

Summary of the 64th Meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC

#JuneClimateM



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Introduction

From the 8th to 18th of June, the 64th session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) took place in Bonn, Germany.

The conference officially included:

- ◆ The 64th session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 64); and
- ◆ The 64th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 64).

Nearly 7,000 delegates and observers came together to make progress on important issues, including the Global Goal on Adaptation, the Mitigation Work Programme and the Just Transition Work Programme.

Many participants came to Bonn expecting a lengthy 'agenda battle' that would prevent the adoption of the agendas and the start of substantive negotiations, particularly relating to climate finance. This has been a regular occurrence in recent years (e.g. SB 62, COP 29 and SB 60). However, on the 8th of June, the agendas were swiftly adopted, and discussions began smoothly.

Two agenda items from the SBI provisional agenda were held in abeyance, meaning that the items will not be discussed at this session, nor will they be removed from the agenda. These two agenda items were the Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports from Annex I Parties and Information contained in national communications from non-Annex I Parties. The consideration of the review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee was deferred to SB 65. Finally, two technology-related agenda items (the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer and the alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism) were deferred, as was the second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance.

Negotiations took place on the remaining agenda items with Parties aiming to make progress on key issues ahead of COP 31, taking place in Antalya in November later this year.

This summary provides a comprehensive overview of the progress in many of the negotiating streams and their outcomes, as well as discussions that took place outside the formal negotiation process at SB 64. For educational purposes, this summary does not follow the official meeting agendas, but works thematically, across agenda items. For more detailed explanations of the relevant COP, CMP and CMA decisions, please refer to LRI's Paris Agreement A to Z app.

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Table of acronyms

SHORT	FULL
ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AILAC	Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean
AIM	Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
AR7	Seventh Assessment Report (of the IPCC)
BAR	Baku Adaptation Roadmap
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BBNJ	Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (Agreement)
BTRs	Biennial Transparency Reports
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CBDR-RC	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CGE	Consultative Group of Experts
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTC	Climate Technology Centre
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
EITs	Economies in Transition
ETF	Enhanced Transparency Framework
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GCNMA	Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEF-8	Global Environment Facility's eighth replenishment
GEF-9	Global Environment Facility's ninth replenishment
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GST	Global Stocktake
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITMOs	Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes
JTM	Just Transition Mechanism
JTWP	Just Transition Work Programme
KCI	Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures

SHORT	FULL
KJWA	Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LMDC	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LRI	Legal Response International
LT-LEDS	Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPGs	Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines
MWP	Mitigation Work Programme
NAP	National Adaptation Plan(s)
NBSAPs	National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal (on Climate Finance)
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
NDEs	National Designated Entities
NMA	Non-Market Approaches
NWP	Nairobi Work Programme
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCCB	Paris Committee on Capacity-Building
RSO	Research and Systematic Observation
SB	Subsidiary Body/Bodies
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SSJWA	Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TIP	Technology Implementation Programme
ToR(s)	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

From Belém to Bonn

As the halfway point between COP 30 and COP 31, the 64th sessions of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) provided an opportunity to take stock of the objectives set at COP 30 in Belém and begin progress ahead of COP 31 in Antalya.

COP 30 concluded with a delayed and contentious closing plenary, during which multiple Parties raised points of order and objected to adopting certain decisions, including those on the Mitigation Work Programme and the Global Goal on Adaptation. As a result, the COP 30 President, Corrêa do Lago, requested that the secretariat prepare best practices to guide the decision-making process of COPs to ensure “transparency, inclusivity, predictability and legitimacy” and prevent such procedural issues from arising again.

Tensions remained high arriving in Bonn for SB 64 and in its opening statement at SB 64, AILAC recalled the shortcomings of the COP 30 closing plenary, and stressed the need for a more transparent approach to consensus-building.

FURTHER READING

Please refer to the [LRI Outcome Summary of COP 30](#) for further information on the closing plenary.

Although the best practices document was neither released nor mentioned at SB 64, the SB chairs' preparatory [joint note](#) placed particular emphasis on transparency, inclusivity, procedurally sound outcomes and consensus-based decision-making, thereby mirroring and acknowledging the concerns raised during the closing plenary.

This summary provides a detailed analysis of the outcomes of many of the negotiation streams discussed at SB 64. However, SB 64 also offered the opportunity to reflect on progress under the Action Agenda advanced by the COP 30 Presidency. In his opening address at SB 64, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell recalled the importance of the Global Climate Action Agenda in complementing the negotiations and helping bridge discussions within the UNFCCC process with action taking place beyond it, thereby building momentum for implementation through voluntary initiatives.

Part of the difficulties faced at COP 30 was resistance to references to transitioning away from fossil fuels and deforestation in decision texts. This led to further voluntary initiatives, with the COP 30 President launching two roadmaps: one on “transitioning away from fossil fuels” and another on “halting and reversing deforestation”, in response to the outcome of the Global Stocktake ([Decision 1/CMA.5](#), paras. 28.d and 33–34). Despite initial optimism surrounding the Action Agenda, it sits uneasily alongside a deeper tension: as voluntary initiatives multiply outside the negotiated process, questions are mounting over what they mean for the formal UNFCCC track. In particular, the relation between voluntary initiatives and formal negotiated outcomes is proving to be an increasingly controversial topic.

Ahead of SB 64, the COP 31 President made clear his intention that the action agenda continue to take an increasingly important role, and ensured at SB 64 that Parties be involved in shaping its outcomes and implementation through multiple engagement events.

Parties, notably those from the Arab Group, reaffirmed their opposition to the inclusion of roadmaps in any negotiated outcome during the SB 64 opening plenary. Voluntary initiatives by establishing coalitions of the willing are also seen as potentially diverting ambition away from the formal negotiated process, thereby reducing the responsibility placed on Parties.

At SB 64, the Brazilian COP Presidency convened events on both roadmaps.

Regarding the shaping of the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, the COP 30 President welcomed the 115 [contributions](#) submitted by Parties to the roadmap. He also presented the initiative and its link to the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake. Finally, a major theme of discussion at this event was the momentum generated by the Roadmap, which led to the [First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels](#), held in Santa Marta in April 2026.

Regarding the Presidency Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030, the COP 30 President announced they had received 22 [contributions](#) representing 140 Parties and more than 150 organisations.

Consultations on both roadmaps took place during these events to advance their elaboration, with the COP 30 Presidency aiming to finalise both roadmaps by COP 31.

Other CMA 7 initiatives aimed at driving climate ambition, implementation and investment include the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission to 1.5, for which consultation events were held in Bonn, gathering input from diverse actors to produce a report ahead of COP 31.

The Global Implementation Accelerator was launched through the Global Mutirão Decision with a view to facilitating implementation and accelerating climate action ([Decision 1/CMA.7](#), para. 41). It is a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative. At SB 64, the COP 30 Presidency outlined the proposed process: an independent group of experts and scientists would identify a shortlist of solutions based on specific criteria, and a board would then select priority solutions. The COP 31 President of negotiations explained that the initiative seeks to identify high-impact solutions capable of triggering systemic global change, while linking them with financial and technical tools and implementation partners.

The Belém Mission to 1.5 was also launched at CMA 7 (Decision 1/CMA.7, para. 42) to enable ambition and implementation of nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans while catalysing accelerated implementation, cooperation and investment. At SB 64, the joint COP 31 Presidencies launched a call for submissions to inform the process leading up to a report ahead of COP 31. Certain Parties called for the Mission's work to continue beyond COP 31, with a view to informing the second Global Stocktake.

Through these initiatives, sitting on the outside edge of the formal UNFCCC process, Parties and Presidencies are seeking ways to unlock ambition in the face of an increasingly difficult multilateral environment. However, the multiplication of initiatives, the lack of attention afforded to them by certain groups of Parties and the overall shifting of ambition cannot be ignored when evaluating whether these represent a realistic and strong way forward for the UNFCCC.



Adaptation

› Global Goal on Adaptation

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), set out in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, aims to strengthen countries' resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change. At CMA 7 in Belém, in 2025, Parties adopted 59 indicators to track progress toward the goal and launched a two-year Belém-Addis Vision on Adaptation aimed at refining the underlying metadata and methodologies, collecting countries' experiences in testing the indicators, and encouraging them to integrate indicators into existing policy processes. SB 64 was tasked with establishing a technical taskforce to carry out this technical work, launching the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR), and beginning work on terms of reference (ToR) for a review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including the indicators ([Decision 12/CMA.7](#)).

Negotiations were marked from the outset by fundamental disagreements. Developing countries repeatedly called for explicit references to the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 ([Decision 1/CMA.7](#), para. 53) and for the taskforce to remain under Party oversight. Developed countries, however, preferred an expert-driven taskforce and resisted repeated references to finance, arguing that this belonged under other agenda items.

This disagreement on finance, unsurprisingly, became the dominant point of contention. When finance language first appeared in the draft text, it was bracketed, alongside references to equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). G77 and China argued that the provision of finance from developed to developing countries is grounded in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, should not be renegotiated, and called for the brackets to be removed. On the other hand, the EU, supported by Canada, Switzerland and the UK, pushed for a "no-text" option on these paragraphs. These disagreements stalled progress throughout the negotiations.

On the taskforce's composition, negotiations remained tense, with most developing countries seeking a body led or overseen by Parties, remaining wary of repeating the expert-driven process that had produced the 59 indicators which many considered unsatisfactory.

Views on the BAR, established with the mandate of bringing coherence to the adaptation architecture, followed a similar pattern, with developing countries seeking to ensure that its workshops produce concrete, published outputs on means of implementation, while developed countries argued the roadmap should not become a parallel finance-tracking exercise.

The matter was referred to the SB Chairs, who held consultations before tabling a revised text which offered options based on agreed language relating to finance. Developing countries agreed to move forward on the basis of compromise while developed countries proposed narrowing discussions to the taskforce paragraphs and either dropping or bracketing the rest.

Finally, on the final day, after numerous informal-informals, and a further revised text published by the SB Chairs under their own authority, with weaker finance language, and no reference to equity or CBDR-RC, some Parties were prepared to move forward with this text despite remaining reservations. However, other Parties wanted to discuss this in a Heads of Delegation meeting, which eventually did not produce an agreement.

As such, Parties did not conclude consideration of the GGA at SB 64, and in line with Rule 16 of the draft Rules of Procedure, the item was automatically forwarded, without any agreed text, to SB 65 and COP 31 in Antalya in November 2026.



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› Adaptation communications

Under Article 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris Agreement, each Party should submit and periodically update an adaptation communication. The communication can include national priorities, information on implementation and support needs, plans and actions and may be submitted as a component of, or in conjunction with, other communications, such as National Adaptation Plans, Nationally Determined Contributions and Biennial Transparency Reports. [Decision 9/CMA.1](#) elaborated on the elements that could form part of the communication and provided guidance for its preparation and submission. CMA 1, in 2018, also decided to take stock of, and if necessary, revise, the guidance based on submissions from Parties regarding their experience with application of the guidance, in 2025.

A limited number of submissions were made last year, as a result of which [Decision 4/CMA.7](#) invited SB 64 to continue consideration of the matter, in particular, the timing for inviting Parties to make further submissions; requesting the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the submissions; and take stock of, and if necessary, revise, the guidance.

Discussions held in Bonn highlighted continued divergence between Parties: while all recognised the importance of strengthening adaptation communications, differences remained regarding the timeline and its coordination with other Convention processes: some groups (LDCs, AILAC, AOSIS) supported a shorter timeline that would allow Parties to include their experiences in using the new adaptation indicators and would also coincide with the updating of the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the second Global Stocktake. Others (EU, Japan and the UK) argued that consideration of revising the guidance should take place only after the review of the MPGs. The Arab Group favoured a longer timeline.

Several groups also debated whether to expand the Adaptation Committee's mandate to hold an informal discussion with Parties and non-Party stakeholders at CMA 8 to identify opportunities for leveraging the intersections between adaptation communications, other adaptation-related reporting, planning and communication instruments, and tabular formats when integrating consideration of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience therein, and to improve adaptation reporting and communications. Other Parties preferred not to add new activities. In the absence of agreement, SBI 64 decided to continue consideration of this issue at SBI 65, based on the [informal note](#) prepared during the session.

› Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change

The NWP, established in 2005, functions as the UNFCCC 'knowledge-to-action hub' for adaptation and resilience, engaging diverse knowledge holders in the co-creation, curation and delivery of actionable knowledge and practical know-how tailored to the specific and evolving needs of countries, particularly developing countries, and communities.

In Bonn, Parties considered progress in implementing NWP activities, drawing on the [2026 annual progress report](#) prepared for the session. Discussions focussed on whether to note or welcome progress made in implementing activities, as well as wording relating to the involvement of stakeholders, particularly the private sector, and reference to thematic targets of the GGA Framework guiding new priority thematic areas under the NWP.

The latter point made it into the SBSTA's [conclusions](#), which also, amongst others:

- ◆ Highlighted the specific adaptation challenges faced in mountain regions and the role of the NWP in addressing knowledge gaps;
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to continue implementing NWP activities in a regionally balanced manner and to strengthen collaboration with NWP partner organisations and other relevant actors in addressing adaptation knowledge gaps and scaling up practical, context-specific adaptation solutions;
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to identify ways to further strengthen the engagement of universities, particularly those in developing countries;
- ◆ Highlighted the importance of ensuring alignment and complementarity between the NWP work and other adaptation-related work under the Convention and Paris Agreement, whilst avoiding duplication of efforts; and
- ◆ Recalled the call made in paragraphs 11 and 12 of [Decision 17/CP.19](#) for developed country Parties, other Parties, organisations, agencies, and NWP partner organisations to provide support, including financial support, for the implementation of the NWP.

Mitigation

› Mitigation Work Programme

For the past three years, discussions on mitigation ambition have seen very little progress in the UNFCCC process, despite its central role in reducing emissions and enhancing sinks to limit the rise in global average temperatures.

Against this backdrop, SB 64 was approached with cautious optimism that Parties might begin to overcome longstanding divisions. The Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) established at COP 27, in 2022, to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade in a manner that complements the Global Stocktake (GST), is set to be reviewed at COP 31 ([Decision 4/CMA.4](#)). Discussions in Bonn were therefore expected to provide an initial indication of its future direction.

In practice, negotiations largely reproduced familiar dynamics. Longstanding divergences persisted between those advocating for a more action-oriented MWP, capable of supporting enhanced mitigation ambition and implementation, and those emphasising that mitigation remains nationally determined, opposing any form of guidance. Tensions were particularly high over the evolution of the MWP's modalities and relationship with other processes, especially the GST, with some groups, including the Arab group, LMDCs and AGN, firmly rejecting these linkages.

This heightened state of affairs was further evidenced by the numerous points of order raised and the difficulty to agreeing on a way forward, including on whether to advance discussions first on the basis of a set of [guiding questions](#) during the first week, then, on the basis of an informal note during the second week, both ways forward supported by the LDCs, AILAC and the EU, but opposed by the Arab group, LMDCs and AGN.

At the outset of the second week, the MWP remained the only agenda item without a textual proposal, which was eventually prepared by the co-facilitators as part of a set of documents: a [non-status document](#) reflecting the exchange of views, an [informal note](#) and [draft SB conclusions](#), prompting further procedural debate regarding their mandate to prepare these documents.

Most groups expressed dissatisfaction with these documents and proposed revisions, while some groups, including the Arab group, LMDCs and AGN, rejected moving forward on the basis of these documents.

Two issues stood out as the main crux of discussions:

- ◆ References to paragraph 16 of [Decision 13/CMA.7](#), particularly in relation to its implication for the mandate of the MWP and the inclusion or not of the GST within its scope; and
- ◆ The timeline for the continuation of the MWP, in particular whether the reference to “in this critical decade” in Decision 4/CMA.4 acts as a sunset clause bringing the MWP to an end in 2030.

Despite efforts to bridge differences, including, in particular, Brazil's preparation of a further draft non-paper under its own authority and with extensive input from other groups, Parties were unable to converge. Ultimately, the issue was raised to the heads-of-delegation level, who engaged in joint consultations across mitigation, adaptation, and response measures but were unable to reach a substantive agreement.

The [procedural conclusions](#) adopted noted the lack of consensus and deferred further consideration to SB 65.

Article 6

› Article 6.2

Article 6.2 enables Parties to voluntarily cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs through the exchange of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). To support the operationalisation of Article 6.2, Parties mandated the secretariat to provide and maintain infrastructure (such as an [international registry](#) and an [Article 6 Database](#)), to coordinate technical expert reviews of submitted reports, and to deliver capacity building programmes. For more information on the Article 6 market mechanisms, see [LRI's explainer](#).

At SB 64, the SBI addressed arrangements for funding, infrastructure, processes, and capacity building for implementing the guidance on cooperative approaches under Article 6.2. Parties also participated in a mandated event, the Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue, an informal peer-to-peer discussion on how Article 6.2 can stimulate ambition in practice, while addressing issues such as inconsistencies in Parties' initial reports on their authorisation, tracking, and use of ITMOs.

› Arrangements for funding infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building for implementing guidance under Article 6.2

On the issue of funding, the secretariat provided a breakdown of the required budget, estimating a shortfall of around USD 8 million for the 2026–2027 period to implement these mandated activities. Discussions revolved around how to fund the gap and, in the pre-session [technical paper](#), the secretariat set out four options:

- ◆ Funding from the secretariat's core budget;
- ◆ Supplementary funding through voluntary contributions;
- ◆ A usage-based fee whereby participating Parties would be charged fees for using the Article 6.2 infrastructure and processes, for example per transaction, connection, or review conducted; or

- ◆ User fees levied on participating Parties, whereby the costs of funding operation and maintenance activities would be recovered from payments made by Parties, on a scale based on their participation in and benefit from the Article 6.2 infrastructure and processes, calculated either equally across participants or proportionally to the existing UNFCCC scale of contributions.

Informal consultations, based on the [informal note](#), exposed contrasts between developed and developing countries. Developing countries and LDCs emphasised equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and avoiding new barriers for participation of developing countries, while several developed countries and AOSIS emphasised that Article 6.2 participation is voluntary and creates benefits for users, so non-participating Parties should not necessarily bear the costs.

The African Group and LMDCs preferred funding through the core budget, and the LDC Group expressed concerns about usage/user fees discouraging participation in cooperative approaches by Parties with limited capacity.

The LDCs were apprehensive about funding requirements that could run counter to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, particularly for countries that do not envision participating in the Article 6 voluntary mechanisms soon. The LDCs were of the view that usage-based or user fees are not suitable for capacity-building activities. The Arab Group and AILAC opposed additional burdens on participating Parties, noting that such a fee would defeat the purpose for which the international registry was established – to support Parties that lack access to a registry.

Switzerland suggested the funding was almost a non-issue to be resolved quickly, preferably by the secretariat but not through its core budget, with the possibility of exploring financing from private entities. The EU and UK preferred the fees model, with the UK noting that fees would not be a barrier to Parties' participation in Article 6.2 and the EU stating that it prefers that Article 6.2 ultimately becomes self-sufficient through fees. AOSIS and the Coalition of Rainforest Nations preferred a combination of supplementary funding (through voluntary contributions) and usage-based fees.

The first week of discussions ended without any draft conclusion on the funding of the mandated activities, with Parties asking for more time to consider the proposals.

In the second week, Parties continued to consider the [updated informal note](#) and draft conclusions. The main discussions revolved around: (i) the language inviting voluntary contributions to a trust fund for supplementary activities; (ii) the language on the secretariat's fundraising efforts; and (iii) whether to request the secretariat to prepare more detailed information on the assumptions underlying the approved supplementary budget.

On the text inviting voluntary contributions, concerns were raised that this could encroach on budgetary discussions under the administrative, financial, and institutional matters agenda item. Parties then agreed to recall the existing CMA decision requesting voluntary contributions to the supplementary trust fund to support the Article 6.2 infrastructure, expert review process, and capacity-building activities ([Decision 19/CMA.7](#)).

On the secretariat's fundraising efforts, some preferred deleting the paragraph on this point, while Switzerland opposed deletion and proposed requesting the secretariat to "strengthen and enhance" rather than merely "continue" fundraising efforts.

Parties also discussed whether to request the secretariat to prepare more detailed information on the assumptions underlying the approved supplementary budget. The LMDCs preferred that the secretariat, in its annual Article 6.2 report to the CMA, reference relevant budgetary information already available in existing reports, while the EU argued that limiting the request to information already available would not serve the purpose of understanding the assumptions behind the budget.

At the end of the negotiations, Parties agreed on [draft conclusions](#) regarding existing CMA language, voluntary contributions, and possible budget information requests. In the conclusions, the SBI:

- ◆ Requested the chair to prepare an informal note capturing the views of the Parties for consideration at SB 65 in November 2026, with the intention to recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption at CMA 8;
- ◆ Recalled [Decision 19/CMA.7](#) where Parties were urged to provide voluntary contributions to the trust fund for supplementary activities;
Took note of the significant funding gap and expressed concerns on the implementation of the infrastructure and processes under Art. 6.2; and
- ◆ Requested the secretariat, in its reporting to the CMA, to provide detailed information on the assumptions underlying the supplementary budget aligned with the distribution of activities in the updated technical paper prepared by the secretariat on funding options.

› Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue

On the issue of promoting the use of ITMOs, the Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue held during SB 64 saw Parties, including the EU, Zimbabwe, Japan, and Bhutan, present on their progress, along with contributions from non-Party stakeholders.

The secretariat flagged that, as carbon markets grow, maintaining integrity is essential to ensure that international cooperation delivers real, measurable action, while the EU talked about implementing measures deliberately, slowly, and carefully, recognising that carbon pricing and the emissions trading scheme are core to implementing NDCs. Inconsistencies in Parties' initial reports on ITMOs were seen by some (e.g. Switzerland) as 'teething issues' that should not cause great concern; while several civil society organisations argued that inconsistencies in Parties' reports are deeply worrying, flagged dangers inherent in the carbon markets themselves, and cautioned against mechanisms that might replicate extractive dynamics with insufficient regard to the interests of local ecosystems and populations.

› Article 6.8

Article 6.8 on non-market approaches (NMAs) aims to promote initiatives and cooperation between Parties to achieve their mitigation and adaptation goals, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, without trading emission reduction units or ITMOs. NMAs may include projects ranging from sustainable agriculture and the protection of riparian forests by local communities to ecotourism and recycling programmes, among others. The Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA) work programme seeks to identify measures and tools that facilitate the coordination and implementation of NMAs and enable information sharing ([Decision 4/CMA.3](#), Annex, para 8). NMAs are published on an online platform to further facilitate their registration and information exchange. For more information on NMAs, please see [LRI's explainer on Article 6.8](#).

› Meeting of the Glasgow Committee on NMA (GCNMA)

The [ninth meeting of the GCNMA](#) was convened by the SBSTA Chair in conjunction with SB 64. It included a spin-off group with six group discussions and welcomed the growing number of focal point nominations (120 as of July 2026), support providers (now 34) and NMAs recorded – five as of June 2026.

In its [conclusions](#), the SBSTA, amongst others:

Invited Parties and observers to submit by 31 August 2026 views and information on topics for discussion at the in-session workshop to be held in conjunction with the next GCNMA meeting; and

Asked the secretariat to use different modalities, including quizzes, in its capacity-building webinars related to Article 6.8.

› Review of the work programme under the framework for NMA

CMA 3 had requested SBSTA 64 and 65 to review the NMA work programme, including its activities, with a view to enhance its effectiveness and make recommendations for consideration and adoption at CMA 8 ([Decision 4/CMA.3](#)). In addition, CMA 7, under the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme (MWP) negotiation stream, requested SBSTA 64 to consider ways of implementing additional functionalities on the NMA Platform to enable Parties to record relevant projects they identify under the MWP ([Decision 13/CMA.7](#)).

At SB 64, the SBSTA also initiated the review of the GCNMA's work programme – considering ways to enable Parties to record projects that they identify under the MWP on the NMA Platform through their national focal points for Article 6.8; and enable interconnection between the NMA Platform and other platforms, including national platforms for Parties that request it. One main hurdle in registering MWP projects in the NMA Platform is that MWP projects may involve only one Party, whereas NMA projects necessarily involve at least two Parties (as they are based on Parties cooperating).

The SBSTA considered the [technical paper](#) prepared by the secretariat at the request of CMA 7 on potential additional functionalities of the NMA Platform to allow for registration of MWP projects, which provided two main options:

- ◆ Make no changes to the NMA Platform – thus projects identified under the MWP would need to align with all the agreed aims of, and criteria for NMAs, and the Platform would not distinguish between such projects and others, retaining its focus on recording and exchanging information on NMAs.
- ◆ Change the Platform to allow for projects identified under the MWP to either (2.1) be recorded as ‘proposed’ NMAs until another cooperating party was secured; or (2.2) ‘single-Party’ projects.

Many delegations preferred option 1, which would retain the NMAs while raising awareness thereof; with one delegate stressing that the MWP cannot alter the definition of NMAs.

On interconnection between the Platform and other relevant platforms, options included adding hyperlinks to the Platform; creating a dedicated section on the Platform, using the NMA Platform as a data aggregator, or the secretariat as a standard-setter.

SB 64 concluded with the SBSTA requesting its chair to prepare an informal document, informed by the relevant views expressed by Parties at this session, for consideration at SBSTA 65 (in November 2026).



Global Stocktake

The Global Stocktake (GST) is the process, established by Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and elaborated in [Decision 19/CMA.1](#), through which Parties periodically assess collective progress towards the Agreement's goals. The first stocktake (GST 1) concluded at COP 28 in Dubai in 2023, and its outcome decision created two follow-up processes: the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes (paragraph 97) and an annual dialogue on how the GST outcomes inform Parties' nationally determined contributions (paragraph 187). The annual dialogue began at SB 60 in 2024, but Parties were unable to agree the modalities of the UAE dialogue until COP 30/CMA 7 in Belém.

After reaching a decision in Belém, at CMA 7, in November 2025, on refining the procedural and logistical elements of the GST process, which has implications for the second Global Stocktake (GST 2), as well as agreeing on the modalities of the United Arab Emirates GST dialogue ([Decision 3/CMA.7](#)), the SB 64 session did not hold negotiations on the GST. However, two mandated events took place: the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes and the Annual GST Dialogue. The discussions in those spaces highlighted continued differences over implementation mechanisms, the role of science and knowledge, and how GST outcomes should translate into national action.

› UAE dialogue on implementing GST outcomes

After two years of failing to agree on the scope and modalities, the first UAE dialogue on implementing the GST 1 outcomes finally took place over 10–11 June 2026. The COP 30/CMA 7 decision established it as a forum to exchange experience and information on opportunities, challenges, barriers, and needs in implementing the GST outcomes, with particular attention to means of implementation, alongside strengthened international cooperation ([Decision 3/CMA.7](#)).

The discussion was organised into three broad themes:

- ◆ Implementation of mitigation and response-measures outcomes;
- ◆ Implementation of adaptation and loss-and-damage outcomes; and
- ◆ Strengthening international cooperation and identifying key enablers in finance; technology development and transfer; capacity-building and other enabling conditions for implementation.

This three-part structure is important as the dialogue was intended to cover the GST outcomes as a whole, rather than being a finance-only discussion. There had been a significant procedural disagreement before SB 64 about its scope: some Parties argued that, because the UAE dialogue sits within the finance section of the GST 1 decision, it should focus principally on finance/Article 9.1; others argued that it should cover all GST outcomes, including the politically sensitive mitigation outcomes. This was further compounded by the fact that negotiations on its modalities sat under the finance agenda items.

› Discussions under each theme

The dialogue encountered logistical difficulties at the outset. The co-facilitators had proposed that the discussions be undertaken in breakout rooms for each thematic area. However, because the event was held in Chambers Hall and no separate breakout rooms were planned, this proved difficult. The secretariat proposed using different corners of the room, but concerns surrounding the acoustics of the room were raised, in particular due to the attendance of more than 100 participants. The co-facilitators subsequently proposed a phased discussion format, which was resisted because it limited the amount of time available to discuss each theme. Nevertheless, it was ultimately accepted, allowing discussions to proceed.

› Mitigation and response measures

The discussion looked at practical implementation of mitigation outcomes and barriers to implementation. This was politically sensitive because of the GST 1 call for Parties to contribute to global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, as well as the other mitigation elements in paragraph 28 of [Decision 1/CMA.5](#). These discussions were one reason some developing countries raised concerns that the dialogue could become a mechanism for tracking implementation ambition rather than a space to discuss the support needed to implement the GST outcomes.

› Adaptation and loss and damage

The second theme considered the implementation of GST 1 adaptation-related outcomes and associated needs. Discussions included adaptation gaps and the importance of support for implementation. This connected closely with the broader adaptation negotiations at SB 64, particularly the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), adaptation finance and implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience.

› International cooperation and enabling conditions

Although means of implementation and support were discussed in previous themes, finance, technology, and capacity-building featured most prominently here. Recurring issues included limited access to predictable and highly concessional finance; high cost of capital; difficulties accessing multilateral climate funds; simplifying access procedures; technology transfer; capacity-building; and the need for stronger international cooperation.

These were framed not simply as separate finance issues, but as conditions necessary for implementing the GST outcomes. Developing countries stressed that implementation of GST outcomes must be supported by adequate means of implementation, while developed countries placed greater emphasis on domestic action and international cooperation.

This reflects the broader developing-country position that GST implementation cannot be separated from means of implementation. The closing statement of G77 and China specifically welcomed both the UAE dialogue and the concluding Annual GST dialogue as having taken place in line with their respective mandates.

The second UAE dialogue will take place next year, at SB 66 (June 2027), after which it will conclude. As part of the dialogue, a high-level ministerial roundtable will be held at CMA 9 (November 2027).

› Annual GST Dialogue

The third Annual GST Dialogue considered how GST 1 outcomes have informed the preparation and implementation of NDCs. Parties discussed lessons from the first GST cycle, including how GST outcomes can support increased ambition and implementation. Following the first two dialogues in 2024 and 2025 and despite there being no firm termination deadline for this annual dialogue in the GST 1 decision ([Decision 1/CMA.5](#)), the 2026 dialogue concluded the process established under GST 1 at SB 64, in accordance with [Decision 3/CMA.7](#), with future arrangements to be considered in the context of GST 2.

The dialogue was open to Parties and non-Party stakeholders and was structured around two themes: (i) reflecting and translating GST outcomes into NDCs; and (ii) advancing and enabling NDC implementation.

The discussion took place through two breakout groups, with participants rotating between them, followed by a closing plenary to report back. The opening included presentations from various groups and Parties, including developed and developing countries, as well as non-Party stakeholders. Discussions focused on how Parties had translated GST findings into nationally specific targets and policies, as well as on implementation challenges, including finance, technology, capacity-building, investment, international cooperation and stakeholder engagement.

The dialogue remained a non-negotiating, knowledge-sharing process and did not produce prescriptive guidance on NDC content. The secretariat, under the guidance of the SB chairs, is to prepare a summary report of the dialogue for consideration ahead of CMA 8. As the 2026 dialogue was the final one under GST 1, the question of whether and how the dialogue should continue is to be considered in the context of GST 2.

Similarly, the need for finance and other means of implementation emerges repeatedly as enabling conditions for implementation, including GST outcomes, and is reiterated across GST-related dialogues and other spaces, such as the [trade dialogue](#), [the GGA negotiations](#), and [the negotiations under finance](#).



› Cross-cutting issues:

Even though SB 64 placed more attention on the implementation of GST 1 outcomes than on negotiating the GST 2, long-standing disagreements and diverging visions permeate discussions across negotiation streams: the importance of science, evidence and different knowledge systems was repeatedly highlighted in discussions on implementation and the preparation of future GST work, as well as more broadly in discussions around science under Research and Systematic Observation (RSO) and other negotiation streams. Following pushback against the role of the IPCC, and the importance of science, various countries took a stance against questioning the value and role of science during a [press conference](#) under the banner of 'Defend the Science'. For more on this, please see the [RSO section of this summary](#).

Finance

In UNFCCC meetings, climate finance has recurrently proven contentious, leading to “agenda fights” over how to consider the obligations developed countries have to provide and mobilise climate finance. In Belém, the COP 30 President circumvented an agenda fight by convening presidential consultations on, among other topics within climate finance, specifically the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, on developed country Parties’ obligations. The Global Mutirão decision ([Decision 1/CMA.7](#)) reflects the outcomes of the presidential consultations, which decided to convene a high-level ministerial round table to reflect on the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG), including on the quantitative and qualitative elements related to the provision of finance (para 52), as well as to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole (para 54).

Developing country Parties hoped the climate finance work programme would provide space to discuss the climate finance obligations of developed country Parties. Yet, this was met with disappointment at SB 64 as it was not included in the formal negotiation agenda, nor framed as a mandated event, but merely as engagement workshops.

Whilst the SB 64 agenda was adopted seemingly without hindrance, intense negotiations took place in the days prior due to the agenda item on the Adaptation Fund, focusing in particular on whether to have three sub-agenda items, to reflect the proposal of having three separate decisions in the [informal note](#) from SBI 63. These would concern respectively the arrangements for the Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement; the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board; and the Fund’s fifth review.

At SB 64, finance was discussed under several dedicated spaces, including formal negotiations, dialogues and presidency events. Under the SBI agenda, only Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund related to finance, as the second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance was deferred to SBI 65.

Concurrently, outside formal negotiations, several mandated events on climate finance took place, including discussions on the climate finance work programme and workshops under the Veredas Dialogue, both established by the Mutirão decision adopted at COP 30 in Belém.

› Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund was established in 2001 under the Kyoto Protocol to support adaptation projects in developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and was financed in part by the share of proceeds from activities under the Clean Development Mechanism. Since 2016, the Adaptation Fund has also served the Paris Agreement. It has been decided that the Fund will exclusively serve the Paris Agreement once the share of proceeds under Article 6.4 becomes available, and the Adaptation Fund Board was requested to consider the Fund’s arrangements in relation to the Paris Agreement (Decisions [12/CMA.5](#) and [18/CMA.4](#)).

With the completion of Article 6.4 negotiations at COP 29, the CMP and CMA encouraged the Board to finalise the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement ([Decision 2/CMP.19](#)) and requested SBI 62 to consider the matter.

At SB 62, while the SBI reached procedural conclusions to continue consideration of these matters at SBI 63 on the basis of an [informal note](#), G77 and China also introduced a [conference room paper](#) with an alternative draft decision which separates the issues under consideration, enabling them to be decided on independently of one another. This approach was supported by developing country Parties at COP 30. In contrast, developed country Parties favoured a package decision that would consider the transition and its membership together. Having achieved no progress on this at COP 30, the CMP and CMA requested SB 64 to continue consideration of this issue based on the work undertaken at SB 63.



WHY DOES THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE ADAPTATION FUND BOARD REMAIN AN ISSUE?

The question of membership stems from the proposal to amend the terminology from 'Annex I/non-Annex I Parties to the Convention' to 'developed country/developing country Parties'. More specifically, Annex I Parties include industrialised countries, including OECD members listed in Annex II, as well as economies in transition, such as the Russian Federation or Türkiye. Under the Convention, only Annex II countries have financial obligations to provide resources to developing countries.

By removing the Convention's categorisation of countries and applying the Paris Agreement's distinction between developed and developing country Parties, certain Parties could potentially be reclassified. This could, in turn, affect their rights and obligations under the relevant provisions of the Convention.

At SB 64, negotiations again focused on three main topics: arrangements for the Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement; membership of the Adaptation Fund Board; and the Fund's fifth review. An [informal note](#) from SB 63 suggested three separate decisions for each item, a proposal supported by developing countries, who argued that each matter has a separate mandate, as the SBI Chair noted in her opening remarks, and should therefore be addressed under separate sub-agenda items. Namely, G77 and China noted that the consensus on the arrangements issue required a stand-alone decision, finding no linkages with the issue of the terminology of the Adaptation Fund board. In contrast, developed countries consider the three matters to be a "package" to be adopted in a single decision and, as such, objected to considering them as separate sub-agenda items.

› Arrangement of the Fund's transition and membership of the Adaptation Fund Board

Parties were invited to share their views on the SBI 63 draft decision for the CMP and CMA on the arrangements of the Fund's transition to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement. G77 and China agreed with the draft decision text on the transition arrangements and suggested forwarding it to the SBI chair, reiterating their position to have three separate decisions. Developed country Parties, including Switzerland, the EU, the UK, Canada, and Norway, restated their position that Board membership should be addressed as part of the transition arrangements, refusing to agree on the transition arrangements without resolving the membership question. For the Arab and African groups, monetising the share of proceeds is an important first step before discussing Board membership. G77 and China, as well as Switzerland, concurred that the fifth review of the Fund should take place after the transition.

The Arab group raised a point of order, asking the co-facilitators whether the matter concerning the arrangements enjoyed consensus. The co-facilitators replied that no further amendments had been proposed, but that CMP and CMA guidance did not prejudice the number of draft decisions, and that views still diverged on whether membership was linked to the arrangements. The Arab group, supported by the African group and AILAC, disagreed, arguing that the three separate mandates under the agenda item did not prevent a text enjoying consensus from being forwarded.

Both the UK and Norway underscored that although no amendments were proposed on the text on the Fund's transition arrangements, there is no consensus on it being forwarded without a text that addresses the question on membership.

The secretariat's legal counsel noted that the draft rules of procedure apply in plenary settings, with discussions in informal consultations and contact groups being guided by them and that texts are to be forwarded if there is consensus to do so.

The Arab group asked the co-facilitator to forward its questions to the SBI Chair for further guidance. The Chair held bilateral consultations with groups, after which she informed Parties in informal consultations that there was no agreement on decisions to take forward and that the issues concerning the number of decisions and regarding the membership have not been resolved at the technical level and would require higher level engagement.

Following this, G77 and China requested the matter to be taken to heads of delegation level, with the Arab group, African group and LMDC stressing that consensus had been reached on two of the three mandates (on the arrangements and on the fifth review of the Adaptation Fund, see below). During the heads of delegation meeting, the SBI Chair asked for ways forward including views on the membership, bridging proposals and whether decisions can be taken separately from the two other mandates. The entrenched views of developed and developing country Parties were reiterated. Without any bridging proposals, the SBI Chair closed the meeting and noted that she will inform the incoming COP 31 Presidency on the matter with a view to conclude it in Antalya.

› Fifth review of the Adaptation Fund

An [informal note](#) from SBI 63 suggested options to initiate the review immediately or to wait for the transition of the Fund from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement for it to take place. Many developing country Party groups, including the LDC, Arab group, African group, AILAC, AOSIS and LMDC stressed that the transition ought to be considered first so as to ensure the monetisation of the share of proceeds from Article 6.4. On the other side, developed countries found terminology of the Adaptation Fund to be an integral part of the transition. Many suggestions were made, such as for the CMP to work with the interim trustee to facilitate this monetisation, as per the African group, and G77 and China suggesting that Parties could focus on providing instructions to the Adaptation Fund Board and the Global Environment Facility to allow for the interim trustee to receive the share of proceeds.

In the second week, heads of delegation met to discuss the fifth review of the Fund following its transition to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement. However, no agreement was reached. G77 and China objected to the co-facilitator's proposal to move forward with procedural conclusions, instead, proposing alternative text that suggested the SBI "continued consideration of three items, transition arrangements, fifth review, and Board membership". The wording led to debates on the wording of "mandates" as opposed to "items", noting only progress and agreement on the fifth review or whether to also include progress on transition arrangements, and the number of draft decisions under consideration.

The UK, the EU and Switzerland, when agreeing with the draft conclusions, stated that the draft conclusion do not preclude one or several decisions and that this would require "legal interpretation" at COP 31.

At the closing plenary, Chile urged Parties to make progress under this agenda item and that procedural disputes should not delay the resources needed from the Adaptation Fund, noting that the share of proceeds from the Article 6.4 mechanism is crucial to support adaptation action.

In its [conclusions](#), the SBI:

- ◆ Stated that it will continue consideration of three separate mandates: (a) the transition arrangements; (b) the initiation of the Fund's fifth review; and (c) the Adaptation Fund Board membership;
- ◆ Noted that progress has been made on the matters relating to the transition arrangements and initiation of the fifth review;
- ◆ Agreed to continue consideration of the three mandates at SBI 65 on the basis of the work and progress achieved at SBI 64 and the [draft texts](#) from SBI 64; and
- ◆ Noted that these conclusions do not prejudice the final outcomes at SBI 65.

Work programme on climate finance

The [work programme on climate finance](#) was established by the Global Mutirão decision (para 54) to consider Article 9.1 in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole, as specified in a footnote to the paragraph, without prejudging the process for implementing the new collective quantified goal on climate finance.

The co-chairs requested [submissions](#) of [views](#) ahead of SB 64, asking Parties and non-Party stakeholders for their expectations for the work programme, the scope of the work programme; its organisation; and outputs and outcomes. Many developing countries, such as the LMDC and Arab Group answered that they wanted it to be a dedicated space to discuss the financial obligations of developed country Parties. Other developing Party groups, such as AOSIS also wanted to discuss qualitative aspects of finance, including access. In their submissions, developed country Parties expressed their interest to streamline the existing climate finance agenda and the mobilisation of finance from diverse sources.

The co-chairs published their [work plan](#) for the climate finance work programme, which included its scope and modalities. To discuss the climate finance work programme at SB 64, three engagement workshops were held, one among Parties; another with multi-stakeholders and another with non-Party stakeholders.

Regarding the scope of the work programme, Parties expressed their views, with G77 and China rejecting the co-chairs' work plan, asking it to focus solely on Article 9.1. They also identified relevant issues to be considered, including transparency and complementarity in the reporting of financial flows. The Arab group favoured "burden sharing agreements" to specify the obligations of developed countries with respect to climate finance. The LDCs expressed their need for quality of finance, including a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance. LMDC also called for predictability of finance flows.

Conversely, developed country Parties, including the EU, Switzerland, Canada and Japan underscored that the scope of the work programme was, as stated in the Global Mutirão, in the context of Article 9 as a whole, and thus could not be reduced to Article 9.1 obligations. They argued that the work programme should focus on implementing the NCQG to fulfil climate finance obligations. Some Parties specifically pointed to broadening the contributor base, finding ways to include private actors, and scaling up investments in line with climate goals.

Regarding the modalities of the work programme, several negotiation groups including the Arab group, LMDC and AILAC expressed that the work programme had been mandated by the CMA and thus should be an agenda item considered at CMA 8. The groups suggested several potential outputs, such as a synthesis report on Parties' views, or an engagement roadmap with intersessional consultations, to be considered at CMA 8.

In contrast, developed country Parties considered the work programme to have already begun at SB 64 and called for substantive discussions to begin.

The G77 and China also called for the work programme to be included in the CMA agenda in the Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings negotiation room and was supported by the COP 30 President in a [letter](#) published during SB 64, in which he requested that the secretariat include it as a sub-item under the "Matters relating to finance" item, on the provisional agenda of CMA 8 and CMA 9. The provisional agendas for COP 31 does include the agenda item.

› Veredas Dialogue on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9

The Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, touches on the aim of making global financial flows consistent with climate goals of low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement which sets out obligations of developed countries regarding climate finance. It was established in Belém, at CMA 7 ([Decision II/CMA.7](#), para 10), and builds on the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue launched in 2023 as a dedicated dialogue to exchange views on, and enhance the understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9. In addition, the high-level Xingu finance talks are to be convened under the Veredas Dialogue, as a high-level round table to facilitate the cooperative exchange of views among Parties, and non-Party stakeholders including academia, international finance institutions and the private sector (para 13).

At SB 64, the Dialogue was scheduled to be held for two days with presentations and a facilitative exchange of views. The first part of the Dialogue's focus centred on nationally determined policies and instruments to implement Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9. It opened with two speeches from the UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell and COP 30 President André Corrêa do Lago who both reiterated the crucial character of climate finance.

Presentations followed on scaling up private climate investment through public finance, integrating climate considerations into public financial management, a climate alignment test for the financial sector, and a review of subsidies and credit incentives affecting agriculture.

The second topic of discussion under the Veredas dialogue concerned the international dimension of financial flow alignment. Parties discussed issues related to natural disasters impacting a country's risk analyses and the failure of credit rating agencies to account for global public goods, as well as the asymmetry of welfare gains and losses linked to carbon border adjustments such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

› Implementation of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T

Hosted by the COP 30 Presidency, this presidential event aimed at discussing the implementation of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to reaching the USD 1.3 trillion target of climate finance mobilisation of the NCQG.

Activities were discussed in order to catalyse collective energies and follow up on the roadmap in mandated workstreams and the action agenda. The discussion summary is intended to inform the follow-up on the roadmap.

Technology Transfer and Development

One of the areas where substantive progress was made at the 64th session of the subsidiary bodies was in the technology transfer and development negotiations.



LRI EXPLAINER AVAILABLE

[LRI has published an explainer on Technology Transfer and Development](#)

Technology transfer and development is seen as critical under both the Convention (Article 4.7) and the Paris Agreement (Article 10) as a key means of implementing both mitigation and adaptation actions for developing countries alongside climate finance and capacity building.

Technology negotiators were faced with a very full agenda at SB 64, with an initial six agenda items:

- ◆ SBI 12(a) and SBSTA 9 Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN);
- ◆ SBI 12(b) Alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the CTCN and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism ;
- ◆ SBI 12(c) Host of the Climate Technology Centre;
- ◆ SBI 12(d) Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;
- ◆ SBI 12(e) Second periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of Decision 1/CP.21; and
- ◆ SBI 12(f) Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer.

To lighten the load and ensure progress was possible with sufficient time allocations, Parties decided to defer consideration of SBI agenda item 12(b) Alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the CTCN and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism to SBI 68 (June 2028) and to defer consideration of SBI agenda item 12(f) Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer to SBI 65 (November 2026).

Whilst all remaining agenda items were negotiated separately, as is usual practice, Parties reached an agreement on the technology agenda items as part of a package deal. This meant that Parties had to agree to the way forward for all agenda items, rather than only agreeing to move forward on certain issues. This is a negotiation tactic that can encourage consensus; however, it also risks blocking progress on multiple agenda items due to disagreements over a single item.

› SBI 12(a) and SBSTA 9 Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)

At COP 30, Parties were unable to agree on a substantive outcome for the [2025 Joint Annual Report of the TEC and CTCN](#), which details their individual and joint activities. Although many Parties welcomed the report and the work done by the TEC and the CTCN during their interventions, they were unable to agree to a text.

One of the main concerns within this agenda item, which reappeared at SB 64, regards financial commitments. In particular, whether the decision should call on Parties “in a position to do so” to provide financial support to the TEC and CTCN. Developing countries argued against this as the Convention and the Paris Agreement state that support, including financial resources, shall be provided to developing countries. As such, only developed countries, and not all Parties “in a position to do so”, should provide financial support to the TEC and CTCN.

Following difficult negotiations on this topic, the co-facilitators proposed moving forward with procedural conclusions only on the 17th of June; Parties were eventually granted more time by the SB co-chairs and, late that evening, left the negotiating room with smiles. They had reached consensus on recommending draft [COP](#) and [CMA](#) decisions in informal-informals as part of the technology agenda package. To reach this consensus, a reference to the technology-related outcomes of the first Global Stocktake was removed from the draft decisions.

The conclusions, inter alia:

- ◆ Welcomed the joint annual report of the TEC and the CTCN and welcomed with appreciation their efforts and progress in implementing their workplan and programme of work;
- ◆ Welcomed the continued efforts of the TEC and the CTCN in mobilising resources; Requested the CTCN, in collaboration with the TEC, to continue organising the regional national designated entity forums;
- ◆ Invited the TEC and the CTCN to continue improving their monitoring and evaluation systems;
- ◆ Highlighted the importance of the provision of financial support to the TEC and the CTCN; and
- ◆ Encouraged the CTCN to continue to mobilise resources, including from the private sector and philanthropies and through matchmaking, programmatic and regional approaches, with a view to enhancing support for implementing its activities.

Since [Decision 14/CP.18](#), the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) has been hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which leads a consortium of partner institutions. In [Decision 2/CP.17](#), it was decided that a review of the CTCN would begin at SB 62. This review was guided by [Decision 20/CMA.4](#). At COP 30, Parties decided to extend the term of the CTC until 2041 and adopted revised functions which will take effect from 2027 ([Decision 17/CMA.7](#)). Parties also agreed to a process to select the future host of the CTC, with SB 64 serving as a critical juncture to agree on a new host and develop the memorandum of understanding with the host to later be adopted at COP 31.

It was therefore essential that at SB 64, Parties reach an agreement on these issues; any delay in agreeing on the host of the CTC would impact the continuity of the provision of technical assistance. Based on the [assessment report of the evaluation panel](#) which shortlisted two candidates – UNEP, and a consortium of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) – Parties engaged in extensive discussions. Parties began by highlighting the strengths and concerns of both potential hosts, noting in particular UNEP's proven track record. Although no one ventured to claim that a host had been agreed upon during the first week, it seemed clear behind the scenes that the Parties had, at least, agreed to recommend UNEP, but disagreements remained over whether other candidates should be considered.

> **SBI 12(c) Host of the Climate Technology Centre**

The CTCN, as the implementation arm of the Technology Mechanism, is a centre and network of national, regional, sectoral and international technology networks, organisations and initiatives that facilitates the rapid transfer of environmentally sound technologies to support low-carbon and climate-resilient development in developing countries.

This was made certain at the start of the second week, where attention turned to the detail of that hosting. In particular, proposals arose that UNEP should host the CTC, in partnership with the UNIDO/UNOPS consortium. Still, the details, in particular the governance arrangements, remained particularly unclear. Within the G77 and China group, disagreements appeared on this, with the African Group and LDCs preferring a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the COP/CMA and UNEP that did not reference the partnership with UNIDO/UNOPS, while the Arab Group wished to see this partnership entrenched in the MoU. Ultimately, following internal consultations, G77 and China proposed recommending UNEP as host, and encouraging UNEP to seek partnership, cooperation and collaboration with UNIDO and UNOPS, and others, as relevant, based on their individual attributes, in the SB conclusions and the draft decisions forwarded to the COP and CMA. The MoU also mentions collaboration, cooperation and partnerships as one of the roles and responsibilities of UNEP.

This was well received by most groups, except for the Arab Group, which denounced unequal treatment across technology agenda items, both in terms of the time afforded to finalise discussions and in the substance of their group's proposals. Following involvement of the SBI Chair and informal-informals on the package of technology items, Parties reached an agreement on the host of the CTC marking one of the successes of SB 64.



The SBI conclusions adopted:

- ◆ Recommended UNEP as host of the CTC;
- ◆ Encouraged UNEP to seek “collaboration, cooperation and partnership, as appropriate, with potential partners, such as [UNIDO], [UNOPS] and others, as relevant, with a view to leveraging the comparative advantages of these organizations”; and
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to prepare the draft MoU between the COP/CMA and UNEP on the basis of the elements of a MoU contained in the Annex, for consideration at SBI 65 (November 2026).

The Elements of a MoU contained in the [Annex](#):

- ◆ Detailed the roles, responsibilities and functions of the COP/CMA and UNEP;
- ◆ Detailed, extensively, information on the role of the CTCN in the support and advice it is to provide to developing country Parties; and
- ◆ Introduced a broader objective to “promote transformational change”.

The draft Decision:

- ◆ Decided that UNEP will be the host of the CTC for an initial 5-year term, followed by two 5-year renewal periods;
- ◆ Contained three options inviting or encouraging UNEP to continue to explore opportunities to collaborate with either specific other bodies (UNIDO/UNOPS) or other bodies more generally. Including, potentially, with a view to leveraging the comparative advantages of each organisation; Adopted the MoU;
- ◆ Requested UNEP to take all necessary measures to ensure continuity in the operations and services of the strengthened CTC; and
- ◆ Contained two options on the funding of the CTC, including either various sources, including the financial mechanism, and/or developed country Parties among others.

> **SBI 12(d) Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism**

Established initially to discuss the need to collaborate and define linkages between the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and later expanded to enhance linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism more generally, this agenda item plays an important role in ensuring coherence across agenda items on means of implementation, thereby increasing access to new technologies, by addressing barriers to accessing finance.

In recent years, progress on this agenda item has been essentially non-existent. Much of the discussion has turned on whether to conclude the consideration of the item, as proposed by various developed countries, by integrating it into the agenda item on the Joint Annual Report of the TEC and CTCN.

At SB 64, Parties were able to make important progress and were able for the first time in many years to conclude consideration of the issue at the session and agreed to draft conclusions recommending a [draft COP decision](#) that:

- ◆ Welcomed the collaboration between the TEC, CTCN, GCF and Global Environment Facility (GEF);
- ◆ Acknowledged the importance of strengthening collaboration and coordination among national designated entities (NDEs) for technology development and transfer, NDEs for the GCF and operational focal points for the GEF;
- ◆ Acknowledged the role of capacity-building in enhancing linkages;
- ◆ Requested the TEC and the CTCN to consider synergies and complementarities between their work and the work of the GCF and the GEF, and to engage with them when developing their respective workplans and programmes of work;
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to prepare by June 2028, and update by June 2032, content on progress, successes and challenges in strengthening linkages between the two mechanisms, and financial support provided by the operating entities of the financial mechanism;

- ◆ Requested the SBI to continue consideration of the linkages at SB 70 (June 2029) and SB 76 (June 2032), taking into account, among others, the content on progress, successes and challenges, with a view to recommending draft decisions on the matter for consideration and adoption at COP 34 (November 2029) and COP 37 (November 2032).

> **SBI 12(e) Second periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of Decision 1/CP.21**

Concluded at CMA 4 (November 2022), the first periodic assessment of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism under the Paris Agreement identified opportunities and challenges which were later considered in the first Global Stocktake and led to the establishment of the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) (see [LRI's Technology Explainer](#) for more information on the TIP). [Decision 20/CMA.4](#) also requested the SBI to initiate the second periodic assessment at SB 64 in accordance with the scope and modalities for the periodic assessment, with a view to it being completed by CMA 9 (November 2027).

Early on, divergences appeared around what the assessment would consider, with the EU strongly arguing against reopening the scope and modalities of the assessment. Parties also disagreed on how the assessment would reference specific support provided to Parties, and the implementation of nationally determined contributions and technology needs assessments.

Despite some issues remaining unresolved, following the adoption of the technology agenda item-package in informal-informals, Parties adopted [draft conclusions](#) which:

- ◆ Initiated the second periodic assessment;
- ◆ Recalled that the outcome of the periodic assessment should guide improved effectiveness and enhanced support to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement; and
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to prepare an interim report on the second periodic assessment for consideration at SBI 66 (June 2027).

Capacity-building

Capacity-building involves empowering developing countries to effectively address climate change and its negative impacts and is recognised in the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as one of the means of implementation. At COP 30, negotiations on this agenda item included the review of the capacity-building frameworks applicable to the implementation of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol under the SBI (Decisions [1/CP.7](#) and [2/CP.7](#)); and the consideration by the CMA of the annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building (PCCB) by the CMA. The SBI oversees the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries and countries with economies in transition (EITs).

Four related review processes were underway in parallel at SB 64: two fifth reviews of the capacity-building frameworks for developing countries — one under the Convention and one under the Kyoto Protocol — and two sixth reviews of the frameworks for EITs, likewise split between the Convention and Kyoto Protocol frameworks.

SBI 62 started the fifth review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework in developing countries under the Convention. The review continued under SBI 63, which agreed to continue considering it at SBI 64, taking into account the [draft text](#) from SBI 63 and with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 31. With regard to economies in transition, COP 26 had requested SBI 64 to initiate the sixth review, with a view to it being concluded at COP 31.

Under the Kyoto Protocol, CMP 20 had adopted the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries and had requested SB 64 to initiate the review for SB 65 to conclude it and recommend a decision for adoption by CMP 21. As regards to EITs, CMP 16 requested SBI 64 to initiate the sixth review under the Kyoto Protocol, to also be concluded at CMP 21.

At SB 64, Parties considered: 1) a draft COP decision on the fifth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention; and 2) draft SBI conclusions on capacity-building under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol.

The draft SBI [conclusions](#) on capacity-building under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, among others:

- ◆ Noted that further efforts are needed to address current and emerging capacity-building gaps and needs related to implementing the Paris Agreement in developing countries and that Parties frequently report gaps and needs in areas that are outside the current scope of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries as it pertains to the Convention; and
- ◆ Emphasised the importance of the Durban Forum on capacity-building as a means of sharing information and lessons learned among a wide range of stakeholders under and outside the Convention and Kyoto Protocol.

On the fifth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries, under the Convention, the SBI recommended a draft [decision](#) to COP 31, which, among others:

- ◆ Emphasised the importance of building long-term capacity in developing countries, including by promoting strong domestic enabling environments;

Emphasised the importance of enhanced support for improving the ability of developing country Parties to implement the capacity-building framework that promotes country ownership, making full use of existing mechanisms and avoiding duplication;

Invited Parties, as appropriate, and other stakeholders, to continue providing support to developing countries for capacity-building activities;

Requested the secretariat to organise a one-day workshop at SBI 68 on the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the capacity-building framework under the Convention; and

Requested the SBI to initiate the sixth comprehensive review at SBI 72 (June 2030).

On the fifth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol, the SBI recommended a draft CMP 21 decision, which, among others:

- ◆ Decided that any future review under the Kyoto Protocol will be subject to a decision by the CMP as and when it deems necessary.

On the sixth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in EITs under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol, respectively, the SBI recommended a draft COP 31 [decision](#) and a draft CMP 21 [decision](#), which, among others:

- ◆ Invited Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC and other Parties, as appropriate, the Global Environment Facility, and various other actors, to continue to support capacity-building in EITs; and
- ◆ Decided that any future review for EITs shall be subject to a decision by the COP and CMP, as and when they deem necessary.



15TH DURBAN FORUM ON CAPACITY-BUILDING

In parallel to the negotiations, the 15th Durban Forum on Capacity-Building, 'From climate plans to funded projects' took place. Established under the SBI in 2011, to enhance monitoring and review of the effectiveness of capacity-building under the Convention. Since COP 24, the topic of the Durban Forum is also aligned with the annual focus area of the PCCB, which for 2025–2026 concerns 'Capacity-building for holistic investment strategies, bankable projects, and stakeholder engagement to strengthen the implementation of NDCs and NAPs in developing countries'.



Just Transition

Just transition, as a concept, remains undefined in the UNFCCC process and includes various elements, including the idea of fairness towards workers and communities when transitioning towards a lower-emission pathway as well as the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Although it figures in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, its presence in the negotiations remained largely confined to the response measures discussions until [Decision 1/CMA.4](#).

That decision established the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), and [Decision 3/CMA.5](#) operationalised it. Negotiations on the JTWP continued around three core mandates at SB 64. The first related to the implementation of the JTWP, the second related to the terms of reference (ToRs) for the review of the JTWP, and the third related to the process for the operationalisation of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), committed to in [Decision 2/CMA.7](#).

› Implementation of the JTWP

The fifth dialogue under the JTWP was held in Yeosu, Republic of Korea, in April 2026 and focused on the topic of holistic approaches to food security, including both agriculture and oceans. Parties' discussions centred on highlighting key messages emerging from the dialogue. Procedurally, Parties discussed whether to summarise these messages leaving a placeholder for key messages emerging from the sixth dialogue or to wait until both dialogues have been completed to capture this, with some expressing concerns that they should not be selectively refined at this stage and that any outcome documents at SB 64 should not prejudge the outcomes of the sixth dialogue due to take place later this year ahead of SB 65 and CMA 8.

Marked points of disagreement also emerged with respect to the substance of the key messages to carry forward from the fifth dialogue. The EU and AOSIS highlighted the need to reduce fossil-fuel dependence in agri-food systems, to support agroecology approaches, and to focus on 1.5°C-aligned just transition pathways in line with the outcome of the first Global Stocktake ([Decision 1/CMA.5](#)). Parties including the G77 and China along with the AGN strongly emphasised the importance of means of implementation for agricultural transitions, including technology transfer, capacity building and predictable, accessible and grant-based finance to enhance food security, with a particular focus on smallholder farmers, pastoralists and fisherfolk. Parties, including the Arab group and the Russian Federation, emphasised that just transition pathways are nationally determined and non-prescriptive, in line with the principle of CBDR-RC, and rejected the inclusion of any specific language on fossil fuels being taken forward.

› Terms of reference for the JTWP review

The second mandate discussed in week two concerned framing the ToRs for the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the JTWP, as requested in paragraph 3 of [Decision 3/CMA.5](#) to inform consideration of its continuation at CMA 8. The language of the ToRs was the subject of significant contestation and informal-informal discussions, particularly with respect to the scope and sources of input of the review. Points of contention on scope included how the review process could inform or be informed by the process for the operationalisation of the mechanism. Parties, including the LDCs, highlighted that, despite being parallel processes, maintaining coherence remains essential, with each process informing and complementing the other.

Other areas of contention included the sources of input, in particular the mapping and inclusion of relevant instruments, initiatives and processes in the UNFCCC and wider UN system.

› Mapping & synthesis report

Paragraph 24 of [Decision 2/CMA.7](#) outlined a request by the CMA for the secretariat to undertake a mapping exercise and prepare a synthesis report covering relevant ‘instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement’, along with relevant ‘entities in the United Nations system’ to inform implementation and feed into the review of the JTWP. In line with this request, the secretariat and co-chairs shared an [initial interim output](#) to inform the SB 64 discussions as an intermediate step towards delivering the requested synthesis report. Although discussion of this initial mapping output was limited to give way to the finalisation of the ToRs for the review, some Parties noted that it was difficult to work within its current form and suggested a closer focus on where the JTM could add value in areas not already addressed by mechanisms in the UNFCCC or broader UN system.

› Just Transition Mechanism

The third and final mandate provided for ongoing discussions surrounding the operationalisation of the Just Transition Mechanism. The CMA in paragraph 25 of [Decision 2/CMA.7](#) decided to develop a JTM with the purpose of enhancing ‘international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity building and knowledge sharing, and enable equitable, inclusive just transitions’. The SBs at their sixty-fourth sessions were accordingly requested to recommend a draft decision on the process of its operationalisation for consideration at CMA 8. An [informal note](#) prepared by the co-chairs on 16th June summarised the proposals on the JTM. The co-chairs highlighted the clustering of issues around functions, governance and timelines for the mechanism; still, there was a lack of consensus on these.



LRI EXPLAINER AVAILABLE

LRI has published an explainer on [Just Transition](#)

The JTM proposals discussed in the contact groups and captured in the note are wide-ranging, covering, for example, facilitating the adoption of 1.5°C-aligned, whole-of-society and multisectoral just transition pathways in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS) and the need for approaches that respect, promote and fulfil human rights. Proposed functions of the mechanism included identifying ways to address barriers to just transition and enhancing international cooperation to facilitate access to means of implementation, such as technical assistance and grant-based finance. Interventions calling for non-prescriptive approaches that do not create new obligations, reporting requirements or conditionalities are similarly reflected in the note.

On governance and modalities, the operationalisation under the CMA and opportunities to harness and build on existing institutional modalities such as in-session dialogues and the role of the secretariat were discussed. Key points of divergence remain with respect to the form the mechanism should take, with some Parties calling for the establishment of a new constituted body or a two-tier body with a governance board and a technical expert group, while others expressed concerns over budget constraints and opposed the creation of any new bodies.

The [draft conclusions](#) were agreed to by the Parties after a suspension and a tense round of informal-informal discussions during the last contact group to finalise the wording. These, *inter alia*:

- ◆ Recalled the consideration of the JTWP; Agreed to continue consideration of the operationalisation of the JTM at SB 65;
- ◆ Took note of the informal note prepared by the co-chairs; and
- ◆ Developed the ToRs (contained in the Annex) and agreed to conduct the review of the JTWP at SBI 65 in accordance with the agreed ToRs.

> Next steps

- ◆ The biannual JTWP dialogues will continue with the sixth dialogue, due to take place ahead of SB 65 in November 2026. The dates and thematic focus area for the sixth dialogue have yet to be released.
- ◆ The secretariat will prepare the synthesis report, building on the initial mapping exercise already undertaken, as requested by Decision 2/CMA.7 to inform the review of the JTWP.
- ◆ The review of the JTWP is to be conducted at SB 65, in accordance with the ToRs, to inform the consideration of the continuation of the JTWP at CMA 8. Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to submit their views on the review via the [submission portal](#) by 1st September 2026.
- ◆ The process for operationalising the JTM will continue to be considered at SB 65 with a view to agreeing on this at CMA 8.



Image: UNFCCC Official

Response Measures

Response measures include a wide array of actions, policies and programmes to tackle climate change, and are dealt with under the Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, itself supported by the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI), which is currently implementing a work plan for 2026–2030.

In recent years, the agenda for response measures has focused primarily on the procedural and organisational aspects of the Forum and the KCI. Tensions have been high at both SB 62 and COP 30, with limited progress. Disagreements persist on key procedural issues and on fundamental aspects of the agenda item, including whether to discuss unilateral trade measures.

At SB 64, a contact group was mandated to consider case studies contained in the KCI's 2025 annual report; decide on input for the technical assessment component of the second Global Stocktake (GST 2); and build awareness on analysing and reporting on impacts of response measures.

From the outset, developing countries made it clear that response measures should not impose new burdens on developing countries and stressed that input to GST 2 should assess socioeconomic impacts, while also expressing concern about delays in the KCI's work. They also emphasised the importance of response measures not creating trade barriers. These themes were explored as part of a mandated technical event that considered the KCI's case studies on just transition, economic diversification, and impact assessment.

Discussions based on draft [SB 64 conclusions](#) and an [informal note](#) proved difficult, with multiple groups from both developed and developing countries voicing their disappointment. The main sticking point was the mandate for the KCI to prepare a synthesis report on response measures for GST 2's technical assessment. Developing countries, including the Arab Group and African Group, favoured a more detailed process, informed through submissions, considered at SB 65, before being submitted to GST 2.

On the other hand, developed countries, including the UK, Canada and Switzerland, preferred a less involved approach for the Parties, with the KCI preparing the report and submitting it directly to the GST 2's technical assessment phase. There were also disagreements over whether some elements included in the informal note were out of scope for the agenda item.

Despite lengthy discussions, running into the evening of the final day of SB 64, as part of a joint Heads of Delegation meeting on adaptation, mitigation and response measures, Parties were unable to converge and could only agree to pursue consideration of the matter at SB 65, without capturing progress.



Transparency

Transparency plays an important role as the first element of the Paris Agreement's reporting, review and compliance mechanisms. It serves to scrutinise and review actions and support provided by individual Parties. At COP 30, a valuable step forward was taken by establishing the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE), the primary institutional mechanism providing technical and capacity-building support to developing countries, as a permanent body – thereby ensuring the predictability of support ([Decision 9/CP.30](#)).

At SB 64 in Bonn, Parties considered reports mandated by CMA 7 to the Secretariat on [experiences and challenges](#) related to implementing the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) and [lessons learned](#) from supporting activities. G77 and China called for using the learnings from the reports to tailor supporting activities.

On capacity-building, Parties discussed what type of activities would have the most impact in terms of reach and effectiveness, and considered a workshop to be held at CMA 8.

On finance, the UK, supported by the EIG, EU, Norway, and Canada, opposed text expressing “deep concern” that the Global Environment Facility's ninth replenishment (GEF-9) resources are insufficient to meet developing countries' transparency-related needs, arguing that every project request under GEF-8 has been funded and that the GEF-9 replenishment is not yet concluded. These arguments reflect similar disagreements at COP 30 on any references to funding gaps.

With the [draft text](#) still heavily bracketed by the end of the session, evidencing persisting substantial disagreement between Parties, the co-facilitators suggested agreeing on procedural conclusions, with discussions to continue at SBI 65, possibly taking into account the draft text. The UK, however, opposed forwarding the draft text with the paragraph on concerns regarding GEF-9. With Parties unable to come to an agreement, in line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, the item will be included in the SBI 65 agenda.

Aside from the formal negotiations, a [high-level dialogue](#) was held in Bonn to provide a space for sharing success stories, lessons learned, and practical experiences from Parties that have successfully developed their reporting systems and submitted their first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). It was also an opportunity to discuss remaining challenges and identify ways to strengthen support for Parties' transparency reporting.

The event was the first of three high-level engagements due to be held this year to maintain political momentum for transparency implementation, including ensuring timely preparation of the second BTRs, strengthening of national transparency systems, and promoting inclusive progress so that all Parties can effectively participate in the ETF.



Agriculture

Agriculture plays a crucial role in global climate and socio-economic dynamics. It is a key source of greenhouse gas emissions, while also being highly exposed to the impacts of climate change. Addressed under both the Convention (Articles 2 and 4) and the Paris Agreement (indirectly through Articles 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10). Please see [LRI's explainer](#) on Agriculture for more details on its legal framework.

Following the conclusion of the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) at COP 27, the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security (SSJWA) was established to strengthen the implementation of climate action in agriculture and food security, through a set of activities and objectives.

Yet, progress in agriculture negotiations has been slow, and despite agriculture's prominent place in the COP 30 Action Agenda, signalling the Presidency's political motivation to prioritise agriculture, very limited progress was made. A long-standing disagreement remains between developing countries that place adaptation, resilience and the need to increase production to ensure food security as central to agriculture in the negotiations, and developed countries that emphasise mitigation and technology development as key, slowing negotiations in recent years.

These divergences led to mere procedural conclusions being adopted at COP 30, forwarding a [draft text](#), leaving much work to be done at SB 64 due to the SSJWA's mandate ending at COP 31 (November 2026).

On the basis of the draft text, and the [annual synthesis report](#) prepared by the secretariat on agriculture, Parties engaged in informal consultations, informal-informals, and the second in-session workshop on "progress, challenges and opportunities related to identifying needs and accessing means of implementation for climate action in agriculture and food security, including sharing of best practices."

Following disagreements over whether to integrate issues beyond the scope of the report from the SB 62 workshop, Parties were unable to agree on a substantive outcome.

Ultimately, Parties agreed to short [conclusions](#). However, various Parties highlighted in their closing plenaries that the lack of substantive progress was a real source of concern. The conclusions:

- ◆ Noted the report of the in-session workshop and the oral presentation at SB 63 by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) on the outcomes of the SCF 2025 Forum;
- ◆ Noted with appreciation the increasing number of Parties that include climate action on agriculture, food systems and food security through national planning documents;
- ◆ Noted the second annual synthesis report on work undertaken by relevant stakeholders on activities related to the joint work;
- ◆ Noted the organisation of the second in-session workshop held at SB 64; and
- ◆ Agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 65.



Research and Systematic Observation

Research and Systematic Observation (RSO) has become one of the ‘hot topics’ of negotiations in recent years, with discussions as fraught as those in other traditionally tense negotiation spaces.

Under RSO, Parties aim to promote and cooperate in scientific research and observation, and support the development of data archives. Both the UNFCCC (Articles 4.1(g) and 5) and the Paris Agreement (Articles 4.1, 7.5 and 14.1) entrench RSO as part of the core Party obligations. These include enhanced cooperation in climate-related research and monitoring, and responding to climate change based on the best available science. As such, the RSO workstream also plays an important role in coordinating work with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Responsibility for these negotiations falls on the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which addresses ‘Research’ when the SBSTA meets in June, and ‘Systematic observation’ when the SBSTA meets in November during the first week of the COP.

When Parties last met to discuss the Research aspect of the workstream, at SB 62 (June 2025), Parties heard from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) that 2024 was the warmest year on record. Despite that scientific backdrop, Parties made very little progress, with disagreements over the function of the IPCC, questions over the role and reliability of science, and discussions on 1.5°C-aligned pathways.

Engagement in climate-science negotiations has proven difficult across processes, with the IPCC still [unable](#) to agree on a timeline for the Seventh Assessment Report (AR7), and fundamental differences remaining across the board under the UNFCCC, generally between groups such as the LDCs, AOSIS, and the EU, and others such as the Arab Group and India. In these conditions, Parties engaged in the 18th meeting of the research dialogue, which focused on advances in climate modelling, pathways for sectoral transformation and understanding climate risks, impacts and tipping points.

Following a first week that saw little substantive progress and a first draft text rejected by AOSIS that emphasised it did not adequately reflect the discussions, the second week seemed to be closer to reaching some form of consensus, on the basis of an informal note published by the co-facilitators on the 16th of June. However, talks broke down on the unresolved issues, which included references to ongoing climate and weather patterns and keeping 1.5°C in reach.

Many Parties were frustrated that this led to a shorter text, backtracking on progress made in the negotiations, and fundamentally questioned some Parties’ view on the role of science. Concerning the Arab Group and India, they argue that questioning science is part of the scientific process and ensures assumptions are challenged.

On the sidelines of the formal negotiating process, several negotiators from Parties including the EU, Switzerland, Fiji, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Panama came together under the banner of ‘Friends of Science’ during a press conference to denounce “coordinated attacks” on climate science and attempts to sideline climate science. They offered a clear guarantee that they will stand firmly against this.

Finally, Parties were able to forward [draft conclusions](#) to the closing plenary, but were unable to agree to forward any document capturing progress made. The conclusions, amongst others:

- ◆ Noted the statements and updates provided by the Global Climate Observing System, the IPCC, the World Climate Research Programme and the WMO, and noted with concern that El Niño, predicted for 2026, would worsen the effects of climate change;
- ◆ Noted the need to enhance efforts to promote and support information integrity on climate change; and
- ◆ Welcomed the update on the AR7 and “looked forward to an agreement on the timeline”.

Administrative, Financial and Institutional Matters

Under the Administrative, Financial and Institutional Matters workstream, delegations come together to address issues such as the UNFCCC headquarters host-country agreement and the secretariat's budget and operational efficiency.

Ahead of SB 64, the SBI was invited to consider eight different documents containing information relating to, among others, the cost implications of the activities mandated at COP 30, the [UNFCCC 2025 delivery highlights](#), the budget's performance and process, funding concerns, [updates](#) to the secretariat's work programme for the biennium 2026–2027 and the programme's budget for that period.

Discussions on the budget this year were inevitably marked by the impact of the US' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which took effect on 27 January 2026, and the UNFCCC, which will take effect on 27 February 2027, and the subsequent cut to the UNFCCC's budget. Parties heard, during an informational event, that the US is currently the UNFCCC's largest contributor, contributing to just over 1/5 (EUR 16.9 million) of the UNFCCC's core budget.

In the draft decisions forwarded to [COP 31](#) and [CMP 21](#), Parties:

- ◆ Expressed concern regarding the high level of outstanding contributions to the core budget for current and previous bienniums;
- ◆ Invited Germany and the secretariat to prepare a report on the implementation of the UNFCCC Headquarters Agreement for consideration at SB 66 (June 2027) – this follows a statement made by Russia during the closing plenary of SB 62 requesting that a written report be prepared and examined as a separate agenda item at SB 64; and
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to further enhance efforts in identifying and implementing efficiency gains.

Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment

Under Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE), Parties advance the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement on promoting and facilitating education, training and public awareness. As established in Article 6 of the UNFCCC, ACE comprises six priority areas: climate change education, public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation in these areas.

At COP 26, held in Glasgow in 2021, Parties adopted the 10-year ACE work programme ([Decision 18/CP.26](#)), which was further refined through a four-year action plan adopted at COP 27, held in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022 ([Decision 23/CP.27](#)). COP 26 mandated SBI 64 to undertake a midterm review of the progress of the ACE work programme to evaluate its effectiveness, identify emerging gaps and needs and consider ways to improve it ([Decision 18/CP.26](#), para 11(g)).

With the ACE action plan's term coming to an end at COP 31 and the mandated midterm review underway, negotiators viewed ACE as an important topic to progress discussions at SB 64. Before the informal consultations took place, the annual Dialogue on Action for Climate Empowerment, alongside the interactive technical workshop, discussed potential elements of a new action plan, as agreed by the Parties at COP 30 ([Decision 17/CP.30](#), para 4).

At SBI 64, Parties suggested elements including youth participation, information integrity (supported by Brazil and Norway), and an impact-based monitoring framework. Norway and the EU also stressed that the new action plan should build on existing structures where possible. In addition, the Women and Gender Constituency called for mechanisms for effective participation and for intersectional activities.

Other proposals include activities to improve accessibility and availability of financial and technical support for ACE implementation, including support for the attendance of national ACE focal points by South Africa.

The EU also suggested training for teachers to provide education for sustainable development and the development of age-appropriate teaching materials.

When accepting views on the draft conclusions, co-facilitators heard proposals from the G77 and China to add: an invitation for submissions on the draft action plan; a request for the secretariat to develop a template for submissions; and a request for the secretariat, subject to the availability of resources, to organise a workshop in conjunction with Climate Week 4 in Azerbaijan on the role of national ACE focal points in supporting the implementation of the ACE Work Programme and its new action plan. This was met with some reluctance by other Parties, which warned of the budgetary implications of these additional activities within the ACE action plan.

Finally, in its [conclusions](#), the SBI:

- ◆ Welcomed the 2026 ACE Dialogue and technical workshop held to discuss potential elements for a new ACE action plan;
- ◆ Agreed to continue consideration of the midterm review of the ACE work programme on the basis of the [informal note](#) prepared at SBI 64;
- ◆ Invited submissions on the informal note, including proposals for strengthening existing activities and new elements by streamlining and merging current ideas in order to enhance the effectiveness of the new action plan;
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to prepare a compilation of the submissions for consideration at SBI 65;
- ◆ Recalled activity C.1 of the current action plan on building and strengthening the capacity and skills of national ACE Focal Points; and
- ◆ Invited the secretariat to continue providing capacity-building opportunities for national ACE Focal Points.



Gender and Climate Change

The Paris Agreement recognises gender equality and women's empowerment and calls on Parties to respect, promote, and consider these obligations when taking climate action. Articles 7, on the Global Goal on Adaptation, and 11, on capacity-building, further acknowledge the need for gender-responsive approaches.

Gender does not feature in the Convention. However, prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Parties established the Lima Work Programme on Gender ([Decision 18/CP.20](#)) at COP 20, held in Lima in 2014, to promote gender considerations and the participation of women in the UNFCCC's constituted bodies, and to advance gender-responsive climate policy and action.

At COP 30, in Belém, amongst intense political and cultural differences on gender interpretation, Parties adopted the new Belém Gender Action Plan for 2026–2034, a tool to support Parties in implementing climate action in a gender-responsive manner ([Decision 7/CP.30](#)). It identified five priority areas: capacity-building, knowledge management and communication; gender balance, participation and women's leadership; coherence; gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; and monitoring and reporting.

While there were no formal negotiations at SB 64 on gender, three mandated events took place:

› The Expert Dialogue on relevant issues in Gender and Age-Disaggregated Data and gender analysis

This [event](#) mapped what disaggregated data already exists, where good practices lie, and where data gaps remain. It also identified opportunities for enhancing coherence and persistent barriers.

› The In-Session Workshop on best practices and tools for strengthening the role of National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points

This [event](#) aimed to strengthen the effectiveness, clarity and institutional positioning of the focal points by clarifying and documenting their current needs and desired roles, facilitating peer learning, and identifying capacity-building needs.

› The Interactive Dialogue on Progress in the Delivery of Gender-Responsive Climate Finance

This [first annual dialogue](#) was designed to enable an evidence-based exchange, bringing together various stakeholders to assess progress, identify gaps and inform future action. However, tension appeared during this due to criticism, in particular from the [Women and Gender Constituency](#), that the climate funds merely reiterated their existing programming, instead of actively engaging with other stakeholders present on their responsibility to deliver gender-responsive outcomes.



Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings

The workstream on Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings (AIM) deals with how the UN climate negotiations are run rather than their substance. It covers the dates and venues of future sessions (for example, recent talks at COP 30 welcomed Ethiopia's offer to host COP 32 in 2027 and pressed the Western European and Others Group to confirm a COP 31 host), the organisation of COP/CMP/CMA meetings, the participation of observer organisations, and a growing push to improve the "efficiency" of the UNFCCC process. Though procedural, these outcomes matter: meeting schedules, session length, observer access and efficiency reforms all shape negotiating capacity, especially for smaller developing-country delegations.

Parties spent the first week engaging in discussions on AIM through three "baskets" as proposed by the co-facilitators:

- ◆ Future sessions including COP 31 provisions;
- ◆ How to increase the efficiency of the UNFCCC process;
- ◆ How to enhance the engagement of observers in the process.

In recent years, discussions have been very rich and lively, with Parties raising concerns about the multiplication of agenda items and events, and the challenges this represents for participation, especially for developing countries. This year, much of the discussion focused on the procedural issues raised in the closing plenary of COP 30, and calls for an inclusive, open, transparent and respectful approach to the rules of procedure.

Calls for improvement have been resisted by some groups of Parties for not being exclusively 'Party-driven' – i.e. including the secretariat or the Bureau, or an external report on the issue. In the background, finance discussions have also permeated the AIM discussion: failure to include the Climate Finance Work Programme on the SB agenda led to this request appearing in the AIM room in preparation for CMA 8.

At the end of the first week of negotiations, the co-facilitators produced text with draft conclusions, which was used as a basis for negotiations but met strong resistance from some groups on matters that sought to improve efficiency in the process.

During the second week, Parties continued discussions on process-related issues under three themes: (i) future sessions, including COP 31; (ii) improving the efficiency of UNFCCC processes; and (iii) the role of observers in the process.

The LDC Group and AOSIS highlighted issues related to logistics and visa access, with support from several other Parties. These concerns were directed primarily at Germany as the host of the Bonn sessions, as many participants continue to face difficulties obtaining German visas, whereas access to COP visas has generally been less problematic. The EU and EIG, supported by AILAC, also strongly pushed to make host country agreements and their annexes public and to include stronger safeguards on human rights, freedom of expression, and cost control.

With respect to the efficiency of UNFCCC processes, the Arab group and AGN expressed concern that efforts to improve efficiency could result in overly superficial processes, emphasising that the party-driven nature of negotiations must be preserved. Norway, the EU, and EIG supported measures to streamline the agenda and proposed multi-year planning. AILAC supported these measures, advocated for a stronger role for the Bureau in organising the agenda, and suggested preparing an expert report to inform the ongoing review of process efficiency, which the Arab group resisted. Drawing on the experience of the COP 30 closing plenary, AILAC also emphasised the need to reference the observance of the Rules of Procedure, transparency, and integrity in both negotiations and decision-making. Many groups echoed concerns regarding inclusivity and transparency in negotiations, including in the drafting of Presidency texts.

Regarding observers, the Disability Caucus highlighted that current UNFCCC structures lack adequate physical accessibility, sign language services, and simplified communication formats. The group called for formal recognition as an independent constituency. While references to persons with disabilities remained in the final text, the conclusions did not include a request to establish a new constituency.

The final two days of negotiations were significantly disrupted by a proposal from China to include a reference to [UN General Assembly Resolution 2758](#) concerning Taiwan. The proposed text contained strong language calling on Parties to avoid "sneaking" delegates into meetings through their national delegations. Several developed countries strongly opposed the proposal and engaged in extensive negotiations with China to soften the language.

After substantially reducing both the number and strength of the recommendations, Parties agreed on draft conclusions reflecting many of the issues discussed, including provisions on process efficiency that had initially faced strong resistance from the Arab group and AGN. AILAC and other groups requested the COP 31 Presidency to convene consultations on these matters, which raised strong opposition.

The [draft conclusions](#):

- ◆ Emphasised the importance of openness, transparency and inclusiveness, in making arrangements for sessions, and underscored the importance of open, transparent, inclusive, consultative and Party-driven processes in the conduct and negotiations and the preparation and adoption of decisions and conclusions;
- ◆ Reemphasised the importance of ensuring that participants can exercise human rights without fear of intimidation and repercussions while respecting, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities of the participants, the national laws and regulations in force in the host country;
- ◆ Requested that only legally qualified representatives be nominated by Parties to participate in sessions as Party and Party overflow delegates and requested Parties to carefully review and verify the registration of their delegations in this regard and to take

measures to prevent disruption of the integrity and order of the sessions and the process of negotiations;

- ◆ Recalled that host country agreements should reflect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, and the respective obligations under international human rights law, with a view to ensuring that sessions and mandated events are convened in places where human rights and fundamental freedoms are promoted and protected;
- ◆ Encouraged presiding officers to improve coordination in and enhance the efficiency, transparency and inclusiveness of the UNFCCC process through a range of recommendations;
- ◆ Noted challenges associated with the increasing number of mandated events and highlighted a set of measures aimed at improving the scheduling, coordination, organisation and efficiency of these events;
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to prepare an information paper, on the basis of Party submissions, with regard to the organisation of work and management of agendas and mandated events; and
- ◆ Requested the secretariat to prepare a paper, informed by submissions from Parties and observers on ways to urgently address the significantly increasing number of organisations admitted as observers to the UNFCCC process and the associated physical and logistical challenges.

FURTHER READING

For more on the COP 30 closing plenary, read the 'Reflections on the Closing Plenary' in [LRI's COP 30 summary](#).



Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue

The annual Dialogue on ocean-based climate action was mandated by COP 26 in Glasgow in 2021 ([Decision 1/CP.26](#), para. 61), with the first annual Dialogue taking place at SB 56 in June 2022. COP 27, in Sharm el-Sheikh, then built on the Dialogue, deciding that it would be facilitated by two co-facilitators selected biennially, responsible for selecting topics, conducting the Dialogue and preparing a summary report to be presented at the following COP ([Decision 1/CP.27](#), para. 49). The Dialogue has since taken place at the SB meetings in Bonn every year.

To kick off the Dialogue at SB 64, a COP 31 Presidency segment on the ocean took place, with Türkiye, Australia and, the Pacific Envoy for the Ocean. This was followed by panel sessions in which Parties and experts shared experiences and initiatives on one of the three Dialogue topics:

◆ **Integration of ocean-based priorities in NDCs:**

such as restoration and protection of marine ecosystems, sustainable food production, ocean-based renewables and transitioning away from fossil fuels, sustainable tourism, coastal resilience and marine transport emission reduction. This topic drew on the [Blue NDC Challenge](#), launched at the Third UN Ocean Conference by France and Brazil in 2025, which aimed to help countries integrate the ocean into their climate commitments.

◆ **Means of implementation:** encompassing access to finance, identifying practical pathways to unlock and scale predictable, accessible, and adequate ocean-related climate finance, and recognising that the framing of ocean-related commitments in the NDCs of SIDS and developing Parties, in particular, is often conditional on external support.

◆ **Alignment of ocean-climate-biodiversity synergies and international cooperation:**

practical approaches to improve coherence between the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and identifying areas for alignment across NDCs, NAPs, and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs).

After two days, the Dialogue came to an end, with the co-facilitators summarising the discussions, which highlighted, on the one hand, gaps remaining in the means of implementation as needs and existing financial mechanisms are mismatched. On the other hand, nature-based solutions, the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) [Agreement](#), and engagement from COP 31 Presidencies showed opportunities for cooperation and momentum building.

Despite broad support for continuing the Dialogue, several participants emphasised the need to see more operational outputs, the value of multi-year planning and integrating ocean focal points more directly in other institutional arrangements across UNFCCC processes, including the Global Stocktake.

 LRI EXPLAINER

For more information on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue, please see LRI's [explainer on Oceans within the UNFCCC process](#).



Mountains Dialogue

Historically, mountains have had little space for discussion in the UNFCCC process, despite appearing in both the preamble and the operative articles of the Convention. At COP 28, in Dubai, in 2023, a dedicated space for mountains was established. Under [Decision 1/CMA.5](#), as part of the outcome of the first global stocktake, the Dialogue on Mountains and Climate Change was established.

Following a first Dialogue at SB 60, and an absence from the schedule at SB 62, at COP 30, this Dialogue was proposed as an additional agenda item. This was resisted by various Parties and led to Presidency consultation on the matter. Those consultations ultimately led to the COP requesting the SB chairs to convene a Dialogue at SB 64, to discuss, inter alia, the need to hold an annual mountain Dialogue ([COP 30 Report](#), paras. 40–42).

At SB 64, therefore, participants engaged in discussions on the basis of a [concept note](#) prepared by the secretariat to share lessons and support needs for mountain climate action across national plans, explore entry points within UNFCCC processes to address mountain-related risks and solutions, and consider options, including an annual Dialogue, for continuous engagement on mountains and climate change.

Throughout the Dialogue, participants stressed that the challenges and opportunities in mountain environments should be consistently reflected across agenda items (including adaptation, means of implementation, loss and damage, and research and systematic observation). Participants also identified synergies with other multilateral environmental agreements.

It was clear that, although the importance of addressing challenges and opportunities in mountain environments was not in question, many Parties were concerned that making this an annual Dialogue would add processes to a UNFCCC system already overwhelmed.

The co-facilitators will prepare and publish a summary report of the Dialogue, and the SB chairs will make an oral presentation on it in their reports to COP 31.



Photo: UNFCCC Secretariat

Climate Change and Trade Dialogue

At SB 64, Parties held the first UNFCCC Trade and Climate Dialogue, established under the COP 30 Global Mutirão decision ([Decision I/CMA.7](#)) following consultations by the COP 30 Presidency on proposals to address trade-related concerns within the UNFCCC negotiations agenda. The Dialogue was designed to examine the growing interaction between climate policies and international trade, and it is the first in a series of three trade dialogues to take place at SB 64, SB 66 (June 2027), and SB 68 (June 2028), with a high-level event to follow.

The initiative emerged from concerns — particularly among developing countries— that climate-related trade measures, such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms (including the EU's CBAM), environmental due diligence requirements, and value-chain-related restrictions, are increasingly being developed outside the UNFCCC framework despite their significant implications for countries' ability to implement their NDCs and pursue sustainable development.

Participants first heard presentations from trade-related organisations before delivering statements and interventions guided by questions designed to explore both the opportunities and challenges associated with trade in the context of climate action and its relationship to the UNFCCC process.

Developing-country groups, including the G77 and China, the Arab Group, AGN, BASIC, AILAC, and the LDC Group, emphasised concerns that unilateral climate-related trade measures could create barriers to trade, increase compliance costs, and constrain development opportunities. These groups called for greater attention to equity, CBDR-RC, capacity-building, and financial support. Developed countries, by contrast, highlighted the potential of trade to accelerate the diffusion of clean technologies, mobilise sustainable investment, and support the transition to low-carbon economies.

› SB Chairs follow-up meeting and next steps

Following the Dialogue, Parties requested more clarification on the next steps, as some developed country Parties used legal arguments to prevent the drafting of a yearly report and indicated that while the Dialogue was still in place, it would not be possible to have an agenda item. The SB Chairs hosted a follow-up meeting on the Climate Change and Trade Dialogue to respond to Parties' questions, where they shared the secretariat's legal guidance that paragraph 57 of the Global Mutirão decision, which established the Dialogue series, does not provide for a report or other formal follow-up from the Dialogue sessions, however, noting that the Dialogue held at SB 64 was webcast and statements will be available on the secretariat website.

The Arab Group, African Group and LMDCs considered this insufficient and called for a written report documenting the Dialogue. The EU noted that a report is mandated, but only after completion of the three Dialogues and the high-level event. The Umbrella Group opposed reopening "carefully balanced decisions" and supported the secretariat's interpretation.

The Philippines asked whether the SB Chairs could produce a report on their own authority. SBI Chair Gardiner explained that, according to the secretariat, there is no mandate for an official report, although the Chairs could issue an informal record at their discretion.

On whether the Global Mutirão's request for a report after the high-level event could justify a new agenda item, Gardiner clarified that it could not. She noted, however, that Parties may propose new agenda items under the draft rules of procedure. Several Parties again supported establishing a permanent agenda item on trade and climate. For now, however, the Dialogue will continue on an annual basis through 2028, and the SB Chairs will prepare an "informal note under their own authority and with no legal status" as a record for the incoming SB Chairs to take into account as they prepare for the next two Dialogues.



Cooperation with Other International Organisations

Consultations on cooperation with other international organisations under SBSTA 64 again exposed deep divisions over the scope and future of the agenda item. At the outset, Parties reviewed the [secretariat's summary](#) of cooperative activities with UN entities and international organisations, with many stressing the value of greater synergies among the Rio Conventions to improve coherence, avoid duplication, and make better use of limited resources. Others, however, warned against mandate creep, duplication, accountability gaps, and overstepping the jurisdiction of other treaty regimes, and argued that cooperation through the [Joint Liaison Group](#) was already sufficient.

As the discussions progressed, delegations diverged on what future work should look like. Some Parties called for technical cooperation, capacity-building, transparency, finance, and the impacts of unilateral trade measures, while others proposed strengthening the Joint Liaison Group through stakeholder engagement, side events, and information-sharing. The main fault line remained whether the item should continue at SBSTA 65 or be deferred to SBSTA 66, with some Parties also supporting closure of the item at SBSTA 64.

By the final round of consultations, delegates were considering a [revised draft](#) that would keep discussions within the item's existing scope and allow exchanges on opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of the Joint Liaison Group and cooperation with other international organisations.

The revised text also left open the possibility of continuing consideration at SBSTA 66 and noted possible consultations by the SBSTA Chair in conjunction with COP 31, but Pacific SIDS conditioned their support on Chair-led consultations at COP 31, which the secretariat said was not procedurally possible. Ultimately, no agreement was reached, and under Rule 16 of the draft Rules of Procedure, this item will be included in the provisional agenda of the next session.



Road to Antalya

› A unique presidential arrangement

COP 31 will take place in Antalya, Türkiye, under special institutional arrangements. Under the usual practice of regional rotation, the President and host country are selected by consensus within the relevant UN regional group – in this case, Western Europe and Others Group. Since both Australia and Türkiye campaigned to preside and host, they reached a deadlock that was resolved at COP 30 through an arrangement that keeps physical hosting in Türkiye, but divides substantive functions traditionally associated with the COP Presidency.

Under the [arrangement](#), Türkiye retains the formal COP 31 Presidency. Türkiye will host the conference in Antalya and its President–Designate, Murat Kurum, will exercise the functions formally associated with the COP President under the draft Rules of Procedure, including opening and closing the session, presiding over meetings, overseeing the adoption of decisions and determining whether consensus has been reached. The Presidency has also indicated they will focus strongly on promoting implementation through the action agenda, which entails non-negotiated initiatives promoted in parallel to the negotiations.

Australia, on the other hand, assumes primary responsibility for the substantive conduct of negotiations. Australia’s Climate Minister, Chris Bowen, will serve as the newly created “COP President of Negotiations”, with delegated “exclusive authority” over the negotiations. His functions include convening consultations throughout the year, preparing communications, selecting ministerial and other co-facilitators, advancing relevant mandates, preparing draft negotiating texts, and engaging with the secretariat on the negotiations.

In practice, the arrangement separates formal procedural authority from substantive political and technical leadership. Australia places particular emphasis on Pacific priorities, including through the Pre-COP in Fiji and Leaders’ Gathering in Tuvalu, and the appointment of Pacific Climate Envoys covering 1.5°C, access to climate finance and oceans. The stated objective is to ensure that the experience and priorities of vulnerable Pacific states inform the COP 31 process.

In Bonn, the Presidencies met jointly with all negotiation groups and held consultations, highlighting that the collaboration aims to deliver efficient results through transparent and predictable negotiations. Türkiye re-emphasised their intention to promote the action agenda, with a strong focus on electrification, amongst other priorities.



LRI PUBLICATION

It is yet to be seen how the arrangement works in practice. More information and analysis on legal aspects and the modalities of this arrangement is available in the LRI [publication](#) on this topic.

› COP 31 Priorities

COP priorities are often defined, amongst others, by the negotiation’s own agenda, for example, important processes like the Global Stocktake happening every 5 years; or the deadline set to agree on a new collective quantified goal by 2025. They can also be shaped by presidencies and their priorities, which are often communicated in consultations, presidential letters and in the negotiation sessions preceding the COP itself.

› COP 31 is framed primarily as an “Implementation COP.”

The central political message from both presidencies is that the Paris Agreement framework is working, but implementation needs to accelerate. The Turkish Presidency repeatedly emphasises moving from commitments to “concrete, measurable and implementation-oriented outcomes”, building on COP 30 and the first Global Stocktake.

This includes implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The Belém Mission to 1.5, led jointly by the COP 29, COP 30 and COP 31 Presidencies, is intended to identify barriers and opportunities to accelerate NDC and NAP implementation, strengthen international cooperation and mobilise investment. Importantly, the Presidency says that its work will be informed by “best-available science and evidence.”

The Turkish Presidency seeks to connect negotiated outcomes with implementation on the ground. The Action Agenda focuses particularly on areas such as electrification and energy transition, circular economy/zero waste, resilient cities and infrastructure, sustainable agriculture and food systems, green industrial transformation and climate finance.

› The Presidencies signal continuity across the Paris Agreement workstreams.

Their joint letter specifically identifies mitigation, adaptation, finance, just transition, agriculture and transparency, the Global Stocktake, trade and finance dialogues, oceans, response measures, and gender. It also signals interest in ensuring that existing work programmes and reviews remain responsive to the changing context and can deliver implementation.

However, they also place some emphasis on the need for stronger adaptation action and greater adaptation finance. It commits to inclusive and science-based adaptation, implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation, progress on the Belém–Addis Vision and Baku Adaptation Roadmap, and work on loss and damage.

Similarly, the letters call for scaling climate finance from all sources, aligning investment flows with climate goals, and recognising the continuing importance of public finance. This is presented as essential to translating commitments into implementation.

Finally, reflecting a priority emerging from the negotiation timeline, they highlight the importance of reaching a decision that develops further and establishes a just transition mechanism.

› “Dialogue, Consensus and Action” are the three organising principles in the process

Türkiye and Australia present these as the guiding principles for the process towards Antalya. The emphasis is on an inclusive, balanced, transparent and results-oriented process, with the objective of bringing Parties' different positions towards common ground. This aims to ensure that many of the procedural issues that have plagued the UNFCCC during recent years do not resurface in Antalya, thereby beginning to rebuild trust in the process.



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