



# COP 29 OUTCOMES



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# 1. INTRODUCTION

From 11 to 23 November 2024, the annual climate conference under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in Baku, Azerbaijan.

The conference formally comprised:

- The 29th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 29);
- The 19th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19);
- The 6th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 6);
- The 61st session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 61); and
- The 61st session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 61).

The following summary does not aim to provide a full and comprehensive report of the negotiations and decisions taken in Baku but to highlight key outcomes of the official intergovernmental process mainly. As a result, only outcomes under the COP and CMA are summarised (and CMP decisions are largely disregarded). At the time of writing, only the [advance unedited version of the decisions](#) was available. To help the reader and provide a general overview, this summary groups together discussions around thematic areas and does not follow the official meeting agendas of the various bodies. We also include a new section on “governance” as governance and legal issues are increasingly becoming prevalent during, and at the end of, negotiations. This section highlights some of the main issues that shaped COP 29.

For more detailed explanations of the relevant COP, CMP and CMA decisions, please refer to LRI’s Paris Agreement A to Z app,<sup>1</sup> and LACLIIMA’s [“Rumo à COP: guia de bolso para entender as negociações do clima – Edição COP 29”](#). You can find [here](#) a list of calls for submissions arising from the conference in Baku, and [here](#) a list of UNFCCC mandated events for 2025.

<sup>1</sup>Available at: <https://apps.apple.com/gb/app/paris-agreement-a-to-z/id1560932012> and <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lri.parisagreement>.

## 2. NEW COLLECTIVE QUANTIFIED GOAL ON CLIMATE FINANCE

Through [Decision 1/CP.21](#) countries decided to set “a new collective quantified goal from a starting point of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”. In 2021, Parties established an ad hoc work programme (AHWP) for 2022 to 2024, with yearly technical expert dialogues (TEDs) to further develop the views of Parties and non-party stakeholders on the elements of the NCQG ([Decision 9/CMA.3](#)). In Dubai, after two years of intense discussions, countries decided “to transition to a mode of work to enable the development of a draft negotiating text” for consideration by CMA 6.

In 2024, three TEDs were held alongside three meetings under the ad hoc work programme. These sessions provided an opportunity for Parties to engage collaboratively in discussions in an open, inclusive and transparent manner. The co-chairs prepared a draft negotiating text on the possible structure and elements of the substantive framework, organized as a package of options built from views expressed and contributions submitted throughout the AHWP. For more on the pre-COP 29 state of play of NCQG negotiations, please see LRI’s [NCQG briefing](#).

In the Baku climate conference, discussions on the NCQG began with the widespread rejection of the preliminary text presented by the co-chairs. A reformulated proposal resulted in discussions on technical topics such as transparency and access to financing. However, the first week ended with no significant advancements on the core elements of the goal, including quantum, contributors and structure.

The text was forwarded to the COP Presidency, which appointed Ministers to lead political engagement and convened technical sessions with delegation heads. During the second week, successive versions of the draft text were released, including a “[Streamlined compilation of proposals](#)” with qualitative and quantitative elements that sought to capture most viewpoints. This was later replaced by [a more concise version](#) that faced widespread criticism for its ambiguity and significant omissions on substantive matters previously debated by Parties throughout the AHWP.

Negotiations continued beyond the official end date of COP 29. Efforts focused on incorporating elements into the text that were deemed essential to meeting the needs of developing countries. Tensions ran high and it seemed that ‘no outcome’ on the NCQG was possible. At one point, AOSIS and the LDCs temporarily walked out of the talks because they had not been consulted on one of the draft texts, while other groups were invited to meet with the COP President team. In the end, a compromise was achieved and the decision was adopted in the closing plenary.

### **The NCQG decision ([Decision 1/CMA.6](#)) included:**

#### **→ Contextual elements that:**

- Aim to accelerate the achievement of the Paris Agreement’s objectives, with a primary focus on limiting the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C, while pursuing efforts to limit it

to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, alongside enhancing climate resilience, supporting low-emission development, and aligning financial flows with climate-resilient pathways;

- Decided that the goal will support developing countries' climate plans, such as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs), enhance ambition, and address their evolving needs, prioritizing vulnerable nations like LDCs and SIDS;
- Noted the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's findings in its latest Sixth Assessment Report, highlighting the need for significantly scaled-up adaptation and mitigation financing, the availability of global capital to close investment gaps, and the critical role of governments in addressing barriers through public funding and clear signals to investors.

#### → Quantitative elements that:

- Called on all actors to collaborate in scaling up climate finance for developing countries to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035, with a specific goal of at least USD 300 billion annually led by developed countries from diverse public and private sources, towards ambitious mitigation and adaptation efforts, transparency, and counting outflows and mobilisation by multilateral development banks;
- Encouraged voluntary contributions from developing countries, such as through South-South cooperation.

#### → Quantitative elements on access to climate finance that:

- Underscored the need to address barriers to climate finance, including high capital costs, co-financing requirements, and complex application processes, as well as enhancing transparency and eliminating

conditionalities for access, particularly for LDCs and SIDS;

- Urged Parties that provide bilateral climate finance to increase support for locally led approaches and institutions, particularly for adaptation; enhance capacity-building, technical assistance, and readiness programs; expand multi-year, country-led programmatic approaches; consider scaling up existing projects over initiating smaller new ones; streamline reporting requirements where possible, and consider measures for increasing finance for LDCs and SIDS;
- Invited international financial institutions to align operations to tackle climate change and poverty, including by deploying a range of instruments, particularly non-debt instruments; considering expanding concessional and grant financing for vulnerable countries; and improving access and effectiveness of climate finance;
- Called on multilateral climate funds to enhance access, effectiveness, and flexibility by prioritizing direct access, simplifying processes, promoting programmatic approaches and streamlining reporting.

#### On the way forward, countries agreed on:

- Launching the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T", aiming to scale up climate finance for developing countries including through grants, concessional instruments, and measures creating fiscal space, supporting low-emission, climate-resilient development and national climate plans, with a final report to be presented at CMA 7 (November 2025);
- Requesting the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare a report biennially for the CMA's consideration, beginning in 2028, on collective progress towards the delivery of the NCQG;

- Inviting submissions for financial support data for 2025 and 2026 using common tabular formats by 30 June 2028 and biennially thereafter to ensure a comprehensive overview of financial support and to inform the global stocktake under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement;
- Conducting a special assessment of access to climate finance at CMA 12 (2030);
- Conducting periodic assessment on the implementation of the NCQG as part of the global stocktake, with a review of the NCQG decision in 2030, and starting deliberations on future directions prior to 2035.

## On the NCQG decision

The NCQG decision faced strong criticism for failing to clearly articulate the obligations of developed countries to provide climate finance, as mandated by Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. Instead, the language used aligns with Article 9.3, in which climate finance is to be mobilized under the responsibility of all actors.

Furthermore, the decision lacks provisions addressing key issues such as human rights obligations, an explicit definition of climate finance and the exclusion of certain financial flows (under market rates, for example), as well as opposition to fossil fuel investments, thereby weakening efforts to ensure a just climate transition. For more on the concept of just transition, please see LRI's [explainer](#).

Questions have also arisen about the process around the adoption of the NCQG decision, which brings up wider discussions about the UNFCCC process including regarding consensus decision-making and the discretion of presiding officers. For more detail on the process of adoption of the goal, please see the Governance section of this summary and LRI's [advice about the adoption of the NCQG decision](#).

Additionally, there is a lack of clarity regarding actions to be undertaken under the Baku to Belém Roadmap to achieve the USD 1.3 trillion target.





Photo: UN Climate Change - Kamran Guliyev (Flickr)



# 3. CLIMATE FINANCE

Climate finance is a cross-cutting subject that permeates nearly all areas of the international climate regime. At the heart of the Paris Agreement, climate finance is set as one of the treaty's objectives: to make "finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development" (Article 2.1.c). Furthermore, climate finance is also referred to as a means of implementing the Agreement, determining that "developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention" (Article 9.1). As echoed in this provision from the Paris Agreement, financial obligations from developed to developing country Parties are also at the core of the Convention. These include support to implement the Convention and meet their adaptation needs (Articles 4.3-4.5), even making developing countries' implementation of the Convention conditional to such financial support (Article 4.7).

## 3.1 Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance

The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) supports coherence and coordination in the delivery of finance inside and outside the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Matters relating to the SCF are addressed under both the COP and CMA.

At the Dubai climate conference (2023), countries took note of the report published by the SCF on clustering types of climate finance definitions in use, including the executive summary thereof, as well as noted

"the complexities, in relation to accounting of and reporting on climate finance at the aggregated level, associated with the application of the variety of definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and non-Party stakeholders" ([Decision 5/CP.28](#)). In this regard, the SCF was requested to "consider updating, in the context of its sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, its operational definition of climate finance, building on the non-exhaustive list of potential options" as provided in the report on clustering types of climate finance definitions.

Countries also requested the SCF to include information from the biennial communications under Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement in the SCF's sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows ([Decision 9/CMA.5](#)). Furthermore, countries decided to undertake a series of activities in the context of the [Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue](#) to enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Agreement.

At the Baku climate conference, this agenda item addressed the [SCF's annual report](#), which included the SCF's:

- [Summary report](#) of the 2024 Forum of the SCF on accelerating climate action and resilience through gender-responsive finance,
- [Second report](#) of the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement,
- [Report](#) on common practices regarding climate finance definitions, reporting and accounting methods, and
- [Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows](#). This agenda

item mainly focused on the Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (sixth BA). It indicated a 63% increase in global financial flows in 2021-2022 compared to the previous biennium, with an annual average of USD 1.3 trillion. The discussion emphasised the need to redirect financial flows to underrepresented regions, particularly in developing countries, given that current

flows are concentrated in East Asia, Northern and Western Europe, and North America. The sixth BA also included considerations on identifying the needs of developing countries, highlighting more than 5,760 national needs, 48% of which were quantified with values totalling between USD 5.01 and 6.85 trillion by 2030. Another relevant point was the update of the operational definition of climate finance by the SCF.

## Climate Finance Definition Updated

The SCF's definition of climate finance in its first Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows [Report](#) (published in 2014) had not been updated since then - new proposals put forward in subsequent editions were unsuccessful. [Decision 5/CP.28](#) tasked the SCF to consider updating its operational definition of climate finance as part of the sixth BA. The SCF did so, and agreed to apply the following definition of climate finance for its future work:

- “Climate finance aims at reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases, aims at reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and mainstreaming and increasing resilience of human and ecological systems to negative climate impacts, and includes financing for actions identified in a country's nationally determined contribution, adaptation communication, national adaptation plan, long-term low-emission development strategy or other national plan for implementing and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention” ([Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows](#))

## 3.2 Long-term finance

In 2009, developed countries pledged to mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020 to support climate action in developing nations ([Decision 2/CP.15](#)). However, countries have repeatedly acknowledged with deep regret that this goal was not met up to, and including, 2021, urging developed countries to fully deliver on it through 2025 ([4/CP.28](#)). At the climate conference in Dubai in 2023, countries engaged in intense discussions about the inclusion of the potential achievement of the goal in the final

text, prompted by preliminary data from an OECD report suggesting that the target was likely met in 2022. However, this claim formulated by developed countries was further refuted. There were other reports that contradicted such claim -i.e. from Oxfam- that were also not included. Issues such as the lack of a common definition of climate finance, tracking methodologies, access challenges faced by developing countries, fiscal constraints and rising adaptation costs were stressed by countries ([Decision 4/CP.28](#)).

At COP 28 in Dubai, Parties also requested the Secretariat to prepare a report on its activities, as referred to in paragraph 10 of [decision 6/CP.23](#), related to exploring ways and means to assist developing countries in assessing their needs and priorities in a country-driven manner, including their technological and capacity-building needs, and in translating climate finance needs into action. In the climate conference in Baku, parties discussed the Secretariat [report](#), also known as the 'Needs-based Finance project' that highlighted the successes and challenges encountered in assisting developing country Parties in assessing their needs and priorities, Parties focused on the USD 100 billion goal.

Discussions were preceded by the presentation of the second [report](#) of the Standing Committee on Finance on progress towards achieving the USD 100 billion goal. The report's key findings revealed a notable divergence among the sources analysed due to the different methodologies they applied, acknowledging what was discussed during the GST negotiations at COP 23. While the [OECD](#) claimed the target was achieved in 2022, reporting USD 115.9 billion mobilised, [Oxfam](#) and the [SCF's](#) own preliminary accounts pointed out that the funds fell significantly short of the pledged amount, underscoring persistent challenges in fulfilling the agreed financial objectives as well as the complexity in measuring the provision of climate finance.

#### **The COP [decision](#), among others:**

- Recalled the commitment of developed countries mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year, including through 2025;
- Noted with appreciation the SCF report on progress towards achieving the goal, including the key findings and recommendations presented there, and took note of the efforts undertaken by Parties at the session and looked forward to continuing deliberations on this matter at COP 30.

## **3.3 Report and Guidance to the Green Climate Fund**

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is currently in its second replenishment period and operating under its [2024-2027 Strategic Plan](#). During the Baku climate conference, countries welcomed the GCF's annual [report](#).

The report concludes that the approval of proposals has increased, amounting to USD 15.9 billion allocated to 286 projects across 133 developing countries. The private sector portfolio reached USD 5 billion in commitments, demonstrating a high potential to mobilise additional resources. The number of accredited entities increased to 139, thereby promoting direct access to the fund for 89 local and regional entities. Additionally, efficiency measures have been adopted to reduce the processing time for funding requests and improve support for national adaptation plans. The GCF has encouraged deeper engagement with Indigenous Peoples and local communities by following the recommendations of its Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group. The report, however, stressed that funding should be balanced between adaptation and mitigation, aligning with the 2024-2027 strategic plan. The Fund worked with the Climate Technology Centre and Network to improve access to climate technologies and continued collaborating with other global initiatives, including the Adaptation Fund and the Global Environment Facility. An ambitious vision was outlined for the Fund to efficiently manage USD 50 billion in capital by 2030.

#### **The COP 29 [decision](#) on finance welcomed the report and urged and encouraged the GCF Board to take several measures:**

- Updating its gender action plan;
- Continuing to integrate into its decision-making consideration of people and



communities on the frontlines of climate change, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities;

- Exploring alternative financing instruments and frameworks aimed at increasing public and private funding.

**Furthermore, the GCF Board was requested to:**

- Strengthen the monitoring and reporting of disbursements and their resulting impacts, notably regarding multi-country activities, in alignment with the integrated results management framework;
- Continue considering ways to better serve different regions in a geographically balanced manner;
- Consider taking measures to ensure that the monitoring and accountability requirements for procedures after accreditation are fit for purpose and take into account the capacity constraints of direct access entities;

The same COP 29 decision considered the relationship between the COP and the GCF, deciding to modify the arrangements between the COP and the GCF (annex of the [decision](#)). The Board should consider and approve them before COP 30, being effective from the Board's approval.

**The COP decided that guidance will be communicated to the GCF:**

- Annually until 2026, and biennially thereafter;
- At/after each COP session immediately preceding the final year of each GCF replenishment;
- Should the COP decide to do so upon request by a Party, consistent with rules 9–13 of the draft rules of procedure being applied.

**On the way forward, in the COP decision:**

- Parties were invited to submit views and recommendations on elements of guidance for the GCF;
- The SCF was requested to take into consideration submissions by Parties in preparing its draft guidance for the GCF for consideration by COP 30 and CMA 7.

### **3.4 Report and Guidance to the Global Environment Facility**

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is accountable to the Conference of the Parties for both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. All its activities are reported to the COP at each session, where countries may decide to provide further guidance on policies, program priorities, and eligibility criteria for funding, among others.

Based on the [report](#) presented, the COP [decision](#) invited the Global Environment Facility (GEF), to consider, among other aspects, working with developing countries to incorporate just transition elements into national climate plans and programmes; supporting the establishment of nationally determined mechanisms to facilitate coordination of received support; increasing the contribution of the GEF project portfolio to adaptation, as appropriate and in line with its mandate.

The COP welcomed the GEF's ongoing efforts, in collaboration with the GCF, the Adaptation Fund, and the Climate Investment Funds, to improve developing countries' access to climate finance, scale up successful projects, maximise climate finance impact, and enhance coherence. The COP also invited the GEF to ensure that these efforts do not restrict developing countries' access to resources or reduce available funding.

The GEF was requested to further simplify the processes of the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, to facilitate access for eligible countries.

The COP decided to modify the [Memorandum of Understanding](#) between the COP and the GEF (for consideration and approval by the GEF's Council) to change the frequency at which the COP communicates any policy guidance to the GEF Council, as follows:

- Annually until 2026, and biennially thereafter;
- At/after each COP session immediately preceding the final year of each GEF replenishment;
- Should the COP decide to do so upon request by a Party, consistent with rules 9–13 of the draft rules of procedure being applied.

A separate [decision](#), by the CMA:

- Requested the GEF to include information on how funds are used to ensure that enabling activities support the sustainability of national reporting systems and strengthen institutional capacity in developing countries in its 2025 report.
- Requested the GEF to explore ways to enhance support for the Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency and activities aimed at avoiding gaps between project cycles, providing timely support, and improving the sustainability of national communication systems and the necessary workflows for developing countries to meet their transparency-related requirements on a continuous basis under the enhanced transparency framework of the Paris Agreement.
- Regarding the GEF's 9th replenishment cycle, **the CMA invited it to consider:**
  - Information submitted by Parties in their first biennial transparency report;
  - The use of transparency support funds available under its 8th replenishment cycle;

- Information submitted by Parties under paragraph 17 of decision 18/CMA.5; and
- The synthesis report provided under paragraph 18 of decision 18/CMA.5.

### 3.5 Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on the scope of Article 2, Paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement

The Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue between Parties, relevant organisations and stakeholders was launched at the Sharm el-Sheikh climate conference in 2022 ([Decision 1/CMA.4](#)). This dialogue explores:

- The scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, establishing a goal to redirect global financial flows towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathways through a collective objective; and
- The complementarity between Article 2.1(c) and Article 9, the latter concerning financial obligations of developed countries within the context of climate finance.

It was initially programmed to develop activities in 2023. However, countries decided to continue and strengthen the dialogue “in 2024–2025, recognising the significant scale of investment needed to keep the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, and to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate-resilient and low greenhouse gas emission development, including in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty” ([Decision 9/CMA.5](#)). This decision was taken on the recognition in the first Global Stocktake of the “need for further understanding of Article

2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement”, as well as on the notion of “the limited progress towards making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” ([Decision 1/CMA.5](#)).

Based on the 2024 report presented by the co-facilitators of the dialogue, the CMA [encouraged](#) the continuation of work with increased efforts to organise and conduct the workshops scheduled for 2025 under the dialogue in an inclusive, open, and transparent manner. This includes measures to ensure participatory representation, facilitate the engagement of Parties and non-Party stakeholders, and seek content relevant to all Parties.

**On the way forward, the CMA 6 [decision](#):**

- Encourages the secretariat to continue organising the workshops under the dialogue during 2025 (that were mandated in Dubai through [decision 9/CMA.5](#) in a participatory manner, ensuring representation of Parties and

non-party stakeholders, and aiming to have content relevant to all Parties;

- Invites Parties and stakeholders to submit their views on the topics to be addressed during the workshops scheduled for 2025 by March 1, 2025.

## 3.6 Adaptation Fund

Matters regarding the Adaptation Fund (AF) are considered under the CMP and CMA agendas.

The CMP and the CMA welcomed the [annual report](#) and [its addendum](#) submitted by the Adaptation Fund Board (AF Board) for the year 2024 ([Decision 2/CMP.19](#) and [Decision 13/CMA.6](#)). Parties noted the progress in implementing the medium-term strategy and the update of the environmental and social safeguard policy of the Fund, as well as the adoption of an increased mobilization target, compared to 2023, the receipts for 2024, and the pledged contributions. Countries noted with concern the outstanding pledged contributions and urged Parties to fulfil their pledges.

### Adaptation Fund: 2024 in numbers ([Decision 2/CMP.19](#) and [Decision 13/CMA.6](#))

- Resource mobilisation target for 2024 of USD 300 million;
- Cumulative receipts of USD 1,827 million into the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund, comprising USD 215.83 million from the monetisation of certified emission reductions, USD 1,489.88 million from voluntary contributions and USD 121.43 million from investment income earned on the Trust Fund balance;
- Cash receipts amounting to USD 309.94 million, comprising USD 0.91 million from the monetisation of certified emission reductions, USD 256.92 million from voluntary contributions and USD 52.11 million from investment income earned on the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund balance;
- Outstanding pledged contributions from previous years of USD 122.57 million, of which USD 72.67 million under existing signed agreements with donors.



Recalling Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement and paragraph 18 of [decision 1/CMA.3](#), the importance of financial contributions to the AF by developed countries was recalled (in the CMP decision) and stressed (in the CMA decision) in the context of:

- Urging developed countries to at least double their collective provision to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025; and
- Achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation financing.

The [CMP.19](#) and [CMA.6](#) decisions underscore financing for locally led adaptation projects by promoting the goals of the Fund's Medium-Term Strategy and welcoming the establishment of a new global aggregator program and a dedicated funding window. Countries further welcomed the approval of additional financing for the global aggregator programme, requested the AF Board to accelerate efforts to implement the programme, and underscored "the need to tailor projects to local contexts, including through initial assessments and consultations with diverse groups".

Countries also highlighted the AF Board's initiatives to address gender challenges in funding climate action. Both [CMP.19](#) and [CMA.6](#) welcomed the progress made in implementing the AF's updated gender policy and action plan and the gender scorecard, "including by developing the first Adaptation Fund [e-learning course](#) on gender mainstreaming". In addition, countries welcomed the decision taken by the AF Board to develop and adopt a stand-alone Adaptation Fund policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment.

### On the way forward, the AF Board was:

- Requested to further increase the gender-responsiveness of the AF's resources;
- Invited "to consider areas for improvement in the context of the gender-responsiveness of the work of the Adaptation Fund, taking into account relevant insights, including from the summary report on the 2024 Standing Committee on Finance Forum on accelerating climate action and resilience through gender-responsive finance";
- Encouraged to complete, "as a matter of priority, its work related to implementing its mandates in decisions [1/CMP.14](#) and [13/CMA.1](#) and to report thereon in its annual report" to be considered by CMP 20 and CMA 7 (November 2025); and
- Requested "to provide updates on its activities and scope of support in relation to assisting developing country Parties in their efforts towards the implementation of the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including towards achieving the targets referred to in paragraphs 9–10 of [decision 2/CMA.5](#)".

The need for maintaining continuity during the AF's transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement was also emphasised. The [CMP.19](#) and [CMA.6](#) requested the SBI to consider the matter of the arrangements for the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and to make recommendations for further consideration by CMP 20 and CMA 7 (November 2025).



Photo: UN Climate Change - Kiara Worth (Flickr)

# 4. MITIGATION: MITIGATION WORK PROGRAMME

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As there is a direct relation between global average temperatures and the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, mitigation - understood as efforts to reduce emissions and enhance sinks - is key to solving the climate change problem. Various negotiation streams relate to mitigation, such as Article 6, NDC features and Periodic Review, which are covered in other sections of this summary.

In 2021, during the Glasgow climate conference, Parties agreed to establish a Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP) to urgently enhance mitigation ambition and implementation, designed as a complement to the Global Stocktake (GST) ([Decision 1/CMA.3](#)). At the 2022 climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, the format and scope of the MWP -then called Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Work Programme- were defined, emphasising facilitative, non-prescriptive outcomes that respect national sovereignty and circumstances without imposing new targets or singling out specific sectors ([Decision 4/CMA.4](#)). The programme was set to be operationalised through focused exchanges of views, information, and ideas, with a commitment to hold at least two global mitigation dialogues annually. Implementation of the MWP began immediately after COP 27/CMA 4, with a planned review in 2026 to assess its progress.

At the Dubai climate conference (2023), negotiations on this topic were marked by tensions due to concerns about overlaps with the Global Stocktake (GST) and

objections from fossil fuel-producing countries, who felt the energy sector was disproportionately targeted by the 2023 global dialogues and report under the MWP. Developing countries also expressed apprehension that discussions on investment might prioritise private sector contributions over the responsibility of developed country governments to provide financial support. Consequently, substantive mitigation outcomes were incorporated into the GST decision, leaving the MWP decision largely procedural. Countries requested the secretariat to organise future dialogues and the Subsidiary Bodies to monitor progress and barriers in implementing the programme.

In the Baku climate conference (2024), this work programme once again emerged as one of the most polarised topics, with parties taking rigid and uncompromising positions. The main contention centred on whether the MWP should address metrics and mitigation gaps identified in the COP 28 decision on the Global Stocktake (GST). Some developing countries, particularly those from the LMDC group and the Arab Group, firmly opposed the idea of using GST outcomes to guide the MWP's work. In contrast, countries such as Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) strongly advocated for this approach.

By the end of the first week of negotiations, the lack of consensus almost led to the early application of Rule 16 of the UNFCCC Rules of Procedure, deferring discussions to the next session of the Conference of



the Parties. However, thanks to substantial efforts by the Presidency and pressure from countries advocating for continued discussions during this session, negotiations resumed in the second week, under the CMA. The MWP negotiations effectively restarted from scratch, with Parties being invited to share their expectations for the CMA 6 decision on the program. Consensus was reached on a proposal to establish a digital platform to connect mitigation initiatives and projects with potential investors for fostering trust and facilitating the exchange of experiences among Parties, with a focus on implementation rather than increasing mitigation ambition.

In consideration of previous work undertaken in the MWP, [Decision 2/CMA.6](#):

- Welcomed the progress made in implementing the MWP during 2023–2024 and highlights key developments, including platforms for sharing solutions and addressing challenges, facilitating matchmaking opportunities between projects and financiers, and publishing annual reports;
- Noted the key findings, opportunities, barriers, and solutions outlined in the 2024 annual report on “Cities: buildings and urban systems,” emphasizing emission reductions, tailored approaches, enhanced collaboration, and the integration of climate action into sustainable urban planning, with a focus on international cooperation and support for developing countries;

### **On the way forward:**

- Parties, observers and other stakeholders are invited to submit via the submission portal by 1 May 2025 views on the design and features of the platform with a view to an exchange of views on the platform taking place at the sixty-second sessions of the subsidiary bodies (June 2025);

- The secretariat will organise future global dialogues and investment-focused events under the guidance of the work programme co-chairs to promote regional and gender balance, increase participation from developing countries, ensure transparency in agenda-setting, strengthen matchmaking for financial access, and enhance understanding of regional perspectives.

Furthermore, as previously established in [Decision 4/CMA.4](#), two dialogues will be held in 2025. On this matter, Parties, observers, and stakeholders are encouraged to submit:

- Suggested topics for the 2025 global dialogues by 1 February 2025, with the MWP co-chairs selecting and announcing the topics by 1 March 2025, ensuring varied themes across dialogues;
- Views on solutions, challenges, and needs for each dialogue under the work programme, including input on experts, financiers, and the specific circumstances of vulnerable developing countries, via the submission portal four weeks in advance.



Photo: UNFCCC (website)

# 5. ADAPTATION

Adaptation refers to the process of adjusting infrastructure, lifestyles, societal mechanisms, and natural systems to climate change and its effects. The Paris Agreement dedicates a specific article to adaptation: Article 7 guides countries towards the objective of promoting climate resilience through measures taken to enhance adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerabilities associated with climate change. Within the UNFCCC, there are various negotiation and work streams aiming to address this important issue.

## 5.1 Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), established under the Paris Agreement, defines an aspirational level of adaptive capacity, resilience, and vulnerability reduction in response to climate change. However, while the Agreement provided for the creation of the GGA, it did not establish quantifiable targets or elaborate on its specific characteristics. To address this gap, at COP 26, Parties agreed to launch the two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme on the GGA (GlaSS), aimed at developing a framework to track and measure progress on adaptation ([Decision 7/CMA.3](#)).

Following this development, Parties embarked on the complex task of designing a framework for the GGA. Discussions on this issue at COP 28 were highly contentious, with negotiations culminating—after considerable effort—in the adoption of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience ([Decision 2/CMA.5](#)). The most divisive points centred on the inclusion of specific targets and financial commitments, with significant disagreement over the recognition of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC).

The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience aims to guide the implementation of the GGA and assess overall progress towards adaptation objectives. It establishes thematic targets in key areas such as water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty eradication, and cultural heritage, alongside dimensional targets linked to the iterative adaptation cycle. The Dubai decision (2023) also launched a two-year work programme, set to conclude at COP 30, to develop indicators for tracking progress towards these targets. Additionally, the UNFCCC Secretariat was tasked with examining how transformational adaptation, which has been recognised as a crucial component of adaptation objectives, is defined.

At the Baku Climate Conference, deadlocks in other adaptation agenda items shifted the focus towards negotiations on the GGA. Discussions centred around three key priorities:

- The UAE-Belém work programme on indicators to assess progress towards the thematic and dimensional targets established at COP28;
- Operational issues outlined in paragraph 38 of Decision 2/CMA.5, particularly concerning the functioning of the GGA and its alignment with future Global Stocktake processes;
- Debates on the concept of transformational adaptation and its potential integration into the GGA framework.

After two weeks of intense and often challenging negotiations, Parties achieved a hard-fought consensus, leading to a decision that paves the way for the operationalization of the GGA in the lead-up to COP 30 in Belém, where a final outcome on the work programme for indicators is anticipated.



### Decision 3/CMA.6 on the GGA decision:

Reaffirms the request made at SB 60 for technical experts to refine the mapping of existing indicators and develop new indicators, while emphasising geographical and gender balance amongst the experts, providing further guidance to ensure common methodologies, collaboration across targets, a reduced number of global indicators, and the development of enabling factor indicators for adaptation action. In this context, the decision highlights additional criteria for the potential set of indicators, which include measurability and data availability to enable transparent monitoring of progress, the ability to use data already available or easily collectable, the use of consolidated and available metrics, relevance to multiple thematic targets, and an outcome-oriented approach. To avoid imposing additional reporting burdens on countries, the decision also specifies that the final outcome of the UAE-Belém Work Programme on indicators should consist of a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators.

The Parties have also agreed that the final outcome of the UAE-Belém work programme should include a comprehensive set of indicators—qualitative, quantitative, and thematic—addressing social inclusion, human rights, specific ecosystems, children’s vulnerabilities, and enabling factors for adaptation implementation, with clear purposes, data sources, and mechanisms for standard development, and that it should constitute a source of input for the technical phase of the GST.

Looking ahead, as part of the decision agreed upon by the Parties, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap has been launched to drive progress in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, while supporting the implementation of the elements outlined in paragraph 38 of [Decision 2/CMA.5](#). The Subsidiary Bodies have been tasked with continuing considerations on paragraph 38 of [Decision 2/CMA.5](#), focusing on key aspects including,

but not limited to, paragraph 38(a–e), at their sixty-second sessions. This paragraph is aimed at advancing the GGA, specifically supporting the implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. The key focus areas include (a) facilitating the exchange of knowledge and experiences; (b) identifying relevant inputs for future GSTs; (c) enhancing understanding of climate risks and impacts; (d) strengthening collaboration with scientific bodies; and (e) developing terms of reference for reviewing adaptation efforts.

Additionally, Parties have established the Baku High-Level Dialogue on Adaptation, which will take place alongside CMA 7, with its outcomes to be reported at the relevant session, aiming to advance the implementation of the GGA framework. The decision also calls for Parties to update their adaptation communications and prepare BTRs in alignment with the UAE Framework, while requesting the secretariat to assess progress towards achieving the frameworks’ targets as part of the second GST. Furthermore, Parties have agreed that the review of the UAE Framework will be conducted after the second GST, with the development of the Terms of Reference for this review set to begin following the completion of the UAE-Belém work programme.

Finally, the decision recognizes the importance of both incremental and transformational adaptation approaches in safeguarding the well-being of people and the planet, acknowledging the technical report prepared by the secretariat. Given the limited available time for in-depth discussions on this matter at COP 29, Parties have agreed to continue deliberations on transformational adaptation at the sixty-second sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies.

## 5.2 Adaptation Committee

The Adaptation Committee (AC) is the overall advisory body to the COP on adaptation matters. It was established in 2011 as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework

with the mandate to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner. Whilst initially set up under the Convention, the AC now serves both the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and reports to the CMA as well as the COP.

At SB 60 (June 2024) Parties had agreed to consider the annual report of the AC and the review of its progress, effectiveness and performance separately (under two separate sub-agenda items) at SB 61.

#### **Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee:**

no substantive outcomes could be reached on the review, with Parties diverging on whether the review should be conducted under the authority of the COP only or under both the COP and CMA. For more details on the issue of the AC governance, please see LRI's advice [here](#). Additionally, Parties also clashed over the basis for negotiations, debating whether to use an informal note developed by the co-facilitators, a conference room paper put forward by the AGN, or a merged version of both documents. The negotiations were marked by heightened tensions, frequent interruptions, procedural disputes, and repeated objections. Ultimately, the SBs agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 62 (June 2025).

**Report of the Adaptation Committee:** in Baku, discussions initially focussed on the AC's work and output but soon stalled, as tensions and procedural obstructions dominated the negotiation room. With parties unable to reach an agreement, the SBs adopted procedural conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.9](#)), merely recommending that the COP and CMA welcome the 2023 and 2024 reports of the AC - which they did.

## **5.3 National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)**

Under this agenda sub-item, Parties are mandated to assess progress in formulating and implementing NAPs. In Baku,

consultations did not get off to a good start with Parties disagreeing on what should be the basis of negotiations: an informal note from SB 60 (developing countries' position) or a new draft text prepared by the co-facilitators, that would be informed by the informal note but not include all its elements (developed countries' position). Eventually Parties seemed to have found a compromise solution and engaged on substantive issues, in particular on the need for increased public finance on adaptation, on whether to include developed countries' obligations to provide finance, technology and capacity-building (known as 'means of implementation or 'MOI') to developing countries for the formulation and implementation of NAPs; the role of the private sector as a provider of adaptation finance, as well as language on mainstreaming adaptation.

Despite constructive engagement on the draft text, substantial disagreements remained by the end of the first week. The Presidency indicated that it did not intend to allow for negotiations to be continued in the second week under the COP, but was effectively overruled by the SBI adopting conclusions forwarding the matter to COP 29 for further consideration on the basis of a [draft text](#) developed at SB 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.18](#)). Informal consultations thus continued in the second week with much of the time spent on determining the status of the draft text in the procedural conclusions. Developed country parties pushed for the text to be treated as an informal note (with no formal status), whilst developing countries wanted assurances that the draft text would be used at the next SB session. Ultimately, a consensus was agreed with the COP requesting SB 62 "to continue consideration of this matter (...) on the basis of the draft text available on the UNFCCC website" ([DT.DC.COP29.i2f.1](#)) This latest [draft text](#) is still heavily bracketed, indicating that developed and developing countries' views on how to address this topic are still far apart.



Photo: UNFCCC (website)



# 6. LOSS AND DAMAGE

Loss and damage remains one of the most contentious and politically sensitive issues on the climate agenda, as it concerns the impacts of climate change that cannot be prevented or addressed through mitigation or adaptation measures, and roles and responsibilities for addressing it. The Paris Agreement formally incorporates loss and damage under Article 8, which calls on Parties to enhance understanding, action, and support on a cooperative and facilitative basis regarding the loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. The escalating frequency and severity of climate-induced disasters, including rising sea levels, storms, floods, and wildfires, underscore the urgency of this discussion. For developing countries, securing a robust response to irreversible climate-related losses — where adaptation is no longer viable — is of paramount importance.

## 6.1 The Warsaw International Mechanism

Article 8 of the Paris Agreement formally integrated the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) into the treaty. Established at COP 19 in 2013, the WIM was designed as a framework to enhance research, capacity-building, and technical expertise in understanding the risks associated with loss and damage, as well as to develop strategies for their prevention, minimization, and management.

The Executive Committee (ExCom) is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the WIM's functions, supported by specialized thematic groups focusing on key areas such as slow-onset

events, non-economic losses, comprehensive risk management, displacement, and support measures. While the Paris Agreement placed the WIM under the authority and guidance of the CMA, it did not establish a clear governance structure between the COP and the CMA—leaving unresolved questions regarding decision-making authority, the division of responsibilities, and whether governance should be shared or remain distinct between the two bodies.

At COP 28, Parties welcomed the WIM Executive Committee's report, acknowledging progress in technical guidance and the contributions of its thematic expert groups. They emphasized the need to enhance coordination with relevant organizations and encouraged engagement with the Santiago Network; however, the WIM governance structure remained unresolved.

Discussions on defining the terms of reference for the WIM's review – due to take place during SB 61 – were carried out at the 2024 Bonn Climate Conference, resulting in a decision to forward a draft for consideration at COP 29. Meanwhile, the UNFCCC Secretariat was tasked with preparing a comprehensive report on WIM's progress and mandates. At that point, discussions were marked by disagreements over the review's scope, with developing countries advocating for a broader approach that would encompass the WIM's functions, reflecting key institutional developments since the last review, such as the establishment of the Santiago Network and the Loss and Damage Fund.



Initial expectations for the Baku Climate Conference suggested that negotiations would be largely technical and relatively uncontentious, given the seemingly straightforward nature of the agenda items. However, this assumption was quickly disproven within the first week. A significant portion of the discussions was consumed by procedural debates on the way forward, particularly regarding whether the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) Review and the Joint Annual Report (JAR) should be addressed in a single decision or split into two separate decisions. Despite extensive negotiations, no consensus was reached during the first week, leading to the application of Rule 16 at the conclusion of SB 61. However, this procedural deadlock was subsequently challenged, and discussions on the agenda item continued into the second week, justified by its prior approval in the agenda of the Governing Bodies—yet procedural complexities and political disagreements persisted.

#### The decision on the WIM:

Ultimately, Parties agreed on a single procedural decision ([Decision 16/CMA.6](#)) that vaguely acknowledged progress in the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Santiago Network but deferred substantive discussions on the Joint Annual Report (JAR) and the review of the WIM to SB 62. Once again, Parties indicated that considerations regarding the governance of the WIM would remain on the agenda for further debate at COP 30/CMA 7.

## 6.2 The Santiago Network

The Santiago Network (SNLD), established at COP 25, functions as a platform to facilitate connections between vulnerable countries and experts who can provide specialized technical assistance tailored to each country's unique risks and

circumstances related to loss and damage ([Decision 2/CMA.2](#)). At COP 27 in 2022, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, the Parties agreed to establish the institutional framework for the SNLD, including the creation of a Secretariat, an Advisory Board, and the selection of a host institution for the Secretariat ([Decision 12/CMA.4](#) and [Decision 11/CP.27](#)).

At COP 28 in Dubai, Parties reached a decision for the Santiago Network Secretariat to be hosted by a consortium formed between UNDRR and UNOPS for an initial term of five years, under the guidance of the Santiago Network Advisory Board ([Decision 6/CMA.5](#)). The consortium is encouraged to collaborate with the Caribbean Development Bank and carry out cost-benefit analyses to determine the optimal location for the Secretariat's headquarters, while leveraging the presence of UN regional offices to ensure comprehensive global support and accessibility. The Secretariat is to closely coordinate with other UNFCCC entities, including the Loss and Damage Fund and the Warsaw International Mechanism, to foster synergy and maximise the effectiveness of their collective efforts.

Following the selection of the host institution for the Santiago Network, it was initially anticipated that discussions at COP 29 would be largely procedural, focused on reviewing progress and addressing technical aspects of implementation. However, this assumption was swiftly disproven within the first week. A major point of contention arose with Kenya's dissatisfaction over the decision – taken by the Network's Advisory Board at its first meeting in March 2024 – to establish the Santiago Network Secretariat in Geneva, creating a significant negotiation impasse. In the end, Parties settled on a procedural decision ([Decision 16/CMA.6](#)) that offered only a broad acknowledgment of progress in the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism and the Santiago Network while

deferring substantive discussions on the JAR and the WIM review to SB 62. The decision also formalised the adoption of the rules of procedure for the Advisory Board of the SNLD, further clarifying the framework for its future work.

## 6.3 The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage

The Loss and Damage Fund marks a significant milestone in international climate governance, following years of sustained pressure from vulnerable countries to secure adequate recognition and financial support for irreversible climate impacts. The debate over a dedicated financial mechanism for loss and damage gained traction at COP 26 in Glasgow (2021), where the Glasgow Dialogue was established to explore the feasibility of such an instrument. However, at that stage, negotiations did not lead to the immediate creation of a fund, limiting discussions to an informal space outside the formal negotiation agenda.

At COP 27 in Sharm El-Sheikh (2022), developing countries intensified their demands, calling for the establishment of an implementation arm within the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM). This would not only include a dedicated fund for loss and damage, but also additional financial instruments such as climate disaster insurance mechanisms and investments in infrastructure reconstruction. As a result of these persistent negotiations, Decisions [2/CP.27](#) and [2/CMA.4](#) were adopted, formally establishing the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). This outcome was widely celebrated as a historic victory for climate-vulnerable nations, which had long advocated for a dedicated financial mechanism.

To ensure the effective operationalisation of the fund, a Transitional Committee was created and tasked with developing the necessary guidelines for its governance. Throughout five meetings in 2023, the Committee deliberated on key aspects, including eligibility criteria, funding sources, and institutional structure. The presidency of COP 28, held in Dubai, received the Committee's recommendations, facilitating unprecedented development: on the first day of the Conference, Decisions [1/CP.28](#) and [5/CMA.5](#) were adopted, officially defining the framework for the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund. While the Fund is not formally under the WIM, it was designated as an entity operating within the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, also serving the Paris Agreement. It will function under the guidance and accountability of both the COP and CMA and is expected to operate in a coherent and complementary manner with existing mechanisms, including the WIM and the Santiago Network.

The Fund aims to provide support to developing countries in addressing both economic and non-economic losses and damages associated with climate change impacts, including both slow-onset events and extreme weather events. To achieve this, it was determined that the Fund would operate with the support of an autonomous secretariat, overseen and governed by a Board appointed by the Parties. This Board is responsible for establishing the operational modalities and defining access mechanisms for financial resources.

It was further decided that the World Bank would serve as the interim trustee of the Fund for a four-year period. Between COP 28 and COP 29, three Board meetings were held to advance the operationalisation of the Fund. In June 2024, the World Bank's Executive Board of Directors formally accepted the institution's role as the interim trustee, marking a key step in ensuring the Fund's implementation and financial management.

At COP 29, in Baku, the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was considered under two agenda items: (i) The Report of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and guidance to the Fund; and

(ii) Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and the Board of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.

### **Decision on the Loss and Damage Fund:**

Negotiations concerning the review of the first year of the Loss and Damage Fund's operations since its establishment at COP 28 progressed, culminating in the adoption of a [decision](#) that, among other elements, recognises the selection of the Philippines as the host country for the Fund's Governing Board and acknowledges the formal signing of the cooperation agreement. The decision also commends the World Bank's role in supporting the operationalisation of the Fund. Furthermore, it expresses appreciation for the pledges of financial contributions made to the Fund by the governments of Australia, Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Sweden, as well as by the government of the Walloon Region of Belgium.

Regarding the arrangements between the COP, the CMA and the Fund Board, the [decision](#) reached by the Parties formally welcomes and approves the draft arrangements between the COP, the CMA and the Board of the Loss and Damage Fund, as contained in the report of the Standing Committee on Finance, developed consistently with the Governing Instrument of the Fund and subsequently approved by the Fund's Board. By approving these arrangements, the decision effectively brings them into force, subject to final approval by the CMA (and COP in the case of the CMA mirror decision). Additionally, the decision requests the Fund's Board to report on the implementation of these arrangements in its annual reports to both the COP and CMA, starting from their thirtieth and seventh sessions, respectively, in November 2025.





Photo: UN Climate Change - Kamran Guliyev (Flickr)



# 7. ARTICLE 6

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows Parties to cooperate through voluntary market-based and non-market-based approaches to implement their NDCs. Paragraph 8 of this Article establishes a framework for non-market approaches, while paragraphs 2-7 outline two distinct market-based approaches:

- Article 6.2 involves the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) between two or more Parties;
- Article 6.4 envisions the creation of a centralised mechanism, governed by a Supervisory Body. This mechanism will enable the generation of emissions reduction units, pursuant to methodologies approved by the Supervisory Body.

The Baku climate conference was a milestone regarding the carbon markets established under Article 6. As a result of the Azerbaijani COP Presidency's prioritisation of the issue and the eagerness of some Parties to see progress, the rules for the operationalisation of these markets were finalised, despite the many challenges and divergences that arose during the negotiations.

## 7.1 Article 6.2

At the Dubai climate conference in 2023, negotiations on cooperative approaches for ITMOs revealed significant divergences, particularly regarding whether cooperative approaches should be limited to agreements between Paris Agreement Parties or extended to collaborations involving other actors. After extensive negotiations, no consensus was reached on key issues, leaving the matter to be revisited at SBSTA 60 and SBSTA 61, with a decision expected at CMA 6 in November 2024.

According to established practice, discussions would have had to restart from scratch in 2024. However, at SB 60, negotiations were based on a new document—an informal note issued by the SBSTA Chair and suggested to Parties as the starting point for discussions. This document contained proposals addressing the unresolved issues from Dubai. By the end of the SB 60 meetings, Parties agreed on session conclusions accompanied by a draft negotiating text presenting various options that would serve as the basis for negotiations at CMA 6.

In Baku, negotiations initially revolved around a 43-page draft decision containing multiple options and diverging positions among countries. Negotiators worked to bridge their differences, ultimately producing a streamlined 19-page draft decision by the end of the first week. This document served as the basis for second-week negotiations, during which Parties reached consensus, although much of the discussion took place behind closed doors, without observer participation.

With the decision finalised, countries deliberated on the remaining elements necessary for implementing the final registry and reporting system under the Article 6.2 cooperative instrument, ensuring transaction transparency and completing the fundamental rules for the authorisation, reporting, and verification of cooperative approaches and ITMO transactions.

One of the most contentious issues was whether ITMO authorisations could be modified or revoked after issuance. Some Parties emphasised that authorisation is a national prerogative. Concerns were raised that if ITMOs were transacted

for NDC compliance purposes and their authorisations were later revoked, it could impact the accounting of NDC compliance under the Paris Agreement.

Another critical point of negotiation was the interoperability and functionality of the Article 6.2 international registry. Previous decisions had established that this registry would also support countries without their own national registry (Decisions [2/CMA.3](#) and [6/CMA.4](#)). However, the United States argued that the international registry should serve only as a platform for visualising transfers rather than facilitating transactions. Conversely, other countries supported allowing the international registry to handle authorisations, transfers, and credit usage for countries lacking national registries. To address this controversy, it was decided that the international registry will function as a tracking system for units, while the secretariat, as the international registry administrator, will provide additional services—including issuance, registration, and ITMO transfers for countries that have not yet established their own registries and opt to use these services.

Regarding the process for identifying and addressing inconsistencies in reporting, extensive discussions were held on distinguishing between significant and persistent inconsistencies. Observer organisations raised concerns about the potential exemption of essential requirements necessary to ensure the environmental integrity of the market.

The outcome of Article 6.2 negotiations, [the decision](#), addressed the following topics:

- The process for granting the three required authorisations for ITMO use, including the cooperative approach authorisation, ITMO issuance authorisation, and participating entity authorisation; the information required for such authorisations; the possibility of issuing them jointly or separately; and the potential for modifying their content.
- The rules for modifying or revoking ITMO authorizations, establishing that such authorisations may only be altered or revoked before the first transfer, with revocation after the first transfer permitted only if explicitly allowed by a pre-existing contractual agreement.
- The requirement for each participating Party to submit an initial or updated initial report for a cooperative approach as a prerequisite for providing annual information on ITMOs in an agreed electronic format.
- The basic elements to be included in the initial information report on cooperative approaches, with a recommendation for participating countries to provide additional details, such as the methodology for baseline establishment and how the country's NDC and climate policies were considered in ITMO generation.
- The adoption of reporting forms and tables, with a request for improvements based on the development of a voluntary, standardised, and user-friendly template by the secretariat.
- The rules governing the first transfer of ITMOs, emphasising the need for a consistent definition of “first transfer” within each cooperative approach.
- The process for identifying, notifying, and correcting inconsistencies in submitted reports, determining that consistency checks' results will be published, indicating whether the reported information is consistent, inconsistent, or unavailable. It was established that adjustments to NDCs for ITMO-transacting countries shall only occur once inconsistencies are resolved to prevent double counting. Additionally, significant and persistent inconsistencies will be highlighted in a report publicly available on the UNFCCC website via the [centralized accounting and reporting platform](#) and accessible to the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee for further action.

- The interoperability between registries under Article 6.2 and 6.4, as well as national registries, ensuring that connections enable data retrieval and visualisation of holdings and transaction history of authorised Article 6.4 emission reductions (A6.4ERs), while also facilitating their transfer to the international registry.
- The request for the secretariat to provide additional registry services, enabling Parties to issue mitigation outcomes as units that will be interoperable with the international registry, supporting their participation in the instrument as needed.
- The role of the Centralised Accounting and Reporting Platform (CARP) in generating summaries of information submitted by Parties.
- The provision of special capacity-building support to least developed countries, facilitating their participation in cooperative approaches.

Additionally, it was determined that the secretariat shall update its Article 6.2 reference manual and organise a dialogue, to be held alongside each SBI session, to facilitate exchanges of information and experiences on how cooperative approaches contribute to enhanced ambition.

Moving forward, countries intending to utilise the Article 6.2 cooperative instrument must develop domestic legislative and systemic frameworks to enable the issuance, purchase, and sale of ITMOs. There are high expectations regarding the availability of UNFCCC capacity-building programs to support countries in this endeavour, as well as the finalisation and operationalisation of pending registry systems.

## 7.2 Article 6.4

At the Dubai climate conference in 2023, discussions on Article 6.4 were marked by significant disagreements, with no consensus reached, as the EU insisted on finalising discussions on Article 6.2 before making decisions on Article 6.4, considering both to be part of an interconnected decision package.

Similar to Article 6.2, negotiations on Article 6.4 continued at SB 60. The agenda was considerably less challenging than that of Article 6.2, primarily because many aspects of the mechanism's operationalisation fall under the mandate of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body (SBM). Conclusions from the SB 60 negotiations were issued, accompanied by a document listing suggested elements to use in negotiating a decision on the mechanism at CMA 6 in November 2024.

At the Baku climate conference, unlike the impasse at CMA 5 in Dubai, progress on operationalising the "Paris Agreement Credit Mechanism" (PACM) began immediately with a [decision](#) during the CMA opening plenary under Article 6.4. In this decision, Parties took note of the SBM's adoption of requirements for the approval of methodologies and greenhouse gas removal activities. However, this development was controversial as some Parties viewed the SBM's approach as circumventing the CMA's oversight.

The remainder of negotiations on Article 6.4 centred on key issues such as the linkage between the mechanism registry and international registry of Article 6.2 and the need to align the authorisation process with that established for Article 6.2 cooperative approaches. A significant portion of the discussions focused on the timing of A6.4ER authorisation, with several Parties emphasising that it should take place no later than issuance.

In [Decision 6/CMA.6](#) resulting from the two-week negotiations, several key actions were decided and mandates established, they:

- Noted that the SBM will expeditiously elaborate on the adopted standards, while striving to ensure regulatory stability. The SBM is required to report on the progress of their application in its annual report to the CMA, reaffirming the CMA's role in providing guidance and maintaining authority over the SBM's work.
  - Requested the SBM to accelerate the implementation of the mechanism's registry and the development of standards and guidelines for determining activities eligible to issue credits, including those related to baselines, downward adjustments, standardised baselines, suppressed demand, additionality, leakage, as well as non-permanence and reversals. These considerations include post-crediting period monitoring, reversal risk assessments, and remediation measures. The SBM is also requested to expedite the revision of baseline and monitoring methodologies currently in use under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
  - Ensured that the SBM secures adequate technical and scientific expertise to support its work. The Supervisory Body is mandated to consult independent experts, stakeholders, and local communities, integrating the knowledge and practices of Indigenous Peoples while striving to maintain regulatory stability by minimising the frequency of revisions to standards and procedures.
  - Required the SBM to consider relevant international environmental treaties when establishing criteria for methodologies, aiming to align the UNFCCC with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), while avoiding conflict with some Parties that were opposed to the explicit inclusion of CBD. Making this requirement on the SBM seeks to enable it to incorporate co-benefits, such as biodiversity gains and the assurance of social and environmental safeguards, into PACM methodologies.
  - Established the framework for authorising corresponding adjustments for the use of credits in NDC compliance or other international mitigation purposes. It was decided that the host country may choose to issue the authorisation at a later stage and, provisionally, allow credits to be issued as Mitigation Contribution Units (MCUs, units/credits that can be used for purposes other than those requiring corresponding adjustments).
  - Decided that Party registries may voluntarily connect to the mechanism registry, with the connection enabling the transfer of A6.4ERs while ensuring the avoidance of double counting and allowing access to data on holdings and the transaction history of A6.4ERs.
  - Granted an exemption from the share of proceeds for climate adaptation for least developed countries and small island developing States, which they can choose not to make use of.
  - Extended the deadline for transitioning forestry activities under the CDM to the PACM, provided that requests for transition are submitted and approved by December 31, 2025.
- According to its [Preliminary Workplan](#) for 2025, the SBM is now mandated to begin detailing the requirements for approving activities that will generate Article 6.4 credits, as well as to implement the registry structure and processes necessary for the mechanism's operation. The SBM's progress in carrying out its work in 2025 shall be reported to the CMA 7 in November 2025.



## 7.3 Article 6.8

Article 6 includes a component on non-market approaches (NMAs), aimed at fostering initiatives and cooperation among Parties to achieve their mitigation and adaptation goals without the commercialisation of emission reduction units or mitigation outcomes. What could count as an NMA is broad but based on what Parties have expressed so far, these focus on projects ranging from REDD+ and capacity-building programs for sustainable agriculture to the protection of riparian forests by local communities, partnerships between governments and non-governmental organisations for ecotourism, the adoption of renewable energy for use in small communities, environmental revitalisation in urban areas, recycling programs, among others.

A work programme, implemented by the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), aims to identify measures and tools that facilitate the coordination and implementation of NMAs and enable information sharing ([Decision 4/CMA.3, Annex](#), para. 8). An online platform where NMAs are published enables recording and exchanging of information on NMAs ([NMA Platform](#)).

At SB 60, following Parties' mandates from CMA 5 in Dubai in 2023, the operationalisation of the NMA Platform was finalised, and the user and submission manual for the Platform was launched. During the 5th meeting of the GCNMA, held concurrently with SB 60, a workshop was conducted where Parties and organisations presented on financing, technology, and capacity-building for identifying and developing NMAs. Spin-off groups were also held to discuss the next steps in the work programme, such as capacity-building, climate finance, Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities' involvement, and the use of the Platform.

At the Baku climate conference, negotiations advanced rapidly, with Parties successfully reaching an agreement on the decision text during the first week. In parallel, Parties undertook an expedited and straightforward assessment of the progress and outcomes of the first phase of the work programme (2023-2024) to enhance and recommend the implementation schedule for the second phase (2025-2026). The recommendations for phase two included utilising spin-off groups to explore specific topics and updating the NMA Platform to enable the registration of individual NMAs.

There was broad participation of Parties, relevant bodies, and observers in the activities held during CMA 6 in November 2024. These activities included presentations, a World Café, and a roundtable discussion aimed at sharing information on ongoing or planned NMAs and providing details on available financial, technological, and capacity-building support. Additionally, one NMA was included on the NMA Platform by Uganda, focusing on adaptation, resilience, and sustainability, and 79 nominations for national focal points for Article 6.8 were received.

During the negotiations, certain Parties proposed initiatives to foster communication between the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to explore potential synergies through joint initiatives between the Chairs of both Conventions, focusing on climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable development. However, the proposal was not accepted. Nonetheless, the final decision recognises the importance of developing NMAs that link climate change action with biodiversity conservation and sustainable development, including what has been termed "Mother Earth Centric Actions". These encompass diverse value systems, including those based on living in balance and harmony with Mother Earth, prioritising benefits to nature over purely anthropocentric approaches.

However, countries such as the US and the UK expressed discomfort with this approach, as well as with the request for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to incorporate the concept of “Mother Earth Centric Actions” into their funding allocations.

Finally, Parties prepared for the continuation of capacity-building activities and information-sharing efforts, both through the Platform and events to be organised throughout 2025. These efforts aim to encourage greater participation from stakeholders, including international organisations, technical experts, the private sector, civil society organisations, Indigenous Peoples, and financial institutions.

The **Draft Conclusions of SB 61** and the **Decision 7/CMA.6** addressed the following key matters:

- Welcomed the expedited and simple assessment of the progress and outcomes of the first phase of implementing the work programme and acknowledged activities carried out during SB 61 aimed at exchanging information on NMAs under development, showcasing successful cases, and promoting initiatives supporting capacity-building, technology transfer, and financing.
- Noted that one NMA had been submitted to the Platform.
- Outlined next steps, including for the second phase of the work programme, emphasising that it will focus on fully implementing programme activities following a learning-by-doing approach, and for improvements to the NMA Platform through submission by the Parties, by 31 March 2025, of inputs on ways to enhance it, challenges faced and potential solutions, as well as ways in which NMAs can support a Party’s implementation of its NDC.
- Recognised the importance of integrated non-market approaches linking climate action, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable development, including Mother Earth Centric Actions acknowledged by some cultures.
- Encouraged spin-off groups to focus on knowledge-sharing, expand stakeholder participation, timely deliver invitations, and identify discussion topics in advance.
- Noted that Party submissions may help identify themes for spin-off groups in the 7th and 8th GCNMA meetings and requested the Committee to continue inviting Indigenous Peoples and local community representatives to in-session workshops.
- Invited Parties and stakeholders to engage in outreach efforts to increase public, private, and civil society participation in implementing NMAs.
- Requested the secretariat to provide regular updates and quantitative assessments, which may include the number of nominated focal points and the number of submitted NMAs.
- Requested the secretariat to incorporate activities related to the NMAs into its broader Article 6 capacity-building programme and to continue capacity-building efforts in the second phase of the work programme, prioritising national focal points for Article 6.8.

As Parties transition from the initial phase of the work programme to the subsequent phase, efforts will be directed towards the continued development and utilisation of the NMA Platform.



Photo: UNFCCC (website)



# 8. THE GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

The global stocktake (GST) is one of the Paris Agreement's core pillars of accountability and it provides for a comprehensive assessment ('stocktake') of all Parties' collective progress towards implementing and achieving the Paris Agreement's long-term goals. The outcome of each GST is meant to inform the preparation of Parties' next round of NDCs and to enhance international cooperation. After the culmination of the first GST (GST 1) at COP 28 in Dubai in 2023, the GST negotiations at SB 60 in Bonn in June 2024 and at COP 29 in Baku were focused on how and in what form Parties could take forward the outcomes of GST 1 in the negotiations and in their NDCs, as well as how they could refine the GST process in the context of what they had learned during GST 1. The GST negotiations at COP 29 consisted of three elements: (1) a dialogue on the implementation of the outcomes of the first GST (CMA 11(j)); (2) the report on the annual GST dialogue (CMA 4(b)); and (3) how to develop the procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process (CMA 4(a)).

## 8.1 Dialogue on Implementing the Outcomes of GST 1

Negotiations here involved parties attempting to agree on how to establish the dialogue referred to in paragraph 97 of [Decision 1/CMA.5](#). This paragraph, along with the subsequent paragraph 98, provides that parties must establish a dialogue on how to implement the outcomes of GST 1 and operationalise this dialogue at CMA 6. These negotiations began at SB 60 in June 2024. They quickly became bogged down

over the issue of whether the scope of the dialogue should be limited to the finance and implementation-related outcomes of GST 1, given paragraph 97 was in the finance section of the GST 1 outcome, or whether it should cover the entire outcome of GST 1, including the language at paragraph 28 that focused on mitigation efforts and fossil fuels. Parties such as China, India, some members of the African Group, and the LMDCs mostly argued for the former while parties such as Canada, the US, the EU, AOSIS and the EIG argued for the latter. Parties at SB 60 were not able to agree on this point and so the text that was forwarded to COP 29 for further negotiations contained five different options reflecting different parties' positions on what the scope of the dialogue could be.

Disagreement regarding the scope of the dialogue did not abate at COP 29. On day one, arguments regarding the placement of this negotiation item under financial matters in the CMA 6 agenda, rather than under the GST heading in the agenda, prevented the agenda from being immediately adopted ([See the governance section](#)). While parties agreed at the beginning of the conference to not limit discussions on the potential modalities of the dialogue to only financial issues, parties remained divided on what the dialogue should involve and whether it should provide guidance on how parties should implement the GST 1 outcomes. Parties were also divided on whether the dialogue should conclude in 2028, whether the dialogue should explicitly refer to NDCs being informed by the outcome of GST 1, what the outcome of the dialogue should be and whether the decision should explicitly refer to the need to transition away from fossil fuels.



The Presidency introduced a draft decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.21](#)) at the closing plenary, but parties led by AILAC, AOSIS, and the EIG expressed their opposition, arguing that it lacked wording setting out how the GST 1 outcome could adequately inform Parties' NDCs as well as that it seemed to backtrack on mitigation commitments made at COP 28. Parties could not find consensus on supporting the draft, and so in line with the provisions of rule 16 of the UNFCCC rules, the CMA agreed for the discussions to resume at SB 62 in June 2025 so that a full decision could be agreed upon at CMA 7 during COP 30.

## 8.2 Report on the Annual GST Dialogue

Negotiations here focused on the presentation of the Report on the Annual GST Dialogue ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/5](#)) that had taken place during SB 60 in June 2024. The Annual GST Dialogue was established in the outcome of GST 1 ([Decision 1/CMA.5](#)) to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practice on how GST 1 could inform the preparation of Parties' next round of NDCs. Parties discussed the report in informal consultations but were divided on what mandate they had been given for their conclusions on the report. Some Parties, especially China and those in the African Group and LMDCs, argued the decision should simply present the report as it was, with no comments. Other parties, especially the US and those represented in the EIG, EU and AOSIS argued that the decision presenting the report should provide a platform by which Parties could provide comments and/or guidance on how the report could or should assist parties in the preparation of the next round of NDCs. Parties supporting the latter position noted that the presentation of the first annual dialogue was the only opportunity for Parties to provide substantive guidance, using the content of the annual dialogue

report, to provide substantive guidance to Parties on good and best practices for the preparation of the next round of NDCs before those NDCs were finalised (by 10th February 2025). However, Parties supporting the former position rejected any text that could be seen to compromise the nationally determined element of Parties' NDCs and argued there was no mandate for any such commentary on the report. Similar arguments were raised in the negotiation concerning NDC features ([See section on Features of NDCs](#)). China and the LMDC bloc also argued that the annual dialogue had fulfilled its mandate in one session and therefore there was no need for the dialogue to be repeated; however this was opposed by other parties including the African Group and EU. Parties failed to reach consensus on these issues. No text was consequently forwarded to the Presidency for a decision. In line with the provisions of rule 16 of the UNFCCC rules, negotiations regarding the outcome of the Annual GST Dialogue will now resume at SB 62.

## 8.3 Procedural and Logistical Elements of the Overall GST Process

Negotiations here focused on reviewing the procedural and logistical lessons learned from the GST 1 process and then agreeing on how these lessons could inform and improve the effectiveness of GST 2 and future GSTs. Parties broadly agreed on most elements of the draft text ([DT.DD.CMA6.i4a.1](#)) but were divided on how to refer to the IPCC as a source of science informing the GST, with the LMDCs, China and Arab Group preferring to include wording stating that non-IPCC sources of science should be treated equivalently to IPCC sources. The EU, EIG, Canada, US and AOSIS wanted to retain the prioritisation of IPCC science as the best available and that the GST should be first and foremost informed by the best available science.

The same groups of Parties were also divided on when the cut-off point for scientific inputs and contributions by technical bodies into the GST should be, with the former wanting a clear cut-off point for scientific and technical inputs, while the latter group wanted to ensure scientific inputs could continue into the stage of the GST dedicated to considering the GST outputs. This latter approach would ensure that the most recent science could be used to inform the GST outcomes and for the review of Parties' inputs into the GST to begin earlier. The LMDCs, Egypt and Turkey also attempted to remove references to the need for a party-driven negotiating process regarding the outputs of future GSTs, but this was opposed by most other Parties.

Parties were not able to reach an agreement in their negotiations, but the negotiations produced an informal note ([IN.CMA6.i4a.3](#)) that was accompanied by an annex setting out text that had arisen from the parties' informal discussions and negotiations but that had not been formally communicated to the co-facilitators in time. Due to the lack of agreement, this negotiation stream will continue at SB 62 in June 2025. Despite this lack of agreement, parties were pleased with the progress that had been made and expected that the final text would be agreed upon at SB 62 and in good time before the GST 2 cycle begins in 2026.



Photo: Water, Climate & Biodiversity: Integrating Solutions into NDCs and NAPs - Kamran Guliyev (Flickr)



## 9. FEATURES OF NDCs

In the decision adopting the Paris Agreement, ([Decision 1/CP.21](#), paragraph 26), countries had agreed to request the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop “further guidance on features of [NDCs]” for consideration and adoption of CMA 1. However, the Paris Agreement itself does not mention “features” when establishing and regulating NDCs.

At the climate conference in Katowice (CMA 1, 2018), countries could not agree on the topic other than noting that features of NDCs are outlined in the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement, and deciding to continue to consider the matter at the CMA session in 2024 ([Decision 4/CMA.1](#), paras 19 and 20).

### Disagreement on what a NDC feature is

The main divergent views then, which replayed at CMA 6 in 2024 in Baku, were about different interpretations on what an NDC feature is, and therefore, whether further guidance was needed and what it should entail. For some, a potential additional feature would be to align NDCs with the 1.5°C goal, or that NDC features should reflect the outcomes of the first GST. Others, including countries like Chile, India and Norway, thought negotiations on this topic should be deferred until 2029 or later either because it will be a natural time to refine the features following the next GST (due in 2028) or because they see no need to specify additional features. Of interest, the African Group of Negotiators considered that if further guidance on NDCs was negotiated this should reflect that NDCs are not only about mitigation, and, therefore, include new features on adaptation, loss and damage and finance.

Countries in Baku adopted the **following conclusions** (which will be reflected in the report on the session) rather than a decision:

- They noted that Parties expressed views on the matter, including those reflected in the non-exhaustive compilation of in-session submissions available at [unfccc.int/documents/644017](https://unfccc.int/documents/644017).
- They agreed to continue consideration of this matter at CMA 8 (November 2026).



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# 10. PERIODIC REVIEW

At the Bali climate conference (2007), countries adopted the [Bali Action Plan](#), deciding to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, whose work would be conducted under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AHWG LTCA), a special subsidiary body created to that aim ([Decision 1/CP.13](#)) that would present its conclusion for consideration of COP 15. At COP 15 in 2009, Parties decided to extend the work of the AHWG LTCA for one year, requesting the group to present their outcomes at COP 16. Within this shared vision for long-term cooperative action and following conclusions expressed by the IPCC, Parties recognised the need for deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions and urgent action towards a new goal of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (para 4. [Decision 1/CP.16](#)). The same decision established a periodic review of this long-term goal (para 138).

Taking into account equity and other principles of the Convention and commitments across thematic areas such as mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building, Parties must undertake a review to evaluate the adequacy of the long-term global goal and the overall progress toward achieving it, including the achievement of the objectives of the Convention. The Parties also agreed on taking periodic reviews at least every seven years, where the first one ran from 2013 to 2015. Parties then reassessed the long term goal, as mandated in the Bali Action Plan, updating it to reflect that “the goal is to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well

below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” ([Decision 10/CP.21](#)). The updated goal was included as a key component of the Paris Agreement, in Article 2.1.

In the Madrid climate conference (2019), Parties initiated the process for the second periodic review. Countries agreed on the scope and modalities, following procedures defined in previous decisions, relevant principles and provisions of the Convention and the best available science. The review process was concluded in the Sharm el-Sheikh climate conference (2022), where countries expressed “alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused a global average temperature increase of around 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels to date” ([Decision 21/CP.27](#)). This time, one of the most contested issues was how to reflect the importance of equity in achieving the LTGG. Developing countries cautioned against redefining agreed UNFCCC language relating to equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR). Views diverged on whether to include references to action before 2030.

Parties were supposed to continue periodic reviews at the twenty-ninth session, taking into account experience from the “2013–2015 review and the second periodic review, and the first global stocktake; potential overlaps and synergies between the periodic review, the global stocktake and other relevant processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement; and the availability of new information” ([Decision 5/CP.25](#), [Decision 21/CP.27](#)).

#### COP 29 decision on periodic review:

During the negotiations, Parties were unable to reach a consensus on the continuation of the periodic review. The United States and other delegations, mainly from developed countries, considered it unnecessary given its overlap with the GST, whereas the LDCs and other groups -mainly but not exclusively developing countries- advocated for laying the groundwork for future periodic reviews. While the overlap might seem significant in terms of both processes assessing progress towards long-term goals, taking a similar modality in terms of impact, and even happening in a similar timeframe (for the second GST and the third periodic review) the overlapping is not complete. The institutional home of each agreement influences its actual and potential scope. The global stocktake is the dedicated mechanism to review the implementation of the Paris Agreement and is therefore conducted by the CMA. It is, therefore, a poor institutional fit for a broader, systematic review of UNFCCC agenda items outside of the Agreement. Moreover, the principles of equity and differentiation are stronger in the Convention, which might be of interest to developing countries to hold developed countries to account for their commitments under the Convention. Opinions also differed regarding the appropriate timing for revisiting this matter. In its decision, the COP [decided](#) that the considerations will be continued at the thirtieth session of the Conference of the Parties in Belem.





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# 11. JUST TRANSITION

The concept of Just Transition aims to ensure an equitable shift towards a low-carbon economy, emphasizing the creation of decent work and quality jobs, while addressing the socio-economic impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The establishment of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) in Sharm el-Sheikh (2022) ([Decision 1/CMA.4](#)) marked a significant milestone, recognizing the need for a focused dialogue on just and equitable transition pathways. Up until COP 27 in 2022, the concept of just transition had been discussed under the workstream of “response measures” in the UNFCCC. However, countries saw the need to create a separate work programme on just transition to acknowledge that the issue is not only one of transition of the labour force and green technology (which is how it was discussed under response measures). This development underscored the passage from viewing just transition as merely a labour issue to acknowledging its broader implications on socio-economic, energy, and workforce dimensions, all within the context of nationally defined priorities.

By COP 28, the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) had been established, focusing on discussing pathways to achieve the Paris Agreement goals under a just and equitable transition. Despite initial progress, negotiations revealed divergent views on the JTWP’s scope and implementation, leading to stalled discussions. [Decision 3/CMA.5](#) adopted the elements of the JTWP, with implementation starting immediately.

The agenda at COP 29, the Baku climate conference centred on further developing the JTWP, specifically:

- Operationalisation and scope of the JTWP;

- Mechanisms for implementing just transition pathways; and
- Financing and international cooperation for just transitions.

Since Parties did not agree on a draft decision text in the negotiations in Bonn (June 2024), considerations on the implementation of the United Arab Emirates just transition work programme drew on the informal note ([IN.SBI60.i7\\_SBSTA60.i9.4](#)) prepared by the co-chairs at SB 60, exchanges of views and inputs submitted by Parties, as well as the annual summary report on the two dialogues held in 2024 ([FCCC/SB/2024/7](#)). Negotiations were marked by extended discussions on the JTWP’s scope, with divergent views on whether to prioritise labour transition or broader socio-economic aspects, and there were debates on the need for an actionable work plan, with developing countries advocating for concrete outcomes. While developing countries emphasised the need for a broad approach that includes socio-economic dimensions beyond the labour transition, developed countries cautioned against prematurely defining a detailed work plan without consensus on overarching goals. The negotiations were further hampered by disagreements on financing and the role of just transition.

By the end of COP 29, there was no consensus on an actionable work plan and further discussions were deferred to SB 62 to allow for more in-depth discussion with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 30 (2025). The continuing dialogue at SB 62 will aim to refine the objectives and implementation mechanisms, while COP 30 will revisit the JTWP and aim for consensus on an actionable framework and financing mechanism.





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# 12. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER

The Convention and the Paris Agreement recognise the importance of technology to enhance climate resilience, to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, and establish obligations for Parties to cooperate, obligations on developed country Parties to support developing countries, and a Technology Mechanism serving both the COP and the CMA. Negotiations on technology cover a range of issues:

## 12.1 Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism, as well as to support implementation of the Paris Agreement

Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC establishes the need for technology transfer to support climate action in developing countries, emphasizing environmentally sound technologies (ESTs). The first programme with this objective was adopted by the Global Environmental Facility in 2008 as the [strategic programme on technology](#), later renamed the Poznan Strategic Programme (PSP) at COP 14 (2008) ([Decision 2/CP.14](#)). The PSP aimed to promote technology transfer through three main instruments: Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), pilot projects linked to TNAs, and the dissemination of successful ESTs.

At the Cancún climate conference in 2010, the Technology Mechanism was introduced ([Decision 1/CP.16, para 117](#)) and incorporated other important objectives such as technology transfer as support for climate technology centres, networks, and public-private partnerships. It includes the TEC (Technology Executive Committee, the policy arm) and the CTCN (Climate Technology Centre and Network, the implementation arm), to facilitate the implementation of enhanced action on technology development and transfer. During the climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022, the TEC and the CTCN launched a [Joint Work Programme of the Technology Mechanism \(2023-2027\)](#) that brought together, for the first time, the long-term strategies of the TEC and the CTCN and defined areas of focus for the mechanism as a whole, in order to increase its impact ([FCCC/SB/2022/L.12](#)).

At the Dubai climate conference in 2023, Parties reaffirmed the centrality of technology transfer in achieving the Paris Agreement's goals. They encouraged enhanced collaboration between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism to increase access to resources and expand the deployment of climate technologies ([Decision 9/CP.28](#)). In the First Global Stocktake ([Decision 1/CMA.5](#)) Parties also established a new programme, the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), “supported by, inter alia, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism” (para 110),



which includes limited resources of the Technology Mechanism, assessment of its quantitative impacts, lack of follow-up activities on CTCN technical assistance, and lack of support for national focal points for technology development and transfer, among others.

The GST 1 (para 109) noted the Technology Mechanism initiative on artificial intelligence for climate action, which aims “to explore the role of artificial intelligence as a technological tool for advancing and scaling up transformative climate solutions for adaptation and mitigation action”. In [Decision 9/CP.28](#), Parties stressed addressing technology transfer gaps, particularly in developing countries, promoting regional balance in technical assistance, and integrating gender considerations into climate technology activities. In pursuit of this objective, a global roster of technology and gender experts, launched by Chile, was introduced to amplify women’s voices in climate negotiations and decision-making, with Parties encouraged to ensure gender balance in the TEC and CTCN bodies.

At COP 29, under the COP, CMA, and SBI agenda items on ‘Matters relating to technology development and transfer,’ the following topics from the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network were discussed.

Based on the [Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN](#), the COP, CMA and SBI discussed among others, the key points of that report below:

- i. The TEC and CTCN continued to implement the Joint Work Programme (2023–2027), focusing on innovation, technology transfer, and policy support. The enhanced coordination between the TEC and CTCN has led to better alignment with financial mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility.

- ii. AI and digital tools can enhance climate resilience and support mitigation efforts. The TEC and CTCN finalized and began implementing the AI for Climate Action initiative, including a global AI application hub for open-source AI-powered climate solutions.
- iii. The Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) are crucial for defining country-specific climate technology priorities.
- iv. A call for Parties to increase financial contributions to the Technology Mechanism to scale up implementation efforts.
- v. The CTCN recommended to the COP and the CMA that Parties are encouraged to identify their technology needs to ensure they receive more targeted support; that Parties foster collaboration and coordination between NDEs and other focal points to promote the effective design of CTCN TA projects and the development of fundable projects; and that the CTCN mobilise additional resources from all sources to fully implement its mandate.
- vi. The TEC recommended to the COP and the CMA that early warning for all must be promoted, specifically through innovation and technology in support of risk-informed climate resilience policy and action; that climate technologies must be promoted for agrifood system transformation, that hard to abate sectors such as cement and steel, are included in the process of preparing and implementing NDCs to enable deep industrial decarbonization; and that gender-responsive technology and infrastructure for sustainable urban mobility is promoted.

The Parties’ decision at COP 29 ([Decision 10/CP.29](#)) highlights the progress made in executing their respective mandates and emphasises the need for continued collaboration to enhance the impact of technology development and transfer efforts.

The Parties decided:

- To conduct a review of the functions of the Technology Mechanism by SB 62 (June 2025), with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA 7 and COP 30 (November 2025).
- That an agreement would be reached at CMA 7 and COP 30 (November 2025) on whether to extend the term of the CTCN.

## 12.2 Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism

Negotiations had a rough start as Parties debated in length on the meaning of the expression ‘take into account’ the [draft text](#) referred to in the SB 60 conclusion, and on whether/how to consider the [report](#) of the in-session workshop held at SBI 60. These issues, which are further explored in the [Governance section](#), were present in the discussions on the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism at COP 29, that nevertheless centred on improving coordination to ensure that financial resources effectively support the development and transfer of climate technologies. Recognizing the critical role of technology in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, Parties engaged in exchanges on how to strengthen collaboration between the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

A key focus was on identifying barriers that limit the effectiveness of these linkages, including challenges in accessing financial support for Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), Technology Action Plans (TAPs), and technical assistance. Developing countries, in

particular, highlighted the need for streamlined processes to translate their technological priorities into fundable proposals.

Additionally, discussions explored ways to enhance national-level coordination, emphasizing the role of National Designated Entities (NDEs), National Designated Authorities (NDAs), and GEF focal points in aligning technology initiatives with available financial resources. Stakeholders also addressed the importance of capacity-building, knowledge exchange, and structured engagement with financial institutions to bridge existing gaps.

Another key discussion was about the need (and request) for consolidated information and data on linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, including on the support provided by the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund to the CTCN network; for conducting and updating technology needs assessments; for implementing outcomes of technology needs assessments, including technology action plans, and Climate Technology Centre and Network technical assistance outcomes; for enhancing the capacity of developing countries to translate their technology needs assessments and Climate Technology Centre and Network technical assistance results into fundable proposals. The subject of enhancing linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism was also discussed in the finance negotiation stream, which led to procedural questions around avoiding meeting collisions, etc. These are explored further in the [procedural and governance section](#).

During its closing plenary on November 16, the SBI reached procedural conclusions and agreed to refer the issue to SBI 62 for further discussion.

## 12.3 Technology Implementation Programme

At the Baku climate conference, expectations were high for the establishment of the TIP's structure, including its objectives, programmes, and governance. However, these expectations were not met. During the discussions, developing countries proposed the creation of a technology acceleration and transfer hub within the scope of the Technology Implementation Programme. This hub would aim to streamline the development, deployment, and scaling of climate technologies, particularly for developing countries. However, this proposal faced opposition, primarily from Developed countries, who questioned the necessity of creating new bodies and structures beyond those already established under the Technology Mechanism. They argued that the existing mechanisms, the TEC and the CTCN, if properly funded and optimized, could effectively address the needs of technology transfer without the added complexity of a new hub. Given the lack of agreement on this and other issues, the Parties concluded that the discussions were premature and they ([Decision 18/CMA.6](#)):

- Launched a process for elaborating the Technology Implementation Programme;
- Requested the SBI to consider this matter at SB 62 (June 2025) based on the deliberations at COP 29, as reflected in the draft text, while recognizing that the draft text does not represent consensus among Parties, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA 7 (November 2025) to inform and further elaborate the Technology Implementation Programme.

## 12.4 Poznan Strategic Programme

Regarding the Poznan Strategic Programme (PSP), - discussed under the SBI agenda - with the completion of activities under this programme, going into COP 29 there were questions around whether Parties should consider the future of this agenda item. Nevertheless, countries agreed to continue considerations at SBI 61, solely for the purpose of analysing the programme and extracting lessons learned to inform new programmes, such as the TIP. **In the [Decision](#), the way forward:**

- Requested the secretariat to prepare a report on the evaluation of the Poznan Strategic Programme for consideration at SBI 64 (June 2026), taking stock of progress, challenges, successes and lessons learned from implementing the Poznan strategic programme.
- Decided to continue discussions on the best approaches to supporting the implementation of activities, including those identified as priorities in NDCs, NAPs, TNAs, TAPs, and LTS, with the aim of considering a decision by COP 31 (2026) once the technology implementation programme is initiated, to help guide its implementation.



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# 13. CAPACITY BUILDING

The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement share the goal of empowering developing countries to effectively address climate change and its negative impacts. This is facilitated by the [Paris Committee on Capacity Building](#) (PCCB), established under the Convention in 2015 while also serving the Paris Agreement. It plays a central role in identifying and addressing capacity-building gaps and needs in these countries while also promoting coherence and coordination in related activities. At COP 28 (November 2023), Parties decided ([Decision 12/CP.28](#)) that the 2nd review of the PCCB would start at SB 60 (June 2024) and end at COP 29 (December 2024). At SB 60, two identical draft decisions were recommended to the COP ([Decision 12/CP.29](#)) and the CMA ([Decision 19/CMA.6](#)) to consider and adopt on the topic of the second review of the PCCB.

During these negotiations, Parties met to discuss the annual technical progress report on the PCCB, which raised debates surrounding whether to include information on the integration of GST outcomes in its annual report, and if so, whether to refer to specific articles. This was resolved by a bridging proposal by Norway, that suggested including this information with a wider reference to relevant GST paragraphs. As such, the SB 61 forwarded draft conclusions to the COP and CMA on the annual progress report on the PCCB.

Under the COP 29/CMA.6 agenda item ‘Matters relating to capacity-building’, the governing bodies addressed three topics, deciding:

→ On the annual technical progress report on the PCCB, [Decision 13/CP.29](#) and [Decision 20/CMA.6](#), among others:

- Welcomed and took note of the recommendations contained in the 2024 report. These recommendations include, enhancing the coherence and coordination of capacity-building and avoiding duplication of efforts, enhancing developing country ownership of building and maintaining capacity, enhancing the sharing of good practices, experience and lessons learned related to capacity-building, promoting collaborative work with various bodies and making use of information from the Durban Forum on capacity building.
- Took note of the 2025 focus area of the PCCB: capacity-building for designing holistic investment strategies, bankable projects and stakeholder engagement aimed at strengthening the implementation of NDCs and NAPs in developing countries.
- Emphasised that capacity gaps and needs pertaining to implementing the Paris Agreement still exist in developing countries and recalled Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, which states that all Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement and that developed country Parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties;

On the same topic, the CMA also:

- Invited the PCCB to include in its annual report information on how it has integrated, in line with its mandate, relevant outcomes from the GST I.

Under the COP 29/CMA 6 agenda item 'Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation', the COP ([Decision 12/CP.29](#)) and the CMA ([Decision 19/CMA.6](#)) adopted the SBI conclusions that had been forwarded by SBI 60 on the second review of the PCCB, they:

- Reaffirmed the need to promote efficiencies and avoid duplication of efforts in the implementation of capacity-building activities;
- Decided to extend the PCCB for five years and to review its progress and need for extension at COP 34 and CMA 11 (2029);
- Requested SBI 68 to prepare the Terms of Reference (TORs) for the PCCB's 3rd review;
- Requested the PCCB at its 9th meeting (which will likely take place in June 2025) to develop a work plan for the period of its extension for consideration at COP 30, requesting that the PCCB extend its current work plan until then;
- Invited Parties and relevant institutions to provide support and resources to the PCCB.

On the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention, the COP adopted ([Decision 11/CP.29](#)) the conclusions that had been forwarded by SBI 60 in which they:

- Adopted the TORs for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the convention and requested SBI 62 to initiate the review based on these TORs and taking into account the submissions of Parties and relevant stakeholders;
- Requested that the SBI complete its work at SBI 63, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration at COP 30.

On the sidelines of the conference, the [6th Capacity-building Hub](#) highlighted initiatives aimed at strengthening climate action. The Hub served as a platform for knowledge-sharing, featuring diverse sessions focused on empowering countries and communities to tackle climate challenges effectively. Recordings of all sessions are available on the Hub's [YouTube channel](#).



*Photo: UN Climate Change - Habib Samadov (Flickr)*

# 14. RESPONSE MEASURES

Response measures are actions, policies and programmes by countries to respond to climate change, often relating to carbon emissions. They could take many forms, including taxes, levies, subsidies, and labelling. The scope of response measures varies – they could apply multilaterally, bilaterally or unilaterally. Response measures by a grouping or country may affect the countries it trades with, for example, if an additional tax is applied on imports based on calculated emissions. In the UNFCCC context, Parties seek to collaboratively reduce negative impacts and increase positive impacts of implementing mitigation under UNFCCC agreements.

The Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) was established in 2018 ([Decision 7/CMA.1](#)). The KCI supports the work of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures (the Forum). The Forum is a single platform that covers the work on all COP, CMP and CMA matters on the impact of the implementation of response measures. It was also decided that the Forum shall provide recommendations for consideration by the SBs, aiming to recommend actions for consideration and adoption by the COP, CMP and CMA.

At SB 60 (June 2024), the SBI and SBSTA agreed to continue developing the next five-year workplan of the Forum and the KCI at SB 61 (November 2024), aiming to recommend a draft decision at COP 29, CMP 19 and CMA 6 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/7](#); [FCCC/SBI/2024/13](#)). The co-chairs produced a [non-paper](#) relating to the workplan. The [current workplan](#) covers SB 52 (June 2020) to SB 63 (November 2025).

Per [Decision 13/CP.28](#), [Decision 4/CMP.18](#) and [Decision 19/CMA.5](#), the first global dialogue on the impacts of the implementation of response measures took place in Ghana in September 2024, together with the 11th meeting of the KCI. As captured in the secretariat's [summary report](#), participants discussed evidence-based approaches and holistic strategies for maximising co-benefits and minimising negative impacts of implementing NDCs. In a breakout group on designing coherent policies, the interaction between trade and climate policies was discussed, and participants highlighted the importance of considering the impacts of response measures across all countries.

The SBs forwarded their agenda item (Matters relating to the Forum) to COP 29, CMP 19 and CMA 6 as they did not reach conclusions. The COP/CMP/CMA agenda item was the report of the Forum. In informal consultations, Parties began from the abovementioned non-paper. The G-77 and China argued that the Forum and the KCI must take into account negative cross-border impacts caused to developing countries by developed countries' climate policies, whereas the UK and the US highlighted the co-benefits of climate action. Following informal consultations, closed-door Presidency consultations were carried out.

**The decision adopted by the COP, CMP and CMA ([Decision 16/CP.29](#), [3/CMP.19](#) and [22/CMA.6](#)) (*inter alia*):**

- ➔ Acknowledged the secretariat's summary report on the first global dialogue;
- ➔ Adopted updated rules of procedure contained in the [2024 annual report](#) of the KCI (the 2024 KCI Report);



- ➔ Adopted recommendations regarding the following activities of the current workplan:
    - Activity 6 on promoting the use of guidelines and policy frameworks to assist Parties in promoting just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs; and
    - Activity 10 on sharing experience and best practices in reporting on efforts to assess and analyse the impacts of the implementation of response measures;
  - ➔ Adopted a workplan for 2026 to 2030, which does not specify timelines for implementing activities, which encompasses 17 activities including:
    - Assess and analyse the impacts (including socioeconomic impacts) of response measures to achieve all outcomes of the global stocktake and different net zero scenarios and pathways;
    - Analyse, assess and report on the impacts of measures taken to combat climate change, including cross-border impacts;
    - Identify ways of enhancing private-public partnerships to address the impacts of response measures;
    - Develop a KCI toolbox that can be customized to local circumstances for Parties to use in identifying, assessing and addressing the impacts of response measures;
    - Develop five regional case studies on just transition of the workforce, the creation of decent work and quality jobs and on economic diversification and transformation to understand the opportunities and challenges in planning and implementation;
    - Develop case studies to identify and analyse the social and economic impacts of economy-wide nationally determined contributions;
    - Identify and exchange experience on technological solutions aimed at reducing climate change impacts and creating decent work; and
  - ➔ Requested the KCI to include in its 2025 annual report a timeline and modalities for its implementation of each activity in the new 2026 to 2030 workplan.
- There were about 60 activities set out in the co-chairs' workplan non-paper, which was ultimately streamlined to 17 in the adopted workplan.
- Since developing countries are concerned about negative cross-border impacts of response measures, they are keen to discuss unilateral trade measures (see below on 'Trade and climate'). Unlike the non-paper, the adopted workplan does not mention unilateral trade measures, though it does reference "cross-border impacts" and UNFCCC Article 3.5 (emphasis added in bold):
- "The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. **Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.**"*
- Though an attempt to put "trade-restrictive unilateral measures" on the agenda failed, the inclusion of "cross-border impacts" in activity 6 of the adopted workplan could be a route for developing countries to raise such concerns. Per the adopted workplan, the expected outputs of activity 6 would be two reports and recommendations to the UNFCCC governing bodies.

The 12th meeting of the KCI is scheduled in Bonn for 12 to 13 June 2025, ahead of SB 62. A second global dialogue is expected in conjunction with the meeting ([Decision 13/CP.28](#); [Decision 4/CMP.18](#); [Decision 19/CMA.5](#)). SB 62 is expected to consider the 2025 annual report of the KCI, including the timeline and modalities for the 2026 to 2030 workplan, and the summary report of the second global dialogue.

For more details, please see LRI's advice on:

- [The purpose and functions of the Forum and the KCI](#);
- [The rationale for, and the potential benefits and drawbacks of, unilateral trade measures](#);
- [The EU CBAM](#); and
- [The EU CBAM and potential conflicts with WTO law](#).

## Trade and climate – unlikely bedfellows?

Unilateral trade measures, such as the European Union (EU)'s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) that applies to imports from non-EU countries, were another point of contention at COP 29.

Similar to COP 28 (2023), China on behalf of BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) made a [six-page submission](#) to propose an agenda item to discuss “Concerns with climate change related, trade-restrictive unilateral measures”. In their view, such measures “hinder the efforts of developing countries to advance their climate commitments and ambition” and “undermine the basis of multilateral cooperation”.

Ultimately, BASIC compromised on this proposal when they were promised that Presidency consultations would be held on the matter. The COP President characterised the consultations as “constructive discussions” but there was “no consensus”.

Developing countries have sought to discuss unilateral trade measures under the UNFCCC, but developed countries have pushed back by arguing that the proper forum for trade is the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some argue that tensions over trade will continue simmering at international climate negotiations, and that an integrated approach to climate and trade would be beneficial. Perhaps hoping to be third time lucky, China has said that they will again propose to put unilateral trade measures on the COP 30 (2025) agenda.

# 15. GENDER

The process of integrating gender into the UNFCCC's climate policies has been an ongoing effort. With the decision taken at COP 20 (2014) in Lima, where [Decision 18/CP.20](#) was adopted, the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) was established, with an aim to promote gender balance and the effective participation of women in the bodies established under the UNFCCC, and achieving gender-responsive climate policy. The plan included, among others, efforts to organise workshops on gender responsiveness and capacity building for female delegates.

At COP 23 in Bonn, [Decision 3/CP.23](#) established the Gender Action Plan (GAP). This plan aimed to enhance the integration of gender issues into climate policies and practices, focusing on the differing impacts of climate change on men and women, with particular attention to vulnerable communities, such as indigenous peoples. The action plan also included promoting climate empowerment and technology transfer.

In Sharm El Sheikh, at COP 27, an interim review of the implementation of the Gender Action Plan was conducted. The review was based on activities carried out since COP 23 and took into account amendments and suggestions for new activities. At COP 28 (2023), Parties decided that the SBI would begin the final review of the Lima Work Programme on Gender and the Gender Action Plan in 2024. [Decision 15/CP.28](#) included the preparation of a synthesis report of submissions by Parties and non-party stakeholders on progress, challenges, gaps, and priority areas of work carried out so far, to be

discussed during the SB 60 (June 2024) and at COP 29. Parties could not reach agreement on the review and in the SB 60 conclusions agreed to continue the review at SBI 61/ COP 29, on the basis of the [draft text](#) used in the Bonn session.

At COP 29 in Baku, the main discussions revolved around intense negotiations on the draft COP decision, revised during this session, and was marked by significant tensions and sensitivities. One of the main points of contention was the risk of regression from previously agreed language, with several Parties opposing any weakening of already established commitments. While some countries advocated for aligning the document with national principles and sensitivities, civil society sectors criticized the discriminatory tone of parts of the draft and emphasized the importance of inclusive climate action. Additionally, a governance-related discussion stalled the negotiations. A proposal was brought by the USA and other developed countries during the SBs in June 2024 to add gender to the CMA agenda as a joint agenda item and was reiterated at COP 29. Developing countries did not accept going forward with the proposal, but its discussion ended up taking much time in the negotiation room, also conditioning the decision outcome, as developed countries opposed to the inclusion to any reference to the Paris Agreement in the decision if the proposal was not accepted. For details on this issue, refer to the [procedural and governance section](#) of this summary.

#### Ultimately, in (Decision 7/CP.29):

Parties concluded the final review, and decided to extend the strengthened Lima Work Programme on Gender for an additional 10 years. They also decided to develop a new Gender Action Plan, starting at the sixty-second session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), in June 2025, with the aim of recommending a decision for consideration and adoption at COP 30 in November 2025. The decision also encourages Parties to appoint and provide support for a national gender and climate change focal point, and to strengthen the gender-responsiveness of third climate actions, among other calls and requests to Parties, public and private entities, constituted bodies and relevant stakeholders to integrate and prioritise gender in their work.

#### On the way forward:

- Parties were invited to include information on the implementation of the enhanced LWPG and any other gender action plan in their national reporting;
- A review of the implementation of the enhanced LWGP shall be initiated at the SBI 70 (June 2029) with a view to be concluded at the SBI 71 (November 2029) and a draft decision thereon to be recommended for consideration and adoption by the COP 34 (November 2029);
- The development of a new gender action plan will be initiated at the SBI 62 (June 2025);
- A technical workshop will be organized and held by SBI 62 (June 2025), and a second in person or hybrid event aiming to facilitate the design of gender action plan activities and to inform the development of the new gender action plans with Parties and observers invited to submit views on its format and scope by the 31st of March;
- The secretariat was requested to continue to support implementation of the LWPG including through the preparation of an annual gender composition report and a biennial synthesis report on progress in integrating a gender perspective into constituted body processes, among other actions.





Photo: UN Climate Change - Habib Samadov (Flickr)

# 16. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

At the Paris climate conference in 2015, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) recognised “the need to strengthen knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples related to addressing and responding to climate change” and established a forum, the [Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform](#) (LCIPP), “for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner” ([Decision 1/CP.21](#), para. 135).

At COP 23 in 2017, countries agreed on the overall purposes of the platform and that it would perform three core functions: knowledge exchange, capacity for engagement, and climate change policy integration and actions ([Decision 2/CP.23](#)). At the 2018 Katowice climate conference, the LCIPP Facilitative Working Group (FWG) was established as a constituted body to further operationalise the LCIPP and facilitate the implementation of its functions ([Decision 2/CP.24](#)).

**Decision 14/CP.29:** At COP 29 in Baku, countries welcomed the progress in implementing the functions of the LCIPP and the [report of the FWG](#) which included the draft workplan of the LCIPP for 2025-2027. They decided to continue the mandate of the FWG.

## On the way forward, among others:

- ➔ The secretariat is requested to explore:
  - Ways to enable FWG members to participate in SB and COP sessions; and
  - Possible arrangements for simultaneous interpretation in the official UN languages.

- ➔ The COP 30 Presidency is invited to convene at that session a thematic workshop and relevant dialogues in line with LCIPP’s workplan;
- ➔ Parties, relevant constituted bodies and representatives of work programmes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement and other stakeholders, including regional entities, are invited to take into account the challenges and recommendations to engage Indigenous Peoples and local communities under the Convention and the Paris Agreement as detailed in the FWG’s report;
- ➔ In view of its next review in 2027, the FWG is requested to report on the outcomes of its work, to consider and propose recommendations relating to the scope and functions of the LCIPP and to prepare a draft workplan for the LCIPP for 2028-2031 for consideration by COP 32 (November 2027);
- ➔ To assist with the FWG review in 2027, Parties, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and stakeholders are invited to submit views on:
  - Activities and thematic focuses for the 2028-2031 workplan of the LCIPP for consideration by the FWG at its 16th meeting (2026); and
  - The impact of work under the LCIPP.

# 17. AGRICULTURE

In 2022, the Parties to the Convention requested the SBSTA and SBI to establish the 4-year Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security and the Sharm el-Sheikh online portal for sharing information on projects, initiatives and policies for increasing opportunities for implementation of climate action to address issues related to agriculture and food security ([Decision 3/CP.27](#)).

While the joint work was established by the SB 58 in June 2023, since then, negotiations had not seen much progress, partly due to disagreements within the G77 group. After many informal meetings during the SB 60 in June 2024, it finally saw a breakthrough. Parties agreed on [conclusions](#) containing a [road map](#) to SB 65, and:

- ➔ Requested the secretariat to:
  - Develop the online portal;
  - Prepare an annual synthesis report on agriculture-relevant work undertaken by constituted bodies;
  - Organise workshops.
- ➔ Agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 61.

At SB 61 in November 2024, countries considered the joint work and agreed on [conclusions](#). Among others they:

- ➔ Welcomed the secretariat's [presentation](#) on the Sharm el-Sheikh [online portal](#);
- ➔ Regarding the online portal, requested the secretariat to:
  - Further develop it to enable submissions to be further categorised by project, initiative or policy;
  - Develop, by SB 62 (June 2025), a template for submissions, on the basis of the structure outlined in annex I;
  - Further develop its structure, functionalities and accessibility, taking into account countries' views, as captured in annexes I-II.
- ➔ Invited Parties and observers to use the template when making submissions to the portal.
- ➔ Agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 62.





Photo: UNFCCC (website)



# 18. ACTION FOR CLIMATE EMPOWERMENT (ACE)

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) refers to measures to strengthen education and public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation (under Article 6 of the UNFCCC and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement). Discussions around the greater participation of youth are also included under this agenda item.

The Glasgow work programme on ACE (ACE WP) was adopted in 2021 ([Decision 18.CP.26](#); [Decision 22/CMA.3](#)). It has four priority areas: (i) policy coherence; (ii) coordinated action; (iii) tools and support; and (iv) monitoring, evaluation and reporting.

In 2022, the ACE WP was refined through the adoption of a four-year action plan ([Decision 23/CP.27](#); [Decision 22/CMA.4](#)). The action plan established short-term, clear and time-bound activities up to COP 31 in 2026, and aimed to empower all of society to engage in climate action, particularly children and youth, respecting, promoting and considering obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and the empowerment of women. The decision also foresaw the annual dialogue on ACE, and Parties and non-party stakeholders were invited to make suggestions on its structure.

In Dubai (2023), the topic was covered under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) agenda. Parties were unable to reach consensus, and discussions on the theme were postponed to SBI 60. At the Bonn

climate conference in 2024, Parties discussed the priority area of tools and support and included an expert-run session on how to write strong project proposals. Considerations on this matter were forwarded to SBI 61, taking into account the informal note prepared at SBI 60 ([DT.DC.SBI60.i18.1](#)).

In the Baku climate conference, ACE was only considered under the SBI agenda. The SBI's work on ACE took place in informal consultations and informal-informals. Parties clashed on elements to be included in submissions relating to the ACE WP's midterm review (scheduled for June 2026). It was notable and fitting for the topic of empowering everyone in society that observers were included in informal-informals sessions when these are usually limited to Parties only. The SBI conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.14](#)):

- Welcomed the Dialogues on ACE held in 2023 and 2024;
- Recalled the importance of integrating ACE elements into national climate change policies and actions and noted the secretariat's [compendium of good practices for integrating ACE into NDCs](#);
- Requested the secretariat to highlight the importance of sharing progress and challenges related to accessibility of tools and support, including financial and technical support, for ACE implementation when the secretariat provides support to the Presidency of COP 30 and CMA 7 (November 2025) for in-session events; and

- Invited Parties and non-Party stakeholders to continue submitting information via the [UNFCCC submission portal](#) on ACE implementation, including information relevant for inclusion in the annual summary reports which would help Parties in the midterm review of the ACE WP at SBI 64 (June 2026).
- The Baku climate conference held other side-events on ACE, including:
- ACE Presidency Event which focused on ‘Advancing Climate Transparency: Opportunities through Action for Climate Empowerment’, where there were discussions on the role of different stakeholders in supporting climate transparency processes; and
  - Five Youth-led Climate Forum Dialogues and a Youth-led Climate Forum Headline Event which enabled children and youth to discuss policy priorities directly with decision-makers.

Per the SBI conclusions, ACE events are expected to be held during COP 30 / CMA 7. Civil society’s interest and participation leading up to COP 30 in Brazil may be a useful case study for the ACE workstream, such as how socio-cultural factors impact public participation and awareness.

On the way forward, the ACE WP is scheduled to have a midterm review at SB 64 (2026) and a final review at SB 74 (2031). The next Dialogue on ACE is expected during SB 62 (June 2025) and is likely to focus on one of the ACE WP priority areas of policy coherence and/or coordinated action (these two are the priority areas not yet covered by Dialogues on ACE). In accordance with the ACE WP action plan, the June 2025 Dialogue on ACE is expected to discuss enhancing understanding of the role of children, youth and indigenous peoples in ACE implementation and promoting intergenerational knowledge-sharing, and to discuss using a clear, inclusive, intergenerational and gender-responsive approach to national climate change policies and action.

# 19. TRANSPARENCY-REPORTING UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT

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Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes an enhanced transparency mechanism called the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). This article stipulates that all Parties must submit reports on their performance and measures to achieve the commitments made through their respective NDCs, as well as disclose inventories of their GHG emissions. In addition, reporting on information on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support provided by developed countries to developing countries is mandatory. Reporting on information on climate change impacts and adaptation is optional for all. Developing countries may also report on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support needed and received. For more information on Article 13, please see the [Guide to the Paris Agreement](#).

In accordance with [Decision 1/CP.21](#), developing countries have flexibility in the scope, frequency, and level of detail of reporting. LDCs and SIDS, whose special circumstances are recognized, also have some discretion as to when they report.

At the climate conference in Katowice ([Decision 18/CMA.1](#)), countries opted for a common set of rules, applicable to all Parties, but with flexibility for developing countries that need it, in light of their capacities. It was also decided that in this first round, the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) must be submitted by 31 December 2024.

After adopting common formatting tables in Glasgow for emissions reporting and NDC progress monitoring, Parties in Sharm El Sheikh defined methods for reporting and reviewing adaptation efforts and climate change impacts. Current transparency negotiations focus on funding and capacity-building to ensure compliance with reporting rules, with Decision 17/CMA.4 encouraging the GEF to continue providing financial support for developing countries to prepare their BTRs.

At COP28 (2023), countries welcomed the GEF's increased climate funding, the Climate Transparency Platform launch, and emphasized the need for adequate, predictable, and timely support for developing countries, recognizing LDCs and SIDS, to strengthen their ETF capacity. At SB 60 (June 2024), discussions on the ETF centred on parties' experiences with the test version of reporting tools and challenges faced by developing country Parties in integrating the tools into their national inventory arrangements. In its conclusions, the SBSTA welcomed the test version of the ETF reporting tools and ongoing technical training workshops, acknowledging challenges faced by developing countries in their integration. It emphasized the need for training and support, particularly for LDCs and SIDS, noted the tools' availability by June 2024, and highlighted potential resource needs for further training and feature integration.

At the **Baku climate conference**, there were two main topics in discussion regarding transparency: reporting tools under the ETF and the provision of financial and technical support to developing countries for reporting and related capacity-building under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. This agenda item was initially established in 2021 for consideration at CMA 4 and at each session thereafter, as countries recognized the need for enhanced support to be provided by multiple sources and channels, including the GEF ([Decision 5/CMA.3](#)). Countries welcomed the support provided by the GEF and its implementing agencies for the implementation of the ETF, including through the joint programme of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency and Global Support Programme, as well as the “information on financial support requested, approved and provided for the preparation of biennial transparency reports by developing countries” ([Decision 21/CMA.6](#)).

#### **On the way forward:**

- ➔ Parties are invited to submit information on their experience and challenges related to implementing Article 13, “including in relation to establishing or enhancing their institutional capacity and national reporting systems”, as previously established at the Dubai climate conference in 2023 ([Decision 18/CMA.5](#)). A synthesis report on the information provided, as well as reported in the developing country Parties’ first BTR prepared by the secretariat, followed by a facilitative dialogue organized by the secretariat at SBI 62 to discuss its content;
- ➔ A workshop will be organized by the secretariat in consultation with the GEF and its implementing agencies in SB 62 (June 2025), aiming “the sharing of experiences of developing country Parties in preparing their first biennial transparency reports, including

in accessing the funds received and their adequacy for the sustainability of the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework”, followed by a summary report to be submitted to CMA 7 ([Decision 21/CMA.6](#)).

In the parallel track of negotiations on the Guidance to the Global Environment Facility, the respective [decision](#) requested the GEF to enhance the delivery of support for the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency and enabling activities by ensuring seamless project transitions, timely assistance, and sustainable national reporting systems and workflows, enabling developing country Parties to continuously meet their obligations under the enhanced transparency framework of the Paris Agreement. **Furthermore, the GEF was encouraged to** consider in the context of its ninth replenishment:

- information provided by developing countries in their BTR on support needed and received for the implementation of Article 13, including for transparency related capacity-building (paragraphs 143–145 of the annex to [decision 18/CMA.1](#));
- information provided by Parties on their experience and challenges related to implementing Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, including in relation to establishing or enhancing their institutional capacity and national reporting systems, as well as the synthesis report prepared by the secretariat on this matter and on information reported by developing countries in their BTRs;
- the allocation of transparency support funds under its eighth replenishment.

**Reporting tools under the Enhanced Transparency Framework:** in SBSTA informal consultations, discussions related to, among others, maintaining the interoperability of the tools with the IPCC software in coop-



eration with the IPCC; further enhancing the tools and incorporating the actions referenced in its presentation during the relevant mandated event at SBSTA 61; and organizing a mandated event at SBSTA 62 to inform parties about these updates.

**In its conclusions, the SBSTA, among others:**

- Welcomes the timely completion of the final version of the tools for the electronic reporting of the common reporting tables and common tabular formats under the ETF;
- Requests the Secretariat to continue organizing technical training workshops;
- Requests the Secretariat to maintain, in cooperation with the IPCC, interoperability between the tools and the IPCC software; and
- Requests the Secretariat to further enhance the ETF reporting tools and to organize an event at SBSTA 62 to inform parties on progress.

***Provision of financial and technical support to developing countries:***

discussions on this item focused on addressing the challenges faced by developing countries in implementing the ETF. Parties welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to provide support for the preparation of the first round of BTRs. Developing country groups also highlighted, among others: issues with regard to the transition between support for reporting under the Convention and the Paris Agreement; assessing financing needs to meet enhanced reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement and factoring these into the next replenishment process under the GEF; GEF funding being insufficient to comply with their reporting obligations under the ETF; and the need for in-house capacity building in developing countries.

Parties could not reach agreement under the SBI, so the matter will be included on the SBI 62 agenda in accordance with Rule

16. Nevertheless, they eventually reached agreement under the CMA.

**In its decision, the CMA:**

- Emphasizes the importance of the continued provision of support for building the transparency-related capacity of developing countries on a continuous basis;
- Welcomes the Secretariat's efforts in delivering capacity building for the implementation of the ETF, in particular through regional online and in-person workshops, and encourages the Secretariat to tailor these capacity-building activities to sub-regions that share similar conditions and challenges;
- Emphasizes the importance of building the capacity of developing countries to transition from ad hoc reporting approaches to government-led, systematic, and institutionalized processes for preparing and submitting national reports under the ETF;
- Requests the Secretariat to organize a workshop at SB 62 in consultation with the GEF and its implementing agencies to facilitate the sharing of experiences of developing countries in preparing their first BTRs, including in accessing the funds received and their adequacy for the sustainability of the implementation of the ETF; and
- Requests the Secretariat to prepare a summary report on the workshop by no later than three weeks prior to the CMA 7.



Photo: UNFCCC (website)

## 20. RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION (RSO)

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Research and Systematic Observation (RSO) is the mechanism under which Parties are mandated to promote and cooperate in scientific research, systematic observation, and the development of data archives. This commitment is rooted in the UNFCCC's obligations (Article 4.1(g) and Article 5), which call for enhanced cooperation in climate-related research and monitoring, as well as the Paris Agreement's emphasis on responding to climate change based on the best available science (Article 4.1, Article 7.5, and Article 14.1).

RSO plays a fundamental role in coordinating global climate research and observation efforts, including the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other scientific bodies. The preamble of the Paris Agreement underscores the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change, with science serving as the foundation for informed decision-making and policy action.

RSO negotiations take place under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). Typically, research-related discussions occur during the first sessional period of the year (usually in June), while systematic observation is addressed in the second sessional period, generally in November ([FCCC/SBSTA/2012/5](#)). For further details, please see LRI's pre-COP 29 [summary of the RSO negotiation stream](#).

At COP 28 in Dubai, RSO negotiations were marked by divergent views on the role and scope of the Systematic Observations

Financing Facility (SOFF). This UN fund, co-created by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), UNDP, and UNEP, was established to support the implementation of Global Basic Observing Network (GBON) regulations. Currently, SOFF provides financial and advisory support exclusively to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a limitation that has been questioned by other developing countries seeking broader eligibility for assistance. However, negotiations in Dubai failed to reach a consensus on expanding SOFF's support. Instead, discussions concluded with a general encouragement for Parties and relevant organizations to enhance their support for the systematic observation community.

At COP 29 in Baku, RSO discussions addressed several substantive issues, highlighting key tensions among Parties. These included calls from some developing countries to acknowledge the role of historical emissions, pushback from certain Parties on the legitimacy and methodologies of climate science, and debates on how to prioritise limited resources, particularly regarding the development of early warning systems and financing for systematic observations. Parties also revisited the scope of the Systematic Observations Financing Facility (SOFF). Notably, for the first time, an agreement was reached to invite SOFF to consider expanding its support to a broader range of countries beyond its current focus on LDCs and SIDS.



For more on the current and potential interlinkages between the WMO and the UNFCCC process, please see LRI's advice on the Global Basic Observation Network.

The SBSTA **conclusions** highlight several points, including:

- Recognition of the importance of robust Earth observation systems and long-term data records, as well as the role of innovation and technology in climate monitoring, including to the work of the IPCC;
- Utmost concern about the state of the global climate system, citing GHG observations and noting that 2024 is on track to be the hottest year on record, primarily due to long-term warming caused by emissions from pre-industrial times to the present.
- Acknowledgment of the [Global Climate Observing System \(GCOS\) global climate monitoring principles](#), encouraging Parties to consider these updates and nominate GCOS national coordinators;
- Appreciation of the Technology Executive Committee's work on early warning systems and the publication of a [policy brief](#) on early warnings for all through innovation and technology;
- Emphasis on the urgent need to maintain and expand systematic observations to support adaptation efforts and implement "Early Warnings for All".
- Recognition of persistent gaps in systematic observations globally, with appreciation for ongoing support aimed at addressing these gaps in developing countries;
- Reinforcement of the need to sustain long-term data collection and management, encouraging open data-sharing and the development of related data products;
- Invitation for Parties and relevant organisations to submit proposals on potential themes and structure for Earth Information Day 2025 via the UNFCCC submission portal by 29 August 2025.

The Earth Information Day is an annual event designed to facilitate the exchange of information on the state of global climate system and advancements in systematic observation ([FCCC/SBSTA/2019/2](#)). At COP 29, the event featured updates on Earth observation and five thematic breakout discussions. The SBSTA 61 recognized it as an important platform for direct engagement between the systematic observation community and end users of climate data and information ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.17](#)).

Given ongoing developments in RSO discussions, future Earth Information Days are likely to feature updates on the progress of the 'Early Warnings for All' initiative, a priority area given the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Discussions may also address efforts to close gaps in systematic observations, ensuring broader accessibility to climate data and forecasting tools. The debate on expanding the SOFF to support more countries may also resurface.

Considering the current political landscape, RSO negotiations may become even more relevant in light of emerging challenges posed by climate change scepticism. However, this could be counterbalanced by the tangible human and economic toll of extreme climate events, which continue to elevate climate risks in political and cultural consciousness. The role of RSO in providing reliable, science-based climate data will be increasingly critical for countering misinformation and reinforcing evidence-based decision-making.



## 21. COMPLIANCE - PARIS AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE (PAICC)

The PAICC was established under Article 15 of the Paris Agreement as a mechanism to facilitate the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement. PAICC features an expert-based committee and it is not punitive, but facilitative in nature, and should pay attention to the national circumstances of countries when examining their compliance with the Agreement. Following the adoption of its remaining rules of procedure at CMA 4 ([Decision 24/CMA.4](#)), the PAICC has fulfilled its responsibilities through annual reports, recommending precise and targeted measures to assist Parties in addressing potential cases of non-compliance with their obligations.

At the Baku Climate Conference, matters relating to the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance of the Paris Agreement were negotiated under CMA informal consultations, discussing, among others, the annual report of the Committee ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/7](#)). The Committee's report to the CMA included a recommendation to postpone the review of its modalities and procedures until 2027 - instead of 2024 - owing to the Committee's limited experience to date. The Committee's modalities and procedures were adopted at CMA 1 ([Decision 20/CMA.1](#)) and finalised at CMA 4 ([Decision 24/CMA.4](#)), and therefore, their work regarding the last cycle of NDC submissions was very limited, while it is expected to increase significantly from 2025 onwards, given the upcoming submissions of NDCs, BTRs and national communications.

During the first informal consultation, Parties expressed they would agree on the recommendation to postpone the review. Chile requested that the draft decision also include a request to the Secretariat to address the

Committee's concern - noted in paragraphs 28 and 29 of their [annual report](#) - that the NDC registry currently does not allow to show two NDCs as active, and could result in a Party's NDC that is currently being implemented being archived and in a Party's NDC that is not yet being implemented being labelled as active. The request was supported by Norway, Australia, Canada, the US and the UK.

In a second informal consultation, the Secretariat presented and answered questions about the functionality of the NDC registry to display NDCs that are active during different time horizons. Delegates debated how to capture this discussion in the draft decision, with the EU, supported by the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Chile, proposing, and Saudi Arabia opposing a reference to the registry. After a huddle, parties agreed to refer more broadly to the section of the Committee's annual report that outlines the current limitations of the registry in the preamble of the decision.

In its [conclusions](#), the CMA notes that Parties held discussions on the matters contained in Chapter II.B of the annual report of the Committee and concluded that it will continue consideration of this chapter at CMA 7. **The CMA came to the following agreements in regards to PAICC and decided:**

- Decided to postpone the first review of the modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the Committee to CMA 9 (November 2027), as requested by the Committee, and
- Requested the Committee to undertake the first review of its modalities and procedures with a view to making recommendations for consideration and adoption by CMA 9.



Photo: UN Climate Change - Kamran Guliyev (Flickr)



## 22. ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

Within the Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters workstream, Parties convene to address topics such as decision-making rules in the UNFCCC process and monitoring UNFCCC Secretariat and institutions, including on the use of their budget. This agenda item is initially examined under the SBI, which subsequently proposes draft decisions for review and adoption/endorsement by the three governing bodies: COP, CMP, and CMA. Documents on administrative matters were not made available in a timely manner before the start of SBI 61, which was later noted with concern in the COP and CMP decisions (Decisions [20/CP.29](#) and [4/CMP.19](#)). At the 61st meeting (November 2024), the SBI considered:

- The financial report and audited financial statements for 2023 and the report of the United Nations Board of Auditors [published](#) on the 10th of October

2024 that focused on auditing financial statements, the management of budget processes, the outcomes of the 'fit for purpose' initiative launched in 2018 to better adapt the UNFCCC Secretariat to its evolving missions and the remaining challenges in terms of matching the governance and resources of the UNFCCC secretariat to its mandate;

- The [Executive Secretary's note](#) on budget performance and addendum on the programme performance for the biennium 2022–2023;
- The [updated](#) secretariat's work programme for the biennium 2024–2025;
- The [status](#) of contributions and fees.

However, decision-making in the UNFCCC process was once again not discussed and the COP agreed to continue its consideration at its next session.

### The UN Board of Auditors

Established in 1946 to provide an independent audit of the accounts and management of the United Nations and its funds and programmes, it plays an important role in ensuring transparency throughout the UN system. As set out in Annex I to [Decision 15/CP.1](#), the accounts and processes of the UNFCCC are subject to the internal and external audit process of the United Nations. The annual audit of the UNFCCC contains the statement of financial position, the statement of financial performance, the statement of changes in net assets, the cash flow statement and the statement of comparison of budgets to actual amounts. The role of the UN Board of Auditors was [explored further](#) during the LRI side event co-hosted at COP 29.

As has become a regular occurrence and is highlighted in the draft decision forwarded by [SB 60](#) in Bonn earlier this year, discussions once again revolved around the Secretariat's budgetary constraints, which resulted in the Secretariat's failure to deliver on certain activities or tools. Discussions also focused on the UN Board of Auditors' report, and specifically its recommendation that the secretariat "inform and consult the Parties far ahead of the budget appropriation process on the main elements and scenarios of the next budget cycle, to better take into account their concerns" (para. 57). As a response to this recommendation, the Secretariat informed Parties that the Heads of Delegations had been invited to a briefing on the proposed budget for the next biennium during the 2nd week of the Conference. Among the seven other recommendations to the Secretariat contained in the audit, many boil down to the need for financial stability (long-term, predictable funding) and increased efficiency in implementing mandates and the monitoring and reporting linked to these.

The audit also examined the outcomes of the "fit for purpose" initiative, launched in 2018 to better adapt the UNFCCC Secretariat to its evolving missions. Key findings in this part of the report note that the restructuring efforts' impacts have not been assessed in spite of demands expressed by the Parties and previous recommendations by the Board of Auditors, while a survey shows staff experiencing difficulties with the new organisational scheme. Consequently, the report recommends setting up and monitoring indicators on the effectiveness and efficiency of the most critical processes for the functioning of the Secretariat and staff engagement and well-being.

Under the COP 29 and CMP 19 agenda item 'Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation' the governing bodies adopted – or, took note of, for the CMA – draft conclusions that had been forwarded by [SBI 60](#). Decisions [20/CP.29](#) and [4/CMP.19](#), among others:

- Expressed concern that activities such as the regional climate weeks, and tools such as the virtual conference platform were cancelled due to the unpredictability in contributions to the trust fund for supplementary activities;
- Requested the Secretariat to increase transparency regarding the reappropriation of portions of the core budget and of funding in the trust fund for supplementary activities;
- Requested the Secretariat to significantly improve the transparency of its budget management process;
- Encouraged the secretariat to enhance clarity on the nature of activities, whether mandated or not, in documents on the programme budget for the biennium 2026-2027 and requested the Secretariat to consider the challenges it faces in implementing mandated activities in the programme budget for 2024-2025 when preparing the programme budget for 2026-2027;
- Urged Parties to further contribute to the trust fund for participation in the UNFCCC process to ensure the widest possible participation in the process in 2024–2025. The trust fund for participation provide support for eligible delegates from developing countries to attend UNFCCC COP sessions, subsidiary body meetings, and other official gatherings. For more on the fund and their eligibility criteria, see [LRI's advice](#).
- Urged the secretariat to prioritize the delivery of mandated activities and outputs to ensure the inclusive participation of delegates from developing country Parties.

While under the COP 29, CMP 19 and CMA 6 agenda item 'Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters' the governing bodies adopted – or endorsed for the CMA – draft conclusions that had been forwarded by [SBI 61](#) that:

- Took note of the report by the UN Board of Auditors, the status of contributions and fees and the updated work programme of the secretariat for the 2024-2025 biennium.



# 23. PROCEDURAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Governance and legal issues underpin the negotiations. Negotiations are often stalled or held up by discussions about mandates, powers of governing and constituted bodies, the relationship between the Convention and the Paris Agreement, the COP and the CMA, to name just a few examples. In this section, we highlight some of the main governance and legal issues that shaped COP 29. Others, such as whether the review of the Adaptation Committee should be conducted under the COP or COP and CMA, are dealt with under the relevant thematic section.

## Adoption of the Agenda

The agendas organise the work of the COP and other governing and subsidiary bodies and are normally adopted at the opening of the session to then launch the work of Parties. They will have been drafted by the Secretariat and circulated as 'provisional' at least six weeks before the session and should include, among others, any topic agreed to be included during a previous session, those where rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure was applied (where a decision is not achieved, and the matter is left to be considered in the following session), any item proposed by a Party before the agenda is circulated. Further, Parties can propose additional agenda items after the provisional agenda has been produced but before the opening of the session, in which case a supplementary provisional agenda is distributed.

Prior to COP 29, a supplementary provisional agenda ([FCCC/CP/2024/1/Add.2](#)) was circulated that included various proposals by Parties to add agenda items to the COP, the CMA, the CMP and the SBs on: a mountains dialogue; the establishment of a regional centre for climate change technologies in Central Asia; the special needs and circumstances of Africa; the governance of the WIM; and unilateral trade measures and international cooperation in line with the First GST Outcome.

The main issue holding up the adoption of the agendas did not relate to the additional items circulated in the supplementary agenda, however. Although there was some discussion about how to take them forward, major disagreement centred on the placing of the item on the dialogue on GST implementation under matters relating to finance (agenda item 11), instead of under the GST (agenda item 4) in the CMA 6 agenda. This placing was strongly opposed by the EU, AOSIS, EIG, LDCs and AILAC. The scope of such dialogue had been highly contested during the previous SB session, with some Parties understanding the dialogue as circumscribed to finance outputs in the GST decision whilst others saw it as a dialogue to implement all outputs in the GST decision (and options in the middle). Please refer to the [GST section](#) of this summary and [LRI's SB 60 summary](#) for further details.

Some Parties pushed for the conference work to start by adopting the agendas provisionally, while discussions continued on this one point. This is what happened at the SB 58 meeting, where agendas were only adopted towards the end of the session.

However, for others this was not acceptable. [LRI legal advice](#) on the status of negotiations taking place based on provisional agendas during the SBs has recommended taking a cautious approach, as such work would likely not be accepted by the SBs if the agenda was not adopted by the end of the session, and conclusions reached by the Parties on a provisional basis would not be formally adopted. The same applies to COP/CMP/CMA decisions.

On Monday evening, Parties ultimately reached an agreement: they accepted the President's proposal to keep the item under finance, with a footnote indicating this would not prejudice the scope of the dialogue. Most additional agenda items proposed by Parties were taken up in Presidency consultations, as there was no consensus on adding these to the agenda.

Still, the afternoon of the first day saw no negotiations, with work being launched at around 8 pm. **The following were adopted:**

- The COP supplementary provisional agenda ([FCCC/CP/2024/1/Add.2](#));
- The CMP supplementary provisional agenda ([FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/1/Add.1](#));
- The CMA supplementary provisional agenda ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/1/Add.1](#)), with the footnote on the placement of the dialogue on GST implementation;
- The SBI supplementary provisional agenda ([FCCC/SBI/2024/15/Add.1](#)), with an additional agenda item on the provision of financial and technical support related to reporting and review under article 13 of the Paris Agreement;
- The SBSTA supplementary provisional agenda ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/8/Add.1](#)).

As for the additional items discussed under Presidential consultations, no consensus could be found, and therefore, there was no decision on those items.

## Use of SBs draft text as basis for the negotiation

During SB 60 (June 2024), negotiations on the linkages between the Technology and the Financial Mechanisms took place. Parties also engaged in an in-session workshop to take stock of existing linkages through presentations from key stakeholders and to discuss opportunities for further linkages. Some of these opportunities were reflected in a [draft text](#) with recommendations for adoption at COP 29. However, by the end of the session, Parties could not agree on the draft text and as a result only procedural conclusions were adopted. Therefore, the discussion was re-opened at COP 29.

In Baku, Parties expressed diverging views on how to proceed, given that the procedural conclusions from the SBs agreed to *take into account* the draft text. Parties debated what “taking into account” means. The G-77+ China supported using the text as a basis to move forward with discussions. Japan preferred having a clean start. The UK and EU suggested welcoming the report on the in-session workshop held at SBI 60 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/16](#)) and the synthesis report on maintaining and enhancing collaboration and cooperation between them ([FCCC/SBI/2024/1](#)). Parties ultimately gave the Co-Facilitators the mandate to prepare a draft text which incorporated both the SBI 60 draft text and views expressed during the session. As noted in the [technology section](#) of this summary, Parties reached procedural conclusions only and agreed to continue considering this at SB 62.

The issue of what text to use as a basis for negotiations is ultimately about Parties wanting to make sure that positions put forward in a previous session and reflected in textual form are carried over to the next session. It also arose in the context of the NAPs discussions, with some Parties wanting to use an informal note from the June session whilst others pushed for a new draft text prepared by the co-facilitators, that would be informed by the informal note but not include all its elements. At the end of the first week, procedural conclusions were adopted, forwarding the matter to COP 29 for further consideration on the basis of the draft text developed at SB 61. Discussions in the second week centred on determining the status of this draft text: developed country parties pushed for the text to be treated as an informal note (which has no formal status), whilst developing countries wanted assurances that the draft text would be used at the next SB session. Ultimately, a consensus was agreed with the COP requesting SB 62 “to continue consideration of this matter (...) on the basis of the draft text available on the UNFCCC website.” ([DT.DC.COP29.i2f.1](#)).

## **Practical steps and guidance to the COP/CMP/CMA to enhance the linkages between Technology and the Financial Mechanism**

Since COP 21, there have been moves to encourage the Technology and Financial Mechanisms to develop a strong cooperative approach to pursue the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Convention.

Amongst the various proposals put forward, some Parties suggested taking practical steps to enhance coordination between finance and technology negotiations, requesting the Secretariat to ensure there were no clashes between negotiation streams. For COP 29, the scheduling of the session considered this request by the Parties, avoiding meetings colliding.

Another key issue was the inclusion of guidance to the Financial Mechanism in the technology-related decision. LRI provided [legal advice](#) on the *legality* of a technology COP/CMA decision including such guidance. The advice recalls that “As a matter of practice, Parties negotiating conclusions and decisions under each agenda item must do so in a manner that is consistent with their mandate. Therefore, comprehensive guidance to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism should mainly -but not necessarily exclusively- come through agenda items 8(b) and 8(c) of the COP29 Provisional agenda pursuant to the COP mandate to the SCF to prepare draft guidance for the COP to consider and adopt. The G77 + China suggested text requesting actions from the SCF (Standing Committee of Finance) and inviting the GCF and the GEF to consider and support technology needs. The technology decisions did not extensively consider guidance to the Financial Mechanism. However, under the review of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer, the [decision](#) “Welcomes the ongoing collaboration of the Global Environment Facility with the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network and encourages the Global Environment Facility to consider opportunities for scaling up programmes focused on technology and innovation.”

## Work of the SBs going into COP/CMA

During the first week, delegates were told in the SBs negotiations that they needed to reach an agreement during that week and were informed by the Presidency that some issues would not be taken up during the second week. One of these issues was Just Transition. Parties extended the negotiations as much as room allocation allowed for on Saturday 16th of November but did not manage to reach an agreement. They were informed that negotiations on the issue could not continue during the second week. A [draft](#) was circulated before the SB closing plenary containing procedural conclusions - as Parties did not agree on using the informal note prepared by the co-facilitators - forwarding the issue to the following SBs meeting (June 2025). Given that the CMA is the governing body of the Paris Agreement, the SBs could not prevent the CMA from taking up the matter if Parties wanted to continue the discussion. Ultimately, in the SBs closing plenary, the SB Chairs noted the SBs could not conclude their consideration of this matter and agreed to forward this item to CMA 6 for further consideration.

A similar issue arose in the context of the negotiations on national adaptation plans. Parties were informed by the Presidency that they needed to finish negotiations, even if not reaching an agreement, and they would not be allowed to continue during the second week. The Parties, marking the party-driven nature of the process, decided to forward the matter to the COP for further consideration in the second week.

This shows that there is no procedural obstacle to negotiations started in SBs being further taken up by COP or CMA, and the party-driven nature of the process means that if parties agree to continue discussions, the President cannot prevent this.

## Power of the governing bodies to request actions or extend invitations to bodies and organisations outside of the UNFCCC regime

A recurring issue in the negotiations is whether COP decisions can mandate non-UNFCCC bodies and organisations to do something. During COP 29, multiple negotiation streams debated on if and how to reference such bodies. For example, in the GST negotiations on refining the Procedural and Logistical Elements of the overall GST Process, Parties debated the role of the IPCC, including inviting it to consider shortening its timelines for the preparation of the AR7 so that the report (including from its three working groups and its synthesis report) would then be available in time for the second GST in 2028. While many developing and developed countries supported this mention, the LMDCs and Arab Group opposed, arguing that the COP/CMA should not interfere with the IPCC, as an independent body. Parties were hoping to extend a more precise invitation to the IPCC, after the first GST invited the IPCC to consider how best to align its work with the second and subsequent global stocktakes and to provide relevant and timely information for the next global stocktake (Paragraph 184, [Decision 1/CMA.5](#)). Ultimately, the CMA could not adopt a decision.



Under RSO, Parties agreed to invite the SOFF (Systematic Observation Funding Facility) to consider expanding its support to developing countries beyond LDCs and SIDS. SOFF is a specialized United Nations climate fund, established by the WMO, UNDP and UNEP. This topic, however, was highly debated during COP 28, where the inclusion of a reference to SOFF failed. Then and now, some Parties argued that a COP decision could not reference an independent body like SOFF, nevertheless, ultimately the inclusion was agreed.

Indeed, COP decisions can invite or encourage external organisations, initiatives and bodies, but they cannot request or mandate them. In fact, invitations are common practice and therefore, there is no basis in objecting to such references from a legal perspective. By contrast, COP/ CMP/CMA, as the governing bodies of the UNFCCC regime, can certainly mandate, request or demand actions from other UNFCCC bodies – whether the SBs, the constituted bodies, or the Secretariat, as they all serve the COP. ]

## CMA governance over gender (Lima Work Programme) CB/ACE

As part of the review of the implementation of the Lima Work Programme (LWP) and its Gender Action Plan (GAP), Parties debated the role of the CMA in those. Since the LWP was adopted prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, gender and the LWP are under the governance of the COP. During the SBs in June 2024, which were mandated to begin the review of the GAP, the US and other developed country Parties proposed that gender be added to the CMA agenda as a joint agenda item. Their views were

reflected in the draft text that accompanied the procedural conclusion of the SBs ([FCCC/SBI/2024/13](#)) and the matter was deferred to COP 29:

*‘161. Australia, Canada, the EU and its member States, the United Kingdom and the United States indicated that consideration by the CMA of the gender-responsive implementation of the Paris Agreement would enhance integration of gender considerations into and its mainstreaming in the UNFCCC process. They proposed that the CMA include a standing item on gender in its agenda.’*

During COP 29 negotiations, this proposal dominated the discussions, as a result of which Parties made little progress on the actual review of the LWP and the GAP. The G77+China opposed this proposal, and consequently, developed countries withheld their agreement to extend the LWP. During the negotiations, developing countries hoped the decision text would include references to gender equality and gender policies in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, despite being reflected in a COP decision. Developing countries argued that, as gender was not under the CMA agenda, no reference to the Paris Agreement could be included. Ultimately, Parties did not include any explicit reference to the Paris Agreement. For more information on the gender negotiations, please see the [Gender section](#).

## NCQG decision adoption process

The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) was adopted during the closing plenary in the early hours of Sunday, 24 November 2024. The COP 29 President was the presiding officer during the adoption of the NCQG text, and gavelled through the decision very quickly, without raising his eyes to scan the room or check if Parties wanted to intervene or object to its adoption. Shortly after its adoption, various Parties made statements about the NCQG text, its substantive content and/or the procedure around its adoption, including some objecting its adoption and expressing dissatisfaction with the goal or the decision-making process, including India, Nigeria and Malawi (on behalf of LDCs). Other countries also made statements accepting 'with reluctance' the goal adopted. This has raised questions about the legitimacy of the process of adoption of the goal, including the possibility of it being challenged.

As known, decisions under the UNFCCC regime are generally made "by consensus". The concept of "consensus" is not clear-cut. Current practice shows a degree of dependence on the COP President's interpretation of consensus when determining whether consensus has been achieved, which grants them some procedural discretion while at the same time having the obligation to exercise their powers fairly. In this case, the COP President should have verified that there were no objections before gaveling the decision, a step that he omitted, as video footage from the closing plenary shows he did not raise his gaze to scan the room.

Rule 34 of the UNFCCC draft Rules of Procedure enables delegates to raise points of order, which are key to escalate procedural concerns, including to challenge the existence of consensus or to challenge the fact that the COP President did not scan the room for objections immediately before adopting the NCQG text. Post-adoption of the NCQG text, India reportedly signalled that it wanted to raise a point of order, but it seems this was not acknowledged by the COP President, and India's statement later on had both substantive and procedural points, which means that it was not unequivocally raised as a point of order according to Rule 34. The COP President did not take it as such either but heard India's and other statements and indicated they would be included in the report of the session.

LRI has provided a comprehensive [legal advice](#) on the matter of the process of adoption of the goal and the potential avenues for challenging it.



Photo: UN Climate Change - Kiara Worth (Flickr)



## 24. DECLARATIONS, POLITICAL AGREEMENTS, PLEDGES, PARTNERSHIPS, ETC.

The processes involved in negotiating COP/CMA decisions are typically slow and often require compromises. However, beyond formal negotiations, States, subnational entities, and private actors are increasingly engaged in declarations and/or political agreements. These have the potential to advance climate action even if the results of UNFCCC negotiations are not ideal. Such

declarations, which can emanate from the COP presidency or other sources, are usually not binding on States but express States' intentions. For more details, please see LRI's [advice on possible outcomes from a COP](#). Below are some of the key commitments launched at COP 29, based on information available as of March 2025.

### COP Presidency texts:

#### i. Water

The COP 29 Presidency launched the Water for Climate Action program, accompanied by a [declaration](#) endorsed by 57 countries, committing to integrated approaches to tackle the causes and impacts of climate change on water resources and water basins. The declaration emphasizes the incorporation of water-related mitigation and adaptation measures into national climate policies and aims to strengthen scientific collaboration through enhanced data sharing and the development of regional climate scenarios. Furthermore, the Baku Dialogue was inaugurated as a platform to foster international collaboration on the interconnections between water, climate change, biodiversity, and desertification, ensuring that water remains a priority on the global climate agenda.

#### ii. Methane

The COP 29 Presidency launched the [Reducing Methane from Organic Waste Declaration](#), endorsed by, including 7 of the world's top 10 organic waste methane emitters. The declaration commits to set sectoral targets within future NDCs and implement concrete policies to reduce emissions. Developed with the UNEP-convened Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), the declaration supports the 2021 Global Methane Pledge's goal of cutting methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030, addressing organic waste as a critical source of anthropogenic methane emissions.



### iii. Harmoniya Initiative – Agriculture, Food and Water

The COP 29 Presidency, in partnership with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), launched the [Baku Harmoniya Climate Initiative for Farmers](#), aiming to recognize and empower farmers as key agents of climate action by consolidating existing agricultural climate initiatives into a unified platform. The initiative will create an online portal and provide accessible guidelines to help farmers and rural communities access support and resources more easily.

### iv. Tourism

The [COP 29 Declaration on Enhanced Climate Action in Tourism](#) emphasizes the inclusion of the tourism sector in NDCs, highlighting that there is a need for the sector to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change. The text proposes measures including sustainable practices, clean technologies, and low-emission transport, with a focus on developing countries with a significant tourism industry, including SIDS and LDCs. It also reaffirms the commitment to fostering global partnerships and integrating tourism into national and global climate strategies. So far, the declaration has been endorsed by 62 countries.

### v. Energy Transition

As part of its commitment to enhancing ambition and enabling action, the COP 29 Presidency, in partnership with the International Energy Agency (IEA), launched a [call to action](#) outlining five key opportunities to advance energy goals, including scaling up renewable energy, doubling energy efficiency progress, and reducing methane and fossil fuel emissions. Stakeholders are urged to support the [COP29 Global Energy Storage and Grids Pledge](#) and the [COP 29 Green Energy Pledge: Green Energy Zones and Corridors](#). These measures aim to boost clean energy investment in developing economies and ensure future NDCs are informed by the Global Stocktake outcomes. The overall aim is to achieve a just and equitable energy transition.

### vi. Cities

The [COP 29 Declaration on Multisectoral Actions Pathways \(MAP\) to Resilient and Healthy Cities](#) recognizes the critical role of cities in addressing climate change, as they account for 70% of global GHG emissions while being highly vulnerable to its impacts. It underscores the need for inclusive urban planning, nature-based solutions, clean technologies, and sustainable infrastructure to enhance urban resilience and reduce emissions. The declaration also emphasises mobilizing climate finance, fostering multilevel and multisectoral collaboration, and aligning urban climate action with national strategies. Finally, it calls for the establishment of the Baku Continuity Coalition to ensure sustained focus on urban climate action across future UNFCCC sessions. So far, the declaration has been endorsed by 45 countries.

## vii. Digital

The [COP 29 Declaration on Green Digital Action](#) aims to accelerate sustainable digitalization, reduce emissions in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, and expand access to green digital technologies. Endorsed by 76 countries, the initiative highlights the need for joint action among policymakers, international organizations, the environmental community, and the energy and ICT sectors to ensure that global digital transformation occurs sustainably, aligned with clean energy solutions, a circular value chain, and low-carbon socioeconomic development.

## viii. Peace

The Joint Solemn Appeal by the COP 29 Presidency for a COP Truce was formulated with the aim of promoting international cohesion during the COP 29 climate negotiations, emphasizing the need to overcome political differences in order to focus on climate action. The appeal acknowledged the adverse impacts of conflicts, such as the intensification of greenhouse gas emissions and environmental degradation, which exacerbate the climate crisis. 133 countries endorsed the appeal.

## Non-presidential texts:

### i. Ocean

In the [COP 29 Baku Ocean Declaration](#), the Ocean Pavillion calls on all countries, organisations and private-sector actors to make robust, long-term investments in ocean observations, research and mapping to address the objectives set out by the climate, biodiversity and desertification COPs.

### ii. Phase Out New Unabated Coal

At COP 29, 25 countries and the European Union launched a [Call to Action](#) to exclude unabated coal from their electricity systems in national climate plans. The commitment recognized the urgent need to reduce emissions to maintain the 1.5°C target, emphasizing that the first step is to halt the construction of new coal plants. The signatories pledged to reflect this directive in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), long-term strategies, and energy plans, reinforcing alignment with the first Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement.

### iii. Clean Power

At the G20 in Rio de Janeiro, the [Global Clean Power Alliance](#) was officially launched, with 12 countries and the African Union joining its first mission. The initiative aims to accelerate the global clean energy transition through international cooperation, enhancing energy security and promoting job creation. The launch follows discussions on climate action at COP 29 in Azerbaijan.

