹⁵https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2023_02a01_cma2023_08a01.pdf

- “acknowledges the significant progress made under the ad hoc work programme in 2023”;
- decides “to transition to a mode of work to enable the development of a draft negotiating text” for consideration by the CMA.6;
- acknowledges the need for the ad hoc work programme to build on the technical work conducted and the submissions made thereunder and allow for deliberations among Parties that are conducive to the development of a draft negotiating text for consideration by the CMA 6;
- decides to take into consideration and build on the outcome of the first global stocktake and the framework for the global goal on adaptation in its deliberations on the new collective quantified goal;
- confirms that the deliberations on the scale and elements of the new collective quantified goal will take into consideration the exigent need to support implementation of current NDCs and NAPs and adaptation communications, increase and accelerate ambition, and reflect the evolving needs of developing country Parties, and the need for enhanced provision and mobilization of climate finance from a wide variety of sources and instruments and channels.
- decides to conduct at least three TEDs and three meetings to enable Parties to engage in developing the substantive framework for a draft negotiating text under the ad hoc work programme in 2024;
- invites submissions in advance of each TED and meeting under the ad hoc work programme;
- requests the secretariat to prepare a compilation and synthesis of those submissions;
- decides to convene the 2024 high-level ministerial dialogue on the NCQG well before CMA 6 to provide guidance to set the NCQG at that session;
- requests the co-chairs to include, in their annual report to be issued no later than 4 weeks prior to CMA 6, a substantive framework for a draft negotiating text capturing progress made.

ARTICLE 6

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows parties to cooperate using voluntary market-based and non-market-based approaches in order to implement their NDCs. Paragraphs 2-7 of this Article outline two different market-based approaches: the first one involves the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) between two or more parties (Art. 6.2 PA); the second one envisages the creation of a central mechanism, governed by a Supervisory Body (Art. 6.4 PA). This mechanism will enable generation of emissions reductions units, pursuant to methodologies approved by the Supervisory Body. Paragraph 8 of the Article provides for a framework of non-market approaches.

ARTICLE 6.2

Article 6.2 negotiations started ahead of most other negotiation streams at climate conference in Dubai because an informal note with a proposed negotiating draft text had already been shared by the SBSTA Chair two weeks before the conference. The lengthy 29 pages text comprised a long list of 17 topics, as follows:

- I. Scope and definition of a cooperative approach**
- II. Process for managing common nomenclatures**
- III. Authorization**
 - A. Authorization of cooperative approaches**
 - B. Authorization of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes**
 - C. Authorization of entities**
- IV. Application of first transfer**
- V. Agreed electronic format**
- VI. Tables for submitting annual information as part of the regular information**
- VII. Sequencing and timing**
- VIII. Process of identifying, notifying and correcting inconsistencies in data**
- IX. Inconsistencies identified in Article 6 technical expert reviews**
- X. Modalities for reviewing information that is confidential**
- XI. Special circumstances of the least developed countries and small island developing States**
- XII. Application of methods for converting the non-greenhouse gas metric into tonnes of carbon dioxide**
- XIII. Additional functionalities and procedures for the international registry**
 - A. Article 6, paragraph 4, emission reductions in the international registry [and participating Party registries]**
 - B. Provision of services to cooperative approaches**
- XIV. Accounts in the international registry and the role of the international registry administrator**
 - A. Accounts in the international registry**
 - B. Role[s] of the international registry administrator [and the administrators of Party-specific sections in the international registry]**

XV. Submission of information by Parties using the international registry

XVI. Funding secretariat activities relating to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement

XVII. Work programme

However, such anticipation was not enough to enable Parties to successfully achieve consensus on this challenging agenda.

There were diverging views in most of the topics, starting with the first one, on the definition of cooperative approaches under article 6.2. This was a new topic (it was not mandated by the CMA 4 decision), added at the request of some parties, who feared there was a misalignment on basic understandings about the scope of the article 6.2 cooperative approaches, including on whether they would be limited to approaches between two or more parties to the Paris Agreement or would cover approaches carried out between one party and other actors. Furthermore, parties did not agree on issues like the scope, content and timing of the authorizations, and the template for the Agreed Electronic Format (AEF), among others.

After exhausting all-night discussions left to the very last minute at the end of the conference, it was not possible to find a middle ground, and no decision at all was reached.

The discussions will therefore continue in 2024 and the agenda will be addressed again at SBSTA 60 and SBSTA 61, with a view to adopt a decision at CMA 6 in November 2024.

ARTICLE 6.4

As with Article 6.2, the SBSTA Chair had also shared an informal note with a proposed negotiating draft text ahead of the climate conference in Dubai, enabling Parties more time to digest and prepare for the negotiations. The list of topics was more manageable, with only 6 pages and four matters to be discussed at the SBSTA level, as follows:

- I - Emission avoidance and conservation enhancement activities
- II - Article 6, paragraph 4, mechanism registry
- III - Authorization of Article 6, paragraph 4, emission reductions
- IV - Other matters (National arrangements)

Nonetheless, in addition to the SBSTA list of topics, the CMA 5 mandate also included approval of a set of recommendations from the Supervisory Body, including the following:

- Requirements for the development and assessment of methodologies for the mechanism, and the requirements for activities involving removals under the mechanism;
- Exemption of the least developed countries from the share of proceeds for adaptation, while acknowledging that they may choose not to make use of this exemption;
- Transition of afforestation and reforestation project activities and programmes of activities registered under the clean development mechanism to the mechanism under Article 6.4 by no later than 30 June 2024.

Discussions on removals had already proved to be contentious since the recommendations submitted by the Supervisory Body at CMA 4 were rejected, and the CMA requested the Supervisory Body to revise them on the basis of inputs from stakeholders. Consultations took place over 2023 with more than 400 submissions, and resulted in what was called a “technology-neutral” recommendation - one that would not clearly identify accepted technologies, but provide general guidance as to the criteria that must be observed by such methodologies.

In Dubai, such generic and concise guidance was not welcomed by some parties, and the suggested compromise approach was to adopt the guidance but request the Supervisory Body to do further work to complement it. Other issues such as the connection between the mechanism registry and the International Registry under Article 6.2 were also contentious, but Parties seemed to be engaged in finding compromise. However, these compromises could not be accepted by the European Union, who declared they would not agree to any decision under Article 6.4 until a decision on Article 6.2 was achieved, considering these to be part of a “package decision”.

The result was that there was no decision on Article 6.4 at CMA 5 as well, and the discussions will resume at SBSTA 60 and SBSTA 61, with a view to adopt a decision at CMA 6 in November 2024.

ARTICLE 6.8

The discussions under Article 6.8 at CMA 5 included spin-off groups and an in-session workshop, including plenary presentations and round-table discussions. The first part of the workshop focused on cooperation and engagement on non-market approaches (NMAs) related to forests and their ecosystem. The second part was aimed at exchanging information more broadly on NMAs including on:

- best practices and lessons learned from identifying, developing and implementing them
- the financial, technology and capacity-building support they may require and
- the support available.

Parties reported that these interactions were useful and expressed their intention to continue working in this manner. However, Parties were disappointed that the UNFCCC web-based platform on NMAs was not ready to be tested at CMA 5, contrary to what was scheduled. In addition, there were diverging views about mentioning finance for Article 6.8 activities as well as encouraging “carbon pricing” policies as a non-market approach.

In the end, Parties were able to reach a decision that included:

- A request for the secretariat to develop a manual on the process for submitting and recording information on NMAs on the UNFCCC web-based platform;
- An invitation for submissions by 31 March 2024 on views and information on: (a) Themes for spin-off groups; (b) Existing NMAs under the initial focus areas of the work-programme activities;

- The organization of an in-session workshop, including round-table discussions, to:

- exchange information and articulate cooperation opportunities on specific NMAs proposed by interested Parties, and
- focus on the engagement of relevant stakeholders as well as Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including representatives of the Facilitative Working Group of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform;

- A request for the secretariat to prepare a report on the workshop in line with decision 8/CMA.4, paragraph 10, including on the joint mitigation and adaptation approaches referred to in Article 5.2 of the Paris Agreement;

- as part of the broader Article 6 capacity-building programme- reiterating to the secretariat to include activities related to Article 6.8, including to build the capacity of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and other relevant stakeholders to participate in the relevant work-programme activities.

In terms of next steps, parties will continue with the first phase of the work programme: to identify all relevant elements of the work programme activities and operationalize the UNFCCC web-based platform for recording and exchanging information on NMAs. In this regard, the secretariat is requested to make it operational as soon as possible, before SBSTA 60 in June 2024.

JUST TRANSITION

Up until COP27/CMA4 in 2022, the concept of just transition had been discussed under the workstream of “response measures” in the UNFCCC. However, countries saw the need to create a separate work programme on just transition, perhaps to acknowledge that the issue is not only one of transition of the labour force and green technology (which is how it was discussed under response measures). As a result, [decision I/CMA.4](#) (paras. 50-53) established a Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement under a just and equitable transition.

During the course of 2023, and much of COP28/CMA5, Parties debated on the operationalisation of the work programme: its scope, its goals and implementation, as well as whether and how to define ‘just transition’.

Eventually, the decision [text](#) published in the early hours of 13th December confirms that the objective of the JTWP is to discuss pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2.1. Parties also decided on “elements” to be included in the work:

- Just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2.1, in the context of Article 2.2 (see [Guide to the Paris Agreement section on Article 2 of the Paris Agreement here](#)).
- Just and equitable transition, which encompasses pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection so as to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition.

- Opportunities, challenges and barriers relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication as part of transitions globally to low emissions and climate resilience, taking into account nationally defined development priorities.
- Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience at the national and international level.
- Just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities, including through social dialogue, social protection and the recognition of labour rights.
- Inclusive and participatory approaches to just transitions that leave no one behind.
- International cooperation as an enabler of just transition pathways towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.

On the ‘how’ the JTWP will be carried out:

- a joint contact group will be convened at each of SBSTA and SBI sessions, starting at SB60 (June 2024), after which the SBs recommend a draft decision to the CMA for consideration and adoption at each of its sessions.
- at least two dialogues (in hybrid format) shall be held each year, on opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers relevant to topics submitted by Parties, observers and other non-Party stakeholders.
- outcomes of relevant work of the UNFCCC constituted bodies and under other UNFCCC workstreams, and ongoing work outside the UNFCCC process may be taken into consideration.

In terms of results of the JTWP, Parties requested the Chairs of the SBs and the secretariat to prepare an annual summary report on the dialogues and a summary report on the JTWP activities, respectively.

Parties also decided to start implementing the work programme immediately after the conference with a view to it informing the second GST and other relevant processes. The effectiveness and efficiency of the work programme will be reviewed and its continuation considered during 2026.

TECHNOLOGY

Technology negotiations refer to parties' effort towards the development and transfer of technology towards climate mitigation and resilience. COP 16 established the [Technology Mechanism](#), comprising the TEC ([Technology Executive Committee](#), the policy arm) and the CTCN ([Climate Technology Centre and Network](#), the implementation arm), to facilitate implementation of enhanced action on technology development and transfer.

During the climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, the TEC and the CTCN launched a [joint work programme](#) that brought together, for the first time, the long-term strategies of the TEC and the CTCN and defined areas of focus for the mechanism as a whole, in order to increase its impact. It was also agreed that the technology transfer needs and challenges would be captured during the GST process. This was accomplished as the GST output does reference the persistent gaps in technology transfer, the unequal access to technology and the importance to address those.

The COP 28 and CMA 5 agenda on technology included consideration of the TEC and CTCN's [first joint annual report](#).

The SBs agreed on a draft decision that was passed and approved by the COP 28 and CMA 5.

The main points include:

- Parties had debated whether to 'welcoming' or 'taking note' of the report during the SBs, as they disagreed on their appreciation of the TEC and CTCN work. Finally, the draft decision and COP 28 / CMA 5 welcomes the joint annual report of the TEC and CTCN and the progress of the implementation of the joint work programme of the Technology Mechanism for 2023-2027 and the technology framework, as well as enhanced coordination and collaboration between the TEC and CTCN, including through their adoption of new and improved modalities of work;
- The decision also invites them to continue their efforts to enhance the exchange of systematic feedback on their work, including on the provision of technical assistance and related policy recommendations;
- Invites the TEC and CTCN to report on the progress of the support provided to national designated entities, and parties to explore ways of enhancing the provision of technical and logistical support to their national designated entities and improving national level coordination;

- Requests the TEC and CTCN to enhance awareness of artificial intelligence (AI) and implement the Technology Mechanism initiative on AI giving special attention to the capacity needs for its use and consider how it can support the implementation of technology needs assessment outcomes and the joint work programme of the Technology Mechanism for 2023-2027; and
- Notes the insufficient transfer and deployment of technology in developing countries, encourages the TEC and CTCN to continue collaborating with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and relevant financial institutions, and calls for regional balance in this work.

The decisions also refer to gender in two instances:

- Commending the TEC and CTCN on their continued efforts to mainstream gender considerations in the implementation of the joint work programme of the Technology Mechanism for 2023–2027, including the launch of the global roster of gender and climate change technology experts and the endorsement of the CTCN gender policy and action plan (para. 10); and
- Noting with concern that gender balance has not yet been achieved in the composition of the TEC and advisory board of the CTCN and (in the COP decision only) encourages Parties to take steps to achieve a gender balance by nominating more female candidates as members of these bodies (para. 13).

Launching the global roster of gender and climate change technology experts was promoted by Chile, as part of the country's efforts towards gender balance in the negotiations.

It is expected that SB 60 will focus on the link between the technological and financial mechanisms. COP 29 will see another joint report of the TEC and CTCN, and the consideration of the Poznan strategic program ([PSP](#)) on technology transfer at SBI61 (November 2024). The PSP, through the GEF, provides funding to climate technology development and transfer activities and the Technology Implementation Programme. Considering that many of the climate technology activities under the Poznan strategic programme have been completed, the SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 61 (November 2024) with a view to taking stock of progress and successes in and lessons learned from implementing the Poznan strategic programme, and the results of the global stocktake relating to technology, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption at COP 29 (November 2024) with the aim of supporting the implementation of activities, such as those identified and prioritized in developing countries' NDCs, NAPs, technology needs assessments and technology action plans, and long-term strategies.

CAPACITY BUILDING

The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement all aim to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to respond effectively to climate change and its adverse effects.

RESPONSE MEASURES

The [Paris Committee on Capacity Building \(PCCB\)](#) is the main body that addresses gaps and needs in implementing capacity building in developing countries and enhances the coherence and coordination of capacity-building activities. Its current [workplan](#) is due to finish at the end of this year.

In Dubai, the COP and CMA acknowledged developing countries continue to have persistent gaps in capacity and urgent needs for effectively implementing the Paris Agreement and welcomed the PCCB's [2023 technical progress report](#) and took note of the recommendations in the report, and adopted the [terms of reference](#) for its second review.

In terms of next steps:

- **Annual technical progress report:** parties and other stakeholders are invited to consider the recommendations and take any necessary action; and
- **Second review of the progress and need for extension of the PCCB:** the review will start at SBI 60 (June 2024) and should complete by SBI 61 (November 2024). The outcome of the review should then be captured in a decision of the COP 29 and CMA 6 (November 2024).

In the margins of Dubai, the 5th Capacity-building Hub showcased efforts to enhance climate action through the lens of capacity-building. All sessions of the Hub are on its YouTube [channel](#).

The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement all recognise that implementing “response measures” (mainly measures to reduce emissions) can impact countries’ economies. In 2011, a Forum was set up to understand and address these impacts. The Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures ([KCI](#)) was created to support the Forum’s work in 2018.

At COP 27, the planned midterm review of the workplan of the Forum and its KCI could not be concluded. Parties therefore carried on with this during the year. In addition, the review of the Forum’s functions, work programme and modalities also took place in 2023.

In Dubai, the COP and CMA adopted [a joint decision](#) which among others:

- Adopts the expanded list of functions, work programme and amended modalities of the Forum and its KCI ([annex I](#)) and requests the SB 69 to review these every five years, starting in 2028;
- Decides that the Forum shall develop and recommend a five-year workplan in line with its functions, work programme and modalities by SB61 (November 2024);
- Requests the KCI to propose updates to its rules of procedure for ultimate consideration and adoption by COP 29 /CMA 6 (November 2024);

- Takes note that the Forum concluded the midterm review of its workplan and that of its KCI and requests both to implement the activities arising from the outcomes of the review contained in [annex II](#) in 2024 and 2025 (including developing regional case-studies and build awareness about the positive and negative impacts associated with low and zero emission transport technologies);
- Requests the Forum and its KCI to implement the decision's recommendations and for the KCI to report on progress made in its annual report; and
- Requests the secretariat to organize a two-day global dialogue in conjunction with the KCI's intersessional meetings in 2024 and 2025, in hybrid format, and notes that the forum will consider further dialogues at SB 63 (November 2025). Parties and others are invited to submit views on topics for the global dialogues which the SB Chairs will decide on. The secretariat will prepare a summary report of each global dialogue.

GENDER

In 2014, the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) was established, followed by the Gender Action Plan (GAP) in 2017. At the climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, amendments to the GAP were adopted, emphasising the participation of young women, indigenous people and local communities. In addition, [Decision 24/CP.27](#) invited the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to organise a workshop on gender-sensitive climate action and just transition. The decision also emphasized the importance of promoting gender balance within delegations and enhancing inclusivity in the UNFCCC process.

In Dubai, the COP 28 [decision](#) on Gender and Climate Change recognized the achievements of the Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Action Plan, highlighting the necessity of continued progress in this area.

Key elements of the proposed review and enhancement of the gender-focused initiatives within the UNFCCC framework include:

- A request to the SBI for initiate the final review of the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan during its sixtieth session in June 2024. The goal is to complete this review by the sixty-first session in November 2024. The focus will be on assessing progress, identifying challenges, pinpointing gaps, and determining priorities;
- An invitation for Parties, UN entities, bodies constituted under the UNFCCC, and relevant organizations to provide their perspectives on the implementation of the Gender Action Plan. These insights, particularly regarding progress, challenges, gaps, and priorities, are to be submitted by 31 March 2024. Submissions should include specific deliverables or outcomes for each activity within the plan and propose future directions for gender and climate change initiatives;
- A request to the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report from the submissions, to organise a workshop at the sixtieth SBI session, with focused regional-level and global-level discussions, and. to prepare a summary report reflecting the discussions held at the workshop.

ACTION FOR CLIMATE EMPOWERMENT (ACE)

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) refers to measures to strengthen education and public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation (under Article 6 of the UNFCCC and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement). Discussions around the greater participation of youth are also included under this agenda.

At COP 26, in Glasgow, parties decided to establish the Glasgow Work Programme on ACE to include and empower society, especially youth, more effectively in the negotiations.

At COP 27, in Sharm el-Sheikh, parties adopted a 4-year ACE Action Plan under the Glasgow Work Programme on ACE. The action plan establishes short-term, clear and time-bound activities up to COP 31 in 2026, and aims to empower all of society to engage in climate action, particularly children and youth, respecting, promoting and considering obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and the empowerment of women. The decision also foresaw the annual dialogue on ACE, and Parties and non-party stakeholders were invited to make suggestions on its structure.

The [2023 event \(ACE Dialogue\)](#) discussed the monitoring, evaluation and reporting of ACE implementation, keeping in mind its linkages with other priority areas under the Glasgow work programme. It took place in Bonn, in conjunction with the subsidiary bodies' (SBs) meeting in June.

The annual summary report of the work programme can be found [here](#).

In Dubai, the topic was covered under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) agenda item 19, “Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment”. However, no consensus was achieved and according with rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, the theme will continue to be discussed in the SBI’s 60th session in Bonn this year.

TRANSPARENCY

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes an enhanced transparency mechanism called the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). This article stipulates that all Parties must submit reports on their performance and measures to achieve the commitments made through their respective NDCs, as well as disclose inventories of their GHG emissions. In addition, reporting on information on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support provided by developed countries to developing countries is mandatory. Reporting on information on climate change impacts and adaptation is optional for all. Developing countries may also report on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support needed and received. For more information Article 13, please see the [Guide to the Paris Agreement](#).¹⁶

¹⁶<https://legalresponse.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Guide-to-the-Paris-Agreement.pdf#page=99>.

The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have discretion as to when they report, the scope, frequency, and level of detail of reporting (and in the scope of the review).

At the climate conference in Katowice ([Decision 18/CMA.1](#)), countries opted for a common set of rules, applicable to all Parties, but with flexibility for developing countries that need it, in light of their capacities. It was also decided that in this first round, the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) must be submitted by 31 December 2024.

After the Parties adopted common formatting tables in Glasgow for reporting emissions and monitoring progress towards meeting the NDCs, in Sharm El Sheikh, they defined ways of reporting and reviewing information related to adaptation and the impacts of climate change in their respective territories.

With the countries having agreed on the content of the BTRs, negotiations on transparency are currently centered on the flow of funding and capacity building so that all countries can comply with the reporting rules. [Decision 17/CMA.4](#) asked the GEF to take the necessary measures to guarantee the required financial support for Parties to prepare their reports. The issue was discussed at SB 58, with special attention to ensure that the financial flows to developing countries needed to prepare the BTRs are provided with the necessary speed and continuity.

In Dubai, the topic was covered under the agenda item "Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: Provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity-building".

Among other things, the [decision](#):

- Acknowledges the increased allocation in the GEF's climate change focal area, including the Capacity Building for Transparency Initiative;
- Appreciates the launch of the [Climate Transparency Platform](#), an online tool to facilitate reporting by developing countries under the ETF; and
- Underscores the importance of the adequacy, predictability and timeliness of the support provided to developing countries, recognising the special circumstances of LDC and SIDS, to build and enhance their institutional and technical capacity to implement the ETF.

Regarding the next steps, the decision requests the secretariat to:

- Organise an in-person workshop at SBI 60, as well as regional online workshops prior to that session, to support developing countries in preparing their BTRs and enhancing sustainable institutional capacity and national reporting systems;
- Organise an in-session facilitative dialogue, to be held at SBI 60, to facilitate the sharing of experience that may be helpful for developing country Parties in enhancing their institutional capacity and national reporting systems for implementing the enhanced transparency framework;
- Prepare a summary report on the lessons learned, and best practices shared at the facilitative dialogue referred to in paragraph above;

- Prepare, no later than three weeks before SBI 62, a synthesis report, reflecting information on progress, best practices and remaining challenges contained in the submissions presented by the parties with information on their experience related to implementing Article 13 and in BTRs that have already been presented by developing countries; and
- Organise an in-session facilitative dialogue at SBI 62 to discuss the outcomes of that synthesis report. At SBI 62 Parties will consider the outcomes of the synthesis report and the facilitative dialogue with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at CMA 7 (2025).

RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION (RSO)

Research and Systematic Observation ([RSO](#)) refers to the mechanism under which Parties are to promote and cooperate in research, systematic observation and the development of data archives. The preamble to the Paris Agreement recognises the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, with Articles 4, 7 and 14 of the Paris Agreement specifically providing for action to be taken in accordance with the best available science.

The RSO negotiations take place under the SBSTA, where negotiations in regards to “research” are usually considered during the first sessional period of a year (SBs) and systematic observation during the second sessional period of a year (COP), as mandated in paragraph 46 of [FCCC/SBSTA/2012/5](#).

At the 58th sessions of the SBs the Parties failed to agree that the IPCC [AR6](#) was ‘the’ most comprehensive and robust report available or that currently represented the latest and ‘best available science’. Instead, consensus was reached on the final draft [conclusions](#) that simply refer to AR6 as being ‘more comprehensive and robust than AR5’ and ‘an important contribution to the best available science for supporting decision-making on climate change.’

At SB 59 at COP28 were concerned with consideration of updates from the Global Climate Observing System and World Meteorological Organization; report from the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites and the Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites; report from Earth Information Day 2022 and Earth Information Day 2023.

The SBSTA adopted conclusions in its closing plenary on 6 December 2023 and forwarded draft decisions to the COP and CMA which were subsequently adopted.

The SBSTA's [conclusions](#) include, amongst others:

- recognizing the vital importance of robust Earth observation systems and related long-term data records for enhanced understanding of changes in the global climate system and their attribution, mitigation and adaptation action, and early warning signs;
- expressing “alarm and utmost concern” about the state of the global climate system and 2023 being on track to be the warmest individual year on record;
- recognizing the need to address data gaps, including in the atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, ocean and coastal regions, tropical forests, desert and mountain regions;
- emphasizing the continued need to address gaps in systematic information globally, and noting the continued efforts of the Systematic Observations Financing Facility ([SOFF](#)), encouraging parties and relevant organisations to further strengthen their provision of support to the systematic observation community;
- noting the new Global Greenhouse Gas Watch initiative;
- emphasizing urgent need to expand systematic observations in support of adaptation and deliver Early Warnings for All; and
- inviting parties and relevant organizations to submit views on possible themes for and ways to organize Earth Information Day 2024, to be held in conjunction with SBSTA 61 (November 2024), by 31 August 2024.

The COP/CMA decisions recognize that AR6 represents a more comprehensive and robust assessment of climate change than AR5 and encourage the scientific community to continue expanding the scientific knowledge base on climate change and addressing knowledge gaps with a view to supporting the AR7 cycle.

They also encourage Parties to continue drawing on the information in AR6 to inform national climate policies and action plans.

AR7 is expected to be released by late 2029 and it is hoped that negotiations and discussions at the next SB meeting and COP29 will continue to emphasize the importance of addressing the gaps in research and systematic observation efforts.

COMPLIANCE

PARIS AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE

The Paris Agreement established, in its Article 15, a mechanism to ‘facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement’. This mechanism takes the form of a Committee, the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee ([PAICC](#)), that is tasked with considering implementation and compliance issues by Parties through various procedures.

Last year, CMA 4 had adopted the PAICC remaining rules of procedure following from the ‘Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement.’ previously set out in [decision 20/CMA.1](#). Additionally, CMA 4 and welcomed the committee’s report to the CMA. In Dubai, the CMA took note of [this year's report](#).

It also noted the two outstanding nominations for seats from the Eastern European States and the urgent need to ensure full representation of regional groups and constituencies on the Committee, and that it would undertake the first review of its modalities and procedures during CMA 6, instead of CMA 7 as it was originally planned for, noting that CMA 7 will take place one year after than expected due to COVID. Therefore, there were no negotiations on PAICC.

However, the report contains a couple of elements worth noting, as these are the first exercises of PAICC functions in supporting implementation and compliance:

- The Committee found that a Party (The Holy See) had not communicated a nationally determined contribution and that another Party (Iceland) had not submitted a mandatory biennial communication of information and decided to initiate a “consideration of issues”, and notified both Parties.
- Following receipt of the notification, The Holy See submitted its nationally determined contribution (on 31 May 2023) and Iceland submitted the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement (on 30 June 2023).
- Additionally, the Committee noted that three Parties submitted mandatory biennial communications of information via the online portal after the deadline established in [decision 14/CMA.3](#), paragraph 12. The Committee engaged in a knowledge-building exercise with the Transparency division of the secretariat to deepen its understanding of the preparations under way for the biennial transparency reports within the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

CMA 6 in November 2024 should welcome another report of PAICC where it will communicate any consideration of issues or request the CMA to consider systemic issues in relation to implementation. In addition, the PAICC will also review its own modalities and rules of procedure.

AGRICULTURE

At the last climate conference in 2022, Parties [mandated](#) the SBSTA and SBI to establish the 4-year Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security. The objectives of the joint work are, among others, to promote a “holistic approach” to deliver a range of multiple benefits, such as adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and mitigation; and to address issues related to agriculture and food security by enhancing coherence, synergies, coordination, communication and providing support and technical advice.

At the same conference, Parties decided that an online portal will share information on climate action that addresses issues related to agriculture and food security.

In Dubai, countries discussed how to operationalise the online portal and considered possible elements of the joint work under the SBI and the SBSTA. However, as they were unable to reach an agreement, the [conclusions](#) simply state that discussions on the matter will continue at SB 60 in June 2024, taking into account the [informal note](#) from COP 28.

DECLARATIONS AND POLITICAL AGREEMENTS

Consensus is required for COP/CMA decisions, and the diplomatic processes involved in negotiating decisions are typically slow and often involve compromise. Beyond formal negotiations, however, States, subnational entities, and private actors increasingly engage in declarations and/or political agreements. Some of the main initiatives launched at COP 28 are highlighted below.

FOSSIL FUELS

The COP 28 presidency co-launched with Saudi Arabia the Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter, signed by 50 fossil-fuel companies. The document pledges to end gas flaring by 2030, and to zero-out methane emissions and align with net-zero by 2050. The pledge covers emissions from operations and does not extend to Scope 3 emissions.

Elsewhere, Colombia announced its support for a proposal for a [fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty](#), bringing up the number of countries calling for such a treaty to 12. It is the first major oil exporter to join the group.

The [Powering Past Coal Alliance](#), an initiative launched at COP 26 that pledges to phase out unabated coal, was joined by new signatories, including the US and the UAE.

The Coal Transition Accelerator, led by France, the US and the EU was launched in order to disseminate knowledge, devise fresh policies by drawing on best practices and past experiences, and tap into new avenues of both public and private funding to enable just transitions from coal to renewable energy.

Australia and Norway joined the Clean Energy Transition Partnership (CETP), a global initiative aimed at ending international public financing for fossil fuels.

The Netherlands spearheaded a coalition of 12 nations in issuing a new collective statement advocating for the phase out fossil-fuel subsidies. Signatories have pledged to enhance transparency regarding their expenditures on such subsidies.

DEFORESTATION

Brazil, host of COP 30, introduced the "Tropical Forests Forever" Fund, with the objective of offering financial assistance to 80 tropical countries for the preservation of trees. The fund proposes annual payments contingent on the conservation or restoration of hectares of forest. Brazil's ambition is to secure \$250 billion for the fund, sourcing investments from sovereign wealth funds and various investors, among them the oil industry.

The UK pledged an extra \$38 million to Brazil's Amazon Fund, alongside a pledge to prohibit the sale of products linked to illegal deforestation in their supply chains. This prohibition would encompass palm oil, cocoa, beef, leather, and soy.

France has confirmed financial support for three forest finance initiatives, allocating \$100 million to Papua New Guinea, \$60 million to the Democratic Republic of Congo, and \$50 million to the Republic of Congo. A portion of this funding is expected to stem from verifiable carbon credit transactions.

FINANCE

UAE-led Leaders' [Declaration on a Global Climate Finance Framework](#), signed by 13 countries, aims to drive widespread financial reform, including that of multilateral development banks.

France and Kenya set up the Taskforce on International Taxation to Enhance Development and Climate Action, in order to push for climate taxes on aviation, fossil fuels and financial transactions.

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEMS

The Emirates [Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems and Climate Action](#), signed by 159 parties, was launched at COP 28. Simultaneously, a group of 200 non-state actors signed the Call to Action for Food-Systems Transformation, calling for transitioning away from fossil fuel use within food systems.

On Food Day, the Alliance of Champions for Food Systems Transformation was launched by Brazil, Cambodia, Norway, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. On the same day, the FAO released a report on a global road map to achieving food security (SDG 2) without breaching the 1.5 °C threshold.

NATURE

Climate initiatives on Nature Day focused on how to integrate actions to achieve both the goals of the the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), signed at Biodiversity COP 15 in 2022, and the Paris Agreement.

The UAE COP28 presidency and China COP 15 presidency released a [Joint Statement on Climate, Nature and People](#), recognizing the need to ensure coherence between the next NDCs to be submitted in 2025, and the next national nature plans, due to be submitted before Biodiversity COP 16 in 2024.

China notably joined the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People, an initiative comprised of 118 nations that have pledged to protect 30% of Earth by 2030, launched in Paris in 2021.

METHANE

At COP28, new signatories joined the Global Methane Pledge, a collective effort to cut methane emissions by 30 percent from 2020 levels by 2030 launched at COP26, bringing up the total to 155 countries.

The US, China, and the UAE held a summit on methane and other non-CO2 gases, encouraging countries to submit their upcoming national climate plans so as to ensure that they encompass all GHGs and are economy-wide. The US also announced plans to reduce methane and other pollutants from the oil and gas industry.

RENEWABLES

The [Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge](#) was launched at COP 28, committing to triple the world's installed renewable energy generation capacity to at least 11,000 GW by 2030, taking into consideration different starting points and national circumstances, and to double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements from around 2% to over 4% every year until 2030. The initiative was led by the EU, the US, and the UAE and was signed by 124 countries. China and India had backed the goal of tripling renewables at the India G20 summit, but did not sign the new pledge.

The High-Level Champions and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), launched the Utilities for Net Zero Alliance, which includes 25 global utility and power companies and commits to advance clean energy development.

NUCLEAR

A [declaration](#) to triple nuclear energy by 2050, Recognizing the Key Role of Nuclear Energy in Reaching Net Zero, was endorsed by 25 national governments at COP 28, including the US, the UK, France, and Japan.

HEAVY INDUSTRY

Germany and Chile launched a climate club, currently with 36 members, to foster cooperation to curb emissions from heavy industries such as steel and cement.

HEALTH

COP28 held the first thematic Health Day, marked by the announcement of the Emirates [Declaration on Climate and Health](#), with 123 signatories. The declaration states the urgency of taking action on climate change for better health outcomes.

Groups including the Green Climate Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and the Rockefeller Foundation announced USD 1 billion in funding for climate and health.

COOLING SYSTEMS

The [Global Cooling Pledge](#) adopted at COP 28 was signed by 66 countries, and aims at reducing cooling-related emissions across all sectors by at least 68% globally relative to 2022 levels by 2050, consistent with limiting global average temperature rise to 1.5°C and in line with reaching global net-zero emissions targets with significant progress and expansion of access to sustainable cooling by 2030. Separately, UNEP launched the Global Cooling Watch 2023 Report, which notes that, as temperatures rise, there is a global trend of growing cooling demand.