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Summary of the 62nd Meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC

September 2025

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The Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC held their 62nd sessions from the 14th to the 25th of June, 2025. The start of the session seemed to pick up right where Baku ended, with its controversial adoption of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), that left many developing countries disappointed with the agreed quantum and open questions on the financial obligations of developed states.

To discuss those questions, Like-Minded Developing Countries proposed a new agenda item that would enable substantive consultations on Article 9.1. They also proposed another item on trade-restrictive unilateral measures. Developed states opposed these additions, resulting in an 'agenda war' and the suspension of the opening plenary.

With regards to the substantial deliberations, frustrations and disagreements of states transpired throughout negotiations streams, leading to informal notes and conclusions with little agreements and many caveats being adopted during the closing plenary, many states voicing their reservations on them. Bearing in mind the agenda issues that beset the start of the session and the slow progress of the negotiations, Executive Secretary Simon Stiell stressed that 'just as we have no planet B, there is no process B'.

This document provides a summary of the progress – and lack thereof – in the many negotiation streams that took place at the 62nd sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies to the UNFCCC and what remains to be considered at the next meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies in Belém.

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


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Table of abbreviations

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| AGN | African Group of Negotiators |
| CARP | Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform |
| CfRN | Coalition for Rainforest Nations |
| CMA | Meeting of the Parties serving to the Paris Agreement |
| CMP | Meeting of the Parties serving to the Kyoto Protocol |
| COP | Conference of the Parties |
| CTCN | Climate Technology Centre and Network |
| ETF | Enhanced Transparency Framework |
| GGA | Global Goal on Adaptation |
| GST | Global Stocktake |
| HoD | Head of Delegation |
| ITMOs | Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes |
| JTWP | Just Transition Work Programme |
| LT-LEDS | Long-term low-emission development strategies |
| MRV | Measurement, Reporting, and Verification |
| MWP | Mitigation Work Programme |
| NAP | National Adaptation Plan |
| NCQG | New Collective Quantified Goal |
| NDC | Nationally Determined Contribution |
| NMA | Non-market approaches |
| OIMP | Other International Mitigation Purposes |
| PACM | Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism |
| PCCB | Paris Committee on Capacity-building |
| RSO | Research and Systematic Observation |
| SB | Subsidiary Bodies |
| SBI | Subsidiary Body for Implementation |
| SBSTA | Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice |
| TER | Technical Expert Review |
| TIP | Technology Implementation Platform |

1. Mitigation

The negotiations on mitigation at SB 62 focused on three different items: 1) how the Sharm-el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP) could be a 'safe space for overcoming barriers and take actionable solutions'; 2) the elaboration of a digital platform, which would match mitigation projects with funders; and 3) elements of a draft decision to be considered at CMA 7.

The MWP was set up 2021 with a view to scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation by 2030. In 2022, in Sharm el-Sheikh, the [mandate of the MWP](#) was delineated, specifying that the MWP is facilitative, non-prescriptive and that its outcomes respect national sovereignty and circumstances and do not impose new targets or single out specific sectors. The MWP holds at least two dialogues per year, allowing for parties to discuss and take decisions on mitigation action, in addition to holding investment-focused events. At CMA 5, in Dubai, Parties requested SBs 60 to 65 to consider progress in implementing the MWP. Five dialogues have so far taken place under the MWP and Parties did not finish their consideration of the MWP at SB 61.

A safe space for 'overcoming barriers and take actionable solutions'

Concerning the first topic of discussion, Parties including the LMDC, African Group, Arab Group, India and China, highlighted that the MWP would be a safe space for 'overcoming barriers and take actionable solutions' as long as its mandate was respected and it remained non-prescriptive, non-punitive, based on national sovereignty and did not set additional targets.

Conversely, AOSIS, AILAC, LDC and developed countries expressed their worry that the MWP would become deadlocked and hindered to deliver scaled up mitigation ambition and implementation if it did not incorporate the GST outcomes. They reiterated, as they did in COP 29, that the MWP should be a way of implementing the outcomes of the first global stocktake through high-level messages, including on para 28(d) of the [GST decision](#) on 'mitigation efforts in relation to energy, including the transitioning away from fossil fuels'. They also stressed that the MWP would be a safe space if the recommendations of the fifth global dialogue and investor-focused event would be considered in the scaling up of mitigation action.

The MWP negotiations emphasised, again, that Parties have diverging views on the purpose of the MWP. Entrenched views on one side view the MWP as promoting a space for sharing knowledge whilst the other side considers the MWP to drive action.

Digital platform

Regarding the establishment of a digital platform to facilitate the implementation of mitigation actions, as mandated by [CMA 6](#), negotiations first focused on whether its development falls under the mandate of the MWP. AOSIS and AILAC warned that the digital platform seemed to distract from the mandate of the MWP on mitigation ambition.

Opinions diverged on the use and content of such a platform. In this regard, AOSIS noted that the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Registry already existed, and the EU, along with EIG, UK and Canada underscored the need to avoid duplication, hoping first for an assessment of current platforms and digital tools.

Other delegations including the African Group, Arab Group, LMDC and Russian Federation wished to continue discussions on the digital platform, including through intersessional work leading up to Belém.

Draft CMA 7 decision

Concerning the elaboration of a draft CMA 7 decision, it was difficult for parties to find consensus on its structure and content. The content of the draft decision that was discussed included the reference to the digital platform; the mentioning of key findings from the global dialogues; and extension of the MWP. Contentious topics included any high-level political messages and actionable recommendations from the fifth and upcoming sixth global dialogues; linkages between the MWP and NDCs – given that the NDC synthesis report is due before COP 30 – and the alignment of the NDCs to the 1.5 °C temperature goal; the further consideration of the digital platform under MWP, and the continuation of MWP after 2026.

On the last day of the session, Parties had yet to agree on draft CMA 7 decision and conclusions. LMDC, the African Group, and the Arab Group emphasised that these should not impose any targets on state parties. The SBs agreed on a procedural outcome to continue the consideration of the MWP at SB 63 in Belém, taking note of the [informal note](#).

2. Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation

In 2023, Parties agreed to develop a framework to track and measure progress on adaptation by reference to thematic and dimensional targets (under the UAE Framework for Global Resilience). They also launched the two-year United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme to develop indicators for tracking progress achieved towards these targets.

On the agenda at SB 62 was the continuation of the work started under this work programme. At the beginning of the conference, an in-session workshop took place to take stock of the progress made by the experts mandated to compile a list of indicators. Following this, negotiations got underway aimed at providing further guidance and clearer criteria to the experts for reducing and refining the list of indicators, with the objective of agreeing on a list of no more than 100 indicators by CMA 7.

Parties were broadly in agreement on: 1) the need to reduce the number of indicators from the consolidated list of nearly 500 indicators, 2) the need for further workshops with the experts to further refine them and 3) structuring them along headline or globally applicable indicators and sub-indicators to be chosen from a menu of options linked to their relevance. By contrast, there were serious disagreements on whether to include indicators on means of implementation and on cross-cutting elements such as human rights and gender. Means of implementation (MOI) essentially refer to financial, technological and capacity-building support for adaptation measures, which are seen as key for many developing countries.

Developed countries, by contrast, are generally reluctant to include indicators on MOI. Still on finance, developing countries called for any indicators related to Official Development Assistance (ODA) and national budgets to be excluded from the list.

Ultimately, a compromise was reached with the [agreed text](#) (FCCC/SB/2025/L.4) requesting experts to reduce the indicator list from 490 to no more than 100, globally applicable, indicators, including indicators related to means of implementation, enabling factors as well as cross-cutting considerations, such as gender, human rights, youth and social inclusion. The experts are to do this on the basis of existing guidance as set out in relevant conclusions and decisions (see para 14) and additional guidance designed to ensure that:

- indicators are relevant to adaptation (and irrelevant ones, e.g. related to mitigation are removed),
- qualitative narratives are included to explain the context behind quantitative elements,
- sub-indicators capturing national contexts and circumstances can be included
- indicators for MOI and enabling factors are included and those that are not relevant to the Paris Agreement are to be removed,
- indicators for MOI to measure access, quality and adaptation finance, including provision, in line with the PA, to help Parties addressing needs and gaps in implementing the GGA.

The agreed text further provides that limited data availability should not restrict the development of new indicators and additional capacity-building for developing countries may be required for reporting on such indicators.

In advance of Belém, a hybrid meeting will take place (before the workshop scheduled between SB 62 and SB 63) to enable the experts to probe that the indicators are in line with guidance and review them for consistency and redundancies. The experts are due to deliver their final technical report, including information on methodologies, and the narrower indicator list, by August 2025, with a view to adopting the list at CMA 7. The secretariat will then prepare summary reports of the expert meeting and workshop.

Parties also exchanged views on the future of the Baku adaptation roadmap (BAR) and transformational adaptation, with certain groups stressing the relationship between the BAR and the global stocktake and others seeing it as a way to implement art 7.1 PA and thus going beyond the GGA framework and the global stocktake. Ultimately, however, the focus was on indicators and as a result the views on BAR and transformational adaptation were removed from the draft conclusions and only captured in the [informal note](#) which Parties agreed would serve as basis for negotiation on matters related to the GGA in Belém.

Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee

Negotiations here did not progress, due to continued disagreement over the issue of governance of the Committee, despite bridging proposals being suggested, such as having a COP decision acknowledging the participation of the CMA in the review of the Committee and a separate CMA decision concluding its participation in the review. Consensus could not be reached by the end of the session, however, and the matter has again been deferred to a future session.

National Adaptation Plans

Under this agenda sub-item, Parties are mandated to assess progress in formulating and implementing NAPs. Negotiations got underway in Bonn based on a [draft negotiating text](#) from Baku but quickly stalled over the mode of work to be used, with some complaining that the text, with nearly 160 brackets and 18 options, had simply become unmanageable.

G77 and China produced a conference room paper based closely on the Baku text but more structured. Parties indicated willingness to engage with the text as a basis of negotiation but deep disagreements on the substance reemerged, particularly over means of implementation and its role as a key enabler of adaptation action. Further consultations took place in the second week, and a new, still heavily bracketed, draft negotiation text was published. No agreement emerged from the negotiations, however, and the session ended with procedural conclusions to continue consideration of this matter in Belém on the basis of a draft [text](#) available on the UNFCCC website.

Guidance relating to adaptation communications

Under this sub-item, Parties shared experiences on the development of Adaptation Communications. There was broad recognition that the evolving characteristics of adaptation under the PA require adjustments to the format and content of the communications and agreement on the need to preserve their flexible and voluntary nature, to avoid imposing additional burdens on developing countries, according to [LACLIMA](#).

The [draft decision](#) highlights the importance of ensuring coherence in the information provided by Parties, bearing in mind the multiplicity of communication and reporting instruments (NAPs, NDCs, BTRs, national communications and adaptation communications).

The text notes that only a limited number of Parties have so far submitted their views on their experience with the application of the guidance. It invites the SBI, at its 64th session (June 2026), to continue consideration of the timing for Parties who have not already done so to submit their views and for requesting the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report based on the submissions.

3. Loss and Damage

The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) was established at COP 19 in 2013 to enhance action and support, including finance for loss and damage associated with the impacts of climate change, including slow-onset events such as sea level rise. It was later formally integrated in the Paris Agreement under Article 8, thereby placing the WIM under the governance of the CMA, however, without clarifying the governance arrangements between the COP and CMA, something that still emerges in the negotiations.

Additionally, and to supplement the work of the WIM, the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage was established in 2019 and assigned to provide technical assistance to developing countries. More recently, in 2022, the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was created through decision [2/CMA.4](#) and operationalised at [CMA 5](#), aiming to provide assistance to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

Under the loss and damage negotiations, two agenda items were addressed: 1) the joint annual report of the WIM Executive Committee (ExCom) and the Santiago network and 2) the third review of the WIM. These items had both been deferred, in the absence of agreement, from the SB 61 last November to the SB 62.

Joint annual report of the WIM ExCom and the Santiago network

On the joint annual report, parties agreed to forward [draft conclusions](#) proposed by the co-chairs to SB 63 which took note of the joint annual report of the WIM Executive Committee (ExCom) and the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage.

Third review of the WIM

On the 2024 WIM review, Parties had been disappointed by the persistent gap in finance for loss and damage and the failure to set a new loss and damage finance target at COP 29. Developing countries argued for loss and damage to be included in climate finance negotiation streams, while developed countries rejected the idea that the WIM review would be a forum to consider finance. Discussions under the WIM review included enhancing the accessibility of technical assistance via improved portals and multilingual materials. Parties generally concurred with the need to enhance the accessibility and visibility of these bodies' various knowledge products and work; enhance the role of national contact points for loss and damage; and support their coordinated work with Santiago network liaisons and the FRLD.

There were several topics which required further deliberation, including the question of elaborating a State of Loss and Damage report. On one side, developed countries enquired about the utility and value of such a report. On the other side, developing countries underscored the importance of having an authoritative source like the UNFCCC to inform the L&D process. Regarding a methodology to quantify loss and damage impacts and voluntary inclusion of loss and damage considerations into national plans, the friction between developing and developed countries revolved around whether these were outcomes of the WIM review, as stressed by developing countries, or could be linked to loss and damage finance obligations for developed countries, as cautioned by developed countries.

As concerns scaling up finance and other loss and damage support, the dichotomy between developed and developing countries was salient again. Although developing countries consider it to be an integral part of the WIM review, developed countries, on the other side, argued the issue to be outside the scope of the WIM review's mandate, instead falling under the CMA's guidance to the FRLD. Hence, in the final informal note forwarded to the SBs, the paragraph on "scaling up finance" showed divergence of views.

In the remits of the WIM review, Parties also considered the improvement of coordination and complementarity between the institutions that work on loss and damage, including the WIM ExCom, the Santiago Network, the FRLD and their respective advisory boards and secretariats.

In the end, Parties failed to agree on draft conclusions to be forwarded to the SBs for the third WIM review and instead forwarded an [informal note](#) to COP 30.

4. Finance

Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund was established in 2001 to support adaptation projects in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and is financed, in part, by a share of proceeds from Clean Development Mechanisms activities. In 2016, Parties decided that the Adaptation Fund would also serve the Paris Agreement, and in 2018, upon a recommendation by the CMA, the CMP decided that "the Adaptation Fund shall exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and shall no longer serve the Kyoto Protocol once the share of proceeds under Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement becomes available" ([Decision 1/CMP.14](#)).

The CMP then requested the Adaptation Fund Board to consider the arrangements of the Fund with respect to the Paris Agreement and any other matter so as to the Fund serves the Paris Agreement. This request had been raised in 2022 and 2023 by the CMA, encouraging the Board to continue its consideration of its Rules of Procedure in the context of serving the Paris Agreement, including after the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) has concluded consideration of matters related to membership of the Board (Decisions [12/CMA.5](#) and [18/CMA.4](#)).

In 2024, given the completion of Article 6.4 negotiations, the CMP and the CMA encouraged the Board to finalise, as a matter of priority, its work related to implementing its mandates in these previous decisions and to report thereon in its annual report to the CMP 20 and the CMA 7.

In addition, the CMP and the CMA requested the SBI to consider, at its 62nd session, the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration by the CMP.

During the negotiations, Parties debated three main issues: 1) the arrangements for the Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement (which relate to governance and administrative issues); 2) the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board and how its placement under the CMA instead of the CMP would be reflected in its composition; and finally, 3) the Fund's fifth review.

On the negotiations over the Fund's arrangements, Parties seemed to converge on a simple transition, where the CMA welcomes the Adaptation Fund under its current governance arrangements. Unlike other bodies which have a single governing instrument, in this case the Adaptation Fund governance arrangements would be spread out through various decisions. A simple transition entails not discussing now the content of those decisions, as well as keeping the current trustee and secretarial arrangements.

Discussions around membership seem also to have found agreement among Parties in changing the terminology of representatives – replacing annex I and non-annex I parties by developed and developing countries, so as to match the wording of the Paris Agreement – without altering the current representation. The issue of the fifth review emerged as contentious towards the end of the session, as Parties seem to agree on using the terms of reference of the previous review, but diverged on its timing, specifically whether to delay it until the transition is complete.

While AOSIS and LDC supported commencing the review under the CMP, even if it would only be concluded under the CMA once the transition is complete, others, such as the African Group, AILAC and the UK, preferred undertaking the entire review under a single governing body – the CMA – after the completion of the transition. For AOSIS and LDC, these negotiations should be held in parallel and should not be decoupled, whilst the rest prefer to postpone them to ensure a quicker transition.

Ultimately, the SBI reached procedural conclusions agreeing to continue consideration of these matters at SBI 63 on the basis of work conducted at SBI 62, and therefore, on the basis of the co-facilitators' [informal note](#). G77 and China introduced a [Conference Room Paper](#) towards the end of the session, which contains an alternative draft decision that only departs from the co-facilitators' one on explicitly dividing issues under consideration to allow for independent decisions on each. Thus, the SBI noted that the work done at SB 62 does not prejudice the number of draft decisions that parties may wish to consider on these matters.

The Roadmap to Belém

Background: NCQG decision

At CMA 6 and COP 29, a decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG) was adopted during the closing plenary in the early hours of Sunday, 24 November 2024. Shortly after the adoption of the NCQG text, various Parties made statements about its substantive content and the procedure around its adoption. Indeed, the draft put forward before the plenary had not been negotiated in the room, and therefore some of its paragraphs were not discussed in detail and their meanings remain to be clarified.

The goal itself is established in paragraph 8 of the [decision](#) as ‘a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action (...)’, with a quantum that is far from the needs of developing countries who repeatedly emphasised during the negotiations that the new quantum should be a ‘trillions’ goal.

As a compromise with developing countries, who found the quantum insufficient, paragraph 7 of the goal includes a ‘target’ or call of 1.3 trillion, as follows:

‘Calls on all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing to developing country Parties for climate action from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035;’

The roadmap

This ‘target’ or aspirational call does not represent an obligation, nor does it explicitly place developed countries in a ‘leading’ position, even though, under their financial obligations in Article 9.3, they should “take the lead” in mobilising this finance. The target established in the NCQG is accompanied by a paragraph setting a “roadmap” to achieve it.

Indeed, paragraph 27 launches ‘under the guidance of the Presidencies of the sixth and seventh sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, in consultation with Parties, the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”, aiming at scaling up climate finance to developing country Parties (...) and requests the Presidencies to produce a report summarising the work as

they conclude the work by the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (November 2025);’

At SB 62, Presidencies of CMA 6 (COP 29) and CMA 7 (COP 30) held Presidency consultations with Parties and stakeholders, asking for submissions beforehand. During the consultations, COP 29 President Mukhtar Babayev called on shareholders to foster the engagement of multilateral development banks in mobilising USD 1.3 trillion in climate finance.

COP 30 President-designate André Aranha Corrêa do Lago highlighted the role of the COP 30 Circle of Finance Ministers in supporting the development and implementation of the roadmap, while some Parties showed dissatisfaction with not being invited to this circle.

Parties’ interventions and submissions vary. Some – especially developed countries – emphasised the role of private finance, whilst others see it as a combination of private and public finance, but underscored the role of public, grant-based and highly concessional finance.

The G77 and China asked for a clear agreement on burden-sharing among developed countries; AILAC called for defining responsibilities amongst the various actors that will contribute and, along with the LDC, emphasised the need to track the implementation of the roadmap.

Next steps

A remaining question is whether there should be a negotiated outcome at CMA 7. A paragraph mandating a report such as the one provided for by the roadmap would usually include the phrase 'to be considered at CMA 7', a line that was omitted in this case. As such, there is no clarity on the content of the report to be presented by the Presidencies nor if the CMA 7 will even negotiate on this matter, and Parties have diverging views on this.

5. Dialogue on the scope of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9

Some mandated events took place in Bonn, in addition to the formal negotiations, including the first of two workshops due to be held in 2025 under the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9. The Dialogue was established in 2022 and launched in 2023 to explore the scope of Article 2.1(c) and its goal of making finance flows consistent with a low GHG emission pathway and climate resilient development, and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement which sets out obligations of developed countries regarding climate finance.

It was later decided to extend the Dialogue to 2024–2025, based on the recognition of a need for further understanding of the issues and of the limited progress so far towards making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

Based on views expressed in the latest round of submissions, the co-chairs of the Dialogue communicated a [message](#) in April 2025, in which they identified overarching themes and discussion topics to be considered during the two 2025 workshops. The theme of the first workshop being 'Different approaches to Article 2, paragraph 1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 in diverse contexts', providing an opportunity to hold an exchange of views and identify solutions on:

- building capacities for nationally determined financial sector development, with case studies on

adaptation and climate resilience in diverse contexts

- transition planning for low GHG emission and climate resilient development pathways and financing just transition pathways in diverse contexts
- opportunities to support NCQG implementation through Article 2(1) (c) of the PA.

See [here](#) for a schedule of the programme that took place during the first workshop. Presentations and discussions will be captured in a report to be forwarded for consideration at CMA 7.

A second workshop under the Dialogue is taking place on [6–7 September 2025](#).

6. Global Stocktake

The Global Stocktake (GST), outlined in article 14 of the Paris Agreement and elaborated in the Decision 19/CMA.1, is one of three key compliance mechanism in the Paris Agreement, along with the enhanced transparency framework and the Paris Agreement implementation and compliance committee. It provides for an assessment of collective progress towards implementation of the Paris Agreement. Discussions at SB 62 related to the consideration of the first GST cycle and its outcomes decision that was agreed at COP 28 in Dubai in 2023.

In particular, the two GST negotiation streams in Bonn considered the modalities of the 'UAE Dialogue', outlined in paras. 97 and 98 of the [GST 1 decision](#), as well as considering refining the procedural and logistical elements of the GST process on the basis of the first GST experience, as recalled by paragraph 192 of the GST 1 decision. It is worth noting that, according to the GST 1 text, both the discussion of the UAE Dialogue modalities and the refinements to the GST cycle were expected to have concluded at CMA 6 last year in Baku.

In the modalities of the UAE Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes discussions, very little progress has been made. The main issues, concerning the scope of the dialogue is far from settled. Most developed countries, SIDS, LDCs and AILAC want to have a scope that covers mitigation elements, including the transitioning away of fossil fuels, while LMDCs and other developing countries persist in a narrow scope that only considers finance. Additionally, there is strong disagreement on structure, mentions of unilateral measures, and

now even the title of the future Dialogue, remain unresolved.

In light of the little progress, further challenges to the utility of the Dialogue have been made with the suggestions including that because it is so delayed, it will become obsolete before it has even commenced; or that if it takes a broad scope, it will be too powerful compared to other agenda items; or replicate the work of GST 2. These suggestions have largely originated from India, Saudi Arabia and China, often speaking on behalf of the LMDC and Arab Group.

Despite having divergences on the nature of the Dialogue's output or specific timelines, the EIG, EU, AOSIS, AILAC, LDC and AGN have all advocated for the Dialogue to take place. The idea of two half-day sessions seems to be supported, but how to ensure they are meaningful – through either a report or a decision text – is still undecided and again, will be determined depending on the scope of the discussion.

Ultimately, week 2 of the SB 62 session concluded with conflict around which co-facilitator's draft to proceed with, both eventually being integrated into one fully bracketed document for consideration at the next session.

Given the huge range of outcomes put forward in GST 1 – including key targets around fossil fuel phase out, developing national case studies, ocean-based mitigation and reforming financial architecture, among others – the stalled UAE Dialogue talks are a missed opportunity for international cooperation on climate action.

With a similarly extended lifespan on the agenda are the negotiations addressing procedural and logistical refinements of the GST cycle. The key issue in this stream is the misalignment of the second GST cycle with the publication of the next global IPCC report, which might not be published in time for the input phase of the GST 2. At risk is that the next consideration of global climate progress and necessary action, GST 2, will not reflect the most recent best available science. Countries have suggested a decision encouraging the IPCC to align its report with the GST cycle or recognising the 'critical' character of IPCC reports so it can be considered even during the latter stages of the GST process.

While the majority of Parties recognise IPCC reports as critical information to incorporate into the cycle, others strongly disagree noting the Global North bias of the IPCC. Other than an isolated protest from the EU, Parties have generally recognised the need to address research gaps relating to developing countries within IPCC reports, but are unwilling to undermine or dilute recognition of the IPCC report as reflecting best available science.

To balance these concerns around the inclusion of the IPCC report, counter proposals have included shortening the length of the Technical Dialogue, further intersessional work, and holding a Special Event to ensure consideration of the IPCC report is included within GST 2.

Annual GST NDC Dialogue

On 19 and 20 June 2025 Parties took part in the second Annual GST NDC Dialogue. As established in paragraph 187 of [decision 1/CMA.5](#), the Annual GST

NDC Dialogue (“the Annual Dialogue”) is a mandated event dedicated to facilitating the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the global stocktake (i.e. decision 1/CMA5) are informing the preparation of Parties’ next nationally determined contributions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement.

Each of the two days of the Annual Dialogue consisted of initial presentations dedicated to a particular theme followed by interventions from Parties from the floor. The first day’s theme was “Integrating GST outcomes into the preparation of NDCs” and saw presentations from Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, representatives of SIDS, Georgia, Nepal and Brazil.

Interventions were made by Parties including AOSIS, who called for progress to be made on adopting the report on the first Annual GST NDC Dialogue which was held at SB 60 in 2024 and had been subject to negotiations at COP 28. Parties represented by the LMDC called for the report on the current Annual Dialogue to be non-prescriptive and purely factual, and for there to be no agreed adopted outcome.

The second day’s theme was “Advancing NDC implementation and enabling environment” and saw presentations from the OECD, Japan, China, the EU and Trinidad and Tobago. Interventions were then made by Parties representing the LDC group, AILAC and AOSIS, who all called for greater and more transparent climate finance to be provided to national governments and multilateral bodies such as the IPCC. Zimbabwe also described the need for technology transfers and capacity-building so that parties could enhance their NDC ambition and meet existing targets.

The EU stressed that increased NDC ambition was not a barrier to increased GDP growth, and that NDCs should incorporate and respect human rights and children’s and youth rights, gender equality and indigenous knowledge. The EU also confirmed the importance of the Annual Dialogue sessions for meeting NDC targets and increasing ambition. Saudi Arabia also intervened to submit that the GST process allowed all Parties to adopt different technological and methodological pathways in accordance with their national capacities to meet their climate goals and that multilateral cooperation was important for supporting Parties in these pathways.

After interventions from Parties ended, there was a short speech by the SBSTA Vice-Chair, followed by a further speech from a representative of the COP 30 Presidency. The SBSTA representative confirmed that the views and submissions made by Parties in the Annual Dialogue would be captured in a dialogue report to be brought to CMA 7. The COP 30 Presidency representative noted that COP 30 would be about the GST and the next round of NDCs, and that the GST outcome itself is equivalent to a “global NDC”, that, if implemented as part of a strengthened spirit of multilateralism, would bring prosperity to Parties’ economies and societies.

7. Article 6.2

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enables Parties to cooperate in implementing their NDCs on a voluntary basis through market-based and non-market-based approaches. Articles 6.2 and 6.4 deal with market-based approaches, and Article 6.8 with non-market-based approaches.

Art 6.2 addresses parties' voluntary engagement in "cooperative approaches" involving the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) towards their NDCs, mandating that in doing so they *"promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance," and that they "apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting"*. Article 6.2 thus enables countries to sell ITMOs to other countries to address gaps in meeting their own climate goals.

To engage in cooperative approaches, countries must meet certain requirements, including submitting detailed reports which are reviewed through the Article 6 Technical Expert Review ([TER](#)) process, coordinated by the secretariat and guided by CMA decisions [2/CMA.3](#) and [6/CMA.4](#).

ITMOs are tracked by the [International Registry](#) managed by the UNFCCC, which also helps automatically fill in required reporting information. The Registry is part of the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform ([CARP](#)) which provides guidance on how to submit information, templates for submissions, a list of reports by submitted by participating countries and a list of authorisations.

As Parties are to communicate, this year, their new NDCs with targets for 2035, they are also increasingly looking to Article 6 to fulfil their targets, with 78% reportedly stating that they plan to use at least one type of Article 6 cooperation, with many (52%) referring to Article 6.2 (see [NDC synthesis report, 2024](#)).

At COP 29 in Baku, guidance regarding Article 6.2 was provided on: authorisation and "first transfer" of ITMOs, reporting format and additional elements, inconsistencies of reported information and their consequences, and the function of registries, to fully operationalise the Article 6.2 mechanism and enhance its environmental integrity and transparency (see [here](#) for key outcomes from COP 29). Parties resolved not to engage in further negotiations for the guidance until CMA 10 in November 2028, at which point the review process for the existing guidance, including unresolved issues, would resume, and Parties would continue considering the circumstances of LDC and SIDS according to [Decision 4/CMA.6](#).

At COP 29, in Decision [4/CMA.6](#), Parties further requested the secretariat to:

- develop and publish a voluntary standardised template that each participating Party may use to provide the information to be included in the authorisation for the use of ITMOs;
- prepare a technical paper on the updated draft agreed electronic format for Parties' submission of annual information on authorisation of ITMOs, including recommendations for the technical improvement of the updated format, for consideration at CMA 10;

- provide registry services to Parties who request them;
- update the current version of the Article 6.2 reference manual for the accounting, reporting and review of [cooperative approaches](#); and
- starting from SB 62 (June 2025), hold a regular dialogue during SBI sessions (twice a year) to exchange experiences on Article 6.2, involving Parties and non-Party stakeholders.

Accordingly, the SB 62 meetings included an “[inaugural dialogue](#)” for Parties and non-Parties to explore how Article 6.2 cooperative approaches can enhance ambition in NDCs and mobilise climate finance, particularly for developing countries.

The dialogue comprised two parts. The first part involved presentations by various stakeholders and roundtable discussions on:

- The role of Article 6 in raising ambition and implementing NDCs, including what are the main challenges and opportunities – with interventions from Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, the EU and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN);
- Ambition on other international mitigation purposes (OIMP), including how parties are using ITMOs beyond NDCs, how they are preventing double-counting and what are the eligibility criteria for using these credits – with presentations by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Sweden;
- Ambition in voluntary climate commitments – with contributions from Singapore, UK, UAE and Kenya.

Findings included: that Article 6 cooperation can enable higher levels of ambition than simply relying on domestic measures, with additional and verified mitigation measures and learnings over time, as well as the introduction of decarbonised technologies and new standards, facilitating NDC realisation and broadening their scope. Demand signals, enhanced standardisation, trust built with partner countries and a robust compliance market are enablers of Article 6 activities, while challenges lie in the difficulty of agreeing on standards and details, lack of NDC clarity and project implementation difficulties, lack in confidence in credits and lack of resources.

Key lessons comprised the importance of linking Article 6 governance with NDC monitoring, allowing for flexible models and proactively using safety margins and contingency reserves; as well as highlighting the necessary role of Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV).

The secretariat gave presentations on key aspects of the Article 6.2 mechanism:

- The [Technical Expert Review](#) (TER), which reviews the consistency of information submitted in Art 6.2 reports, regular information, and the results of the consistency check. In terms of status, ten cooperative approaches, for which initial reports have been submitted, have been assigned cooperative approach IDs, and the first-ever TER under Article 6.2 of the initial reports have been concluded, with TER reports for five Parties available on the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform (CARP). Additional training and materials are due to become available over the summer of 2025.

- [Reporting / consistency checks](#) – noting that the Article 6 database is to automate the identification of inconsistencies in submitted annual information and notify participating Parties of such inconsistencies; and
- [Infrastructure](#) – including an explanation of the operation of the Forum of Art 6 Registry System Administrators (RSA) and the development of communication standards for interoperable registries.

tries to meet their climate targets through collaboration, there was also sharp criticism of the mechanism. Concerns were raised around whether it ensures that credits / ITMOs represent real and additional emission reductions; whether it actually increases ambition; and, particularly, whether it offers sufficient engagement of and safeguard to communities impacted by relevant projects, especially indigenous people.

The second part of the dialogue started by addressing benefit-sharing and fairness in cooperative approaches, with presentations by the supervisory body for the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), the EU, Zambia, Carbon Market Watch and Grassroots Justice Network. It then focused on capacity-building support, with interventions from the secretariat, the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), the Article 6 Implementation Partnership (A6IP), Germany and Chile. The final segment of the dialogue, on multilateral cooperation, involved the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). Lastly, the secretariat presented on the Article 6.2 International Registry and the RSA, which the secretariat is working to launch “as soon as possible” including clarification on how parties can access the services, account management, interoperability with [national registries](#) and lifecycle of mitigation outcomes.

While the dialogue and other side events in Bonn on Article 6.2 focused on capacity-building and scaling carbon markets, recognising that Article 6.2 at its core is a way for coun-

8. Article 6.8

Article 6.8 focuses on non-market approaches (NMAs), aimed at promoting initiatives and cooperation between Parties to achieve their mitigation and adaptation goals without trading emission reduction units or mitigation outcomes. What could be considered an NMA is broad, based on what Parties have expressed so far, NMAs include projects ranging from REDD+ and capacity-building programmes for sustainable agriculture to the protection of riparian forests by local communities, partnerships between governments and non-governmental organisations for ecotourism, the adoption of renewable energy for use in small communities, environmental revitalisation in urban areas, and recycling programmes, among others.

A work programme, implemented by the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches ([GCNMA](#)), aims to identify measures and tools that facilitate the coordination and implementation of NMAs and enable information sharing ([Decision 4/CMA.3](#), Annex, para 8). In addition, an online platform on which NMAs are published enables the registration and exchange of information on NMAs (NMA Platform).

Negotiations on Article 6.8 PA during SB 62 were marked by difficulties and limited progress, against a backdrop of deep divisions between developed and developing countries on financing issues.

Discussions focused on the NMA Platform, which is intended to facilitate the sharing of experiences and best practices among Parties. Parties exchanged views on implementation modalities, particularly with regard to

financing, technology transfer, and capacity-building. Despite persistent differences on the exact scope of non-market approaches, there was consensus on the need to strengthen coordination between existing instruments and relevant institutions. The first meeting was focused on the development of the NMA platform, including the launch of a discussion forum and updates to the platform's map and resources. For example, the map was redesigned with defined country borders and news resources available, including the user manual for article 6.8 national focal points (version 2) and user guide for the NMA Platform.

The Platform included progress on recording non-market approaches, the registration of national focal points and support providers, and capacity-building activities.

After discussions, the first meeting on this topic decided on a small group approach for the spin-off discussions including on the purchase of renewable energy technologies, green infrastructure, guidance on identifying NMA, and implementation of existing NMA. The discussions also covered opening the NMA Platform to submissions, opening a GCF window for Designated National Authorities, and integrating mitigation and adaptation approaches. It is important to note that during negotiations on non-market-based approaches, the issue of financing, in particular, has been a major sticking point that has likely slowed progress on this issue.

As a result, concrete progress on Article 6.8 at SB 62 remained limited and the matter has been forwarded for consideration at SB 63, without adopting a detailed or binding framework for NMAs, despite the insistence of the LDC group.

9. Response Measures

Response measures include a wide array of actions, policies and programmes to tackle climate change and are dealt with under the Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures (the Forum), itself supported by the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI).

The agenda item on the Forum on response measures struggled to come together to reach consensus on a text until the second week, with the G77 and China producing their own note for consideration. Though paragraphs on considering budgetary implications were welcomed, there was considerable divergence throughout the rest of the week. In particular, the discussion on trade or 'unilateral measures', their definition, and discussion of whether this is the appropriate forum for discussing them. This was reflected in the informal text, after heated huddling and premature clapping, in a range of options for [paragraph 7](#) and compromises around intersessional work among others. Options notably include whether discussion of unilateral measures should be pursued in this stream, the Just Transition Work Programme, or left unaddressed in a 'no text' option.

Divergent views also continued around the status of inputs to the next report and how to capture these differences without synthesising them. Similarly, the modalities for implementing the aspects of the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures workplan remain under consideration.

As stressed in paragraph 8 of the [draft conclusions](#), the text that is being forwarded to Belém does not represent

agreement nor does it prejudice further work. It seems likely that this stream will continue to be a key battleground for considering the relationship between unilateral measures and climate action.

10. Just Transition

The Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), established at COP 27 and further detailed at COP 28, finally saw a breakthrough during the SB 62 session after various sessions in which Parties could not agree on any text. This time, Parties were able to reach procedural conclusions and forwarded an [informal note](#) containing a draft decision to continue negotiations during SB 63 and COP 30. SB 62 negotiations saw a different form of work where Parties were invited to discuss elements of the JTWP in order to build a draft text in the room, on the basis of those discussions. This allows Parties to have more ownership over the drafting of the text, instead of yielding this to the co-facilitators. The JTWP negotiations were also given more time than in Baku and were held in bigger negotiation rooms, including the New York Plenary room.

Some of the main issues still dividing Parties are the concept of just transition; the role of equity and use of fossil fuels in the transition; the importance of international cooperation and means of implementation, the potential outcome of the Just Transition Work Programme, and trade-related measures.

Developed country Parties see just transition mainly as a transition that protects workers' rights. Conversely, developing countries, who often host transition-related projects, see it as a more comprehensive concept, one which includes communities and ecosystemic rights. In terms of equity and fossil fuels, some developing countries, specially members of AILAC and the LDC, aimed to keep the GST language on transitioning away from fossil fuels (with equity considerations), while the LMDC, India and China hoped

to promote instead the importance of access to energy, with the Arab Group adding a 'no text' option, as they advocated for keeping a role for fossil fuels in the text. International cooperation and means of implementation for the transition were also highlighted by developing countries as key elements, while developed country Parties placed a stronger emphasis on the national implementation of just transition. Still, paragraph 21 of the draft text highlights developing countries' need for enhanced support for implementing NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS that incorporate consideration of just transition pathways.

In terms of the potential outcome of the programme, some Parties had been reluctant to discuss this until agreeing on a concept of just transition, hence, the informal note contains three options: 1) improving existing modalities, 2) new institutional arrangements (such as the creation of a technical assistance network), or 3) to defer this decision to 2026 (para 28). Finally, on unilateral trade measures, as part of the compromise reached for the adoption of the agendas, Parties agreed that issues related to trade-restrictive unilateral measures would be discussed in relevant agenda items, including the JTWP. Consequently, the issue was indeed discussed in the room, but Parties did not agree on language, keeping placeholders in paragraph 25 to address the issue.

Other important elements of the draft decision contained in the informal note are the references to the annual dialogues held as part of the programme and various references to synergies with other international organisations, UN bodies, the Rio Conventions and the SDGs, as well as

within the UNFCCC, as they invite constituted bodies to integrate just transition in their workplans and reports.

The following procedural conclusions on this matter were adopted:

- *Welcomed the third dialogue under the work programme, and*
- *Agreed to continue consideration of the JTWP implementation at SB 63, taking note of the informal note prepared at SB 62 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by CMA 7.*

11. Technology

The SBI 62 negotiations under agenda sub-items 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d) deliberated on key components of the Technology Mechanism, pursuant to Article 10 of the Paris Agreement and related COP and CMA mandates. Discussions focused on the review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), enhancing linkages between the Technology and Financial Mechanisms, and the development of a draft decision on the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP).

Review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)

Under SBI sub-item 14(b), Parties considered a [draft decision](#) related to the fifth periodic review of the functions of the CTCN. The review, mandated under [Decision 2/CP.17](#) and guided by [Decision 20/CMA.4](#), assesses the effectiveness, scope, and operational relevance of the CTCN in delivering on its role as the implementation arm of the Technology Mechanism.

Parties broadly acknowledged the growing role of the CTCN in responding to developing countries' demands for technical assistance, innovation system strengthening, and capacity-building. The CTCN's support was welcomed by Parties in areas such as project conceptualisation, facilitating South-South and triangular cooperation, and enabling countries to access international finance and expertise. Several developing countries from the African Union emphasised the importance of increasing the predictability and accessibility of support for National Designated Entities (NDE), particularly for LDC, SIDS, and African states.

There was general agreement on the need for the CTCN to enhance its responsiveness to local and context-specific needs, including by promoting the uptake of endogenous technologies, integrating indigenous and local knowledge systems, and ensuring gender responsiveness. Several Parties supported the CTCN's role in facilitating access to knowledge platforms and innovation networks, while calling for greater visibility of its regional presence and stronger linkages with domestic innovation ecosystems.

Discussions also addressed coordination between the CTCN and other constituted bodies, including the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB), the Adaptation Committee, and the Standing Committee on Finance. Many Parties highlighted the importance of harmonised methodologies, improved monitoring of capacity-building outcomes, and integrated reporting.

The [draft decision](#) recognises the efforts of the CTC to fulfil its functions, support developing country Parties in relation to technology development and transfer, and facilitate effective implementation of the technology framework. It also adopts the revised functions of the CTC, marking a shift from a purely technical and networking role, towards a strategic, finance-linked, innovation-system supporter, and multi-stakeholder facilitator aiming for transformational change.

Some paragraphs remain bracketed, particularly relating to the host selection process as well as details on the extended term of the CTC, and its next review.

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism

Under SBI sub-item 14(c), Parties took stock of progress in operationalising the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. Discussions focused on improving coordination among the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), CTCN, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Developing countries emphasised the need for transparent and predictable funding for technology priorities identified in Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) and Technology Action Plans (TAPs). Several Parties proposed enhancing collaboration between national focal points, including NDAs, NDEs, and GEF operational focal points. Some Parties supported establishing a structured monitoring mechanism to track finance flows for technology implementation with various options and degrees of monitoring being discussed.

However, no agreement was reached on whether this item should be integrated into the joint annual reporting of the TEC and CTCN as called for by countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada, or maintained as a separate agenda item. Further consideration is expected at SB 63.

Technology Programme (TIP)

Implementation

The most dynamic and forward-looking component of the SB 62 technology agenda was SBI sub-item 14(d), where Parties initiated negotiations on the draft decision to operationalise the TIP, as mandated by paragraph 110 of [Decision 1/CMA.5](#).

The TIP is envisaged as a strategic platform to address implementation gaps and accelerate the deployment of climate technologies in developing countries, aligning with the findings of the first periodic assessment and the outcomes of the global stocktake (particularly paragraph 28 of Decision 1/CMA.5).

The TIP is structured around three objectives: (i) to support country-driven implementation of identified technology priorities; (ii) to address cross-cutting challenges in innovation systems, enabling environments, and institutional capacity; and (iii) to integrate the outcomes of the GST and other global processes, such as the Just Transition Work Programme and the Mitigation Work Programme.

Many Parties welcomed the TIP as a long-overdue bridge between the identification of technology needs and their actual deployment. There was broad support for it to focus on transformative systems change, inclusive participation, and the promotion of endogenous and gender-responsive technologies. Developing country groups, including the G77 and China, emphasised the importance of a decentralised, flexible, and demand-driven structure, calling for strong regional engagement and responsiveness to local contexts.

Divergences emerged, however, regarding the institutional governance of the TIP, which remains unresolved. The final [draft decision](#) forwarded to CMA 7 reflects multiple bracketed options concerning who would coordinate, oversee, and implement the programme. At least four institutional options are being considered by Parties but are not necessarily reflected in the draft decision:

Option A: TEC and CTCN-led implementation – Broadly option 1 in the draft decision

This option would assign the overall coordination and implementation of the TIP to the existing TEC and the CTCN. Under this model, the TEC would be responsible for strategic guidance and policy alignment, while the CTCN would serve as the primary operational entity delivering technical assistance, convening dialogues, and engaging stakeholders.

Option B: Establishment of a dedicated TIP coordination body – Not presented in the draft decision

This more ambitious option would create a new institutional arrangement (sometimes referred to informally as a “TIP Secretariat” or “TIP coordination hub”) under the authority of the CMA. It would have its own governance structure, potentially reporting jointly to the TEC and the CMA, and be tasked with overall programme coordination, results monitoring, and stakeholder engagement.

Option C: Joint coordination between the TEC, CTCN, and PCCB – Broadly option 4 in the draft decision

This proposal would formalise a cross-constituency governance model involving the TEC, CTCN, and the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB), reflecting the interlinked nature of technology and capacity-building. Each body would retain its mandate but cooperate on planning, monitoring, and implementing TIP activities under a common framework.

Option D: Phased implementation with ad hoc steering committee – Broadly option 3 in the draft decision

As a transitional model, this option suggests launching the TIP under a time-bound “steering committee” composed of representatives from the TEC, CTCN, operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (GCF and GEF), and selected Party groupings. This ad hoc body would oversee the initial implementation and make recommendations to CMA 8 on permanent governance arrangements.

The distinction among these four options reflects fundamentally different approaches to institutional design. Option A relies on the existing governance architecture of the Technology Mechanism, emphasising continuity and administrative efficiency. Option B represents a more transformative shift, proposing the creation of a new, autonomous body dedicated to the TIP, with a potential for greater strategic coherence and resource mobilisation. Option C seeks to formalise cross-cutting cooperation between the TEC, CTCN, and PCCB, acknowledging the increasing overlap between technology deployment and capacity-building needs. Meanwhile, Option D offers a transitional compromise: a temporary steering arrangement that would allow implementation to begin without resolving institutional questions immediately, while deferring more definitive decisions to CMA 8.

These structural distinctions also carry broader political and strategic implications. Option A, with its emphasis on leveraging existing mandates, is likely to appeal to Parties that prioritise institutional efficiency and continuity, but have been perceived by some parties, including G77 and China as insufficiently ambitious to deliver scaled-up support.

Options B and C, though distinct in form, both reflect a shared desire to elevate the operational capacity of the Technology Mechanism, either by creating a dedicated body (B) or by integrating the work of related constituted bodies under a common framework (C). Both approaches aim to overcome current fragmentation and build institutional visibility, though they differ in their appetite for formal innovation versus inter-body coordination.

Option D, as a transitional model, offers political pragmatism by allowing early implementation without pre-empting long-term decisions, but may risk institutional drift and delay in defining clear governance responsibilities. Ultimately, the debate reflects deeper questions about the post-stocktake trajectory of the Technology Mechanism: whether it should retain a primarily facilitative role or evolve into a more centralised and directive implementation hub.

A number of additional issues remain bracketed in the draft decision, reflecting divergent views on both procedural and substantive dimensions of the TIP. Discussions continued on the scope and function of regional and thematic dialogues, including questions around who should convene them, how they should be financed, and whether their outcomes ought to inform formal decisions under the COP and CMA, a politically sensitive issue.

On substance, Parties remain divided over whether the TIP should prioritise specific emerging technologies or retain an open-ended mandate responsive to nationally defined needs, some Parties worry that having explicit technology lists could be too prescriptive.

There is also debate over participation modalities, particularly concerning the roles of youth, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and non-state actors and whether these should have a mere consultative role or be part of the decision-shaping processes. Additionally, the extent to which the TIP should be formally integrated with the Financial Mechanism remains unresolved, including whether it should be explicitly reflected in the programming strategies of the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility. The beginning of the implementation of the Technology Implementation Programme, currently bracketed as immediately after CMA 7 is dependent on Parties swiftly reaching a decision.

The TIP draft decision text remains one of the most heavily bracketed outputs of the SB 62 session and will require intensive negotiations ahead of SB 63 and COP 30 in Belém. A successful resolution will likely depend on balancing institutional feasibility, political visibility, and equitable access to implementation resources.

12. Capacity-building

Negotiations on capacity-building at SB 62, under SBI agenda sub-item 16, revolved around two interlinked axes: the refinement of the overarching frameworks under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the institutional future of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB).

PCCB Workplan and Strategic Orientation

The ninth meeting of the PCCB, held in parallel with the SBI session, focused on developing the new workplan for the 2025–2029 period. Discussions emphasised three priority areas: (i) enhancing coherence and coordination among capacity-building actors; (ii) identifying and addressing capacity gaps and needs; and (iii) promoting knowledge-sharing and stakeholder engagement. The proposed structure is built around a two-phase adaptive framework, beginning with detailed implementation and followed by strategic evaluation and scaling.

The 2025 focus area — “capacity-building for investment strategies, bankable projects, and stakeholder engagement” — was formally acknowledged and aligns with efforts to link capacity-building with climate finance and the implementation of NDCs and NAPs. Stakeholders also underscored the value of the Capacity-building Hub as a complementary platform for showcasing initiatives and fostering cross-sectoral engagement.

Institutional Divergences Reflected in the Draft Decision

The draft decision ([FCCC/SBI/2025/L.2](#)) encapsulates unresolved debates, particularly regarding the PCCB's mandate and reporting structure. A group of Parties—including the European Union, Switzerland, and Norway—supports a more assertive role for the PCCB, including proposals for it to serve as a formal coordinator of capacity-building activities under the UNFCCC. Some countries from the AILAC group additionally proposed stronger linkages between the PCCB and other constituted bodies such as the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and the Adaptation Committee (AC), as well as closer integration with the Financial Mechanism.

In contrast, other Parties such as those from the ALBA group argued for a more limited role, cautioning against mandate inflation and emphasising the importance of institutional clarity and delineated responsibilities.

These divergent positions are operationalised in the text through several options regarding:

- Whether other UNFCCC bodies should formally take into account the PCCB's recommendations;
- Whether the PCCB should act as a coordinating node or maintain a facilitative and non-directive mandate;
- The appropriate reporting lines: one option proposes joint reporting to both the COP and the CMA, while another limits reporting to the COP alone.

Each of these institutional configurations carries distinct implications for the normative hierarchy and distribution of influence within the UNFCCC architecture.

Another unresolved issue relates to thematic prioritisation in the PCCB's future work. Some Parties, such as the EU advocate for a more prescriptive approach, proposing specific themes such as just transition, gender-responsive capacity-building, and enhanced transparency frameworks. Others, such as LMDC, argue for greater flexibility, emphasising the need to remain responsive to nationally determined needs and avoid pre-selecting focus areas.

While not a point of contention, the PCCB's toolkit and the capacity-building portal were frequently referenced as important instruments to bridge the gap between global offerings and national demands. Many delegations encouraged improving the visibility, accessibility, and language availability of these tools.

The deliberations at SB 62 did not yield consensus on the institutional evolution of the PCCB. All major decisions regarding reporting lines, coordination mandates, and thematic priorities were deferred to SB 63, pending further consultations. A central challenge moving forward will be reconciling differing expectations, namely, whether the PCCB should remain a knowledge-sharing platform or evolve into a more strategic actor capable of guiding investments and promoting coherence across the regime.

Parties also discussed initiating the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework established under the Convention and developing the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review under the Kyoto Protocol, but ultimately agreed to continue consideration of these matters at SBI 63.

As climate implementation enters a new phase following the GST, the PCCB's ability to navigate these institutional tensions will be critical to ensuring that capacity-building is not fragmented across bodies, but integrated as a structural pillar of equity and ambition.

13. Gender

Gender was included as an agenda item at COP 20, where the first Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) was established in order to promote gender balance in the bodies established under the UNFCCC and the integration of gender considerations in climate policy. COP 22 decided on a three-year extension of the LWPG. At COP 23, Parties established the Gender Action Plan (GAP) to enhance the integration of gender issues in climate policies and practices and to promote climate empowerment and technology transfer. At COP25 Parties agreed an enhanced 5-year LWPG and its Gender Action Plan.

At COP 29 Parties decided to extend the enhanced LWPG for 10 years and to develop a new Gender Action Plan (GAP), starting at SB 62, to be adopted at COP 30. For that purpose, an in-session technical workshop was held during SB 62 to facilitate the design of GAP activities and inform the development of the new GAP.

Negotiations under this item aimed to develop key elements and activities for the new GAP, taking into account the outcomes of the review of the enhanced LWPG and its GAP in 2024, and the discussions at the workshop. Parties exchanged views on their vision for the new GAP, with many calling for it to be ambition and action-oriented, well-funded, and aligned with key milestones of the UNFCCC process.

Parties, however, had different views on the inclusion of language on financing, with some calling for recognition of the importance of financial support for the GAP's implementation. There were more divergences on gender terminology, with certain parties wanting to include a binary definition

of gender as “female and male sexes” – including Paraguay, Argentina – whilst others like Saudi Arabia were in favour to delete references to “gender-diverse” individuals. In between those views, the Holy See suggested using language that would be “reflective of different views on gender”. Apart from terminology issues, negotiators showed willingness to make progress on the GAP through intersessional work. Other topics included the recognition of specific groups, such as people of African descent, women farmers, indigenous peoples, and local communities.

The SBI [concluded](#) by agreeing to continue discussions at SB 63 on the basis of the [informal note](#) from SB 62 with a view to recommend a draft decision on the new GAP for adoption at COP 30. Parties also agreed to hold another technical workshop in advance of the conference.

14. Transparency

Transparency or reporting appears in different negotiation streams, including the provision of financial and technical support to developing countries under the Convention, the provision of financial and technical support under Article 13 of the PA, the deliberations concerning the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE), and the consideration of national communications of non-Annex I countries.

Regarding the provision of financial and technical support to developing countries for implementing the measurement, reporting, and verification arrangements under the Convention, Parties heard about the different challenges faced by developing countries in accessing GEF funding, including bureaucracy and slowness. G77 and China pointed to challenges in accessing resources and called for the GEF to provide lessons from its support to non-Annex I Parties. G77 and China also voiced disagreement over the claim that the joint submission of biennial transparency reports and national communications would increase efficiency. Developed countries, in contrast, stressed that the UNFCCC does not have the mandate to directly guide the GEF. The SBI adopted [conclusions](#) that:

- invited parties to submit reflections on certain mandated activities like the climate transparency platform, regional workshops, facilitative dialogues, summary reports, submissions and synthesis reports;

- requested the secretariat to organise a workshop at SBI 63 for Parties to reflect on the mandated activities mentioned earlier, with a view to considering future activities under this agenda item, including a dialogue with the GEF and its implementing agencies;
- agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 63, taking into account the preliminary list of activities in the informal note from SBI 62, with a view to recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption at CMA 7.

In the discussions on the provision of financial and technical support under Article 13 of the PA, Parties highlighted the need for a more structured response to the challenges of implementing the ETF. G77 and China suggested a three-year work plan that would offer periodic summaries on the lessons learnt and offer increased interaction with the GEF. AILAC suggested establishing standards for enhanced coordination for the GEF implementing agencies providing support for transparency. Again, developed countries opposed the GEF being guided by the CMA.

The draft text included several elements such as guidelines to simplify financing processes, standardised project models and increasing institutional capacities, which will be considered at COP 30.

Another agenda item concerned the term, composition and terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) which is mandated to assist developing countries in their reporting. [COP 26](#) requested SBI 62 to start considerations on extending the CGE's term beyond 2026, its composition and terms of reference.

Parties agreed that the CGE was important for implementing the ETF but there were some diverging views over the term for a renewed mandate; the composition of its members; and the revision of the terms of reference. On one side, developed countries argued in favour of a renewable mandate (of either three or six years) and a composition reflecting of regional membership and including seats for LDCs and SIDS, and international organizations. On the other side, developing countries preferred a permanent mandate with the same composition and terms of reference.

Governance issues arose on that latter point, with parties discussing how to emphasise a focus on support for the transition from biennial update reports to BTRs while maintaining a mandate for the CGE to support reporting under the Convention. The SBI will continue at SB 63 taking into account the [draft text](#) and with a view to recommend a draft decision at COP 30.

Finally, as regards the national communications of non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, parties considered a proposal to consolidate the information provided in summary reports, which was questioned by the African Group, weary of the risk of comparing countries with different technical capacities. Unable to reach consensus, this agenda item is to be included in SB 63 provisional agenda on the understanding that it will be held in abeyance at that session.

15. Research and systematic observation

Both the Convention (Arts. 4.1 and 5) and the Paris Agreement (Arts. 4.1, 7.5 and 14.1) recognise the importance and the need for Parties to promote and cooperate in research, systematic observation (RSO) and the development of data archives. As is highlighted in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, science underpins progressive and effective climate action. As such, the RSO workstream supports global climate research and observation, including, in particular, work done by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

These negotiations take place under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and negotiations related to “research” are generally considered during the first sessional period of the year (SBs in June), and “Systematic Observation” is considered during the second sessional period of the year (COP in November). Over recent years, this stream has raised increasing concerns with deep-cutting issues not being resolved.

At SB 60, in June 2024, when ‘research’ was most recently discussed, issues arose around the role of the IPCC, and specifically whether to invite the IPCC to consider work done under the Convention and the Paris Agreement when determining future assessment cycles. Another major issue last year was whether or not to specify research needs, which were seen by many countries as integral to RSO, but some members of G77 and China objected to including these.

Nevertheless, by the of the session, and despite concerns around the adoption process of these conclusions which were swiftly gavelled through, before they were made available online, the decision forwarded to COP 29 welcomed the start of the 7th Assessment Report (AR7) and noted the discussions that took place on research needs.

At SB 62, work on RSO began during the [17th Meeting](#) of the Research Dialogue, a platform for the scientific community to discuss findings, lessons learned, and needs for scientific research and research capacity-building. During this, participants discussed and heard presentations on two main topics: the latest scientific advancements in the understanding of climate change, and the sustainable development and climate action nexus. The IPCC also provided an update on the progress of AR7, indicating that authors have been selected for the [special report on cities](#) and the [2027 methodology report on inventories for short-lived climate forcers](#). Participants also heard from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), that 2024 had been the warmest year on record, reaching a warming of 1.55°C above the 1850–1900 average. After the meeting, some Parties noted with disappointment that none of the presenters in the breakout sessions, came from developing countries.

Disagreements, however, emerged during negotiations on whether to welcome the IPCC’s update on its work, or the IPCC’s work itself. There was also divergence of views following proposals by the EU, supported by various other developed Parties to include language stating that “every increment of warming matters” and to note the WMO State of the Global Climate 2024 report “with great concern”.

Parties such as India, and the negotiation groups like the Arab Group cautioned against this. India argued that the science did not clearly indicate that every increment of warming matters and the Arab Group preferred lighter language regarding the WMO report, so as not to sound alarmist. China added that temperature projections are inherently uncertain. Finally, opposition to the language “1.5°C aligned pathways” also reappeared, a disappointing setback from commitments made in the GST decision (which does not, however, mention these terms explicitly – [Decision 1/CMA.5, para. 4](#)).

With these difficulties in mind, and a willingness from some Parties to adopt concise, non-prescriptive, non-alarmist and non-critical conclusions, Chile and AOSIS used the closing plenary to express deep concern about the latest scientific findings on the state of the climate and called for enhanced mitigation and adaptation efforts.

In the [conclusions](#) that were adopted, the SBSTA:

- Welcomed the update on the IPCC’s work, including the launch of AR7 and encouraged the IPCC to launch work on its methodological report on carbon dioxide removal and carbon dioxide capture, utilization and storage;
- Took note of the reports by the WMO on the State of the Climate and the Global to Annual Decadal Climate Update and noted that current estimates of current global warming are between 1.34 and 1.41 °C;

- Took note of the needs and gaps in research; and
- Requested the SBSTA Chair to prepare an informal summary report on the 17th Meeting of the Research Dialogue, and an information note that maps how research gaps identified since SBSTA 22 under the agenda item on RSO are being addressed by the scientific community to be presented during the 18th Meeting of the Research Dialogue (June 2026).

16. Administrative, financial and institutional matters

Within the Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters workstream, Parties convene to address topics such as the UNFCCC headquarters agreement and the UNFCCC secretariat budget and its efficiency. This agenda item is initially examined under the SBI, which subsequently proposes draft decisions for review and adoption/endorsement by the three governing bodies: COP, CMP, and CMA. At the 62nd meeting, the SBI considered the [proposal by the UNFCCC Executive Secretariat](#) for the Programme Budget for the biennium 2026–2027

As mandated by [Decision 19/CP.28](#), the executive secretariat published before the session a programme budget proposal with three distinct scenarios as well as a core budget proposal set at 92.2 million euros:

1) Zero nominal growth scenario: 73.9 million euros – slightly below the 2024–2025 biennium budget.

2) Zero real growth scenario: 75 million euros – slightly above the previous biennium budget and incorporating additional activities.

3) Actual needs scenario: 109.8 million euros – assuming that all essential and long-term, recurring activities are met.

The proposed core budget, set at 92.2 million euros – a 24.2% increase from the previous biennium's budget – would therefore be insufficient to meet all activities mandated by the Parties. Nevertheless, it became clear during the negotiations at SB 62 that this increase was seen as considerably surpassing the amount of funding Parties were willing to contribute.

Early in the second week, facing a lack of discussion on the quantum and with few hours left from the original end of negotiations on this agenda item, the United Kingdom, supported by various other Parties, proposed that the secretariat prepare new budget proposals, including one for a 19% increase. This was met with varied responses, with some Parties favouring much smaller increases and therefore asked the secretariat to prepare budget scenarios for 5%, 10%, 15% and 19% increases. Finally, Saudi Arabia unveiled its red line, a 10% increase to the biennium budget.

Although less than half the increase originally proposed by the secretariat, the new scenario confirmed that a 10% budget increase would still allow for real growth, beyond inflation. Following extensive closed-door negotiations and last-minute huddles, including those held after the start of the closing plenary, the Parties agreed to a 10% increase. Therefore, the 2025–2026 biennium budget will be 81,516,062 euros.

Beyond the budget discussions, during the opening plenary, Parties also heard an oral report on the implementation of the headquarters agreement. This drew particular attention during the closing plenary, as the Russian Federation requested that a written report on its implementation be published and considered as a separate agenda item at SBI 64.

The draft decision forwarded to COP 30 and CMP 20 for consideration and adoption, among others:

- Noted the improvements to the methodology used to prepare the programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027, in particular the early engagement with Parties and the implementation of recommendations by the UN Board of Auditors.
- Approved the programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027 amounting to 81,516,062 euros.
- Reaffirmed its decision that Parties will seek to approve future core budgets that include all mandated essential and long-term, recurring activities – a hotly debated paragraph due to its potential to impose commitments from Parties.

17. Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings

Under this agenda item, Parties debated mainly about ways of increasing the efficiency of the UNFCCC process; COP arrangements, including for COP 30; and future hosts. Among other proposals to improve COP process and observers' participation, the idea of capping the number of Party and Party Overflow delegations was floated but strongly resisted by Brazil and the Arab Group, who had listed over 2,000 delegates each during previous COPs under this category.

Discussions under the theme 'increasing efficiency of the COP Process' including through streamlining of the agendas have drawn much interest. Parties were invited to present submissions on the issue ahead of the session, and the secretariat published on the 5th of June a [note](#) to inform such discussions summarising Parties views. The idea of merging or streamlining agenda items were supported by various groups from developed and developing countries, but were met with particularly strong opposition from the Arab Group and the African Group of Negotiators, who insisted on the multi-spaces providing for more opportunities for advancing, while suggestions such as inviting COP Presidents and the Bureau to suggest ways to streamline were seen – by some – as attempts to undermine the COP status as governing body and the 'party driven character of the process'.

Finally, Parties agreed on [conclusions](#) that include:

- An invitation to Parties, Party groups and Observers to continue to reduce the length of their statements for presiding officers to

enforce these limits;

- An invitation to consider the implications of their registration of Party Overflow badges;
- A reminder that confirmation of host country well in advance minimises risks of logistical and financial challenges (while confirmation for host of COP 31 between Australia and Türkiye from the group of Western Europe and Other Countries is still pending) and a recommendation to hosts and the secretariat to consider affordability and access of accommodation, access to visas, and affordability of pavilions;
- A request to the secretariat and an invitation to Parties and organisations to deliver and participate in capacity-building activities for delegates to engage in the negotiation process;
- Stressing the importance of striving for efficiency in the UNFCCC process towards enhancing ambition and strengthening implementation in accordance with the draft rules of procedure being applied, noting the decision-making role of Parties.

18. Agriculture

The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture was established in 2017 to highlight the interlinkages between agriculture and adaptation ([Decision 4/CP.23](#)). At COP 27, held in 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Parties adopted a four-year Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security and requested the SBs to establish the Sharm el-Sheikh online portal to share information on projects, initiatives and policies for increasing opportunities for the implementation of climate action to address issues related to agriculture and food security ([Decision 3/CP.27](#)). In 2024, at SB 60, a roadmap for the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security was adopted.

This roadmap envisages two synthesis reports on (1) 'Systemic and holistic approaches to implementation of climate action on agriculture, food systems, and food security, understanding, cooperation and integration into plans'; and on (2) 'Progress, challenges and opportunities related to identifying needs and accessing means of implementation for climate action in agriculture and food security, including sharing of best practices.'

During SB 62, Parties considered a [draft text](#) in informal informals. These discussions led to the following [conclusions](#) of the subsidiary bodies which:

- welcomed the reports and workshops that took place;

- welcomed the template for submissions to the online portal and its further development by the secretariat to enable submissions to be further categorised by project, initiative or policy;
- invited stakeholders to submit information on their activities in relation to the joint work;
- requested the secretariat to present information on how constituted bodies and financial and other entities under the UNFCCC and relevant international organisations, have taken into account decision 3/CP.27 in their work within the second annual synthesis report in a year's time at SB 64; and
- requested the secretariat to synthesise in the annual synthesis report, information including financial allocations and needs, and challenges in and barriers to accessing support for finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building relevant to climate action on agriculture and food security, considering the vulnerability of farmers and other groups vulnerable to climate change impacts, especially small-scale farmers, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth and children, and the measures taken to address such barriers.

19. Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue

The annual dialogue on ocean-based climate action was launched at COP 26 in Glasgow in 2021. At SB 62, the dialogue considered key takeaways from the third UN Ocean Conference that was held in Nice the month prior ([UNOC-3](#)), which invited states to place oceans at the core of their NDCs through the 'Blue NDC Challenge' launched by France and Brazil. Various stakeholders, including the special envoy to the COP 30 Presidency Professor Martinez Scherer, discussed the following topics:

- the adoption of ocean-based measures in the 2025 round of NDCs, underscoring the need to recognise the ocean as part of the climate system;
- the inclusion of ocean-based indicators in the Global Goal on Adaptation and National Adaptation Plans, namely through the co-benefits of ocean conservation including blue carbon preservation through the protection of fragile ecosystems like mangroves and seagrass meadows; and
- synergies between oceans, climate and biodiversity, with a specific focus on the Convention on Biological Diversity and ecosystem restoration.

20. Consultations on the agenda

The difficult adoption of the agenda signalled the strenuous path ahead for the Bonn session since the controversial adoption of the NCQG decision at COP 29 in Baku. Indeed, many developing countries had voiced their disapproval over the NCQG decision and its adoption process. Bolivia, on behalf of the Like-Minded Developing Countries, asked for the consideration of two additional agenda items to be considered at SB 62, 1) on the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement; 2) on promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures.

Bolivia submitted these agenda items following Rule 10(d) of the draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies. Rule 10 defines the provisional agenda for ordinary sessions as comprising of items arising from the articles of the Convention; items that have, in the previous session, been agreed to be included; items referred to in Rule 16; any item proposed by a Party and received by the secretariat before the circulation of the provisional agenda; proposed budget. Rule 11 provides for the agenda to be circulated at least six weeks before the session and Rule 12 specifies that the secretariat, in agreement with the President, shall include any item proposed by a Party that has been received by the secretariat after the provisional agenda has been produced and before the opening of the session – in a supplementary provisional agenda.

The addition of an agenda item that would consider the financial obligation of developed countries was supported by developing countries and opposed by developed countries. The opening session was thus suspended whilst informal consultations were held to resolve the disagreement. After two days of the agenda being blocked and the opening of the session delayed, the agenda was adopted without including the additional items. Instead, it was agreed that the SB Chairs would hold substantive consultations on the implementation of Article 9.1, take stock on those consultations and report back at SB 63 with a view to Parties determining a way forward, with potentially a standalone item on this matter.

With regards to climate change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures, it was agreed that it would be addressed in related issues, including the JTWP; to this effect, a footnote was added to the agenda to specify 'Related issues will be discussed in relevant agenda items, including the just transition work program.' The presidential consultations provided an opportunity for an exchange of views concerning the implementation of Article 9.1.

Developing countries voiced their concerns that the NCQG does not adequately address the obligations developed states have under Article 9.1 i.e. to provide financial support to developing countries. Specifically, developing countries stressed that the scope of those obligations, and related transparency obligations ought to be clarified. LMDC called for a working programme to be set up on Article 9.1, which would consider how to scale up public financing from developed country parties. In the meantime, developed countries stressed their alignment with the obligations under

Article 9.1. The EIG proposed agenda items to consider these financial questions through: 1) the implementation of Article 9 PA under the CMA; 2) the implementation of Article 4 UNFCCC under the COP; and 3) matters related to finance in preparation to COP and CMA under the SBI. This would include the consideration of private sources of funding under Article 9, which was opposed by South Africa and Saudi Arabia.

Some states stressed that the compromise found at SB 62 to adopt the agenda should not be interpreted as a precedent for Belém, with the African Group expressing their intention to put forward an agenda item on the special circumstances and needs of Africa at the COP. Other Parties warned that additional agenda items could delay the start of the negotiations in Belém. Also looking at the agenda of Belém, the EU – opposed by the LMDC – called for CMA 7 to consider the NDC synthesis report and the BTR and that the dialogue on GST implementation be considered under GST matters.

