





SB60 Summary



The **Subsidiary Bodies (SBs)** -the **Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBASTA)** and the **Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)**- assist the governing bodies of the UNFCCC, namely, the **COP for the Convention**, the **CMP for the Kyoto Protocol** and the **CMA for the Paris Agreement**.

These bodies meet once a year (usually in June) and do the technical work of preparing decisions. However, because they are not the governing bodies, they do not make decisions themselves. Their outcomes take the form of conclusions and draft decisions that are later considered and adopted by the **COP/CMP and CMA** respectively. This summary provides an overview of the main negotiations and outcomes of the 60th session of the SBs, which took place from the 3rd to the 13th of June in Bonn, Germany.

LRI attended the SBs to provide legal support to developing countries and NGO delegates in the negotiations. Therefore, this report also highlights some of the main legal issues raised during the session.



Editing author: Monserrat Madariaga Gómez de Cuenca
Contributing authors: Alice Venn, Pascale Bird, Olivia Tattarletti and Harrison Cox
Design: Melissa Morales Madariaga

All reasonable efforts have been made in providing the following information. However due to the circumstances and the timeframes involved, these materials have been prepared for informational purposes only and are not legal advice. Transmission of the information is not intended to create, and receipt does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship. Those consulting this Paper may wish to obtain their own legal advice. To the extent permitted by law any liability (including without limitation for negligence or for any damages of any kind) for the legal analysis is excluded.

ADAPTATION

Global goal on Adaptation (GGA)

At COP 26, Parties agreed to launch a two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme on the GGA (GlaSS) to develop a framework for tracking and measuring progress on adaptation.

This framework, known as the **UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience**, was adopted at COP 28 with the purpose of guiding the achievement of the GGA and the review of overall progress in achieving it.

Parties also agreed on “thematic” targets related to water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty eradication and cultural heritage - and on targets set by reference to the iterative adaptation cycle.

COP 28 also saw the launch of a two-year UAE–Belém work programme on developing indicators for measuring progress achieved towards those thematic and dimensional targets. In Bonn, Parties discussed the modalities of this work programme.

The same issues that had plagued the negotiations in Dubai, finance and the principle of CBDR-RC, re-surfaced, with developing countries insisting on a finance target/finance as one of the key indicators.

Discussions focused on the engagement of experts in the indicator mapping process and criteria for indicator identification.

The question of **who should be charged with developing indicators for the targets** proved contentious: developed countries were of the view that the Adaptation Committee should lead the technical work; G77 and China thought it could contribute to it, but not lead. Some developing countries suggested that expert groups should be formed for each target, whilst others advocated setting up an ad hoc expert group. Ultimately, Parties agreed on the modalities of the work programme and the final conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.6](#)) were adopted at the SBs closing plenary.

A decision on who would lead the process of developing indicators was postponed to COP 29, with a footnote in the draft conclusions noting “the consideration of the Adaptation Committee and/or an ad hoc expert group and/or expert groups” at SB 61.

The conclusions also:

- invited the Adaptation Committee to contribute to the mapping of existing indicators by identifying the information on indicators communicated by the parties through their national reports and communications;
- requested the SB chairs to convene technical experts to assist by reviewing and refining the compilation and mapping of existing indicators and, as needed, developing new indicators, and;
- requested the organization of a hybrid workshop prior to the CMA 6.

Report of the **Adaptation Committee (AC)** and review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Committee

Under this sub-item, Parties continued discussions started in Dubai on whether to assess the review of the AC and the AC report separately or jointly, and whether to consider them as separate sub-items at future meetings.

In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.1](#)), the SBs:

- recommended that COP 29 and CMA 6 take note of the AC's 2023 report;
- agreed to continue consideration of the review of the AC's progress, effectiveness, and performance at SB 61; and
- agreed to consider the annual report of the AC and the review of its progress, effectiveness, and performance under two separate sub-agenda items at SB 61.

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)

Under this agenda sub-item, Parties are mandated to assess progress made towards the formulation and implementation of NAPs. With only 56 developing countries having NAPs in place, the first Global Stocktake had highlighted the importance of countries submitting their NAPs and making substantial progress in their implementation by 2030.

Yet, many developing countries face substantial challenges with both formulating and implementing them.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, discussions centred on access to finance, technology and capacity building by developing countries based on an [informal note](#). Parties also discussed contributions to adaptation by the private sector; text recognizing the special needs and circumstances of SIDS and LDCs, and addressing guiding principles, including the contribution of Indigenous Peoples to climate action and integrating gender in decision-making processes and the implementation of NAPs.

The issue will continue to be considered at SB 61, with a view to recommending a draft decision for adoption in Baku.

Legal advice insight

LRI provided several pieces of advice on the GGA and the AC: in relation to the GGA, LRI's first advice considered the various options for the development of indicators by examining other convention's experiences. Another LRI advice assessed the SB's and COP powers to create an expert or ad hoc group and examined the Adaptation Committee mandate and functions to determine the potential role of the AC in developing the indicators. Finally, LRI examined the AC governance and its relationship to the CMA and COP, to assist negotiations on the AC review.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

The SBs saw developments for loss and damage mainly in regards to loss and damage finance and the **Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM)**, established at COP 19 in 2013 with the aims of enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches, strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders, and enhancing action and support including finance, technology and capacity building ([Decision 2/CP.19](#)). The second [five-year rolling workplan](#) of the WIM from 2023-2027 currently provides for a series of cross-cutting activities and strategic workstreams on themes such as slow-onset events, comprehensive risk management approaches, human mobility, and non-economic loss.

Finance for Loss and Damage

The Glasgow Dialogue was established at COP 26 to facilitate discussions on funding arrangements for loss and damage, with the Dialogue taking place annually at the first session of the SBI until the sixtieth session in June 2024 ([Decision 1/CMA.3](#), Paragraph 73).

COP 27 decided to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to loss and damage (decisions [2/CP.27](#) and [2/CMA.4](#)), and a Transitional Committee was established to assist with the operationalization of the funding arrangements by developing a [report](#) containing recommendations and a draft decision ahead of COP 28, which were adopted in the opening plenary of COP 28. The Fund was then established and operationalized at COP 28 by Decisions [1/CP.28](#) and [5/CMA.5](#) and received over [660 million USD](#) in pledges.

The institutional arrangements for the operationalization of the Fund have been the core focus of recent developments in the run-up to SB 60 in June 2024. The first meeting of the Board of the Fund took place from 30th April – 5th May 2024 in Abu Dhabi, UAE, where the Board Decision adopted the [Workplan of the Board](#) and on the 10th June 2024 during the SB 60 period, it was confirmed by the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, that the World Bank would serve as interim secretariat host and trustee of the Loss and Damage Fund, but it would not have a role in fundraising, funding allocation decisions or in the Fund's projects (press release no: [2024/083/CCG](#)).

The third and final session of the Glasgow Dialogue established at COP 26 to facilitate discussion on funding arrangements ([GD3](#)) took place from 6-7th June at SB 60. It was designed to build upon the discussions of the first two Glasgow Dialogues and was structured around three sessions where Parties were provided with an overview of the mandates of the co-chair's respective bodies and were updated on their current work and progress in delivering on their priorities; shared countries experiences in enhancing the coherence and coordination of activities related to loss and damage, and discussed their technical assistance needs to support the development of programmatic approaches to responding to loss and damage and access to the loss and damage fund.

The plenary discussion of the dialogue was centred around guiding questions on the progress made since COP 28 to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to loss & damage, and any further recommendations on the funding arrangements. Many Parties and observers applauded the institutional progress made so far; however, they called for more effective coordination and urgency in delivering accessible, scaled-up funding to communities on the ground that are at the forefront of climate loss and damage. The issue of accessibility of loss and damage funding was a key topic of discussion raised, including with respect to the fragmentation of the funding landscape, the need for programmatic approaches, simplified access modalities, more direct access and predictability.

The challenge of capacity limitations was also highlighted by several delegations, with many calling for greater capacity building and technical support.

The importance of the role of the **Santiago Network**, coordinating with the Fund, in developing national data systems and in providing technical support was underlined in several contributions to this end.

The need for a more participatory and coherent approach that is rights-based, gender-responsive, and inclusive of indigenous communities was also called for in a number of statements in the plenary discussion, which included contributions from the UN OHCHR, the cross-constituency Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group, and representatives of Indigenous Peoples.

Parties also presented their views on topics and questions to be addressed at an upcoming high-level dialogue to be convened by the UN Secretary General and the Board of the Fund for responding to loss and damage.

A [report](#) by the SBI Chair summarises the discussion that took place during this GD3.

Next Steps

The [second meeting of the Board](#) of the Loss and Damage Fund took place from 9-12th July 2024 in Songdo, Republic of Korea, and focused on the arrangements for establishing and operationalizing the first annual high-level dialogue.

The [third meeting of the Board](#) has been scheduled to take place from 18-20th September 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in respect of which interested Parties are invited to register as observers.

Looking ahead to the annual high-level dialogue on funding arrangements later this year, with options for either an in-person meeting on the fringes of the IOM and World Bank annual meetings in October 2024, a virtual meeting in 2024 or an in-person meeting scheduled for 2025. If scheduled for October 2024, this could provide a valuable opportunity for further coordination on loss and damage funding arrangements ahead of COP 29.

Warsaw International Mechanism ExCom

Terms of Reference for the review of the WIM

In accordance with [Decision 2/CMA.2](#) para. 46, the second review of the WIM is set to take place in 2024, at CMA 6, and the SBs were supposed to design the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for this review in the session immediately prior to the session at which the review will take place.

Thus, Parties met during SB 60 to discuss the ToRs and agreed that the ToRs for the 2019 Review would serve as a basis for the 2024 review but disagreed on the extent of the review compared to its 2019 version. Developing countries, particularly Grupo Sur and G77 and China favoured a broad review of the WIM and its functions, due to the considerable institutional changes to the L&D framework since 2019 (Santiago Network and Loss and Damage Fund).

On the other hand, although acknowledging the significant institutional changes, the US suggested merely reviewing the implementation of the functions of the WIM and potential improvements to its implementation, but not the functions of the WIM. Additionally, the US argued that the review should not look at the broader landscape of Loss & Damage, but rather, the review could study the place of the WIM within that broader landscape. Besides the discussion on the scope of the review, there was a proposal by Georgia to change the composition of the WIM ExCom seeking to permanently allocate one of the rotating non-annex I seats of the WIM ExCom (currently not allocated to any regional group) to the non-annex I Eastern European Group, and therefore altering regional representation in the WIM, AILAC and the Arab Group made it clear that there should not be a review of the composition of the WIM ExCom.

Despite the disagreements, the SBs adopted conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.4](#)) that;

- Finalized the ToRs for the 2024 review of the WIM with a broad mandate, taking into account the broader context of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage under and outside the Convention; performing a review of both the implementation of the functions and the functions themselves; and a review of the structure of the WIM, including its ExCom and the Santiago Network.
- Agreed to undertake the review at SB 61 (November 2024), on the basis of the ToRs included in the Annex and to forward the outcomes to the appropriate bodies.
- Invited Parties to submit their views, as inputs to the 2024 review of the WIM and requesting that the Secretariat prepare a summary report of these views.
- Requested the Secretariat to prepare a background paper to inform the 2024 review with information on the status of work, activities and outputs under the WIM.
- Requested the Secretariat to organise an event in conjunction with SB 61 to provide inputs to the 2024 review of the WIM, with the engagement of party and non-party stakeholders.

In terms of next steps, **the review of the WIM will take place during SB 61 in November 2024.**

It is possible that during COP 29, discussions over the governance of the WIM under CMA or COP will emerge again.

The WIM ExCom also hosted a [side event](#) on the topic of 'Learning from countries and communities responding to non-economic loss and damage' which took place on 4th June 2024 with the aim of enhancing understanding of best practices, exploring technical outputs, and feeding this into the work of the non-economic losses expert group where speakers first drew on examples of non-economic loss and damage in respect of native species and human mobility, along with the downstream impacts they have, including on cultural practices and human security in Vanuatu and Ghana, highlighting the importance of technical and financial support for loss and damage assessments that include non-economic loss.

This intervention was followed by a presentation of research findings on the linkages between healthy ecosystems and human wellbeing and discussed the **impacts of biodiversity loss on local communities and indigenous communities**, along with the **cultural heritage and identity implications of non-economic loss and damage**. One of the WIM ExCom co-chairs concluded the event by emphasizing the importance of securing funding for non-economic loss and damage, participation in the discussions on the new loss and damage funding arrangements, and the development of guidelines detailing how this will work at the local level.

Legal advice insight

LRI has produced advice on the [legal implications of moving the WIM to the CMA](#) and on a possible [shared governance of the WIM](#) that could illustrate those discussions.

MITIGATION

Work Programme

In Glasgow, in 2021, Parties established a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade (MWP, [Decision 1/CMA.3](#), para 27). The programme would be complementary to the global stocktake (GST). This was a recognition that, **without full implementation of NDCs already submitted and strengthening climate ambition, the 1.5°C warming limit would become out of reach.**

The following year, in [Decision 4/CMA.4](#), Parties agreed on the scope and format of the MWP, which became known as the “Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme”. The Parties decided that the MWP would be **operationalized through focused exchanges of views, information and ideas, that its outcomes would be non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, take into account the nationally determined nature of NDCs and would not impose new targets or goals.** It was also agreed that at least two global dialogues would be held every year.

Two [global dialogues](#) were held in 2023, both focused on accelerating a just energy transition. Ahead of SB 60, a third dialogue and investment-focused event was held centred on ‘**Cities: buildings and urban systems**’.

In Bonn, Parties were invited to share views on these dialogues and investment-focused events and on substantive elements to be addressed under the programme and its outcomes.

The latter brought to light strong disagreements on the mandate of the MWP: many countries, both developing and developed, thought that it should reflect and build on the outcomes of the GST, which notably called on countries to transition away from fossil fuels. Others, including the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) and the Arab Group, opposed linkages between the GST decision and the MWP and reflecting the mitigation section of the GST outcome in key messages of a draft decision text, arguing that this would go beyond the MWP mandate. In their view, the focus should be on improving the global dialogues and the investment-focused events.

The same groups and the African Group were also wary that any discussions on NDCs in the context of the MWP might lead to imposing new targets on countries through the back door (and adding to the burden on developing countries).

On 11th June, the co-facilitators produced an [informal note](#) and [draft conclusions](#) under their own authority. With some groups refusing to engage with the documents, the negotiations concluded without agreement. Applying Rule 16 of the draft Rules of Procedure, the matter will be placed on the provisional agendas of SBSTA 61 and SBI 61.

ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

This article allows parties to cooperate using **voluntary market-based and non-market-based approaches in order to implement their NDCs**. Paragraphs 2-7 of this Article outline two different market-based approaches:

The first one involves the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) between two or more parties (Art. 6.2 PA).

The second one envisages the creation of a central mechanism, governed by a Supervisory Body (Art. 6.4 PA).

This mechanism will enable the generation of emission reduction units, pursuant to methodologies approved by the Supervisory Body. Paragraph 8 of the Article provides for a framework of non-market approaches.

In Dubai, parties could not find a compromise on the remaining elements needed to operationalise the two market approaches - with the European Union considering these to be a “package decision”. As a result, no decisions on these topics were taken. In Bonn, in June 2024, parties met again against this backdrop, with the added push of the CMA 6 Presidency (= the COP 29 Presidency) who has made their operationalisation a priority for the next climate conference in November 2024.

Article 6.4

Parties started tackling some of the remaining unfinished business in relation to further guidance under this article. Other than on confidentiality and emissions avoidance, progress on substantive technical issues was limited. An intersessional workshop scheduled to take place before Baku will give parties another opportunity to try and find common ground and advance on these issues. The SBSTA 60 adopted conclusions, among others, it:

- Concluded that there is no need for further discussion on common nomenclatures and recommended the CMA conclude considering the matter.
- Requested the secretariat to develop an initial list of common nomenclatures and a process for requesting the establishment of and changes to common nomenclatures.
- Completed consideration on the modalities for reviewing information that is confidential.
- Requested the secretariat to develop, publish and implement the necessary administrative procedures, including a specific code of conduct for Article 6 technical expert review teams, for treating and reviewing confidential information.
- Took note of matters contained in a draft text that does not represent consensus among Parties, regarding, among others:
 - authorisation (process, timing, content, changes/revocations and transparency), sequencing, application of first transfer, registries, addressing inconsistencies and details in the agreed electronic format (AEF) (including actions to be reported in the AEF); and
 - whether to include a definition and scope for a ‘cooperative approach’, special circumstances for LDCs and SIDS, and additional functions for the international registry.
- Requested the secretariat to organise a workshop before SBSTA 61 (November 2024), in conjunction with another one related to Article 6.4, to consider the draft text.
- Agreed to continue consideration of the draft text at SBSTA 61 with a view to recommending a draft decision to CMA 6.

Emissions avoidance

Greater clarity was provided in Bonn regarding consideration of emissions avoidance under Article 6.2 and emissions avoidance and conservation enhancement under Article 6.4. Parties agreed to defer consideration of these matters until SBSTA 68 in 2028. They also clarified that, in the absence of further guidance, emissions avoidance is not included in the current guidance under Article 6.2 or the current rules, modalities, and procedures (RMPs) under Article 6.4. They also noted that conservation enhancement is not a separate category of activity in the current RMPs.

Article 6.4

Parties started tackling some of the remaining unfinished business in relation to further rules, modalities and procedures under Article 6.4, focusing on authorization and registries. The SBSTA 60 adopted conclusions, among others, it:

- Took note of the work on further responsibilities of the Supervisory Body and Parties that host activities and agreed to continue considering this at SBSTA 68 (2028).
- Took note of matters contained in a [draft text](#) that does not represent consensus among Parties, regarding among others:
 - authorisation (timing, content, changes, process for changes and implications for share of proceeds (SOP) and delivering overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE)); and
 - the mechanism registry (functions and interactions with the international registry).
- Requested the secretariat to organise a workshop before SBSTA 61 (November 2024), in conjunction with another one related to Article 6.2, to consider the draft text on matters related to authorization and the mechanism registry.
- Agreed to continue consideration of the draft text at SBSTA 61 with a view to recommending a draft decision to CMA 6.

Matters relating to the development of the Clean Development Mechanism

Related to the Article 6.4 mechanism, was another SBSTA agenda item considering matters relating to the operation of the clean development mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol (and therefore under the competency of the CMP).

Under this item, countries welcomed two technical papers by the secretariat, one on the [operations of the CDM registry](#) beyond the end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and another one on the [necessary level of resources](#) for the CDM function.

Some countries had wished to discuss timelines for winding down the CDM's operations and transferring resources to other processes, such as the Adaptation Fund and the Article 6.4 mechanism.

Others, however, were opposed to considering this until the Article 6.4 mechanism is fully operational. For now, it seems that **a discussion on this issue could still be tabled at the next SBSTA.**

In its conclusions, the SBSTA requested the secretariat to prepare a technical paper further breaking down the necessary level of resources for the activities, processes and institutions that need to continue under the CDM, including how available CDM funds are transferred to the Adaptation Fund and to other areas potentially in need of funding.

The SBSTA agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBSTA 61 (November 2024).

Article 6.8

In Bonn, countries convened under the helm of the [5th meeting of the Glasgow Committee on Non-market Approaches \(GCNMA\)](#), tasked to implement the framework for non-market approaches (NMAs) and the work programme adopted in Glasgow.

In its conclusions, the SBSTA 60, among other things, welcomed the **operationalisation of the UNFCCC web-based platform for recording and exchanging information on NMAs (NMA Platform)**.

Further, parties are encouraged to identify and submit their NMAs on the NMA Platform and to provide information on financial, technology and capacity-building support available or provided for identifying, developing and implementing NMAs.

The SBSTA 60 also requested the secretariat to include, as part of its broader capacity-building programme related to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, activities related to NMAs.

At CMA 6 (November 2024), parties will undertake an expedited and simple assessment of the progress and outcomes of the first phase of implementation of the work programme activities to recommend an improved schedule for implementing the second phase of the work programme activities.



FINANCE

With the upcoming COP 29 set to be the ‘Finance COP’, expectations were high at SB 60 for substantial progress to be achieved on the path to determining the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG), which should be established by the CMA by 2025 ([Decision 1/CP.21](#) para 53). Many Parties and groups dedicated their opening statements to setting their expectations on progress on the NCQG during the Bonn session. For developing countries, as the G77 Chair highlighted, even when time is pressing to determine the goal, Parties must ensure that the goal is ambitious, needs-based and meets the necessary scale and quality: “We must secure an outcome that enables the provision and mobilisation of finance for developing countries at the necessary scale and quality, while addressing the systemic dis-enablers of climate finance, including high cost of capital, limited fiscal space, and high transaction costs.” Unfortunately, these expectations were not met, and Parties saw little progress on outstanding substantive elements of the goal.

10th Technical Expert Dialogue (TED)

To facilitate a deepened shared understanding of views on ambition, qualitative elements, structure and transparency of the NCQG, [this dialogue](#) took place on the first day of the Bonn session (3rd June) gathering Parties and Stakeholders.

The first panel was an interactive discussion of the rationale of the NCQG and some of the key considerations behind it.

The second panel, on the other hand, covered the important topics of the structure and transparency arrangements of the NCQG.

Parties and stakeholders discussed the inclusion of qualitative elements in the goal, with some Parties highlighting the importance of improving the enabling environment through, among-others, capacity building to ensure countries would be able to absorb the finance and through addressing the assumption of corruption.

There were also some interventions on the sticky subject of the contributor base, with some developing country Parties highlighting that this should be based on CBDR-RC. The co-chairs prepared a [summary report](#) of discussions held at the 10th TED.

Next Steps

The co-chairs have published a summary of the discussions held in Bonn and [a call](#) for Party submissions in preparation of TED 11, due by the 5th of August to help bridge proposals between different Parties. They will also publish an updated input paper prior to the 3rd Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Work Programme. As they highlighted, Parties must use the intersessional period to bridge the wide gaps between their positions.

New Collective Quantified Goal on Finance

Negotiations on the NCQG took place during the Second Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Work Programme on the NCQG. This Ad-Hoc Work Programme was set up by [Decision 9/CMA.3](#) for a two-year period (2022-2024). According to the Work Programme, the co-chairs must establish an annual workplan, organise Technical Expert Dialogues, produce annual summary reports and finally, engage in regular consultations with Party and non-Party stakeholders. In Dubai, Parties agreed to transition to a mode of work conducting to a draft decision, to be considered at CMA 6. For this, Parties met in four different sessions at SB 60.

In spite of the polarised views, the co-chairs prepared an [input paper](#) which received very strong opposition from most Parties, due to its length (over 60 pages).

As such, Parties provided the co-chairs with a mandate to streamline the input paper, which was done twice. The [final input paper](#) of the *Second meeting of the Ad-Hoc Work Programme* was produced prior to the final negotiation session and was 35 pages long, which many Parties continue to consider excessive. Despite this initial slow progress and focus on the length and structure of the paper, following calls from AILAC and AOSIS to accelerate progress, Parties were able to identify some commonalities which gave hope for the final two meetings. These include references to taking into account the special needs of local communities and Indigenous peoples. There also seems to be general agreement to use existing transparency arrangements, such as the ETF, although in an updated format.

Legal advice insight

In regard to the structure of the goal, which includes negotiations on allocating specific funding towards certain purposes, LRI produced [advice](#) on the inclusion of a sub - goal on loss and damage within the new finance goal. LRI's [explainer](#) on the NCQG also provides for a general overview of the NCQG discussions and its core elements.

Nevertheless, considerable disagreements remain on the core elements of the goal. The African Group and the Arab Group highlighted that there was still no mention of an amount from developed countries. They also suggested an initial amount of 1.3 trillion USD per year (which would represent slightly more than the 5.8-5.9 trillion dollars identified as required by 2030 by the UNFCCC SCF 2021 report). However, developed country Parties were quick to underline their unwillingness to discuss the quantum at this stage. Disagreement on the contributor base seems to be fuelling their refusal to discuss the quantum as they consider them to be inextricably linked. Additionally, parties disagree on the specific mandate for developing the new goal, as can be seen in the [information note on progress made](#) (para. 19).

Specifically, developed country Parties, such as the US, believe the mandate comes from the wider article 2(1)(c), while developing country Parties argue that it is exclusively related to article 9. Article 2(1)(c) is designed to ensure finance flows are consistent with pathways towards lower GHG emissions, this is very wide as most climate-related actions can fall into this category. On the other hand, article 9, establishes the obligation on developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries and article 9(3), specifically, notes that developed countries should continue to take the lead in mobilizing finance, emphasising the significant role of public finance and the consideration of “needs and priorities of developing country Parties” in those efforts, that should be a progression beyond previous ones. These disagreements are profound and fundamentally alter the shape of the goal.

Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on the scope of article 2(1)(c) and its complementarity with article 9 of the Paris Agreement

This Dialogue was established by [Decision 1/CMA.4](#) to exchange views and enhance understanding of the relationship between these two articles of the Paris Agreement. As noted in the previous section, both have similar consequences – an increase in climate finance – but article 2(1)(c) sets a collective objective to ensure finance flows are consistent with pathways towards lower GHG emissions, while article 9 imposes obligations on developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries (art. 9(1)), and take the lead in mobilising finance from a variety of sources in light of their needs and priorities (art. 9(3)), as described in the previous section.

[Decision 9/CMA.5](#) decided to continue and strengthen the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue, requesting that the secretariat, under the guidance of the two co-chairs, organise two workshops per year – the first of which was organised in conjunction with SB 60 and focuses on adaptation. A [message](#) from the co-chairs shared in advance of the Bonn sessions set the aim of the 2024 sessions of the workshop as “to enable participants to identify commonalities and divergences in the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9, through concrete examples of its operationalization and implementation.”

This two-day event took place at the end of the SBs and was an opportunity to discuss adaptation investments and the consistency of financial flows with a climate-resilient development pathway. Parties and stakeholders were encouraged to share best practices. In this vein, attendees heard from various speakers discussing, among others, the benefit of insuring climate risks and how to increase its insurability, how to coordinate better the private and public sectors, the need for predictable returns and for public banks to take on more risks and lead the way in incorporating ESG into their processes. Discussions in breakout groups also highlighted the importance of sustainable development and just transition in adaptation financing. The second workshop of 2024 will focus on the role of the international financial system, different actors within and outside the UNFCCC process, and transparency and credibility.

The Adaptation Fund

In Decisions [13/CMA.1](#) and [1/CMP.14](#), Parties agreed that the Adaptation Fund (established in 2001 to support adaptation projects and programmes) would serve the Paris Agreement under the CMA from the 1st of January 2019. Parties also agreed that once the share of proceeds became available under art. 6(4) (emission reductions trading mechanism), the Adaptation Fund would no longer serve the Kyoto Protocol.

At SB 60, questions surrounding membership to the Board became central in view of the Fund exclusively serving the CMA as some Parties expect the share of proceeds to become available under art. 6(4) before SB 62. Parties agreed to postpone consideration of this issue but disagreed on when to resume its consideration. While some developed countries were optimistic that the share of proceeds would become available following COP 29 and that the Adaptation Fund needed to be ready to receive the proceeds, thus discussions should restart at SB 61, some developing countries argued that discussions should be postponed until a share of proceeds occurs and, as such, discussions should be postponed to SB 62. The Parties were unable to reach an agreement, thus, it was placed on the agenda of SB 61 in application of rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

The Global Stocktake (GST) is an **assessment of the collective progress made by Parties towards achieving the implementation of the Paris Agreement** and does not review individual Parties' progress.

However, it is meant to inform the development of Parties' NDCs. The first GST took place at CMA 5 in Dubai (2023) and the subsequent Bonn negotiations (SB 60) focused on actions following this first exercise on three fronts: firstly, the SBI agenda item 'UAE GST Dialogue' focusing on implementing the GST outcomes, which will be operationalised from CMA 6 (2024) and conclude at CMA 10 (2028); secondly, the mandated event 'Annual GST Dialogue' started at the SB 60 to facilitate sharing of knowledge on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the next round of NDCs and thirdly, a joint agenda item on 'Procedural and Logistical Elements of the Overall Global Stocktake Process'. Both dialogues were established in the GST Decision ([Decision 1/CMA 5](#)).

The most contentious issue was the discussion about the modalities of the UAE GST dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes (paras. 97 and 98 of the GST Decision). The purpose of this item is to advance on the modalities of the dialogue with a view to operationalizing it at CMA 6. Still, little progress was made on those, as during the 5 days of informal consultations, **the "scope" of the UAE dialogue became the key issue.**

Developed countries and some developing countries view the dialogue as a space for the implementation of the entire outcomes of the GST (especially focusing on paragraph 28 as regards to the mitigation efforts, including on fossil fuels), while a majority of the developing countries see it as a space to focus solely on the finance-related outcomes of the GST, due to the placement of the paragraph establishing the dialogue under the "Finance" heading.

Initially, it seemed like the LDCs, AOSIS, AILAC, EIG, the EU, the US, Norway, and Japan shared a similar view on a broad scope of the dialogue, while the African Group, Group Sur and the LMDCs, as well as China, Egypt and South Africa thought it should only focus on finance and means of implementations (MOI).

China also stressed the importance of bearing in mind the relationship between this dialogue and the one on how the GST informs the NDCs, as developing countries would require means of implementation, particularly finance, for implementing their NDCs.

At a later stage of the negotiations, AILAC and the LDCs suggested a bridging proposal whereby the dialogue would cover all GST outcomes with a focus on finance and means of implementation.

These three options were reflected in an informal note, which by the end of the negotiations, became [five options](#)- to capture the caveats of Parties views on what the dialogue scope should be:

- a) Climate finance/MOI to implement GST outcomes
- b) Financial support from developed to developing countries and tracking the delivery of the NCQG
- c) Implementing all GST outcomes
- d) Implementing all GST outcomes with a view to inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support
- e) All GST outcomes with a focus on finance/MOI

The SBI [conclusions](#):

- took note of the [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Facilitators at SB 60, noting it does not represent consensus among parties;
- agreed to continue consideration of the matter at SBI 61 with a view to concluding by CMA 6;
- invited parties to submit views on the modalities of the dialogue; and requested the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis of submissions for consideration at SBI 61.

Secondly, the SBs saw the **‘First Annual Dialogue on the Global Stocktake Informing the Preparation of Nationally Determined Contributions’** (para. 187 of the GST Decision). This two-day mandated event, aimed to facilitate the sharing of good practices on how the GST’s outcomes will inform the preparation of Parties’ next NDCs. Participants heard a series of presentations from Parties and non-party stakeholders on the ways in which they integrated GST findings in their NDC process. It remains unclear whether “the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation” will only cover process, as was mainly the case in Bonn, or if it will extend to the substance and content of the NDCs.

The third GST related topic was the **‘Procedural and Logistical Elements of the Overall Global Stocktake Process’**, where Parties discussed their experience of the first GST with a view to refining its procedural and logistical elements and adopting a decision on this aspect at COP 29. The informal consultations held touched upon:

- ➔ The sources of input and timeline for the information gathering component, including whether and how to align the publication of the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle with the second GST to include the best available science;
- ➔ Ensuring representation and participation of all parties and relevant stakeholders, specifically but not exclusively in the technical assessment component;
- ➔ Noting the lessons learned and challenges from the first GST related to the summary and synthesis reports produced in the technical assessment component.
- ➔ Improving the transition between the technical assessment and consideration of outputs phases of the GST;
- ➔ The role of the contact group in producing the outcomes of the GST and role and composition of the High-Level Committee of future GSTs.

In their [conclusions](#), the SBs:

- Welcomed the conclusion of the first GST and the adoption of [Decision 1/CMA 5](#);
- Took note of the [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Facilitators, noting it does not represent consensus among Parties, is not exhaustive, nor prejudices further work by the parties. This informal note is organised following the same phases considered for the first GST (1) information collection and preparation, (2) technical assessment, and (3) consideration of outputs; and
- Agreed to continue considering the matter at SB 61, with a view to concluding consideration of the matter at CMA 6.

JUST TRANSITION

The Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was established at COP 27 in [Decision 1/CMA.4](#) with the objective of **discussing pathways to achieving the Paris Agreement goals under a just and equitable transition**, alongside an annual high-level ministerial roundtable on just transition to begin at CMA 5. The UAE (JTWP) was discussed and further developed at COP 28 in [Decision 3/CMA.5](#) which outlined seven core elements of the Programme:

1. Just transition pathways to achieving the Paris Agreement goals under Article 2;
2. Just and equitable transition pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce and other dimensions, based on nationally defined development priorities and including social protection;
3. Opportunities, challenges and barriers relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication;
4. Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience;
5. Just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs;
6. Inclusive and participatory approaches;
7. International cooperation as an enabler of just transition pathways.

The broad remit of the JTWP reflects the wide discrepancy among the Parties as to the meaning of just transition and their priorities for transition pathways. The different viewpoints were reflected in the seven drafts of the text that preceded the adoption of [Decision 3/CMA.5](#). The JTWP discussions are carried out in a joint contact group convened at each of the SBI and SBSTA sessions, and in two annual dialogues in hybrid format ([Decision 3/CMA.5, Paragraphs 4 - 5](#)), the first of which took place at SB 60 in June 2024.

First Dialogue of the UAE Just Transition Work Programme

Based on views from Parties and non-party stakeholders, the SB Chairs decided that the first dialogue would focus on just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement through NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS. They welcomed contributions from both Parties and non-party stakeholders to the dialogue. A month after the Bonn session, the SB Chairs compiled an informal [summary report](#) of the first dialogue with a summary of the discussions, key findings, opportunities, and barriers in each of the six topic areas.



Just Transition Contact Group

A Contact Group, co-chaired by Marianne Karlsen (Norway) and Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago), convened eight sessions over the course of the two-week period. The Contact Group facilitated discussions around a [draft decision text](#) on the **implementation of the UAE JTWP to be taken forward to COP 29, upon which the Parties failed to reach an agreement.**

Key issues raised by the Parties included, inter alia, international cooperation and support to deliver just transition pathways, the availability of finance and capacity building to support implementation, **keeping 1.5 within reach aligning with the Global Stocktake and minimizing the adverse impacts of the transition**, the need for rights-based and gender-responsive approaches, key groups and stakeholders to be included in social dialogue, job creation, and acknowledgement of national sustainable development priorities. Parties also discussed how to continue the JTWP work, including whether to request constituted bodies to integrate just transition into their processes and reports, and a proposal from G77 and China to establish a work plan for the work programme, which the US opposed. Parties disagreed on the modalities of the JTWP more broadly, with many developed countries considering that those agreed at COP28 are sufficient, whilst other parties called for additional ones (eg. further dialogues). The wording and nature of the draft text was also debated, in particular, whether sufficient operative clauses were included to enable concrete actions in the implementation of the JTWP.

In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.5](#)), the SBs:

- reiterated that the topic of the second hybrid dialogue, which will be held before SB 61, will be decided by the SB Chairs based on consultation with parties, observers, and non-party stakeholders “in a transparent and consultative manner”;
- emphasized working systematically to cover the elements of the work programme (delineated in paragraph 2 of [Decision 3/CMA.5](#));
- emphasized the importance of ensuring the effective and inclusive participation of parties and non-party stakeholders in the second dialogue, encouraging the Chairs to consider interactive engagement formats; and
- agreed to continue consideration of the matter at SB 61, taking note of the [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Facilitators, views submitted via the submission portal, and the annual summary report on the dialogues, with a view to recommending a draft decision to CMA 6.

Next Steps

The Second Dialogue of the UAE Just Transition Work Programme is scheduled to take place from 2nd – 3rd October 2024 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt on the topic of [‘Ensuring support for people-centric and equitable just transition pathways with a focus on the whole-of-society approach and the workforce’](#). Parties and non-party stakeholders are invited to submit their views on relevant opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers with respect to the topic of the Second Dialogue by 4th September 2024 via the UNFCCC [submission portal](#).

The Second Dialogue represents a crucial opportunity for the Parties to work towards common ground in defining the scope and priorities for the implementation of the UAE Just Transition Work Programme with a view to adopting a decision on this at COP 29 from 11 - 22nd November.

RESPONSE MEASURES

The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement all recognise that implementing “response measures” (mainly measures to reduce emissions) can impact countries’ economies. In 2011, a Forum was set up to understand and address these impacts. Later, in 2018, the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures ([KCI](#)) was created to support the Forum’s work.

The Forum convenes under a joint agenda item of the subsidiary bodies: “Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.” At the SBI 60 and SBSTA 60, the Forum was convened, it held technical events, and started developing its new five-year work plan.

In their conclusions, the subsidiary bodies agreed to continue developing the work plan taking into account a “[non-paper](#)” containing a table of activities, with a view to recommending a draft decision on the matter for consideration and adoption at COP 29, CMP 19 and CMA 6

This paper was prepared by the co-chairs of the subsidiary bodies and is not official because some parties had concerns that it failed to reflect parties’ submissions.

Some Parties including, notably, the G77 and China, expressed the view in the Just transition Contact Group that as the just transition agenda has been broadened under the UAE JTWP, it may no longer be beneficial to include this within the more limited scope of the KCI.

The forum also presented two technical events on guidelines and policy frameworks to promote just transition within and across sectors, and on understanding the positive and negative impacts of low and zero- emission transportation technologies, that aimed to further inform the development of the just transition agenda.

Legal advice insight

Please see [here](#) for an LRI advice outlining the purpose, functions and outputs of the Forum compared to those of its KCI.

AGRICULTURE

At the climate conference in 2022, the Parties to the Convention mandated the SBSTA and SBI to establish the 4-year Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security. For now, the joint work has not been formally established by the COP and this agenda item had not seen much progress in the 15 months prior to the Bonn negotiations, mainly due to disagreement among the G77 group.

During the SB 60, and after many informal meetings, it finally saw a breakthrough. Parties agreed on a road map for the joint work, that defines a timeline until SB 65, where the topic of the first workshop, to be held during SB 62 will be ‘systemic and holistic approaches to implementation of climate action on agriculture, food systems and food security, understanding, cooperation and integration into plans’.

The topic of the second workshop, to be held during SB 64 will be ‘progress, challenges, and opportunities related to identifying needs and accessing means of implementation for climate action in agriculture and food security, including sharing of best practices’.

Other potential topics for the workshops were discussed during the negotiations, such as means of implementation, including finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building, technology needs assessments, technology action plans and national biodiversity strategies and action plans.

Parties also requested the secretariat to develop the online portal, which has already been made available and will be launched at SB 61.

In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/7](#)), the SBs:

- ➔ invited relevant international organizations to submit information on their activities related to the joint work every year, and requested the secretariat to take this into account in preparing the annual synthesis report and make this annual report available for consideration at the first SB session each year, starting in 2025;
- ➔ requested the secretariat to hold in-session workshops in hybrid format, in accordance with the road map contained in the annex, and encouraged observers to participate in the workshops;
- ➔ requested the secretariat to prepare a report on each of the workshops for consideration by the SBs;
- ➔ requested the secretariat to dedicate time during the workshops to coordinate in relation to the joint work and include this in the report to COP 31 on the progress and outcomes of the joint work;
- ➔ invited parties and observers to submit views on the workshops’ subject, format, and suggested speakers;
- ➔ requested the secretariat to develop the online portal in accordance with the timeline specified in the annex; and
- ➔ agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 61.

TECHNOLOGY / LINKAGES WITH FINANCIAL MECHANISM

At COP 21, the need to define and enhance linkages between the *Technology Mechanism* (TM) and the *Financial Mechanism* (FM) was established with the aim of ensuring financial resources, for and scaling up action on, technology development and transfer. Since then, the TM and FM have been encouraged to develop a strongly cooperative approach to pursue the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Convention.

Technology transfer is seen as a key enabler for climate and sustainable action, with developed countries, under Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC, obliged to **promote and facilitate, including through financing, the transfer of environmentally sound technologies** to developing countries to support the latter in implementing climate actions.

Under Article 10 of the Paris Agreement, developing countries are also supposed to be supported on technology development and transfer. As noted in paragraph 9 of Decision 14/ CMA.5 (para.9) adopted in COP 28 last year, there is “insufficient transfer and deployment of technology in developing countries” and therefore, the decision encouraged “the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the CTCN to continue collaborating with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism.

During the SB 60, Parties engaged in an in-session workshop to take stock of existing linkages through presentations from key stakeholders, and to discuss opportunities for further linkages. Parties helpfully highlighted the remaining gaps and the reality of technology transfer, which can be counterproductive when there is insufficient post-implementation support.

Discussions highlighted the value of streamlining project proposals through a plug-and-play approach; they also recognised the value of long-term strategies for enhanced cooperation between national representatives of the different organisations (GEF, GCF, CTCN).

The draft decision which will form the basis of considerations at the next SBs in Baku, in which few paragraphs received agreement - and is therefore largely in brackets- notes, among others, the urgent need for consolidated information and data on linkages, including on the financial resources needed and provided for the CTCN support.

On the same theme of consolidated data, paragraph 12 of the decision contains a bracketed request to the secretariat to prepare a report consolidating the information on funds received, funding gaps, the progress made in enhancing the linkages and potential options to enhance the linkages between the Financial Mechanism and Technology Mechanism for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its sixty-second session (June 2025).

Chile, for the **G77 and China, had been calling for consolidated information and data** since the beginning of the sessions in Bonn, including at the 4th June in-session workshop. This call was echoed by Saudi Arabia for the Arab Group, Kenya for the African Group, Uganda for the LDCs, Egypt and Brazil. However, **this proposal received little support from developed country Parties**. The EU saw it as an additional, unnecessary burden due to the existence of the joint GEF and GCF reports, while Norway questioned the purpose of the consolidated data.

Discussions did not reach a conclusion either on whether to invite the TEC and CTCN to ‘facilitate’ or ‘enhance’ access support for developing countries for capacity-building and remains to be decided, with the EU taking a strong preference for ‘facilitate access’. Indeed, Chile, on behalf of the G77 and China, said that a lot of the expectations from the group were in brackets, but viewed the text as a good basis for continued negotiations. Finally, discussions turned to the involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities in the process, which was eventually included, to enable Parties to forward a draft decision to COP 29.

CAPACITY BUILDING

The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement all aim to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to respond effectively to climate change and its adverse effects.

The [Paris Committee on Capacity-Building](#) (PCCB), which was established under the Convention in 2015, in Paris, and also serves the Paris Agreement, is the main body that addresses gaps and needs in implementing capacity-building in developing countries and enhances the coherence and coordination of capacity-building activities.

The SBI 60 included an agenda item on “Matters relating to capacity-building”, divided into three sub-items. The conclusions of the SBI on these are:

- Matters relating to capacity-building under the Convention
 - *Annual monitoring of the implementation of the capacity-building framework*: acknowledged the progress, reiterated that needs and gaps remain, particularly in LDCs and SIDs, and noted that further efforts are needed to address gaps and needs related to implementing the Paris Agreement in developing countries that are outside the current scope of the capacity-building framework under the Convention.
 - *Terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention*: recommended a [draft decision](#) containing the terms of reference for the review for consideration and adoption at COP 29. The review is scheduled to start at SBI 62 (June 2025) and complete at SBI 63 (November 2025).
- Matters relating to capacity-building under the Convention and the Paris Agreement
 - *Second review of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building*: recommended two identical draft decisions, [one](#) for COP 29, the [other](#) for CMA 6 to consider and adopt. The draft decisions have an annex which sets out priority areas to guide the work of the PCCB. Under the current proposal, the PCCB is extended for five years (and reviewed again at COP 34 and CMA 11). The PCCB, at its 9th meeting, is requested to develop a new workplan for consideration by COP 30 and CMA 7, and to extend its current workplan until a new one is agreed.
- Matters relating to capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol
 - *Annual monitoring of the implementation of the capacity-building framework*: reiterated that, while progress in implementing the framework has been made, needs and gaps remain.

Legal advice insight

As part of the negotiations, certain developed countries proposed to add items for discussion under the CMA agenda, which are currently already discussed under the COP agenda, namely issues concerning gender, action for climate empowerment and capacity building. You can read [here](#), LRI’s advice which explores the scope and mandate of the CMA and the principles to which it may refer when making decisions.

GENDER

COP 28 requested the SBI 60 to initiate the final review of the implementation of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan (GAP) ([Decision 15/CP.28](#)). Parties and observer organisations were invited to submit their views and the secretariat produced a [synthesis report](#) on progress, challenges, gaps and priorities in implementing the gender action plan, and future work to be undertaken on gender and climate change, which was made available one week before the SBI 60. In order to support the review, countries had tasked the secretariat to organize an in-session workshop to discuss the synthesis report. The workshop covered topics such as:

- ➔ the pervasive silo approach of gender within programmes;
- ➔ the need to move from creating plans to ensuring implementation;
- ➔ capturing the “diverse realities of people” by adopting an intersectional lens across the action plan; and
- ➔ enhancing linkages and complementarities with processes such as those related to the NCQG and the GGA.

Delegates could not conclude the review and therefore, in its [conclusions](#), the SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 61 on the basis of the [draft text](#) prepared at SBI 60 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 29.

Legal advice insight

As part of the negotiations, certain developed countries proposed to add items for discussion under the CMA agenda, which are currently already discussed under the COP agenda, namely issues concerning gender, action for climate empowerment and capacity building. You can read [here](#), LRI’s advice which explores the scope and mandate of the CMA and the principles to which it may refer when making decisions.



ACTION FOR CLIMATE EMPOWERMENT (ACE)

Action for Climate Empowerment refers to various measures designed to empower all members of society to engage in climate action (under Article 6, UNFCCC and Article 12, Paris Agreement). This is done through *six elements*:

- climate change education;
- public awareness;
- training;
- public participation;
- public access to information; and
- international cooperation on these issues.

At COP 26, in Glasgow, parties decided to establish the [Glasgow Work Programme on ACE](#) to include and empower society, especially youth, more effectively in the negotiations. At COP 27, in Sharm el-Sheikh, parties adopted a 4-year [ACE Action Plan](#) under the Glasgow Work Programme on ACE. The action plan establishes short-term, clear and time-bound activities up to COP 31 in 2026.

In Bonn, the SBI considered the 2023 summary report prepared by the secretariat on progress in implementing activities under the Glasgow Work Programme. As at SB 59, little progress was made during informal consultations, and Parties were unable to recommend a draft decision. Consideration of this matter will continue at SB 61.

Nevertheless, various events took place during these negotiations impacting ACE. These included the [annual Dialogue](#) on Action for Climate Empowerment which assesses progress in the implementation of the work programme and its four priority areas. This year, the Dialogue's focus was on discussing tools and support to further ACE's objectives and six elements. Parties and stakeholders also met in the [expert dialogue](#) on the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children and youth to discuss relevant policy solutions that have an impact on ACE. Delegates were also able to engage with the [2024 ACE Gallery](#) showcasing resources and knowledge to accelerate ACE implementation.

Legal advice insight

As part of the negotiations, certain developed countries proposed to add items for discussion under the CMA agenda, which are currently already discussed under the COP agenda, namely issues concerning gender, action for climate empowerment and capacity building. You can read [here](#), LRI's advice which explores the scope and mandate of the CMA and the principles to which it may refer when making decisions.

REPORTING AND TRANSPARENCY

Parties to the UNFCCC are subject to reporting and review requirements under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol under the MRV system (Monitoring, Review and Verification), and under the Paris Agreement under the ETF. This reporting allows for tracking of parties' progress on their climate actions and support. Several SBI and SBSTA agenda items address these issues. We highlight here some of the key ones.

They include SBI agenda item 3 on "Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention". Three sub-items were being considered:

- Item 3a: Status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
- Item 3b: Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
- Item 3c: Report on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.

In informal consultations on sub-item 3a, concern was expressed about Annex I countries failing to submit their national communications and biennial reports on time, and the knock-on effect this has on review processes. Members of G77 and China wanted to have more time to discuss the content of the report and their concern over the delay of Annex I countries to submit national communications and biennial reports to be reflected in the conclusions. Annex I countries would not agree to this, suggesting rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure. Eventually a compromise was reached over a package of agenda items proposed by the co-facilitators, in which procedural conclusions were adopted for items 3a, 3b, 3c and 4a, while items 4c and SBSTA 15a, 15b and 15c (Annual reports on technical reviews) were taken note of.

In discussions on sub-item 3b, concern was also expressed regarding data from the compilation and synthesis of reports which indicate that, from 2020 to 2030, GHG emissions of Annex I Parties are projected to increase by 0.5%. The reports also show that no Annex I Party will achieve their 2030 target set out in their NDCs, with existing measures. They also reveal that total climate finance provided by developed countries to developing countries as reported averaged USD 51.6 billion annually in 2019–2020. Again, under this agenda item, developing countries' proposal to add more time to discuss the contents of the reports and to have the findings reflected in the SBI conclusions - including a reference to economies in transition being the ones that account for most of the reduction in 2021, compared to 1990 levels - were opposed by Annex I countries. This led to the compromise referred to above and the adoption of procedural conclusions that agree to continue consideration of these agenda items at SB 61, compromise which included the agenda items concerning non-Annex I reporting obligations under SBI agenda items 4a and 4c, also taken note of. The chairs suggested this package after the US indicated that they would not agree to take note of 4c if not dealt together with items 3a, 3b and 3c.

Additionally, under SBSTA Agenda items 15a to 15c, Parties considered the technical review of information reported by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their biennial reports and national communications (15a), greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (15b) and GHG inventories and other information reported by Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (15c). For these items, the co-facilitators presented a combined text to take note of all three sub-items, which was opposed by developing countries for two reasons: using a combined text would allow Annex I Convention parties that are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol to block Kyoto Protocol related proposals by the G77 and 2) because that prevented actual discussion on each of the sub-items including contentious issues for the developing countries.

Under SBSTA agenda item 14c, Reporting tools under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), discussions centred around the Secretariat's technical paper on parties' experience with the test version of the reporting tools for the electronic reporting of the common reporting tables and common tabular formats under the ETF. The Secretariat clarified that **a support team has been established to help address any technical issues reported by parties; and training sessions will be held in the African and Latin American and the Caribbean regions** ahead of COP 29, as well as at COP 29.

In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.6](#)), the SBSTA:

- welcomed the development of a test version of the ETF's reporting tools, and the regular hands-on technical training workshops to demonstrate the functions of those reporting tools to national experts from parties;
- considered the Secretariat's technical paper on parties' experience with the test version of the ETF reporting tools, including challenges encountered by developing countries in integrating the tools into their national inventory arrangements;
- noted the Secretariat will make reporting tools available for parties by the end of June 2024;
- emphasized the importance of the Secretariat providing training and technical support to enhance developing countries' capacity to use the tools, in particular for LDCs and SIDS; notes the importance of training being delivered online and/or in-person, as appropriate; and encourages the Secretariat to make use of online platforms, training and resources;
- noted that additional resources may be required for organizing the trainings and integrating the remaining features.

Negotiations under this agenda item were complemented by mandated events aimed at providing a progress update on the development of reporting tools and a live demo; an update on the progress in the development of the training programme for the technical expert review of Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs); a workshop on support available to developing country Parties for preparing biennial transparency reports; and a facilitative dialogue for sharing experience in gathering, analysing and managing data.

RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION (RSO)

These negotiations are a key forum for discussing the future advancement of scientific research and global observations that underpin the technical understanding of climate change within the UNFCCC. The RSO negotiations take place under the SBSTA, where negotiations related to “research” are usually considered during the first sessional period of a year (SBs) and “systematic observation” during the second sessional period of a year (COP). These negotiations have become increasingly fractious in the last few years and the SBSTA meeting at SB 60 was no exception. The topic was first discussed at the [16th meeting of the annual research dialogue](#). This dialogue provides a space to share research findings and lessons learned from activities undertaken by regional and international research programmes and organizations. Informal consultations were then held over several days, during which some complained that the dialogue’s choice of topics did not reflect a party-driven process.

Other points of contention this year again revolved around the IPCC, and whether to invite the IPCC to take into account in determining its future assessment cycles, work under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

Another contentious issue related to ‘research needs’: whether to specify them, and whether and how to capture the scientific community’s response to these research needs. Objections were raised by the LMDC and Arab Group and they opposed on-screen textual negotiations and subsequently insisted on the deletion of references to ‘research needs’.

Earlier iterations of the draft conclusions included a reference to specific research needs and research-related capacity building needs, such as revising, refining and developing scenarios and models, adaptation limits, observed and projected losses and damages, adaptation indicators, attribution science, among others.

Confusion was expressed by others from within the G77 as they understand ‘research needs’ to be a core part of the RSO mandate and crucial for improving scientific understanding across all areas of the climate change regime.

Again, as at SB 58, the dispute over the language of the RSO draft conclusions delayed the start of the final closing plenary.

During the plenary, the transparency and conduct of the SBSTA was called into question as the proposed RSO draft conclusions were swiftly gavelled through before they had been made available online. AOSIS expressed a seemingly widely shared sentiment that they were leaving ‘empty-handed’ on scientific matters and Chile expressed its concern that the conclusions did not specify research needs.

Legal advice insight

LRI produced a [summary of RSO](#), which provides for a quick description of this negotiation stream and highlights its most recent developments.

In the [conclusions](#) that were finally adopted, the SBSTA:

- welcomed the commencement of the seventh assessment cycle and the progress of work of the IPCC;
- encouraged the IPCC to enhance inclusivity and regional representation in its seventh assessment cycle;
- took note, with appreciation, of the 16th meeting of the research dialogue;
- noted the discussion on scientific advances and knowledge gaps, and on research needs and research capacity-building needs, and encouraged parties and the scientific community to take action to address climate-related research gaps and needs, including by strengthening research capacity at the regional level, inclusivity, and scientific cooperation; and
- invited parties and relevant organizations to submit views on possible themes for the 17th meeting of the research dialogue, to be held in conjunction with SBSTA 62, and
- encouraged its Chair to identify themes for the dialogue in a consultative and inclusive manner, and to consider inviting the scientific community to present on how research needs and gaps are being addressed.

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

As part of the Administrative, Financial and Institutional matters workstream, parties come together to discuss, among others, [how to track and improve the use of the UNFCCC's budget](#).

This agenda item is first discussed under the SBI, which then recommends draft decisions on these matters for consideration and adoption/endorsement by the three governing bodies (COP, CMP, and CMA). At its 60th meeting, the SBI considered, among others:

- the [annual report](#) on the 2023 secretariat activities and financial performance,
- the Executive Secretary's [note on budget performance](#) and [addendum](#) on programme performance for the biennium 2022–2023,
- the secretariat's [note on current status of contributions](#), and
- the [secretariat's 2024-2025 work programme](#).

The main focus of the discussions was the secretariat's budgetary constraints which have resulted in the secretariat's failure to deliver on various activities this year. This led Parties to express their disappointment that, due to the budgetary constraints, virtual access to the SB 60 and the regional climate weeks had been cancelled.

Some parties, such as the UK, requested clearer information on a decision's potential budgetary implications before it is agreed. This created concern for members of G77 and China and the Arab Group that parties may seek to block decisions due to financial constraints.

Eventually, Parties recommended [draft decisions](#) for COP 29 and CMP 19 which highlight the aforementioned issues. It also requests the Secretariat to improve the transparency of its budget management through quarterly reports and to prepare an information document after each COP detailing the cost implications of the new activities. It also urges the secretariat to immediately implement the outstanding recommendations of the UN Board of Auditors. The COP decision also includes a paragraph 5 reiterating that Parties must seek to approve future core budget including all essential and long-term, recurring activities, mandated by the COP and the CMA.

OTHER EVENTS

Mountains and Climate Change Dialogue

At SB 60, Parties and stakeholders met for the first time to discuss mountains and climate change. This follows long-lasting calls from mountainous countries to include mountains in the UNFCCC process. The underlying goal of the Dialogue was to identify further opportunities to discuss mountains in the UNFCCC process. Additionally, the Dialogue would contribute through the sharing of knowledge, experience and insights to strengthening the resilience of mountain ecosystems and to the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. Questions remain on where mountains fit into the UNFCCC process now that the Dialogue is completed, for more information on this subject, LRI has produced legal advice which you can read [here](#).

Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue

The 2024 Ocean and Climate change dialogue took place during SB 60. Parties and stakeholders met to discuss marine biodiversity conservation and coastal resilience, along with technology needs for the ocean. This gave participants the opportunity to hear about positive examples of adaptation and mitigation measures in relation to the ocean. Some discussions also turned on the importance of seeing the ocean as intrinsically valuable. It was also an opportunity for participants to encourage the inclusion of oceans in the new or updated NDCs due in 2025, as per the [Second Because the Ocean Declaration](#). To gain further insights into the background of the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue, please read our information note on Ocean and Climate Change [here](#).

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