Human and environmental rights under the Paris Agreement’s carbon markets

Query:

Art 6.4

• What protections does the Art 6.4 mechanism have to prevent human and environmental rights abuses?
• What procedure has the SBM adopted to enable individuals and communities to assert their rights should issues arise?
• What role, if any, will domestic redress procedures play?

Art 6.2

• How are human and environmental rights abuses prevented under bilateral or multilateral agreements to implement Art 6.2 instruments?
• If these agreements are not publicly available, how will individuals and communities be able to assert their rights?
• Does the manner in which countries choose to prevent such abuses vary significantly and/or is there some type of “best practice”?

 

Advice:

Summary

The implementation of Articles 6.4 and 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, which focus on cooperative approaches and market-based mechanisms, raises critical questions regarding the protection of human and environmental rights. While both Articles aim to enhance climate action through international cooperation, the effectiveness of their safeguards varies significantly. Article 6.4 includes a centralized oversight mechanism, which provides some degree of protection, while much of the responsibility for ensuring rights protection under Article 6.2 lies with national frameworks and bilateral agreements. The following summary highlights the main findings related to these protections, including the importance of transparency, stakeholder participation, and accessible grievance mechanisms.

Article 6.4: The Centralized Mechanism

• Safeguards and Oversight: Article 6.4 includes a centralized governance structure through the Supervisory Body, which is currently developing rules to protect human rights and prevent environmental harm.
• Rights Protection Tools: Protections include a Grievance Procedure, required stakeholder participation, and sustainable development criteria, as requested by Decision 3/CMA.3.
• Participation of Communities: The mechanism promotes early engagement of affected stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and local communities.
• Climate Finance: A share of proceeds from carbon crediting is directed to the Adaptation Fund, supporting vulnerable countries and enhancing equity.
• Accountability: The Grievance Procedure provides a structured channel for communities to assert their rights.

Article 6.2 – Bilateral/Multilateral Cooperation

• Lack of Central Oversight: Unlike Article 6.4, there is no supervisory body or mandatory grievance mechanism under Article 6.2. Safeguards depend on national frameworks and bilateral decisions.
• Transparency Gaps: Many agreements are not publicly disclosed, limiting the ability of communities to understand or challenge potential impacts.
• Variation Across Countries: Protections vary significantly by country depending on legal frameworks, political will, and capacity to enforce safeguards.
• Best Practices Emerging: These include requiring public consultation, integrating international human rights standards, ensuring project-level transparency, and offering domestic redress avenues.
• Domestic Systems Are Key: Without international oversight, domestic redress procedures play a critical role in providing access to remedies, making strong national institutions essential.
• Access to Justice Barrier: If agreements and related project information remain confidential, rights-holders may be unable to assert their rights, weakening accountability.

 

1. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement, adopted at the 21^st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in 2015, marked one of the greatest milestones in climate change history. A total of 195 parties (194 countries plus the European Union) committed to more sustainable development through an action plan to limit global warming to well below 2.0°C, and with the hope of achieving a maximum of 1.5°C. This commitment is reflected in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Countries that are party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are also party to the Paris Agreement.[1]

 

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes both market and non-market (or non-trade) mechanisms within the UNFCCC framework to enhance the ambition of countries’ NDCs through reporting systems and review cycles. These mechanisms aim to ensure equitable and equal treatment, while facilitating the accreditation and transfer of emission reduction activities between countries. Additionally, they incentivize private sector investment in climate solutions and mandate that a share of the revenues generated supports the Adaptation Fund. During recent Conferences of the Parties (COPs), some important points on Article 6 were particularly achieved:

 

• Guidelines for cooperative approaches, in which Parties to bilateral agreements recognize the transfer of emission reductions between them. This allows mitigation programs, such as countries’ emissions trading systems, to be linked to each other.

 

• Adoption of rules, modalities, and procedures that enable a Market-Based Mechanism within the UNFCCC, to facilitate the crediting of activities seeking emission reductions and essentially support the transfer of these reductions between countries. It also incentivizes the private sector to invest in climate solutions. This would allow a company located in one country to reduce emissions locally. These reductions could then be credited (traded) to another company present in another country. The second company could use these reductions to meet its own emission reduction targets or obligations or to help it achieve carbon neutrality (zero carbon).

 

• Adoption of a work program to support non-trade approaches implemented among the Parties. The work program assists individual countries and their institutions and stakeholders in developing cooperation in several areas (e.g., clean energy development).

 

Additionally, Article 6.4 allowed the structuring of a centralized carbon crediting mechanism, now known as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), which replaces the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and is supervised by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body. This high-integrity mechanism facilitates the identification and implementation of verifiable emission reductions, attracting funding and enabling cooperation between countries and other stakeholders.

2. Article 6.4

What protections does the Art 6.4 mechanism have to prevent human and environmental rights abuses? 

The Article 6.4 mechanism of the Paris Agreement, which establishes the new centralized carbon crediting system, starts to incorporate protections aimed at preventing human and environmental rights abuses, though these are still evolving and subject to ongoing negotiation and operationalization.[2] The Article 6.4 Supervisory Body (SBM) develops rules and regulations under the guidance of the CMA, which include standards, procedures and tools.

• Sustainable Development Requirements

As mandated by Decision 3/CMA.3 on the rules, modalities and procedures for the Article 6.4  mechanism, the Supervisory Body developed a sustainable development tool to ensure projects under Article 6.4 contribute to sustainable development in host countries. This broad requirement, if robustly implemented, should promote environmental integrity and respect for social and human rights. According to the sustainable development tool version 01.1,[3] its objective is to ensure the projects and/or article 6.4 programme of activities comply with the prevention principle, foster sustainable development and contribute to the achievement of the sustainable development goals. However, the definition and enforcement of “sustainable development” remain largely within the purview of the host country, which can be a weak point unless coupled with strong safeguards and transparency mechanisms.[4]

• Stakeholder Consultation

The rules, modalities and procedures for the Article 6.4 mechanism also require that meaningful stakeholder engagement be carried out before project approval. This includes engaging local communities, Indigenous Peoples, and other affected stakeholders to ensure their rights and perspectives are considered in project design and implementation.[5]

Stakeholder consultation is a mandatory requirement for all projects under the Article 6.4 mechanism, as set out in A6.4-STAN-AC-002 (Article 6.4 activity standard for projects – version 2.0). Project participants must conduct a local (and, where appropriate, subnational) stakeholder consultation for every proposed project, ensuring that representatives of local communities, indigenous peoples and relevant local authorities who are directly affected by the project are invited to participate.

The consultation must be open and transparent, providing stakeholders with accessible information about the project, its potential positive and negative impacts, and the means to submit comments. Information should be delivered in an appropriate way, including oral communication where literacy is a barrier, and stakeholders must be given reasonable time to respond.[6]

Project participants are required to summarise all comments received and to explain in the project documentation how these comments were taken into account, providing justification for any that were not incorporated.[7]

After the consultation, stakeholders may submit complaints to the host Party’s designated national authority (DNA) if they believe their input was not properly considered, and these complaints must be addressed before project validation is concluded.[8]

Stakeholder engagement continues after project registration. Project participants must maintain a channel for local stakeholders to comment on the project’s implementation and operation throughout the crediting period, and must review and address any comments received, reporting on how these were addressed in subsequent monitoring reports.[9]

• Grievance Procedure

The SBM launched an Appeal and Grievance Procedure on 2 May 2024, as mandated by Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Annex, paragraph 62. This procedure allows affected people to raise concerns or complaints about projects and creating a potential accountability route in cases of rights violations or environmental harm. The Grievance procedure is further elaborated under the next answer.

• Environmental Integrity and Human Rights Language

The Decision 3/CMA.3 from the Glasgow COP 26 states that the Article 6.4 mechanism shall “respect, promote and consider human rights and the rights of Indigenous Peoples” in line with the preamble of the Paris Agreement. This is not legally binding in the same way as treaty articles, but it sets normative expectations for the mechanism’s operations.[10]

• Avoidance of Negative Environmental and Social Impacts

Host countries and project developers are encouraged to conduct Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs). While not explicitly required under Article 6.4, this is considered good practice and often necessary to meet sustainable development criteria and international funding standards.[11]

• Transparency and Reporting

The Article 6.4 mechanism requires publicly available information about approved activities, including how sustainable development benefits and stakeholder inputs have been addressed. This transparency helps civil society monitor compliance and advocate for rights-respecting implementation.[12]

What procedure has the SBM adopted to enable individuals and communities to assert their rights should issues arise?

The Article 6.4 Supervisory Body (SBM) of the Paris Agreement established an Appeal and Grievance Procedure, [13] as mandated by Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Annex, paragraph 62. The Appeal and Grievance Procedure entered into force on 2 May 2024 and so far has not been resorted to. Decision 3/CMA.3 requested the SBM to ‘develop provisions for the development and approval of methodologies, validation, registration, monitoring, verification and certification, issuance, renewal, first transfer from the mechanism registry, voluntary cancellation and other processes pursuant to chapters V.B–L and VIII of the annex (Delivering overall mitigation in global emissions)’.[14] This provides the mandate for the SBM to develop the appeal and grievance processes.[15]

The Grievance Procedure is designed to be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable and transparent, and the SBM is required to review and revise the procedure as needed based on experience and stakeholder input.[16]

The Grievance Procedure enables individuals, communities, and organizations (grievants) who are directly or potentially adversely affected by a registered Article 6.4 activity to submit a grievance for consideration. To be eligible, grievants must demonstrate a connection to the jurisdiction where the activity in question is implemented, a substantial presence in the affected geographic area, and a concrete, tangible, and particularized claim of harm to health, property, the local environment or other interest.[17]

A grievance may only be submitted in respect of adverse effects of a social, economic or environmental nature that are suffered or may be suffered by local individuals, communities or businesses as a direct consequence of the implementation or treatment of a registered Article 6.4 activity.[18] Complaints about the general design or operation of the Article 6.4 mechanism itself are not eligible for the Grievance Procedure.[19]

The process begins with the submission of a grievance form via a dedicated interface on the UNFCCC website, which must include details of the grievant, their relationship to the activity, a description of the adverse effect, suggested remedies, and any supporting documentation. The secretariat checks the completeness of the submission and, if complete, appoints a panel of three independent experts to review the grievance. The panel determines eligibility and, if the grievance is accepted, the secretariat publishes it on the UNFCCC website.[20]

The grievance panel then considers the case and, within 14 days of publication, issues recommendations or rejects the grievance. [21] Recommendations may include corrective actions for activity participants, advice to the host Party’s national authority, or suggestions to the Supervisory Body for temporary suspension of issuance or renewal until the issue is addressed. The panel may also make general recommendations for revisions to Article 6.4 rules or find that the grievance is not substantiated.[22]

The outcome is published on the UNFCCC website and communicated to the grievant and relevant parties.[23] If recommendations are made to a national authority, the secretariat will follow up three months later to inquire about actions taken and publish the outcome. The panel’s recommendations are not binding, and the panel does not have the authority to award monetary compensation. The conclusion of the panel is final and not subject to further appeal.

If the grievance panel issues recommendations, the secretariat shall, three months after the issuance of such recommendations, contact the DNA of the host Party to inquire about actions taken by the national authority based on the recommendations, report its findings to the Supervisory Body, and publish the outcome of the inquiry on the UNFCCC website.[24] As of October 2025, the procedure has not been used.

What role, if any, will domestic redress procedures play? 

Domestic redress procedures are expected to play a complementary role in the implementation of the Article 6.4 mechanism by providing an initial or parallel avenue for individuals and communities to assert their rights in the context of carbon market activities.

While the SBM of the Paris Agreement has established the Grievance Procedure, the effectiveness of safeguards will also depend on the capacity and willingness of host countries to uphold national environmental, social, and human rights standards. Domestic mechanisms, such as administrative courts, environmental tribunals, or human rights ombudspersons, can offer context-specific remedies and are often more accessible for affected stakeholders.

Moreover, host countries are responsible for authorizing and overseeing Article 6.4 activities on their territory, making domestic legal systems crucial for ensuring that sustainable development criteria and stakeholder engagement obligations are fulfilled. Therefore, while the Grievance Procedure under the Supervisory Body will provide an important accountability layer at the international level, strong and accessible domestic redress systems remain essential to prevent and resolve harms on the ground.

 

3. Article 6.2

 

Through Article 6.2, countries can bilaterally transfer Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) or mitigation results for the purpose of proposing and achieving more ambitious NDCs. These units represent emissions reductions or removals generated in one country.

How are abuses of human and environmental rights prevented under bilateral or multilateral agreements to implement Art 6.2 instruments?

Under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, which governs cooperative approaches through bilateral or multilateral agreements between countries, the prevention of human and environmental rights abuses relies primarily on the discretion and due diligence of the participating Parties. Unlike the more centralized oversight under Article 6.4, there is no mandatory global grievance mechanism or supervisory body for Article 6.2 transactions. However, participating countries are required to ensure that cooperative approaches promote sustainable development and environmental integrity,[25] and they must report on these topics through biennial transparency reports as part of the enhanced transparency framework.[26]

Compliance with reporting requirements is ensured through a dedicated review process, involving a centralized review of submitted information, with the Article 6 Technical Expert Review Team’s (TERT) report informing the Technical Expert Review (TER) process under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). To further enhance transparency, at COP 29 a centralized public platform for tracking authorisation details was launched, complemented by mandatory regular reporting to enhance accountability.

Although the reports focus on environmental integrity (ie. avoiding double counting), these reports are expected to include information on stakeholder engagement, impact assessments, and consistency with national policies.[27] Consequently, the prevention of rights abuses under Article 6.2 hinges on the robustness of national safeguards frameworks, the integration of human rights standards into bilateral agreements, and the transparency and accountability measures countries choose to adopt, as well as transparency and reporting requirements at the UNFCCC.

Moreover, the UNFCCC secretariat has developed an international registry to track ITMOs and Parties can choose to use either their own registries or international ones. Notably, COP29 also made some progress in this area by enabling registry-to-registry connectivity and authorising the use of UNFCCC systems for Parties that lack domestic infrastructure. Through Decision 4/CMA.6, the CMA provided further guidance on the international registry, including on its interoperability.[28]

If these agreements are not publicly available, how will individuals and communities be able to assert their rights?

If bilateral or multilateral agreements under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement are not publicly available, it significantly undermines the ability of individuals and communities to assert their rights, as they lack access to the information needed to understand how these cooperative arrangements may impact them or whether safeguards are in place. Transparency is a cornerstone of accountability, and without it, affected stakeholders cannot effectively participate in decision-making, raise concerns, or seek remedies.

While countries are expected to report on cooperative approaches through biennial transparency reports under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, these reports may not provide sufficient detail or be timely enough for communities to act. Therefore, unless Parties commit to publishing the full text of their Article 6.2 agreements and disclosing project-level information, including impact assessments and stakeholder consultation processes, the practical ability of rights-holders to access remedies and influence outcomes remains severely limited. Public access to information, aligned with the principles of the Escazú Agreement in Latin America and the Caribbean or the Aarhus Convention in Europe, is thus essential for rights protection in the implementation of Article 6.2.

Does the manner in which countries choose to prevent such abuses vary significantly and/or is there some type of “best practice”?

The way countries choose to prevent human and environmental rights abuses under Article 6 mechanisms, particularly Article 6.2, could vary significantly, as there is no uniform, binding framework for safeguards across all Parties. The differences stem from differences in national legal systems, institutional capacities, political priorities, and levels of civil society engagement.

Countries with more robust environmental governance systems and human rights protections could integrate impact assessments, stakeholder consultation processes, and grievance mechanisms directly into their Article 6.2 agreements or national authorization procedures. Other countries may lack these institutional safeguards or apply them inconsistently.

However, emerging “best practices” include ensuring early and meaningful stakeholder engagement, particularly with indigenous peoples and local communities; incorporating social and environmental safeguards aligned with international standards (e.g. UNDRIP, ILO 169); requiring public disclosure and transparency in a simplified language; and establishing accessible redress mechanisms at the national level. While not mandatory, these elements are increasingly recommended in guidance documents by institutions, such as the UNFCCC Secretariat[29] and the World Bank,[30] setting a normative standard for responsible Article 6 implementation.

Practical cases of bilateral agreements under Article 6.2

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, a growing number of countries have entered into bilateral agreements under Article 6.2 to facilitate the transfer of ITMOs.

As of September 2025, there are 102 such bilateral agreements between 62 countries, with 162 pilot activities recorded globally, out of which 133 stem from Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism as explained further below. The full list of pilot activities can be found here – see “Bilateral cooperation between Parties”. Below are a few notable examples of bilateral agreements (amongst many):

Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism

Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) aims to facilitate diffusion of leading decarbonizing technologies and infrastructure through investment by Japanese entities, thereby contributing to GHG emission reductions or removals and sustainable development in partner countries.

The JCM contributes to the achievement of both countries’ NDCs by evaluating Japan’s contributions in a quantitative manner and acquiring the part of credit.

The JCM accounts for most of the pilot activities. As of August 2025, the JCM partnership document is signed with 31 countries including most recently India.

Singapore and Thailand

In August 2025, Singapore and Thailand signed an Implementation Agreement on carbon credits collaboration under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The Implementation Agreement establishes a framework for the generation and transfer of carbon credits from carbon mitigation projects aligned with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Project developers can leverage this framework to develop high-quality carbon credit projects that are aligned with the Article 6 rulebook.

Switzerland

Switzerland has concluded a total of 15 bilateral agreements with Chile, Dominica, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Vanuatu. Host countries would gain accelerated low-carbon development as well as environmental and social benefits, while Switzerland can claim emission reductions, as defined in its NDC under the Paris Agreement.[31] Below are two examples of the bilateral agreements:

Switzerland and Ghana

Switzerland and Ghana have signed a bilateral agreement under Article 6.2 in 2020, which includes articles on environmental integrity and sustainable development. The implementation roadmap of the agreement includes several mitigation activities including inter alia the deployment of non-utility scale solar systems; the dissemination of clean cook stoves and/or enhanced waste management. One ITMO project on sustainable rice cultivation, which is the first project to obtain formal authorisation for the transfer of ITMOs from a seller country and buyer country, is supporting the training of thousands of rice farmers in climate-smart agricultural practices to reduce methane emissions and enable a more efficient use of water. Another project, for which the Ghana’s Environmental protection agency has established a Public Private Partnership with IRECOP, will generate ITMOs from four composting facilities.

Switzerland and Vanuatu 

A bilateral agreement was signed in November 2021, which include the electrification of Vanuatu’s Inhabited Islands through Solar Power ITMO Programme.[32] Solar power is intended to replace fossil fuel-based generators, which contribute to reducing emissions and enhance access to energy to remote communities.

These examples demonstrate the diversity and ambition of Article 6.2 bilateral cooperation. Projects range from clean energy and transport to agriculture and waste management, and they are designed to deliver both climate and sustainable development benefits.

Overall, these practical cases illustrate that Article 6.2 cooperation is already underway, with a diverse range of countries and project types involved.

[1] Iran, Libya, Yemen have signed the Paris Agreement but not ratified it, and the USA began the withdrawal process to the Paris Agreement in 2025.

[2] UNFCCC Article 6.4 Supervisory Body official webpage:
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/constituted-bodies/article-64-supervisory-body#Membership-SBM-2024. See also: A6.4-SBM014-A04. Article 6.4 sustainable development tool.

[3] The Sustainable Development Tool version 01.1 entered into force on 9 October 2024.

[4] Paris Agreement, Article 6.4(a): “…to promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development.”; CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Annex, para 40(a): Activity participants shall describe how the activity promotes sustainable development in the host Party.

[5] CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Annex, para 31(e): Stakeholders, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities, must be engaged in consultations.

[6] Article 6.4 Mechanism, Standard – Article 6.4 Activity Standard for Projects A6.4-STAN-AC-002 version 02.0 appendix 2 on ‘Modalities of local stakeholder consultation’ paras 6-13.

[7] Article 6.4 Mechanism, Standard – Article 6.4 Activity Standard for Projects A6.4-STAN-AC-002 version 02.0 para 85.

[8] Article 6.4 Mechanism, Standard – Article 6.4 Activity Standard for Projects A6.4-STAN-AC-002 version 02.0 appendix 2 on ‘Modalities of local stakeholder consultation’ paras 14-15.

[9] Article 6.4 Mechanism, Standard – Article 6.4 Activity Standard for Projects A6.4-STAN-AC-002 version 02.0 para 87.

[10] Paris Agreement, Preamble: Parties should “respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, children…”; CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Preamble and Annex, para 24(a -ix): Reinforces that human rights language in the preamble must be considered in Article 6 implementation.

[11] CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Annex, para 31(i-iv): Activity participants shall demonstrate consideration of potential environmental and social impacts, and mitigation measures where appropriate. SBSTA documents and Supervisory Body technical papers discuss guidance for safeguards and impact assessments.

[12] CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021), Annex, para 25(v): Requires publication of information on approved activities, issuance of credits, sustainable development contributions, and stakeholder engagement outcomes. Article 6.4 Mechanism Registry (under development) will make such data publicly accessible.

[13] Article 6.4 Mechanism, Appeal and grievance processes under the Article 6.4 mechanism version 01.0 (A6.4-PROC-GOV-006).

[14]  CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021) para 5(a).

[15] See Supervisory Body Article 6.4 Mechanism, Information Note: Decision and Documentation Framework version 01.0 A6.4 INFO GOV 005 paras 5-7 accessible at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/A6.4-INFO-GOV-005.pdf for information on the decision hierarchy between the CMA and Supervisory Body. Paragraph 6 states: ‘The Supervisory Body has authority over and provides guidance to the activities and processes of the Article 6.4 mechanism. All decisions taken by the Supervisory Body elaborate upon and must be consistent with decisions of the CMA.’ The adoption of the Appeal and Grievance Procedure mandated by the CMA consists in a regulatory decision, as explained in para 8. Procedures adopted by the Supervisory Body are defined in paragraph 9 as ‘mandatory series of actions that must be undertaken to demonstrate in a uniform and consistent way that the Supervisory Body, the secretariat, activity participants, DOEs/AEs, and designated national authorities (DNAs) comply with the RMP and the standards issued by the Supervisory Body.’ and are subordinate to CMA decisions.

[16] CMA Decision 3/CMA.3 (2021) para 82. More information on the Appeal and Grievance Process can be found here: https://unfccc.int/appeals-grievances.

[17] Article 6.4 Mechanism, Procedure – Appeal and Grievance Processes under the Article 6.4 Mechanism version 01.0 para 35.

[18] ibid 36.

[19] ibid 37.

[20] Ibid 38.

[21] ibid 45.

[22] ibid 46-47.

[23] ibid 48.

[24] ibid 52.

[25] Decision 2/CMA.3, Annex, para 18(h).

[26] Paris Agreement, Article 13.

[27] Decision 2/CMA.3, Annex, para 18(i).

[28] CMA Decision 4/CMA.6 (2025) para 49: Clarifies that the connection of the Article 6.4, mechanism registry and participating Party registries to the international registry shall enable the ability to pull and view data and information on holdings and the action history of authorized Article 6.4, emission reductions and enable the transfer of authorized Article 6.4, emission reductions as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to the international  registry, consistent with the interoperability arrangements applicable to all registries.

[29] UNFCCC secretariat, Article 6.2 Reference Manual for the Accounting, Reporting and Review of Cooperative Approaches version 3 (2025).

[30] World Bank, Ensuring Environmental Integrity under Article 6 Mechanisms (2021).

[31] UNFCCC, Switzerland’s Second Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement 2031-2035 (2025) 19.

[32] UNFCCC,     Report on the technical expert review under Article        6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement of the initial report referred to in chapter IV.A (initial report) of the annex to decision 2/CMA.3 of Vanuatu (2025) FCCC/A6/IRTERR.1/2024/VUT              Available          at: <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/a6_irterr1_2024_VUT.pdf#:~:text=7.%20Vanuatu%20submitted%20its%20initial%20report%20on,on%20cooperative%20approach%20CA0004%2C%20%E2%80%9CElectrification%20of%20Vanuatu’s>.